Sunday, February 19, 2012



INDEX IN TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                 PAGE NUMBERS

The Case for Review:            

1.  The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC7, Case No. CIV 1689 of 2011: heard 29th August, 2011 and delivered 10/01/2012.
2.  The link:

The Purported Decision:      

3.  Murray J has continuing obligations under the law to discharge his duties as a judge because his Jurisdictional Errors (JEs) had caused His Honour’s duties as a judge not having been fully discharged.  His Honour is thus not ex functus officio..
4.  By virtue of the JEs, Murray’s J judgment is therefore regarded as a Purported Decision[1] only, one which is capable of being judicially reviewed. It is therefore the subject of the  Respondent/Applicant in this application for Judicial Review and Declarative Judgments, pursuant to s. 25(6), 33, 43 and 59 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 (WA) (the Judicial Review).
5.  The common law judicial review by the Supreme Court of Western Australia by way of Prerogative Writs is not available from a judge of the General Division or a Court of Appeal Judge of the Supreme Court of WA against his brother or sister judge of the same rank as himself/herself (the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Powers[2] of the Applicant). 
6.  The Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Powers like Mandamus, Certiorari to the Applicant was discovered by the Applicant through his experimentation with the SEVEN cases below, by way of trial and error.  This is because the reasons for the judgments of each of the SEVEN Prerogative Writ Cases at 126 had expressly EVADED the issues that were before the various courts thereby rendering those decisions NON-RES JUDICATA. BUT for the Heenan’s J decision, in the aftermath of His Honour’s ABOUT-TURN decision on 21.4.2010 and Commissioner Sleight’s and Justice Allanson’s Decisions which indeed explain the rationale for the Non-Availability of the Prerogative Writs to the Applicants, the rest of the SEVEN CASES do not constitute abuse of process of court by the Applicant and therefore they are not appropriate for Murray J to use them as reasons for declaring the Applicant a Vexatious Litigant. These SEVEN CASES are as follows:
6.1. CIV 3086 of 2009 at 20 to 21 by Martin CJ where His Honour uses the epithets “derogatory hypberpole” and “unintelligible” and “incoherent” to dismiss the Applicant’s case: speaks for itself and show some elements of deference[3].  
6.2. CIV 3068 of 2009 at 48 to 50 by Martin CJ – as above.
6.3. CIV1019 of 2010 at 51 to 59 by E M Heenan J who issued Orders to LPCC to show cause.  BUT a fortnight later, His Honour made an ABOUT-TURN and dismissed the case before him.  His Honour was right in refusing the Unavailable Prerogative Remedy by using his discretionary powers to order the LPCC instead of the Regulator to SHOW CAUSE.  For reasons unknown, His Honour changed his mind within a fortnight after issuing the Show Cause Order. His Honour did not need to dismiss the case on procedural grounds (like what Their Honours Newnes and Pullin JJA had misconceivedly done and had thereby inadvertently abused the process of court as they have acted contrary to the law as observed by Kirby J as illustrated in paragraph 5.12 at page 16 of this document in the Table below) but provided for some other remedy.  Consequently, the RIGHT COURSE of justice was interrupted by an act of deference of their Honours. Tenets of justice: impartiality, independence and integrity are therefore reasonably observed to be missing. However, His Honour Justice EM Heenan did honestly and with integrity revealed the unilateral communications he had had with an officer of the Regulator that was reasonably observed to have been pursued for the purpose of interrupting the SHOW CAUSE ORDER.    
6.4. CIV 1877 of 2010 and CIV1981 of 2010 at 126 were later part-heard by E M Heenan J in the aftermath of the ABOUT TURN DECISION (as a result of the Applicant’s complaint to the State Attorney General of WA) in the absence of the Applicant, who had then objected to His Honour’s hearing the case, from afar. The Cases were adjourned sini die and for the first time, the issue of the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders was revealed to the Applicant.  CIV 1877 OF 2010 was finally heard by Commissioner Sleight (the David Taylor’s Case) who took a similar stand to Allanson J (the Tim Thies Case) and both their Honours are very honest as they explained their respective rationale for their decisions.  There seems no Jurisdictional Errors in these two decisions.
6.5. CIV 1604 of 2010 at 43 to 44 by Le Miere J who observed all the tenets of justice but rightly dismissed it on the ground that the matter was not before His Honour.   
6.6. CIV1981 of 2010 at 107 to 110 and 149 to 152 (never been listed before a Judge for hearing at all and it (the application) is the reason for the Principal Registrar to institute legal proceedings in CIV1689 of 2011 against the Applicant to declare him a Vexatious Litigant under s.4 (1)(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act, 2002 (WA) (the Act) and to bar it from being listed ever again. Together came with it, is Murray J’s improper costs order, which is contrary to the policy of public interests litigations. (The subject litigation ruled as vexatious by Murray J concerns the public interests that lawyers do not pillage and plunder their clients and they do not merit Murray J punitive costs orders) The Applicant concedes to CIV1981 of 2010 being barred by Murray J on the sole ground of its non-availability for Prerogative Writ Orders.  This Application is the Second Application for Judicial Review under s.6 of the Act. This First Application for Judicial Review concerns David Taylor, Registrar Powell, Master Sanderson and Owen JA in CACV107 of 2008 and is awaiting approval by the Principal Registrar for filing at the time of writing.    
6.7. CIV 1491 of 2011 by Allanson J at 120 who observed all the tenets of justice and who dismissed it on the ground of the Unavailability of Prerogative Writs.  
7.  Apart from the SEVEN cases, there are two appeal cases to the Court of Appeal:
7.1. CACV41 of 2010 at 60 to 63 heard by Newnes and Pullin JJA who refused to grant Leave to Appeal against E M Heenan J’s decision in CIV1019 of 2010.  As the issue affects the livelihood of the Applicant, the   Leave to Appeal bar imposed by the relevant statute is inappropriate as other jurisdictions in Australia do not impose such a bar.  The bar is reliant on the prospects of success of the case as a condition for the grant of the Leave to Appeal; it is therefore susceptible of abuse because the issue of prospect of success is based on judicial deference or “gracious concession” to certain affected parties of the dispute and it therefore affects the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.  The pillars of justice: independence, impartiality and integrity are therefore being sacrificed for judicial deference.   
7.2. CACV75 of 2010 at 111 to 116 is also heard by Newnes and Pullin JJA about the Leave to Appeal against Ken Martin J in Michelides No.2 or CIV 1903 of 2008 No.2 in relation to the Security Costs Order granted by Ken Martin J in favour of Timothy Robin Thies.  Clearly the rule of law is being flouted for judicial deference.
8.  There is no question of lack of “prospect of success” in terms of the evidence provided below concerning the JEs of Murray J, if both Newnes and Pullin JJA had observed the tenets of justice in terms of impartiality, independence and integrity.  The Table below shows the categories of JEs which impinges on the tenets of justice.   
9.  It’s the judicial deference in so far as it affects the integrity functions of the institution of the Supreme Court of Western Australia[4] that bears relation to the  three principal actors and their wrong doings against the Applicant.  These wrongdoings have not been accepted by the Justices: namely, Mr. Timothy Robin Thies, Mr. Pino Monaco and Mr. David Taylor.  It is this judicial deference as advocated by Chief Justice Spigelman that is preventing the determination of a just solution to all the Applicant’s cases in the judicial system in Western Australian.   
10.       With regard to David Taylor, the wrongdoings of David Taylor is being revealed through President Chaney presiding in the Case of VR158 of 2011 where Maurice Law had subpoenaed David Taylor to provide the bank statement which shows that David Taylor had paid the court fees for CIV1131 of 2006 between the dates of 10.2.2006 and 16.2.2006. The Subpoenaed Evidence provided by David Taylor on 29.11.2011 shown to Maurice Law by SAT on 30.11.2011 and provided copies to Maurice Law on 15.2.2012 shows that Master Sanderson decision in CIV1775 of 2008 and Owen JA decision in CACV107 of 2008 is misconceived.


11.       Order that respondent (Nicholas Ni Kok Chin) is prohibited from instituting any proceedings in any Western Australian court or tribunal without the leave of that court or tribunal.
12.       Order that whole of Supreme Court proceedings CIV 1981 of 2010 of the Respondent are stayed.
13.       Order that the Respondent pay appellant’s costs of the application to be taxed.


The High Court Un-exhaustive List of Jurisdictional Errors[5] ascribed to Justice Murray

14.       The List consists of TEN broad Categories (the Murray J’s Jurisdictional Errors)
(the JEs):
15.       The JEs relate to the Respondent’s written request to the Associate of Murray J copied to the Applicant of this judgment, who is the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of WA and his solicitors, the State Solicitor for the review[6] of the purported decision before the orders of Murray J’s Judgment are perfected (Request for Review of the Purported Decision). 
16.       The Principal Registrar’s responded to the Respondent’s Request for Review of the Purported Decision in his letter dated 31.1.2012 which requires the Respondent either to overturn it or to stay its orders (the Principal Registrar’s Response).
17.       The Respondent’s response to the Principal Registrar’s Response is this Application by way of Originating Motion to a single Judge of the Supreme Court of the Court of Appeal for the Judicial Review for Declarative Judgments[7].





Numerical label of JEs
Description of the Ten Categories of JEs of Justice Murray
THE DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS to Respondent by not taking into account, inter alia the SUMMARY of the RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS as contained in the 16 volumes of complex documents as presented by the Affidavit of Ms. Kah Loh Yee as solicitor for the State Solicitor of WA.


Applica-ble JEs identified by its nos as indicated in table above
Contents of each paragraph of the Purported Decision where JEs have been identified

Description of the JEs: Applicant’s description of what Murray J has done wrong in his purported decision?

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 & 10
7: “The court
records show that on 10 February 2006 (21 days after Jenkins J’s order),
Spunter commenced proceedings (CIV 1131 of 2006) against Nancy Hall,
claiming, by way of relief, a declaration of an equitable interest in the two
8. “On 11 May 2006 the respondent filed a notice of having ceased to act
for Nancy Hall and, on 30 June 2008

11. “The grounds of appeal are confusing and contain references to
unrelated matters, such as a complaint against the respondent before the
Legal Practice Board. Specifically, the respondent states that the Board is
‘tainted by its persecuting malice on the appellant (respondent in these

Murray J (with due respect) shows deference[8] to DAVID TAYLOR:

1.1 At 7 and 8: David Taylor, who wronged the Respondent and his client Nancy Hall by the former making perjurious statements in his Affidavit, sworn 29.3.2007 in CIV1131 of 2006.  This caused the Applicant to avoid having any confrontation with Registrar Powell and to withdraw as solicitor for Nancy Hall because the court through Registrar Powell was reasonably perceived by the Applicant then to be taking sides with David Taylor. As discretion is the better part of his valour, the Applicant decided to avoid confrontation with Registrar Powell (the wrongs of David Taylor);  
1.2. At 8: the LPCC as an independent public body abandoned its public duties by ignoring the wrongs of David Taylor and instead prosecuted the Applicant for no wrongs but on the false pretext that the Applicant is making false allegations against David Taylor. The Applicant’s lawyer independence was suppressed to the prejudice of the rights of his client Nancy Hall who died of grief and frustration because she was not able to seek justice from the justice system of WA (the Dereliction of Duties of the LPCC).
1.3. At 8 and 11: the Pseudo Board of the Regulator, first activated by the former President of the WA Bar Society, Mr. Pino Monaco at 129 was reasonably seen to be plundering and pillaging the Applicant’s client one Dr. Kheng Su Chan.  The Pseudo Board restrained the lawyer independence of the Applicant as a result through the activity of a lawyer Ms. Walter who played two roles in the decision making process and therefore that decision is tainted with bias and illegality: one as a prosecutor at the LPCC and the other as a Committee Member in the Pseudo Board of the Regulator (the Source of the Pseudo Board). 
1.4. At 8 & 11: The wrongs of David Taylor, the Dereliction of Duties of the LPCC and the Source of the Pseudo Board became the subject matters of the Applicant’s Appeal in CACV 43 of 2007 before the then President of the Court of Appeal, Steytler P who entered the Consent Judgment to Set Aside Judge Eckert Decision in VR137 of 2006 between the parties, through the pleas of the Applicant’s counsel, Barrister Tim Stephenson on 26.9.2007
(The Upliftment of the Restraint on the Applicant’s Lawyer Independence Status).
1.5. At 11, the Upliftment of the Restraint on the Applicant’s Lawyer Independence Status met with the disapproval of the Pseudo Board. It re-imposed the Restraint.  This became the subject matter of the Applicant’s Application before the President of SAT Chaney J in VR107 of 2008 or Chin v West Australian Legal Practice Board [2008] WASAT 252. His Honour Justice Chaney took the sides of the Pseudo Board of the Regulator which had improper motives by contradicting the Consent Judgment of the Court of Appeal (Justice Chaney Decision in VR107 of 2008). 
1.6. The Applicant sought leave to appeal Justice Chaney Decision in VR107 of 2008 to the Court of Appeal in CACV 105 of 2008.  Pullins and Newnes JJA denied leave to appeal in Chin v Legal Practitioners Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117 (the CACV 105 of 2008) at 3, and 33 to 42, which is a bar imposed by statute that is both unconscionable and unreasonable and is NOT practiced in other states as it suppresses the independence of the BAR, which is a findings of fact made by Gordon Turriff QC, the President of the British Columbian Bar, whose article is found at the link:
and also at[i]: he extolled on the “The calls for Change to the Legal System suppressing the Independence of the BAR”[ii] at .
See For example, solicitors taking far more in fees than the miners received in compensation
1.7. Other jurisdictions in Australia do not have such statutory bar   because it effectively bars a person from accessing his livelihood for life. It is a prison sentence for no wrongs.    
1.8. The High Court of Australia refused the Applicant’s Special Leave to Appeal the CACV105 of 2008 decision in P36 of 2009 at 40, BUT it gave the Applicant the pointer that the Applicant must work on the issue of the CREDIBILITY of Justice Chaney (the Chaney Credibility).     
1.9.  It must be remembered the Lawyer and those Honourable Judges who took the Applicant’s Lawyers Independence have been former President of the WA Bar Society, namely: Pino Mr. Monaco,  Her Honour Judge Eckert in VR137 of 2006, His Honour Justice Chaney in VR107 of 2008, His Honour Ken Martin J in Michelides No.2 (the WA Bar Society Hidden Policy).

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 & 10
9. “On 29 October 2008, Master
Sanderson granted Ms Hall’s summary judgment application in Audrey
Frances Hall as executrix of the estate of Kenneth Duncan Hall v Chin
[2008] WASC 255.”
17. “The taxing officer then signed a certificate and, pursuant to O 66
r 57, the costs so certified are deemed to be a judgment of the court and
recoverable accordingly.”
12. “The grounds further contained reference to matter CIV 1131 of 2006,
heard by Jenkins J, and the judgment of Simmonds J in Spunter Pty Ltd v
Hall [No 2] [2007] WASC 239.”
13. “Amended Grounds of Appeal were filed by the respondent on 15 January 2009. They appear not to have been substantively changed. A
further minute of amended grounds of appeal was filed on 23 January
2009, pursuant to the order of Pullin JA. These grounds of appeal were
significantly shorter.”
23. “On 26 May 2010 the High Court refused the respondent’s application
for special leave and reasons were published in Nicholas Ni Kok Chin v
Audrey Frances Hall as executrix of the estate of Kenneth Duncan Hall
& Ors [2010] HCASL 104”


2.1. At 9, the learned Registrar Powell as a public officer and a Supreme Court Registrar in charge of court records in CIV1131 of 2006 and CIV1142 of 2005, is more than likely to have falsified those court records by planting evidence into the former file: that the Writ of Summons in CIV1131 of 2006 was deposited into the court Registry at the same time when the fictitious court fees of $654.00 (being short of 20 cents) was paid by David Taylor by cheque on 10.2.2006 (the Falsehood).
2.2. The Falsehood is accomplished by a legal fiction concocted by Registrar Powell of a shortfall of 20 cents in the impugned court fees (the Shortfall).
2.3. The Shortfall is remedied by an imputed credit card payment not on 10.2.2006 or the date of the commencement of the action in compliance with Jenkin’s J Order dated 19.1.2006 in CIV1142 of 2005 but on 16.2.2006 (the Feigned Compliance).
2.4. The latest evidence of the Feigned Compliance compelled by the subpoena of Maurice Law to David Taylor pursuant to the Order of Chaney J in VR158 of 2011 on 29.11.2011 confirms that Registrar Powell planted the evidence to protect his friend David Taylor (the Planted Evidence).
2.5. At 9 & 12:  the Planted Evidence is not being tallied by the perjurious Affidavit of David Taylor filed 29.3.2007 in CIV 1131 of 2006 because the latter refers to the existence of the purported SC false receipt for the payment of the impugned court fees of $654.20 on 10.2.2006 instead of the partial payment of $654.00 made on 10.2.2006 first and then the later payment of the Shortfall made subsequently by David Taylor on 16.2.2006 in accordance with the Planted Evidence (No Tally).
2.6. Despite the evidence of the Falsehood, the Shortfall, the Feigned Compliance and the No Tally which accompanies the Complaint of the Applicant to the LPCC with David Taylor having been notified resulting in the abdication of the Applicant from participating further in CIV1142 of 2005 No.1, David Taylor did persist with his deceptive and misleading conduct before Simmonds J in the ongoing proceedings in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2 with Nancy Hall as the litigant in person. (Nancy Hall is a vulnerable person who has a history of psychiatric morbidity.  She finally lost her estate in a false claim by Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall in CIV 2073 of 2003 in the sum of $2.3m.) (the Fraud of David Taylor).
2.7.  The Planted Evidence is the letter written by Registrar Powell  dated 11.6.2009 found at page 136 of the Yellow Appeal Book in CACV 107 of 2008 which is the Fresh Evidence that was misconceived and rejected by Owen JA on 9.12.2009 in CACV107 of 2008 (the Fresh Evidence before Owen JA).
2.8. At 11, 12, 13 and 17: Registrar Powell is the architect for the wrongful costs orders of Master Sanderson against both the Applicant and Maurice Law and the wrongful cost order of Owen JA in CACV107 of 2008 against the Applicant only, by virtue of his (Registrar Pwell’s) involvement with David Taylor in CIV1142 of 2005 No.1, leading up to the Planted Evidence on 11.6.2009 (Registrar Powell as the Architect of the Wrongful Costs Orders).
2.9. The facts of Registrar Powell as the Architect had been notified to him by both Maurice Law and the Applicant BUT the learned Registrar continued his role as the Taxation Master for those unlawful costs orders. If, there were integrity in his role as a court officer, he would be able to see the NEXUS between the Applicant’s solicitor’s work for Nancy Hall and the Removal of the Spunter Pty Ltd’s Caveats (Registrar Powell’s Personal Interests).
2.10.. See the transcript of the proceedings before Registrar Powell as the Taxation Master for the unlawful costs orders against Maurice Law and the Applicant together with the Applicant’s three comments dated 11.1.2011at the link: See also the Applicant’s Notice of Objections to Registrar Powell dated 9.11.2010 when Registrar Powell is a JUDGE OF HIS OWN CAUSE at the link:
(Notification to Registrar Powell).
2.11. The Nexus would have stopped Nancy’s Estate from being robbed by through a fictitious claim of $2.3m by Mrs. Audrey Hall. The fictitious claim was exchanged for $702k by Michele-Maree Gannaway as evidenced in CIV 2157 of 2011 before Simmonds J. Mrs. Gannaway through her solicitor Mr. C.P. Stokes provided a letter to Maurice Law dated 14.7.2008 stating that no money changed hands for that fictitious mortgage which was relied upon by Mrs. Audrey Hall to obtain that fictitious $2.3m Claim approved by Her Honour Jenkins J. The Nexus is the pointer of the High Court in P1 of 2010 or Hall & Ors [2010] HCASL 104 at 22 and 23, given to the Applicant  as a result of his Application for Special Leave to Appeal the CACV107 of 2008 (The Nexus).
 2.12. J. Nancy Hall’s creditors in the persons of the Applicant as the former s.244 LPA salvour of her estate in CIV1142 of 2005 and CIV1131 of 2006 and Maurice Law of Spunter Pty Ltd in CIV2509 of 2002 have been short-changed as a result. (Master Sanderson Unlawful Costs Orders).


1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 & 10

15. “On 19 June 2009, the respondent sought to adduce new and fresh
evidence in affidavit form and, on 9 December 2009, the appeal was
dismissed: Chin v Hall [2009] WASCA 216 (McLure P, Owen JA &
Buss JA). The respondent was further ordered to pay costs to be taxed.”


3.1. At 15 and 17: Owen JA in CACV107 of 2008 showed deference to Registrar Powell and David Taylor by evading the issues of the fresh evidence of the Falsified Court Records of David Taylor and Registrar Powell (the Rejection of the Fresh Evidence). 
3.2. The rejection of the Fresh Evidence has no legal basis on the facts and the law of the case as the learned Justice contradicted himself (the Self-contradiction of Owen JA ).
3.3. The Self-Contradiction of Owen JA is explained by the Application in his fourteen comments at the following link dated 20.6.2011:
(the Facts of the Planted Evidence by Registrar Powell).

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 & 10
19 The respondent filed an affidavit in support which Pullin JA found was simply an attempt to re-argue matters argued in the Court of Appeal. The application was dismissed and his Honour stated (Newnes JA agreeing) that:
“The Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) states that special circumstances have to be shown before a suspension order may be granted: s 15(3). The principles in Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson[2003] WASCA 307; (2003) 28 WAR 308 apply where a person is appealing against a judgment. In this case, there is no appeal against the decision; those appeal rights having been exhausted. There is no reason to suspend the judgment of the court, no special circumstances have been shown, and the application should be dismissed [8].
26. “The motion was re-listed and heard by Commissioner Sleight on 4 April 2011 and, on 15 June 2011, it was dismissed: Re Hall; Ex Parte Chin [No 2].”


4.1. At: 26: This case must not be confused with Commissioner Sleight’s Decision in RE HALL; EX PARTE CHIN [No 2] [2011] WASC 155 heard 4.4.2011 DELIVERED 15.6.2011.  His Honour Commissioner Sleight is honest and gets to the truth of the matter. He does not avoid the issues but he wants the Applicant to start suing David Taylor.  Maurice Law’s decision to issue a Subpoena to David Taylor in VR158 of 2011 before the President of SAT, Justice Chaney is another effective way of getting at the evidence of the Falsification of the Court Records (Commissioner Sleight’s Honest Decision).
4.2. At 19, their Honours Pullin and Newnes JJA are in jurisdictional errors when they stated that the Applicant is trying to re-argue matters on the following grounds (the Ten Grounds): (Compare with Commissioner Sleight Honest Decision at 26.)
·        The fraud of David Taylor.
·        Master Sanderson Wrongful Costs Orders.
·        The Fresh Evidence before Owen JA.
·        The Rejection of the Fresh Evidence by Owen JA.
·        .The Nexus.
·        Registrar Powell’s Personal Interests.
·        Registrar Powell as the Architect of the Wrongful Costs Orders.
·        The Notification to Registrar Powell.
·        The Self-Contradiction of Owen JA.
·        The Facts of the Planted Evidence by Registrar Powell.
4.3. The Ten grounds above are never the issues that were decided by Owen JA and they therefore are not barred by the principle of res judicata to be heard again in this Application (No Res Judicata). .
4.4. The Ten Grounds formed the Special Circumstances for the Suspension of the Unlawful Cost Orders of Master Sanderson and Owen JA pursuant to s.15 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Acts, 2004 WA (Grounds for the Suspension Orders). 
4.5. As a result of the complaint of the Applicant to the State Attorney General of WA, those unlawful Costs Orders are never being executed till today. This shows that even the opposing parties who are the beneficiaries of those Unlawful Costs Orders are recognizing the legal arguments of the Applicant which have been presented before their Honours Pullin and Newnes JJA and who have not accepted them.  But those arguments are being accepted by those opposing parties who are learned in the law. This is a strange truth (TRUTHS ENDURE ALL KINDS OF ADVERSITY). 
4.6.  Although the appeal rights of the Applicant and Maurice Law have been exhausted, the Errors Apparent on the Court Records will not go away and they MUST NOT remain for posterity to see that the Judicial System of Western Australia is not functioning at all (COURTS MUST UNRAVEL FRAUD AND STRIKE OFF ERRORS ON THE COURT RECORDS)..
4.7.  Posterity DOES REQUIRE that the Jurisdictional Errors of Their Honours be corrected.
4.8. The authority for the Jurisdictional Errors in Australia is to be found in the two treatises written by the learned Chief Justice of New South Wales, His Honour James Spigelman AC at the links provided at 1,3, 4 and 5 and they are entitled:
4.9. On 8.2.2012, Maurice Law and the Applicant made their First Joint Application in CIV 2157 of 2011 pursuant to s.6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act, 2002 with respect to a 10 page Notice of Originating Motion dated 7.2.2012. 
4.10. The Application is for the Judicial Review and Declarative Judgments pursuant to ss.25(6), 33, 43 and 59 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 of the Jurisdictional Errors of Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008, Owen JA in CACV 107 of 2008, Simmonds J in CIV 2157 of 2011 and DCJ Sweeney in DC CIV 2509 of 2002.
4.11. The Application is supported by a Joint Affidavit sworn by Maurice Law and the Applicant sworn 23.1.2012 of 95 pages. The matter is awaiting approval by the Principal Registrar
(the First Application of the Applicant filed pursuant to s.6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act, 2002 WA)   

IN CHIN -v- HALL [No 2] [2011] WASCA 96 (the Suspension Cost Orders).

1. At 19: Despite the Fraud of David Taylor, Registrar Powell’s Personal Interests, the Notifications to Registrar Powell, the Nexus, Master Sanderson’s Unlawful Costs Orders, the Rejection of the Fresh Evidence and the Self-Contradiction of Owen JA, their Honours in Pullin and Newnes JJA rejected the Applicant’s Application for the Suspension Costs Orders.  But as a result of the complaint by the Applicant to the State Attorney General of WA, there was never any enforcement of those unlawful costs orders of both Master Sanderson and Owen JA.

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 & 10
21. “On 22 December 2009, the matter was heard before Martin CJ, who
rejected the application and gave an ex tempore decision. In doing so he
described the grounds upon which relief was sought as being ‘incoherent
and unintelligible’.
27. “The fact that Mr Chin’s application does not comply with the Rules
of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) and the Supreme Court Common
Forms is indicative of the fact that Mr Chin’s application is misconceived, as pointed out by EM Heenan J on 4 August 2010, when Mr Chin’s
application first came before the court.”

28 The background to the imposition of conditions on the respondent’s practice certificate begins with the respondent’s admission as a legal practitioner in Western Australia on 19 December 2003. In mid 2006, he became the subject of an investigation by the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and, on 19 July 2006, the Board, by its professional affairs committee, resolved to impose conditions upon the applicant’s practice certificate pursuant to s 40(3) of the LP Act.

31 On 25 September 2008, the application was heard by the SAT. At this hearing the respondent raised a number of issues in oral submissions, including the suggestion that ‘the Board’s conduct was motivated by racial prejudice’. But the SAT ruled that there was ‘no apparent foundation for that serious allegation’.

32 On 28 October 2008, the respondent’s application was dismissed, with the SAT confirming the Board’s decision: Chin v West Australian Legal Practice Board [2008] WASAT 252. The decision of the SAT upheld a number of conclusions reached by the Board; and stated that [at 84]:
Where the public interest and the maintenance of appropriate professional standards require a particular course of action, that requirement must outweigh the personal interests of the practitioner concerned. That is the case here.


5.1. At 21. Also at 48 to 50: The Applicant objected to the fact that His Honour the Chief Justice of WA Wayne Martin QC was quoted to have said that the relief sought by the Respondent was being “unintelligible and incoherent”. 
5.2. The records of the proceedings do indicate that His Honour misconceived the relief being sought by the Applicant.  Therefore the reason for the dismissal is one of the JEs except for the fact of unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders.
5.3.   The real reason for the dismissal of that application is the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders as enunciated by Heenan J, Commissioner Sleight and Allanson J and the possible deference to the parties concerned by the Chief Justice of WA.  



5.4. The Applicant is unaware of the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders until it was first explained by Heenan J.  At 26 and 27: Murray J refers to the judgment of the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders Case of RE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EX PARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 212, heard and delivered 4.8.2010 by E M Heenan J (the Inchoate Decision) 
5.5. This concept of the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders was definitively explained by Commissioner Sleight on 15.6.2011 in CIV1877 of 2010 when the learned Commissioner completed one of the Inchoate Cases left behind by Heenan J.  This other task is never complete till today but by extension, Allanson J in CIV 1491 of 2011 (heard the Thies’ Case on after the High Court refusal of Special Leave and giving the cue to the Applicant that the Security Costs Order of Ken Martin J being made after the Grant of the S.36 Review by Hasluck J is improper followed by Register Wallace’s Order to Put Back the Horse after Cart by paying the Security Costs Payment in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008) of 11.5.2011 (The Date of Demarcation).  .
5.6. Before and after the Date of Demarcation, the Applicant did not commit any acts whether intentionally or unintentionally that can be legally construed as being involved in Vexatious Proceedings as a Vexatious Litigant that meet its definition as contained in s.3 of the Act (the Non-Vexatious Conduct of the Applicant).  


5.7. At 26 and 27: The Inchoate Decision involves His Honour’s fellow Judge Ken Martin J, which His Honour is reasonably seen to be giving deference to.  It is inchoate because it was heard in the absence of the Applicant and it was adjourned sini die.  Commissioner Sleight was to later complete the judgment in CIV1877 of 2010 on 15.6.2011 whereas CIV1981 of 2010 concerns the biased decision of the learned Justice Ken Martin who obstructed justice against the Applicant in respect of the wrongdoings of Timothy Robin Thies.  The latter was pillaging and plundering the Applicant and his son Paul. The LPCC took sides as with David Taylor. The latter case is the subject of Murray J Order in CIV1689 of 2011 banishing it from ever being heard again (the Obstruction of Justice to the Applicant).
5.8. At 28 and 31: There are only FOUR ISSUES that caused the Restraint of Lawyer Independence of the Applicant by the Regulator:
5.8.1.. The David Taylor or CACV107 of 2008 or Master Sanderson and Registrar Powell Issue.
5.8.2.. The Timothy Robin Thies pillaging and plundering the Applicant and his son Paul.
5.8.3. The Pino Monaco plundering and pillaging Dr. Kheng Su Chan that gave rise to the Pseudo Board.
5.8.4. The President Steytler Consent Judgment in CACV43 of 2007 that was ignored by the Pseudo Board.
 5.9. At 26, 27, 28 and 31. See also CACV105 of 2008 at 3, 33, 41.


5.10. His Honour Justice EM Heenan had first heard the case of CIV1019 of 2010 or RE PRESIDENT OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (SAT), JUSTICE CHANEY; EX PARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 89 on 21.4.2010.  Two weeks before that date, His Honour had issued Orders to the LPCC and the Regulator requesting them to SHOW CAUSE why they have persecuted the Applicant and took away his LAWYER INDEPENDENCE. As a result of secret communications transpiring between His Honour and the Regulator, His Honour made an ABOUT-TURN decision on 21.4.2010 by dismissing the Applicant’s Case for Certiorari against his fellow judge, His Honour the President of SAT, Justice Chaney (the ABOUT-TURN decision).
5.11. At 26, 27, 28 & 31: As a consequence of the About Turn Decision, the Applicant protested against His Honour E M Heenan’s Inchoate Decision.  Again, the element of DEFERENCE is again clear to the public eye (the Deference of EM Heenan J).


5.12. At 27, 28 and 31. See also CIV 1604 OF 2010 at 43 to 47 and 132 to 143: Kirby J in Re Attorney General (Commonwealth); ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321 at 323 expressed CAUTION in relation to declaring a person a VEXATIOUS LITIGANT and to DISMISS the Applicant’s case on the basis of PROCEDURAL ERROR at 131, in the following words:
“First, it is always important for every Judge to keep an open mind in case a person who has been rejected by courts in the past may have, hidden amongst the verbiage of his or her arguments, a point which has not been previously seen and which may have merit. Vigilance, and not impatience, are specifically required where that person is not legally represented; secondly, it is regarded as a serious thing in this country to keep a person out of the courts. The rule of law requires that, ordinarily, a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. It is a rare thing to declare a person a vexatious litigant. It is extremely rare in this Court to use the power, whether under the inherent power or ..... to require leave before a person may commence proceedings invoking the court’s jurisdiction; thirdly, the court must never shy away from the determination of a point sought to be argued simply because it may have major ramifications. ..... I should not be reluctant to provide relief on the legal grounds ... simply because to provide relief would be to attack both the banking and taxation and other economic systems of this country. The history of this Court since its establishment in 1903, including recently, has shown that the court does not refrain from offering relief where the law requires it simply because its decisions may have large consequences for the nation or particular interests in it; fourthly, ... seeking relief by way of the writs of certiorari and mandamus.  It is not necessary for me, in the decision which I have arrived at, to determine whether they are in each case, or in any of the cases, the appropriate process of the court to invoke its jurisdiction. .... today unrepresented. If he had commenced proceedings by an irregular process which had any separate or different merit from the matters which have already been determined by the court, I would endeavour to assist him to get such proceedings into proper form or require him to commence again in proper form. I would not dispose of his application upon such a formal basis; ...


5.13. At 32: His Honour the President of SAT, Chaney J is biased in the following terms:
5.13.1. The public interests that SAT must protect are:
5.13.2.  the lawyer independence of the Applicant in particular and the lawyer independence of all lawyers in Western Australia in accordance with the findings of fact by Gordon Turriff Q.C., the President of the British Columbia BAR.
5.13.3. the independence of lawyers must be preserved in WA in particular for the Applicant so that his client should be able to seek justice in accordance with the law.
5.13.4. Just as the independence of the judiciary is being preserved, it must not be so preserved to the prejudice of lawyer independence.
5.13.5. Lawyers in WA like David Taylor and Timothy Robin Thies must be ethical in practice and disciplinary action must not discriminate one lawyers against another just because they are cronies – Cronyism must not be practiced in the discipline of the members of the legal profession.
5.13.6. Cronyism is seen to be practiced by the Regulator because some members of the Regulator did not conform to rules or were reasonably seen to be flouting the rules and to make biased decisions which are tainted with illegality to the detriment of the Applicant.


5.14. Public interests litigation carried out by the Applicant for the sake of seeking justice for his clients should not be punished with intimidatory costs orders that have no reasonable basis of being enforced at law.  


1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 & 10
33 Reference was also made to comments made by the respondent to the Board, specifically in relation to a judgment by Jenkins J in an appeal against a criminal conviction where the respondent to this matter had represented the applicant. The respondent said:
It is my personal belief that (the client) would have won his appeal on the following grounds:
(a) If the appeal judge hearing his case had been a man instead of a woman, Mr Powell would have gained (sic) more sympathy from a man who would understand a man’s problem instead of a woman who is simply not equipped to understand a man’s problem [71].
The judgment of the SAT described this as demonstrating an ‘extraordinary and illogical prejudice’ [74].


6.1.At 33: The Applicant does not understand why there is a persistent reference to Her Honour Jenkin’s J that mars the character of the Applicant: the inadvertent remarks referred to as an “extraordinary logic” is a triviality that should not have been harped upon if one were to have regard to how it came about (the Jenkin’s Remarks).

6.2. At 33: The Jenkin’s remarks stems from persistent questioning of the Applicant by officials of the LPCC that was out to fish in troubled waters and were looking for misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct of the Applicant within the haystack of the files they seized from the office of the Applicant without receiving any complaints from members of the public except for the complaint of Pino Monaco who wanted to cover his own fault through Ms. Walter (the Fishing Expedition of the LPCC).

6.3. At 33: The Applicant admits that it is a mistake to make such a remark but he was confused when his client one Mr. Powell’s appeal against drug conviction was unsuccessful (not Registrar David Powell).  It was a remark expressed honestly but without derision of the decision making process which concerns an innocent client who had been harassed by the police (Honest Mistake of the Applicant).

6.4. At 33: the hidden motives of the LPCC involving the creation of the Jenkin’s Remarks, the Fishing Expedition of the LPCC and the Honest Mistake of the Applicant is to stop the legal representation of the Applicant’s vulnerable client one Ms. Nancy Hall who is a vulnerable person afflicted with psychiatric morbidity who was always troubling the Applicant as an honest lawyer because she could not find one more honest than the Applicant. Events has so transpired, which the Applicant was unaware during the lifetime of Nancy Hall that she is possessed of considerable wealth that was worthy to be defrauded of, until after her death on 13.1.2008.  Sure enough, she was defrauded of $2.3m in front of the eyes of the lawyer she had trusted and the people responsible for it, are getting away with it (the Victimization of Nancy Hall).


6.5. The Victimization of Nancy Hall resulted in a fictitious claim lodged by Mrs. Audrey Hall, the widow of Nancy Hall’s brother one Kenneth Duncan Hall who has never in his lifetime admitted to any debts owing by Nancy Hall to her brother.

6.6. Her Honour Jenkins J gave judgment to Audrey Hall in the sum of $2.3m based on a fictitious mortgage claim in AUDREY FRANCES HALL As Executrix of the Will of KENNETH DUNCAN HALL (DEC) -v- HALL [2007] WASC 34 ON 18.2.2007.  This happened during the time when the Applicant was prevented by David Taylor’s FALSIFICATION OF COURT DOCUMENTS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006 through the LPCC from protecting his client Nancy Hall.  The unjustified taking away of the lawyer independence of the Applicant caused Nancy Hall estate to be defrauded by Mrs. Audrey Hall (the Fraud of Audrey Hall).

6.7. All those events relating to Pino Monaco, the Pseudo Board, the Wrongs of David Taylor, the Falsification of Court Records by Registrar Powell, the Rejection of the Fresh Evidence by Owen JA, the Wrongful Costs Orders of Master Sanderson, the misleading conduct of David Taylor before His Honour Simmonds J in CIV1142 of 2005 No.2 and the Removal of the New Caveats of Maurice Law and the Applicant from part of Nancy Hall estate by her daughter Mrs. Michele-Maree GANNAWAY in CIV2157 of 2011 resulted in the legitimate creditors of the Estate of Nancy Hall, namely Mr. Maurice Law and the Applicant being defrauded.  All those events works synergistically at the connivance of the LPCC and the Regulator which caused the injustice to the Applicant and to Maurice Law, whose interests were conflicting at the start but they do not conflict anymore after the 10.2.2006 when David Taylor defrauded the court and caused the equity of Nancy Hall Properties to become fraudulently clogged up thus preventing her carrying out her scheduled business ventures.  She died a frustrated person but she kept reminding the Applicant to work for her after her death (the Synergetic Effects of David Taylor’s Wrongdoings). 

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 &10.
45. The Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC) brought disciplinary proceedings against the respondent on 30 June 2009. The proceedings involved an allegation that the respondent’s conduct amounted to professional misconduct, and orders were sought under s 438, s 439 or s 441 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).


7.1. At. 45, 46 and 47: LPCC through the Regulator restrained the Applicant’s Lawyer independence in July 2006.  The Applicant made an application in VR137 of 2006 to Judge Eckert of SAT who confirmed the Restraint but decided that there was NO professional misconduct or unsatisfactory but ONLY deficiency of professional knowledge, as justification for the Restraint on 12.9.2006. 
7.2. The Restraint was set aside by Steytler P in CACV 43 of 2007 on 26.9.2007. So there is no longer any Restraint. The Pseudo Board refused to return the Applicant to his original position. Then the Applicant applied to SAT President Chaney in VR107 of 2008 who confirmed Judge Eckert’s Decision. 
7.3. The matter then went to the Court of Appeal for Leave to Appeal which was refused and then happened the SEVEN Prerogative Writs litigation and finally the three matters concerning the THREE MAIN ACTORS went to the High Court for Special Leave.  But the High Court does not usually grant leave BUT it gave eupheministic hints on how the Applicant could work solutions to this case.  Those pointers of the High Court in relation to David Taylor is the NEXUS, in relation to THIES is the CART before the HORSE, and in relation to the Monaco or Pseudo Board is CREDIBILITY of Justice Chaney.
7.4. LPCC then commenced VR87 of 2009 on 30.6.2009 on the same RES JUDICIATA issues already decided by Judge Eckert in VR137 of 2006 and the CONSENT JUDGMENT of Justice Steytler in CACV 43 of 2007. At 45 and 46, His Honour Justice Chaney decided that there is NO RES JUDICATA in Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Chin [2009] WASAT 219.
This is against the Henderson v Henderson principle[9] that you cannot re-litigate issues that have already been litigated just because you forgot to mention Misconduct or Unsatisfactory Conduct at the first proceedings before Judge Eckert in VR137 of 2006.  In fact Her Honour Judge Eckert stated clearly that the Applicant is NOT GUILTY OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT and UNSATISFACTORY conduct. There is no way this case cannot be barred by the principle of Res Judicata. .
7.5. The President of SAT who already decided on the issue in VR 107 of 2008 and therefore is in conflict of interests, nevertheless came back to say that VR87 of 2009 is not res judicata, despite the VEHEMENCE OF PROTESTATIONS BY THE APPLICANT AS EVIDENCED BY THE CORRESPONDENCE.  This resulted in His Honour abdicating from hearing the case of VR 87 of 2009 to its conclusion.  So the matter came before the Deputy President Judge Sharp who heard it on 11.10.2011 and His Honour has since applied for an extension of a total of 150 days to deliver the reserved judgment.  His Honour is making efforts of trying to be far but the odds are overwhelming as is being reasonably perceived by the Applicant.

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 &10
118 The respondent referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal as a ‘travesty of justice’. The language contained in the application was often emotive, obscure and irrelevant, including phrases like, ‘I humbly say that the courts below know that although the sense of moral values may differ between different societies, morality here means justice and fair play and being able to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong.’ The application continued in this vein for 13 pages.
68 On 11 December 1986, Mr Thies lodged a caveat against the son’s property on the basis of cl 18 of the written retainer by which the son agreed to charge his property with payment of the fees. The respondent’s son caused a notice under s 138B of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) to be issued. Mr Thies then commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The caveat was extended by Templeman J in CIV 1112 of 2007, subject to Mr Thies commencing an action in the Magistrates Court to recover the alleged debt.
81 At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Musk gave ex tempore reasons. In her reasons she described the respondent’s claim as ‘misguided’ and ‘improper’ rather then ‘vexatious or frivolous’. Her Honour ordered that the respondent’s application for default judgment be dismissed; the whole of the respondent’s case be struck out pursuant to s.7(1)(e) Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (CPA) on the basis that it was improper; and the respondent’s claim be summarily dismissed under s 18 CPA. The respondent was further ordered to pay Mr Thies’ costs of the application and the action to be taxed if not agreed, and an order was made pursuant to s 31(3)(b) CPA in relation to all or any professional costs incurred by Mr Thies in this matter, on the basis that the unsuccessful party’s claim was wholly without merit.


8.1.At 118: This is a 60-page Ex-parte Application for Judicial Review and for Declarative Judgments etc., pursuant to s.25(6), 33, 43 and 59 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA.  It is in regard the Removal of the Errors of Law Apparent on the Court Records and the Jurisdictional Errors of His Honour Ken Martin J in CIV1903 of 2008 No.2 and CIV1112 of 2007 and CIV1981 of 2010 (which had never been listed for hearing and is the matter debarred by Murray Jin CIV1689 of 2011).  It is a 7 page Notice of Motion filed in CIV3427 of 2011 dated 19.12.2011 with an Affidavit in Support of 76 pages.  Because it was filed before Murray’s J decision in CIV 1689 of 2011 on 11.1.2012, there is no requirement for it to be filed pursuant to s.6 of the Act (The First Judicial Review). 
8.2. The First Judicial Review is in the post-Unavailability of Prerogative Writs Era.  It is filed at the suggestion of the Principal Registrar that the Thies Matter will go stale if nothing is done about it within a limited time-frame. It is now listed for a Special Appointment on 26th June, 2012 at 10.30 am.  It is involved with the issue of Institutional Integrity of the Supreme Court of WA and it also concerns Registrar Wallace voluntary Security Costs Order to use the $100.00 the Applicant paid as security for Appeal No.6 of 2008 in January, 2008 that was heard and dismissed by Commissioner Herron for which there is an extant improper costs order.  The Applicant objected to this attempt at the regularization of the irregular as a result of the pointer of the High Court Refusal of Special Leave to Appeal in P50 of 2010 as is evidenced by the letters of the Applicant to the Chief Judge of the District Court of WA His Honour Judge Martino. It’s the principle behind this unwarranted payment that is reasonably perceived by the Applicant, activated by Unseen Hands to regularize the discordance decision of Ken Martin J in Michelides No.2 and Commissioner Herron in DCAppeal No.6 of 2008 (The First Judicial Review exempted from Leave under s.6 of the Act).  


8.2 At: 111 to 116: Indeed, there is the misconceived interference with the due process of justice through the deference given to Pullin and Newnes JJA and Ken Martin J in dealing with CACV 75 of 2010. This is the Leave to Appeal to Newnes and Pullin JJA of the Court of Appeal from Michelides No.2.  Again, it unlawfully denies the Applicant his natural justice by the unconscionable statutory bar that inhibits the livelihood of the Applicant (Second Leave to Appeal Denied).
8.2. At 117 to 119: In the aftermath of the Second Leave to Appeal Denied, the High Court Special Leave Denial in P50 of 2010 that followed it is then followed up by another Unavailable Prerogative Writ Application by the Applicant before His Honour Justice Allanson in CIV 1491 of 2011 on 11.5.2010. This Application concerns the obstruction of justice by Ken Martin J in the Security Costs Order of Michelides No.2 dated 8.7.2010 that followed the CIV1903 of 2008 No.1 or Re Michelides; Ex parte Chin [2008] WASC 256 of Justice Hasluck dated 7.11.2008. Ken Martin J knows that that he could not reverse the s.36 Review Order of Hasluck J because there were no justifying circumstances for his doing so.  Therefore, the only way out for Mr. Thies is to grant him the obstruction of justice Security Costs Order that does not comply with facts of the case and the applicable laws. Allanson J is honest in the dismissal of Unavailable Prerogative Writ Application (the Allanson’s J Dismissal).  
8.2.1. Hasluck J s.36 Review Order stayed the JEs of Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2007 who denied the Applicant’s his natural justice by refusing his Summary Judgment Application with Her Honour unwarranted Justifications that it is improper pursuant to s. 17(e) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 WA which only allows such a dismissal provided it is frivolous and vexatious.   Her Honour took the trouble to explain to the Applicant that his Application for Summary Judgment is improper or misguided without being frivolous and vexatious at the same time.  This is an example of extraordinary logic which Her Honour could not justify (the Wrongful Dismissal of Magistrate Musk SM).
8.2.2. Hasluck J s.36 Review Order also stayed the JEs of Magistrate Michelides who decided on the appeal of the Applicant from the DURESS-VITIATED CONSENT JUDGMENT entered into between the APPLICANT and MR. THIES on the belated date of 7.6.2007 after THE WRITTEN CONSENT PAPERS WERE FILED ON 15.4.2007. The delay by the learned Registrar Wilde in entering that Consent Judment only on 7.6.2007 is caused by the doubts created in the learned Registrar’s mind as to whether there is consensus ad idem to that Consent Judgment (The Doubt in Registrar Wilde’s Mind).
8.2.3. The Doubt in Registrar’s Wilde’s Mind in FR417 of 2007  is the result of her receipt of constant correspondence that passed between the parties about the Involuntariness of the Applicant and his son Paul as the party who was being threatened with ever-escalating costs of $2,000.00 per week after the legal services of Timothy Robin Thies had been terminated by the Applicant and his son since the 21.2.2005 as indicated in the correspondence found at pages 24 and 25 of the Applicant’s Appeal Book filed in DCA6 of 2008 dated 17.4.2008 (the Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment).
8.2.4. The Wrongful Dismissal of Musk SM was appealed to District Court Appeal No.6 of 2008 and was heard by Commissioner Herron.  His Honour admits that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of FR944 of 2007 that concerns the Duress Vitiated Consent Judgment of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007 which should have been appealed to Magistrate Michelides beforehand before the FR944 of 2008 is appealed to the District Court.  This is because a Registrar’s Decision must follow the pecking order of appeal to a Magistrate first before it can be appealed to the District Court. Yet, Commissioner Herron decided against the issue of the Duress-Vitiated Consent Order (the Non-Jurisdictional Decision of Commissioner Herron).  
8.3. The Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment is exacerbated by the fact that Timothy Robin Thies was seen to be reneging on the terms of his solicitors costs Agreement entered into between himself and Paul and the Applicant dated 3.11.2004 found at pages 11 to 14 of the Appeal Book that is set by the pre-contractual terms dated 25.10.2004 found at pages 1 to 3 of the Appeal Book (the Solicitor Costs Agreement).  
 8.4 Magistrates Michelides dismissal of the Applicant’s Appeal of the Duress-Vitiated Registrar Wilde’s Consent Judgment is the result of His Honour refusing to take into account the Wrongful Dismissal of Musk SM, the Doubt in Registrar’s Wilde Mind, the Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment, The Solicitor Costs Agreement, and the Non-Jurisdictional Decision of Commissioner Herron (the Wrongful Decision of Michelides SM).   
8.9. Hasluck J decision is not based on Commissioner Herron’s Appeal Decision of DC No. 6 of 2008 but on the s.36 Review of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 which replaced the Prerogative Writ of Certiorari.  The s.36 Review Order of Hasluck J therefore has NO jurisdiction over Commissioner Herron’s Non-Jurisdictional Decision in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 Decision and therefore cannot set it aside but the former Decision stayed the Musk and Michelides Decision. By virtue of the non-jurisdictional nature of Commissioner Herron’s decision, it is therefore a void decision that has no legal effect and cannot be enforced in any court of law (the Void Decision of Commissioner Herron).    
8.10. His Honour Martin J forbodes an intention in Michelides No.2 in the aftermath of Michelides No.1 of Hasluck J to reverse the latter case and to obstruct the justice for the Applicant, for which there are no justifiying circumstances as required by the common law in place.  His Honour is aware of this impossibility by His Honour’s conduct as displayed in the transcripts of the proceedings and his Honour’s decision in the Unlawful Caveats Case which Timothy Robin Thies held as a weapon of ransom for imposing the threats of the Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment upon the Applicant and his son Paul.  The CIV1981 of 2011 contains all the evidentiary material which shows conclusively the biased conduct of Ken Martin J. Michlides No.2 was appealed to the Court of Appeal and to the High Court for Special Leave (the Biased Conduct of Ken Martin J).   
8.3. The Pointers of the High Court is that the CART of Security Costs Order of His Honour Ken Martin J must not be placed before the HORSE of the Grant of the s.36 Review at its second stage before Ken Martin J after it has crossed its hurdle at its first stage before Hasluck J where there are no justifying circumstances to so cause that Obstruction of Justice (the CART BEFORE THE HORSE). 
8.4. At 67 & 68: Murray J is in JE when he does not discern the fact that there is no caveatable interest for Timothy Robin Thies to lodge the caveat in 1986(sic) which should have been 2007. Further Ken Martin J evaded the issue that there is no consensus ad idem between the contracting parties for the solicitor costs agreement to justify the caveat which was removed by Ken Martin J anyway.  On the one hand, Ken Martin J refused to recognize the non-caveatable interests and the ensuing damages for the Paul as a result of the equity of his home property being fraudulently clogged up by Timothy Thies but at the same time His Honour recognized the need to remove that unlawful Caveat expeditiously in favour of Tim Thies.  This is a contradiction of  the NON-DECISION of His Honour Ken Martin J in CIV1112 of 2007 and Michelides No.2 ( the NON-DECISION of Martin J).
8.5. At 68: Mr. Thies cannot have caveatable interests in the unlawfully caveated property of Paul Chin on the grounds(NON-CAVEATABLE INTERESTS OF TIM THIES):
8.5.1. he does not have an equitable interests in that property because he did not contribute to its increase in value or that his legal services to Paul never contributed to its increase in value;
8.5.2. Despite the solicitor-costs agreement and the Consequent Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment being voided by the lack of consensus ad-idem between the contracting parties, that agreement if valid must specify the name of the property to be charged to him before Thies can acquire an equitable interests over it (NO CONTRACT and NO EQUITABLE MORTGAGE).
8.5.3. Mr. Thies did not comply with the Orders of Hasluck J in the first stage of CIV1903 of 2008 No.1.or Michelides No.1 within the required time frame and within the specificities of that Show Cause Order (NO CONTRIBUTION TO VALUE).
8.5.4. There are no justifying grounds for the second judge Ken Martin J at the second stage of the s.36 Review Order proceedings to deviate from the Review Order which had already been granted by the First Judge (NO REVERSAL OF MICHELIDES NO.1).
8.5.5. The Security Costs Order is imposed unfairly by Ken Martin J who denied the Applicant his natural justice and is tainted with illegality due to his biasness, the specificities of which are contained with the Application for Prerogative Orders in CIV1981 of 2010 which is misconceived only to the extent of the Unavailability of Prerogative Costs Orders against another Justice of the Supreme Court of the same rank (ILLEGAL SECURITY COSTS ORDER).
8.6. At 81, there is a reference to CPA or Criminal Procedure Code 2004 (sic) which is actually a reference to Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 (MCCPA).  The JEs of Magistrate Musk is already explained in CIV3427 of 2011.  There is no basis for Magistrate Musk costs under s.31(3)(b) of the MCCPA as the facts of the case do not indicate that the Applicant’s application for default judgment is wholly without merit (Minor Cases and Allowable Costs). 
8.7. At 81: there is no basis for Magistrate Musk to strike out the Default Judgment of the Applicant under s. 17(1)(e) of the MCCPA which provides for “ it is frivolous, vexatious, scandalous”  or improper”.  Her Honour changed the wordings of that provision to “improper” but did not give the basis for it be so changed (the Improper Reason for Judgment). 
8.8. At 77: the Minor Case before Her Honour SM Musk cannot be transferred to the General Division of the Magistrates Court without the consent of the Applicant pursuant to s. 28(4)(a)(b) of the MCCPA (NO Consent of Claimant to Transfer Minor Case to General Division). 
8.9. At 85: the statement of Commissioner Herron regarding the words of the Applicant relating to the unlawful demands for monies which Mr. Thies is not entitled to from the Applicant and his son Paul are justified by the factual matrices of circumstances for which His Honour Murray’s J neutral stand is unwarranted (the Unjustified Comment of Commissioner Herron neutrally assented to by Murray J). 
8.10. At 85, Commissioner Herron recognized that he did not have jurisdiction to decide on the Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007 because it need to be appealed first to Magistrate Michelides before it can be decided by a Judge of the District Court in Appeal No.6 of 2008.  His was to hear the appeal of the decision of Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2008 with respect to the reason why Magistrate Musk dismissed the Default Judgment Application of the Applicant.  Instead His Honour express his wish not to hear those issues but decide on the non-jurisdictional issue of Duress-Vitiated Consent Judgment by stating that it is not so duress-vitiated without considering the grounds advanced by the Applicant for doing so (Non-Jurisdiction of Commissioner Herron).
8.11. By his own admission, Commission Herron did say that he was without jurisdiction and yet he went on to make that non-jurisdictional decision.  Yet he decided on the issue that contradicts the Minor Cases Provisions of the MCCPA and ordered costs against the Applicant when he ought to have known that only Allowable costs are allowed under s. 31 of the MCCPA in the Case of a Minor Claim in FR944 of 2007 (The legislative Intent of Parliament with regard to Minor Cases Provisions).
8.12. At 88: The Thies Show Cause Affidavit dated 6.10.2009  was out of the time frame stipulated by Hasluck J and the objection of the Applicant to Martin J on this point should have been sustained if His Honour was fair-minded, in terms of the following:
8.13. Thies did not comply with the specificities of the Show Cause Affidavit as prescribed by Hasluck J to be concise and not to divert from the main issue of whether there was a consensus ad idem between the contracting parties for the legal costs he was claiming from the Applicant and his son.
8.14. He made misleading statements as to the genuineness and integrity of his false claims for legal costs which he is not entitled to under the solicitor-costs agreement as pre-defined by the pre-contractual terms dated 25.10.2004 as agreed to between the Applicant and Mr. Thies in terms of their email communications. 
8.15. He did not define how his contract for legal services was terminated as soon as he was seen to be reneging on those pre-contractual terms. He did not define how his legal costs can be escalating by $2,000.00 per week from the time his contract for services had been terminated by his clients since the 21.2.2005.  
(the Misleading Statement of Mr. Thies).

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 &10
92….Kenneth Martin J: Third point, even if you weren’t labouring under the lack of a practice certificate, and even if you weren’t labouring under the fact that you can’t practice other than in a supervised practice, my perusal of the materials in the caveat action, 1112 of 2007, indicates that you have an appalling conflict of interest on the basis that the materials that your son deposes to in his affidavit indicate that you are a protagonist in that dispute. So even if you didn’t suffer from difficulties, you would be conflicted from acting in any event. So that is a problem.


9.1.At 92: There is no “appalling conflict of interests” in the situation where the Applicant acted as a litigant in his own case or even in his son’s case where his own personal interests is involved, or he should have been allowed to act as an amicus curiae to help the court resolve this issue.
9.2. The factual circumstances indicate that it was the client-solicitor relationship between the Applicant and Mr. Thies rather than Mr. Thies with the Applicant’s son Paul.
9.3. Where the Applicant did not play the public role of a lawyer in his capacity as a litigant in person in his dispute with Mr. Thies, there is no conflicting public interests and his personal interests in either his own, or his son Paul’s interests with Thies. In this aspect His Honour Ken Martin J has misconceived his judgment in CIV1112 of 2007.  
9.4. At 94, 95, 96 & 97: Ken Martin J did not agree that Timothy Robin Thies robbed the Applicant and his son but he did not define the circumstances as to why it was not.  Why would Hasluck J order the stay of the Magistrates Musk’s and Michelides Decision and their Respective Costs Orders if this did not happen?
The respective queries of the Applicant are:
9.4.1. Where is the entitlement of Mr. Thies to make demands for monies from the Applicant and his son Paul after his services for legal services was terminated by both his clients on 21.2.2005?
9.4.2. Where is the basis for Mr. Thies to keep increasing his legal costs and therefore his demands for monies by $2,000.00 per week after his services for legal services had been terminated since 21.2.2005?
9.4.3. Where is the consensus ad idem between the contracting parties to base the Thies entitlement to make those demands?
9.4.4. What are the factual circumstances which show that the Registrar Wilde Involuntary Consent Judgment is not duress-vitiated when there is prima facie evidence that the reverse is true?
9.4.5. Why is a father not allowed to protect his own son who is being relieved of his monies by the unconscionable acts of his lawyer reneging on his contract for services to his son and himself?
9.4.6. Where is the public interest that needs to be protected by a court of justice where a lawyer is seen to be advancing his own interests over the interests of his own client?
9.4.7. Why are the security costs being granted after the s.36 Review decision has already been granted by Hasluck J and not before?

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 &10
99 In his reasons, Martin J described submissions filed by the respondent in relation to his s 36 application as being: in many places utterly incomprehensible. Aside from being prolix and repetitive, they are couched in emotive language inappropriate to be used by any person, let alone a legal practitioner [23].
100 His Honour granted the application for security in the amount of $20,000 and outlined his reasoning at [39]:

10.1. At 99: The reference to submissions for the s.36 application is misconceived by Murray J.  The s.36 Magistrates Court Act, 2004 Review Order was already granted to the Applicant by the First Judge Hasluck J in Michelides No.1.  
10.2. Ken Martin J role in Michelides No.2 is to agree to the s.36 Review Order and not to change it unless there are justifying circumstances for him to do so.  If there are such circumstances, he has an obligation to define them to the Applicant and he did not.
10.3. His Honour has an obligation to define what he meant by the epithets: “prolix”, “repetitive” and “utterly incomprehensible’ and “inappropriate language” in the context of those submissions and not just to gloss over it and making a general statement without substantiation.
10.4. If His Honour had been in the shoes of the Applicant and members of his family and had personally experienced every minute of those harrowing circumstances when the family was being harassed, annoyed, intimidated and robbed of monies that Mr. Thies was not entitled to under any circumstances, to the extent that Paul was under so much stress that he had literally lost his minds on more than one occasions and had even been incarcerated for losing his mind.  The amount of trauma personally experienced by the family members of the Applicant would reasonably cause any family member to succumb to those threats and intimidation in the form of the duress-vitiated Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment in FR417 of 2007.  It must be remembered that the threats were so real that there is a real likelihood that Paul would lose his own home to Mr. Thies if he did not comply with those threats. These circumstances are being recorded in the many correspondences that passed between various affected parties and cannot be just imaginations.  It would be unconscionable for Ken Martin not to feel the same way as the Applicant and his family members had felt. 
10.5. At 100: There was no grounds in both law and facts for the security costs order to be made and this is elaborated in CIV3427 of 2011.

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 &10
145 Le Miere J …s 4(1)(d) of the Act, as follows:
[T]he nature and frequency of the litigation…without reasonable ground, the distress and aggravation that such litigation must have caused to the persons against whom it has been brought and the amount of time that it has occupied the various courts, together with the likelihood that such conduct will continue [146].
147. The right of an individual to commence proceedings to enforce or defend their rights is a fundamental right in a free society and while to declare a person a vexatious litigant does, of necessity, put a limit on this right, it remains protected under s 6(1) of the Act, ….. Under s 6(7), leave is not to be granted unless the court or tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings; and
(b) there is a prima facie ground for the proceedings.

152 Finally, the applicant should have the costs of the application, to be taxed.


11.1.  At 145 and 148: The very nature and frequency of the
Litigation of the SEVEN CASES as explained by Murray J at 126 in the words of the Principal Registrar as Applicant’s agent, is caused by the Applicant being unaware of the concept of the Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders first introduced by EM Heenan J on 4.8.2010 as explained in the Inchoate Cases and the Date of Demarcation at sub-paragraph 5.6 above (the Hitherto Inexplicable Concept of Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Orders).
11.2. Since the Date of Demarcation on 15.6.2011 at sub
paragraph 5.6. above, the Applicant no longer embarks on the same procedure to seek justice but is now relying on seeking Judicial Review through Declarative Judgments in CIV 3824 of 2011 referred to in sub-paragraph 10.5 above, through s. 25(6), 33, 43 and 59 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA of 84 pages (the First Judicial Review).   
11.3. Since the First Judicial Review was filed on 19.12.2011
prior to Murray J decision in CIV 1689 of 2011 on 11.1.2012, it has now been scheduled by the Principal Registrar to be heard on 26.6.2012 at a Special Appointment at 10.30 am.  It is not an application for Leave pursuant to s.6(7) of the Act, which would have involved the participation of both the Attorney General and the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, if it were so (The First Judicial Review is not a Vexatious Applicant Application).
11.4. The Applicant has since the 8.2.2012 lodged the Second
Application for Judicial Review containing 105 pages with respect to the JEs of Master Sanderson’s Decision in CIV 1775 of 2008, Owen JA Decision in CACV 107 of 2008, Simmonds J Decision in CIV2157 of 2011 and DCJ Sweeney Decision in CIV 2509 of 2002.  This is the First Application by both Maurice Law and the Application for Leave pursuant to sub.6(7) of the Act. It is pending approval by the Principal Registrar (The First Vexatious Litigant Application).
11.5. The Two Judicial Review Applications as explained above
is with reasonable grounds and is not brought about with aggravation to those persons against whom they are brought because the FOUR issues that was before the court in all those SEVEN CASES have never been solved or decided by the Various Courts as explained in sub-paragraph 5.8 above (the FOUR issues have been avoided).   
11.6. As long as the FOUR ISSUES have not been decided by
the various courts, LEAVE pursuant to s.6(7) of the Act ought to be granted by this Honourable Court to the Applicant because the First and Second Judicial Review Applications are not VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS and there are prima facie grounds for those proceedings.  Therefore, it is reasonably clear that His Honour Justice Murray has misconceived the grounds for issuing the Order under s. 4(1)( c) of the Act to declare the Applicant a Vexatious Litigant (The Misconceived Order under s.4(1)© of the Act) .
 11.7. At 149, 150, 151: The Applicant has now incorporated the Evidentiary Materials of CIV1981 of 2010 into the First Vexatious Litigant Application or the Second Application for Judicial Review.  He concedes that it CIV 1981 of 2010 should be stayed on the ground that it had been misconceived by the Applicant on the ground of the concept of Unavailability of Prerogative Writ Relief that was made known to him by EM Heenan J in the Inchoate Case as stated above as at the Date of Demarcation (the Second Judicial Review).
11.8. The Second Judicial Review, however, is based on legal merits for which the relief sought is for declarative judgments and it is based on the Ken Martin J decision regarding Timothy Robin Thies that had obstructed justice to the Applicant (The Reasonable Grounds of the Second Judicial Review).


11.9.    At 15: The Applicant has been involved in public interest
litigations in relation to the FOUR ISSUES that was litigated in the SEVEN CASES as explained above.
11.10.The SEVEN CASES is dismissed on procedural errors in
11.11.As explained by Kirby J at sub-paragraph 5.12 above, the
dismissal of a litigant in person’s case on the procedural grounds is an inappropriate ruling in law, as it is not on the basis of the substantive law that the SEVEN CASES concerns  the efficient and fair administration of justice. The ground that that they have low prospects of success is also not grounded on the facts of the case.
11.12.See the Australian Law Reform Commission website
11.12.1. Para: 13.1: Public interest litigation is
an important mechanism for clarifying legal issues to the benefit of the general community. The Commission concludes that public interest litigation is of significant benefit to the community and that it should not be impeded by costs allocation rules.
11.12.2. Justice Toohey quoted Oshlack v Richmond River Shire Council (1994) 82 LGERA 236 when he said at a symposium:  
“There is little point in opening the doors to the courts if litigants cannot afford to come in. The general rule in litigation that ‘costs follow the event’ is in point. The fear, if unsuccessful, of having to pay the costs of the other side (often a government instrumentality or wealthy private corporation), with devastating consequences to the individual or environmental group bringing the action, must inhibit the taking of case to court. In any event, it will be a factor that looms large in any consideration to initiate litigation.”
11.12.3. Para. 13.11 states: The Commission considers that the significant benefits of public interest litigation mean it should not be impeded by the costs allocation rules.
11.12.4. Para 3.19: A court or tribunal should be able to make a public interest costs order notwithstanding that one or more of the parties to the proceedings has a personal interest in the matter. The extent of the private or commercial interest of each party to public interest litigation should be considered by the court when deciding the terms of any costs order.

“In 1995, the ouster provision was re-enacted in a new form which extended the terminology from a “decision” to a “purported decision”. The introduction of the word “purported” was of potential significance, as suggested in a joint judgment of Gaudron and Gummow JJ in the Darling Casino case where their Honours drew a clear distinction between a decision “under” the Act and a decision “under or purporting to be under” the Act.
See also: Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 at 635.
[2] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 174 – 175 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ), and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 (Bell J). The rule is set out in a passage from the reasons of Deane J in Re Gray; Ex parte Marsh[1985] HCA 67; (1985) 157 CLR 351, 385 quoted at [22] of her Honour's judgment in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks. Other decisions to the same effect are Re Western Australian Industrial Appeal Court; Ex parte Carter(1992) 7 WAR 348, 354; (1992) 44 IR 171; Barton v Walker [1979] 2 NSWLR 740, 755; and Mayor of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239. The same principle applies to applications for mandamus and prohibition: Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (No 1) [1997] HCA 13; (1997) 188 CLR 595.'

[3] Jurisdiction and Integrity - The Second Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture Series – per Justice James Spigelman: See also footnote No.1 above at the link: which states:  
”Recently, Lord Hoffman rejected the language of deference, in a passage which is consistent with the High Court's reasoning in City of Enfield:
"My Lords, although the word 'deference' is now very popular in describing the relationship between the judicial and the other branches of government, I do not think that its overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious concession, are appropriate to describe what is happening. In a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to decide which branch of government has in any particular instance the decision-making power and what the legal limits of that power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts.”
See also the meaning of deference at the link:
1. submission to or compliance with the will, wishes, etc., of another
2. courteous regard; respect

[4] Justice Spigelman observed in his lecture quoted in footnote 3 above:
I noted that in any stable polity there is a widely accepted concept of how governance should operate in practice. The role of the integrity branch is to ensure that that concept is realised, so that the performance of governmental functions is not corrupt, not merely in the narrow sense that officials do not take bribes, but in the broader sense of observing proper practice.
I put forward the idea of integrity as a useful way to conceptualise a universal governmental function, within which the body of law known as administrative law may find a place. The focus is on institutional integrity, rather than personal integrity, although the latter, as a requirement of conduct of occupants of public office, has implications for the former.
Institutional integrity goes beyond a narrow concept of illegality to encompass at least two additional considerations. First, the maintenance of fidelity to the public purposes for the pursuit of which an institution is created. Secondly, the application of the public values, including procedural values, which the institution was expected and/or required to obey.
This focus on fidelity to purpose and on applicable public values does, in my opinion, distinguish the integrity function from other governmental functions, including most executive, legislative and judicial decision-making, which are concerned with the quality of actual outcomes.

ADELAIDE, 5 AUGUST 2004 at the link:
[6] See my Letter to Murray J dated 11th and 17th January, 2012 before the Judgment is perfected at the link:
[7] This Chart is prepared by the Respondent in the above judgment pursuant to s. 27A and 27B of the Evidence Act, 1906 WA.
[8] See footnote No.4 above.  Justice Spigelman refers to acts of deferences as a corrupt act and Murray J might have inadvertently commit a corrupt act. Corrupt acts are defined in the Corruption Crime Commission Act, 2003 WA s. 27 and the Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA s. 121.
[9] Henderson v Henderson (or the so called "res judicata in its classic narrow sense") where Sir James Wigram VC said: "[W]here a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time."
The rule was further explained by the court of appeal in Barrow v Bankside Agency Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 257
"The rule in Henderson v Henderson 3 Hare 100 is very well known. It requires the parties, when a matter becomes the subject of litigation between them in a court of competent jurisdiction, to bring their whole case before the court so that all aspects of it may be finally decided (subject, of course, to any appeal) once and for all. In the absence of special circumstances, the parties cannot return to the court to advance arguments, claims or defences which they could have put forward for decision on the first occasion but failed to raise. The rule is not based on the doctrine of res judicata in a narrow sense, nor even on any strict doctrine of issue or cause of action estoppel. It is a rule of public policy based on the desirability, in the general interest as well as that of the parties themselves, that litigation should not drag on for ever and that a defendant should not be oppressed by successive suits when one would do. That is the abuse at which the rule is directed."

[i] Gordon said in his article entitled: THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BAR
The Importance of independence
Lest you think that I am suffering from regulatory capture, let me first list why it is so widely believed that the governance of the Bar should be taken out of the cloisters of the Inns and the Bar Council and led blinking into the daylight of Westminster and Whitehall.  First of all, legal advice is too expensive.  It
has moved out of the reach of the middle classes.  The advice of a top barrister is affordable by government, by corporate bodies and by wealthy individuals, especially on divorce.   This has been and is even today ameliorated by legal aid, insurance, pro bono, conditional fees and better use of technology, but there is still a void.  Legal aid has been cut and will be cut even more in the management of the UK budget deficit, and I will return to this issue as it bears on the independence of the legal profession.  So there
are many, perhaps the majority of the population, who could never contemplate accessing the individual advice of a barrister or a city solicitor.  It is reported, often with pride (certainly by the journals of the solicitors’ profession) that partners in city firms make £1m a year, and that some barristers make similar sums from criminal legal aid 1.  We know that there are barristers, many of them women and BME, who undertake publicly funded work in criminal and family issues and make only the most modest of livings,
but their pleas are undermined by the excesses at the other end.
[ii] The calls for change: Turning to the critical aspects, there is no doubt that over the last few decades the Law Society has been not only tardy in handling complaints but unresponsive.  Solicitors have also been tainted by the outcome of the monopolising of work by a few firms representing unionised claimants, for
example, miners suffering from lung diseases caused by their work in the mines.  Those firms succumbed to temptation by taking more for themselves than for their clients and even in a few cases taking what was not theirs at all.  The reports of those failings made an indelible impression

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