THE GAZETTED ORDER BY REGISTRAR WHITB Y OF MURRAY J ORDER IN PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT V CHIN [2012] WASC7 IS PER INCURIAM AND NEED BE FOLLOWED BY THE LOWER COURTS

SUBMISSION BY NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN AS TO WHETHER HE HAS A NEED TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT OF THE PERTH MAGISTRATES COURT IN PER/CIV/GCLM: 10010/2021: CHIN V NGUYEN ON THE BASIS THAT THE MURRAY J ORDER IS MADE PER INCURIAM AS THE GAZETTED ORDER IS NOT INTENDED BY HIS HONOUR VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS RESTRICTION ACT 2002 - SECT 6 6 .         Leave to institute proceedings         (1)         An application for leave to institute proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class (in this section called the proceedings ), that is required by an order under section 4(1)(d) is to be made —             (a)         in the case of proceedings in the Supreme Court, to the Supreme Court or a judge; or             (b)         in the case of proceedings in the District Court, to the District Court or a District Court judge; or             (c)         in the case of proceedings before any other court, to the court; or (IF REQUIRED, APPLICATION FOR LEAVE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE PERTH MAGISTRATES COURTS IN MC/PER/CIV/GCLM 10010/2021).         [(d)         deleted]             (e)         in the case of proceedings before a tribunal, to the tribunal,                 and is to be accompanied by an affidavit in support of the application. (2)        The court or tribunal to which the application for leave is made may dismiss the application even if the applicant does not appear at a hearing of the application. (APPLICANT NICHOLAS N CHIN SHALL APPEAR AT THE PERTH MAGISTRATES COURT ROOM 92 AT AT 10.30 AM ON 4.2.2022 AS PER THE NOTICE DATED 5.1.2022) (3)        The affidavit accompanying the application for leave is to list all the occasions on which the applicant has made an application for leave under subsection (1) and to disclose all facts material to the application, whether supporting or adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant. (THE APPLICANT HAS NO RECORDS OF EVER HAVING MADE AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE ON PREVIOUS OCCASSIONS AND CANNOT REMEMEBER ANY). (4)        Neither the application nor the affidavit are to be served on any other person unless the court or tribunal orders under subsection (6) that they are to be served on another person. (THE APPLICATION SHALL NOT BE SERVED ON DEFENDANTS, IF THE APPLICANT IS SO ORDERED BY THE PERTH MAGISTRATES COURT AND IS REQUIREED TO MAKE THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE). (5)        The court or tribunal is to dismiss the application for leave if it considers that — (IS THE HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 4.2.2022 AT 10.30 AM IN COURT ROOM 92 GOING TO BE A HEARING FOR LEAVE UNDER S.6(1) AND S.4(1)(D) OF THE VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS RESTRICTIONS ACT?: IF YES, THEN I DO NOT NEED TO MAKE A FRESH APPLICATION?. IF NO, I WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A FRESH APPLICATION?).             (a)         the affidavit does not disclose everything required by subsection (3) to be disclosed; or             (b)         the proceedings are vexatious proceedings; or             (c)         there is no prima facie ground for the proceedings. (IS THE APPLICANT’S AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING MY FORM 23 APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ELODGED 16.12.2021 SUFFICIENT TO DISCLOSE TO THE COURT EVERYTHING REQUIRED BY SUBS.3? OR IF THE AFFIDAVIT DO DISCLOSE THE FACTS THAT THE IMPUGNED PROCEEDINGS ARE NOT VEXATIOUS AND THERE THERE EXIST PRIMA FACIE GROUNDS FOR IT?).  (6)         Before the court or tribunal grants an application for leave it is to —  (a)         order that a copy of the application and accompanying affidavit be served on —   (i)         the person against whom the proceedings are to be instituted; and  (ii)         any person who made an application under section 4(2)(c) in relation to the applicant; and  (iii)         the Attorney General; and (b)         give those persons an opportunity to oppose the application for leave. (7)         Leave is not to be granted unless the court or tribunal is satisfied that — (a)         the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings; and (b)         there is a prima facie ground for the proceedings. (8)         The applicant and the persons referred to in subsection (6)(a) are to be given an opportunity to be heard at the hearing of the application for leave. (9)         At the hearing of the application for leave, the court or tribunal may receive as evidence any record of evidence given or affidavit filed in connection with an application for leave mentioned in subsection (3). (10)         The court or tribunal may dispose of the application for leave by — (a)         dismissing the application; or (b)         granting leave to institute the proceedings, subject to such conditions as the court or tribunal thinks fit. (WILL THE PERTH MAGISTRATES COURT ACCORDINGLY MAKE AN ORDER GRANTING ME LEAVE TO INSTITUTE THE PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AS IT THINKS FIT; OR THERE IS NO SUCH REQUIREMENT AS THE GAZETTED ORDER OF REGISTRAR WHITBY IS MADE PER INCURIAM? ).         [Section 6 amended: No. 59 of 2004 s. 141.] WHY THE GAZETTED ORDER IS MADE PER INCURIAM: JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT -v- CHIN [2012] WASC 7 CORAM : MURRAY J HEARD : 29 AUGUST 2011 DELIVERED : 10 JANUARY 2012 FILE NO/S : CIV 1689 of 2011 BETWEEN : THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT Applicant AND NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Respondent Catchwords: Vexatious litigants - Application for orders to stay a particular proceeding and prohibiting the respondent from instituting proceedings without leave - Turns on own facts Legislation: Nil Result: Order that respondent is prohibited from instituting any proceedings in any Western Australian court or tribunal without the leave of that court or tribunal Order that whole of Supreme Court proceedings CIV 1981 of 2010 are stayed 145 Le Miere J outlined factors that support the making an order under s 4(1)(d) of the Act, as follows: [T]he nature and frequency of the litigation…without reasonable ground, the distress and aggravation that such litigation must have caused to the persons against whom it has been brought and the amount of time that it has occupied the various courts, together with the likelihood that such conduct will continue [146] Conclusion 148 For the reasons set out above, this court can be satisfied that the respondent has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings as defined under the Act, and is likely to institute or conduct vexatious proceedings in the future if not restrained from doing so. The case is one which both justifies and requires the making of an order under s 4(1)(c) of the Act in relation to proceedings of any kind. [MURRAY J INTENDED TO MAKE THE ORDER UNDER S.4(1)(C ) OF THE VPRA AND UNDER S. 4(10(D) OF THE VPRA: THE INTENTION RUNS COUNTER TOTHE GAZETTED ORDER) 4. Restriction of vexatious proceedings (1) If a Court is satisfied that — (a) a person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings (whether before or after the commencement of this Act); or (b) it is likely that the person will institute or conduct vexatious proceedings, the Court may make either or both of the following orders — (c) an order staying any proceedings, either as to the whole or part of the proceedings, that have been instituted by that person; (d) an order prohibiting that person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, without the leave of a court or tribunal, as the case requires under section 6(1). (WHEN THE TWO LIMBS OF S.4(1)(A) AND (B) ARE FULFILLED, THEN MURRAY J WOULD HAVE MAKE AN ORDER UNDER S.4(1)(D) INSTEAD OF S.4(1)( C). HOWEVER, MURRAY J ORDER IS INTENDED TO CURB FUTURE PROCEEDING EMANATING FROM THE 20 CASES THAT WERE BEFORE HIS HONOUR AND NOT TO CURB FUTURE PROCEEDINGS OF THE APPLICANT. IF OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE OPPRESSIVE AS IT WOULD BE AN INCURSION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OFTHE APPLICANT. THIS EXPLAINS THE REASON FOR MY RATIONALE THAT THE WA GAZETTED ORDER AT PAGE 845 BY REGISTRAR WHITBY DATED 28.2.2012 IS PER INCURIAM: THROUGH LACK OF DUE REGARD TO THE LAW OR THE FACTS THAT THE MURRAY J ORDER IS NOT A BLANKET ORDER THAT COVERS FUTURE PROCEEDINGS BUT IS ONLY RELATED TO THE 20 CASES THAT WAS BEFORE HIS HONOUR. Stay of the Supreme Court proceedings in CIV 1981 of 2010 149 The applicant also seeks a stay of the Supreme Court proceedings in CIV 1981 of 2010. It is not appropriate for the court to make a blanket order staying any proceedings that have been instituted by a person. The court should consider each existing proceeding and whether or not that proceeding should be stayed. In Attorney General v Michael (Le Miere J), it is stated that the court can only make such an order if it is: satisfied that the actions so stayed have no legal merit. The court must be astute to ensure that it does not prevent a litigant from pursuing a claim that may have legal merit [147]. (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: See: OHCHR | Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Article 5 - Equality and non-discrimination 1. States Parties recognize that all persons are equal before and under the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law. 2. States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds. 3. In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided. 4. Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of persons with disabilities shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of the present Convention. Dated this 7th day of January, 2021. Signed by: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin 387 Alexander Drive, DIANELLA WA 6059. PH: 0892757440 MOB: 0421642735 EMAIL: nnchinatv@gmail.com

THE PERMANENT CANCELLATION OF A LAWYER'S LICENCE IS AN INJUSTICE STEMMING FROM FOUL PLAY

See the case at this link: https://www.jade.io/article/758379 Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163 I copy an excerpt from this case. The reader may read the full case to get a fuller understanding: Consideration I do not agree that the distinction between suspension and cancellation is “technical”. I do not agree that the principles applicable to the power to suspend extend to the power to cancel. Ms Zhukovska’s written submissions pointed out that the Law Society’s submissions that once it was found that she was not presently fit to practise, NCAT was required to determine when and subject to what conditions she would become fit to practise, failing which her name should be removed from the roll, rest on a false dichotomy. I agree. There is a third possibility, which is that while NCAT was satisfied that Ms Zhukovska was not presently fit to practise, it was not satisfied that she was permanently or indefinitely unfit to practise. In that case, suspension for a specified period of time is not appropriate. Nor is removal from the roll. Rather, a cancellation order is appropriate, coupled with an order preventing application from being made for at least such time during which NCAT considers that she would not be fit to practise. As noted above, the dichotomy posed by Reynolds JA in McNamara turned on a regime where (a) the Statutory Committee lacked power to cancel a solicitor’s practising certificate and (b) it was held wrong for the Statutory Committee to have regard to the limitations imposed by the Law Society upon the solicitor’s practising certificate. It follows that what was said cannot be taken as authority for what is to occur under the regime applicable to Ms Zhukovska. It is not to the point to say that the evidence and findings did not support an order which was not made by the Tribunal, namely, an order suspending Ms Zhukovska from practice. The issue is whether there was error in the order which was made, namely, that Ms Zhukovska’s practising certificate be cancelled, with the consequence that she must, if she wishes in the future to return to practice, apply for a new practising certificate and satisfy the Law Society that she has ceased to be a person who was unfit to practise. The Law Society’s response was as follows: “This analysis [scil Ms Zhukovska’s submissions] begs the question as to why the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Solicitor was ‘indefinitely unfit to practise’ (Red 80[51]). If the Tribunal was not able to or did not make a finding as to when or in what circumstances the Solicitor would be likely to become fit to practise, then the only available conclusion was that the Solicitor was indefinitely unfit to practise and her name ought to have been removed from the Roll. She was not presently fit to practise.” But this reasoning contains a series of errors. First, the legal onus at all times remained on the Law Society to show probable indefinite unfitness to practise. Accepting that the evidentiary onus might shift, it is wrong to reason that the failure to find that a solicitor would be fit to practise in the future entailed that the solicitor would be indefinitely unfit to practise. Secondly, it does not follow that “the only available conclusion” from the absence of a finding as to when she would become fit to practise is that she was indefinitely unfit to practise. If indeed the Tribunal were satisfied that she would likely become fit to practise after a specified period, then an order suspending her practising certificate for that period would be appropriate. If the Tribunal was not satisfied that she was probably permanently unfit to practise, but was unable to determine when she would become fit to practise, then a cancellation order, not the removal from the roll, was appropriate. Hence, I reject the principal submission advanced by the Law Society. (b) Failure to impose conditions The Law Society complained that while the Tribunal found that Ms Zhukovska was not presently a fit and proper person to practise as a solicitor, there was no basis for the conclusion that she would be a fit and proper person in 12 months’ time, when she might have (although she need not have) complied with the recommendations it made to the Law Society. This was put as a failure to make material findings of fact. In its submissions in reply, it said that by failing to make orders concerning the conditions to be imposed, the task fell to the Law Society to do so if Ms Zhukovska reapplied for a practising certificate. The Law Society advanced the following submission: “This creates a risk that the Law Society may be too harsh (or too lenient) in determining the conditions that should be implemented, in respect of a legal practitioner that had been judged to be unfit to practise by the Tribunal at the time of its decision. By failing to make such orders, the Tribunal also creates a risk of further dispute between the Law Society and the Solicitor as to the form of the conditions the Tribunal impermissibly delegated to it to unilaterally impose, thus failing to discharge its obligation to resolve the complaints that were brought to it for determination.” While the Law Society accepted that it would assess fitness to practise at the time of any later application, it submitted that “the Tribunal must still consider the minimum conditions and/or re-education that must occur before such fitness has a prospect of being established.” Ms Zhukovska sought to draw the inference from the Tribunal’s recommendations that the Tribunal was satisfied that they would be adequate to ensure that she was fit to practise: “The recommended conditions deal directly with the primary concern of the Tribunal apparent from [54] of the Decision {Red 81O}, being the Solicitor’s ‘relative inexperience’ at the time of the conduct. It can be inferred that the Tribunal found that compliance with conditions of that kind and expiry of a period of 12 months would be adequate to ensure the Solicitor was fit to practise.” The Law Society responded that the Tribunal’s recommendations did not bind the Law Society, “thereby demonstrating that it had not, itself, formed a final or definite view as to what conditions should be imposed, when it clearly had the power to do so.” The Law Society also asserted that: “This was contrary to its practice in matters of this type, of ensuring that the form of such conditions is settled and is the subject of orders made by the Tribunal before the proceedings are brought to an end. A recommendation has no legal effect and is insufficient to accomplish that objective.” Consideration I do not accept the entirety of either side’s submission. I do not accept that the Tribunal impliedly found that compliance with its recommendations would ensure that Ms Zhukovska was fit to practise. I do not accept that a recommendation has no legal effect (for it is plainly a Peko-Wallsend relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion by the Law Society). I also do not accept the implicit submission that it was always for the Tribunal, as opposed to the Law Society, to impose conditions which will reduce the scope for controversy and dispute at a later application for the grant of a practising certificate. The Tribunal’s failure to make conditions was attributable to the attitude expressed by both parties, namely, to attempt to make orders immediately on the day if that was possible, and the fact that neither side advanced in any detail conditions which were appropriate. In particular, the Law Society did not propound any alternative regime against the possibility that the Tribunal might not find likely indefinite unfitness to practise. In an ordinary case, it would have been open to the Tribunal to seek further submissions on conditions, perhaps after announcing that it was not prepared to make an order removing the name from the roll. That was not possible consistently with orders being made on the day. But short cuts can make long delays. In the present case, I am satisfied that there was material error in the Tribunal’s decision, insofar as it made no findings to justify the 12 month period during which Ms Zhukovska would not practise, and there was nothing to justify a reasonable prospect of receiving a practising certificate in 12 months’ time, especially given the fact that its suggestions were non-binding recommendations. First and foremost, there was the finding made at [53] and [55] that Ms Zhukovska was, in November 2019, not fit to practise as a solicitor. Yet the Tribunal considered that she might apply for a practising certificate, albeit subject to conditions, after 12 months. That carried with it an implied finding that there was at least a reasonable prospect that she would become fit to practise. But what basis was there for that inference? The answer is that there was none. There had been some five years since Ms Zhukovska’s practice had been suspended, during which time she had, on the evidence, made scant efforts either to maintain her legal education or to fill the evident deficiencies. Most recently, she had paid to “attend” two online courses, each accredited for 1 CPD point (which may have taken an hour, or perhaps less), and had sat in on a single webinar, between the first and second hearings. She also gave evidence in very general terms, that she had taken some steps in early 2017 to maintain her legal education. The gap in the past was not necessarily incurable. It might have been possible for Ms Zhukovska to persuade the Tribunal as to her intentions and ability to become a person who was fit to practise as a solicitor. Yet Ms Zhukovska chose not to give evidence before the Tribunal. I acknowledge that the way in which that occurred was unfortunate, insofar as it was the Tribunal which first offered the possibility of an unsworn statement, only to reject it shortly thereafter. The offer should never have been made. Yet while Ms Zhukovska was understandably concerned to finalise the proceedings as quickly as possible, she should have known that it was essential that she persuade the Tribunal of her genuine desire to reform, and her motivation to do so. She had the benefit of counsel appearing for her. The decision not to give evidence must be taken to have been an informed one. In particular, her decision not to supply a further affidavit after the first hearing to be read in support of her case at the second hearing must be taken to have been an informed one. The Tribunal itself appreciated that conditions were necessary in order to protect the public. Those conditions included steps which Ms Zhukovska must undertake before applying for a practising certificate, and conditions upon her practice. Yet the Tribunal did not specify those conditions. Rather it made incomplete and non-binding recommendations. It is, with respect, impossible to reconcile the Tribunal’s finding that Ms Zhukovska was presently unfit to practise with its finding that that would change in a 12 month period when what would happen during that period was entirely unknown. I conclude that there was material error in this aspect of the Tribunal’s decision. My rejection of the Law Society’s case that Ms Zhukovska’s name should be removed from the roll carries with it the appreciable likelihood that there will come a time when she will be fit to practise. The task for the Tribunal in such a case, with the benefit of having reviewed the evidence of professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct, and Ms Zhukovska’s response to that evidence, is to make such orders as are appropriate, in order to protect the public interest. Here, that should have involved a regime for further submissions in relation to steps to be taken which if satisfied would result in Ms Zhukovska’s having a real chance of establishing she was fit to practise. I shall return to those matters below. (c) Remaining errors In relation to ground 1, the Law Society is correct to contend that removal from the roll would not, strictly, mean that she was “permanently deprived of the right to practise”. She would, however, be deprived of the right to practise for an indefinite period, and until such time as she had demonstrated she was fit to practise. That is how the Tribunal’s language is to be understood when read fairly. I do not consider that ground 1(a) amounts to an error which is material to the outcome. Ground 1(b) complained that the Tribunal wrongly had regard to Ms Zhukovska’s wish to continue to practise. That was not relevant to the question whether she was a fit and proper person, but it was relevant to the other orders which the Tribunal was invited to make. Arguably, the Tribunal may have reasoned from the inference of her wish to return that it might be inferred that she would become of good character. If so, that was wrong. Practitioners facing disciplinary proceedings with the prospect of the suspension or cancellation of their practising certificates, or with removal from the roll, should be in no uncertainty. If they wish to maintain that they will take steps to become fit to practise in the future, the usual if not invariable approach should be to say so under oath or affirmation, and explain the steps they propose to take and why they should be believed, in a way which permits that evidence to be tested by cross-examination if thought appropriate. Ground 2(a) draws attention to another minor error in the decision. Ms Zhukovska’s practising certificate had been suspended in 2014, and would have (unless it were renewed) expired years before NCAT’s orders were made. This was not wholly insignificant. The fact that her certificate had been cancelled would be relevant to a decision on any further application by Ms Zhukovska for a practising certificate. However, nothing material turns on this for present purposes. Notice of contention Ms Zhukovska’s notice of contention was as follows: “1. The Respondent’s situation had changed since the time she engaged in the conduct the subject of The Law Society of NSW v Zhukovska (No 2) [2019] NSWCATOD 196 (Decision), such that: a. she was a fit and proper person at the date of the Decision; or b. she would in future be a fit and proper person to practise as an Australian Legal practitioner, and there was evidence available to the Tribunal to support that finding. 2. The Tribunal should have found, had it been necessary to decide the issue, that the Respondent would be a fit and proper person to practise as an Australian Legal practitioner once the preconditions recommended in paragraph [60] of the Decision were satisfied and/or a period of 12 months from the date of the Decision had expired.” It should be said at the outset that it is not much to the point to assert in a notice of contention that “there is evidence available to the Tribunal to support that finding”. When this Court is asked to make a finding of fact for the first time, the question is whether the finding is warranted on the basis of the entirety of the evidence, not whether there was evidence capable of supporting it. No oral submissions were made in support of the notice of contention until this was brought to counsel’s attention at the conclusion of her address. Counsel reiterated that this Court should find that Ms Zhukovska was a fit and proper person at the date of the decision, and relied on her written submissions. The written submissions occupied slightly more than half a page, although in part they referred to earlier submissions to which they were linked. It was said that Ms Zhukovska had given “clear and consistent acknowledgements of her shortcomings”. At all times, Ms Zhukovska was represented by counsel. She gave evidence and was cross-examined at the first NCAT hearing, which concerned whether any or all of 12 allegations advanced by the Law Society were made out and whether they constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. At the second hearing, which concerned orders following the findings of five instances of unsatisfactory professional conduct and five instances of professional misconduct, Ms Zhukovska did not give evidence, in circumstances explained above. Moreover, Ms Zhukovska did not give evidence in this Court against the possibility that one or more of the grounds of appeal was made out and this Court might re-exercise the discretion. There was no affidavit analogous to the common practice in sentencing appeals of supplying updated information “on the usual basis” as explained in Betts v The Queen (2016) 258 CLR 420; [2016] HCA 25 at [11]. It follows that the most recent evidence from Ms Zhukovska herself was her cross-examination before NCAT at the first hearing in December 2018, described at [41] as a “properly vigorous cross examination”, on affidavits made by her on 25 January and 10 July 2018. Significantly, that led to gaps in evidence as to Ms Zhukovska’s acknowledgement and awareness of her departures from professional standards. Without being exhaustive: Ms Zhukovska maintained that ground 4 (causing herself to become the appointor to the trust) was unsatisfactory professional conduct but not in fact professional misconduct, but NCAT found that it was professional misconduct. What the Tribunal said at [65]-[68] concerning this is reproduced above; Ms Zhukovska denied that ground 11 (overcharging) justified a finding of professional misconduct, which NCAT duly made. Ms Zhukovska maintained that there was no breach of s 254 when she caused the proceeds of sale of Ms Heane’s unit not to be placed in her firm’s trust account. NCAT found that this (ground 5) constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct. In those circumstances, contrary to ground 1(a) of her notice of contention, I am entirely unpersuaded that the Tribunal should have found that Ms Zhukovska was a fit and proper person at the date it made orders. There had not been a complete acknowledgement by Ms Zhukovska of the wrongfulness of aspects of her conduct. There was no evidence from Ms Zhukovska of the steps she would take to ensure that such conduct would not be repeated. Ground 1(b) of the notice of contention is problematic. A finding as sought, namely, that Ms Zhukovska “would in future be a fit and proper person to practise as an Australian legal practitioner” is too imprecise to be made. In five days or five months or five years? Ground 2 of the notice of contention is also problematic. First, the recommended conditions are imprecise, and the “and/or” yields a number of imprecisely defined circumstances. It amounts to Ms Zhukovska asking for findings that she would be a fit and proper person after a “suitable” period of supervision (the duration of which was unspecified) and the “satisfactory” completion of a range of courses on such topics as elder law, powers of attorney, wills and estates practice, ethics and trust accounts; alternatively, after 12 months without any supervision or completion of any course; in the further alternative, after both (1) and (2). For the reasons already given, there is no basis for making, here and now, any such finding as to Ms Zhukovska’s fitness in 12 months’ time or at some other unspecified time. Orders which should be made In some respects, Ms Zhukovska’s case is highly unusual. It is not a case of dishonesty or misappropriation which will ordinarily result in removal from the roll. I entirely concur with the statement that “[t]his Court must insist on the maintenance of the highest standards of honesty and integrity in the performance of duties by legal practitioners”: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Yoon at [34]. The circumstances in which Ms Zhukovska progressively drew down more than $100,000 of her client’s money for her own benefit, which was repaid at around the same time that the Law Society investigation commenced, are concerning. Yet as it happens this sum, and the other loans, were repaid, and no case of dishonesty was advanced by the Law Society (I am not to be taken as suggesting that one should have been advanced). Ms Zhukovska’s conduct also resembles other cases of solicitors abusing elderly and vulnerable clients, which is to be firmly deprecated, but here too some important characteristics are absent. Ms Zhukovska inquired with the Law Society as to the appropriateness of being the donee of her client’s power of attorney, and obtained a trust deed from a reputable firm, and on the advice of an accountant. The overcharging was egregious, but Ms Zhukovska maintained that each invoice was approved by her client. Importantly, Ms Zhukovska was relatively recently admitted. She had been in practice for only four years. The misconduct related to a single client, and occurred seven years ago, in Ms Zhukovska’s first and second years as a sole practitioner. I am confident that Ms Zhukovska is not presently fit to practise as a solicitor. So far as the evidence discloses, nothing has changed since the Tribunal’s finding last November. Will Ms Zhukovska probably be permanently unfit to practise as a solicitor? I join with the Tribunal in not being satisfied that she will probably be unfit to practise for the indefinite future. I have borne in mind the struggles which Ms Zhukovska had endured to obtain legal qualifications in Canada as well as in this State. I am conscious that Ms Zhukovska has followed an arduous route to achieve admission. Leaving Russia to study in Canada in French, followed by the LPAB course in English, demonstrates considerable powers of self-discipline and sustained effort. I would infer that she is enterprising, diligent and self-motivating. There is every reason to think that she might be able to become fit to practise. However, I do not see how Ms Zhukovska could have a realistic prospect of persuading the Law Society at some point in the future that she has become fit to practise unless she makes a solemn statement acknowledging the entirety of her conduct, explaining why it occurred, and what steps she has undertaken and will undertake in order to prevent anything like it from happening in the future. That conclusion is confirmed by her decision not to give evidence before the Tribunal at the second hearing, or in this Court. I also see no reason why Ms Zhukovska should be permitted to make an application until she has demonstrated a commitment in a formal way to complete her training. I am unattracted by the idea (as was the Tribunal) that this could occur through “attendance” at two or three online courses. I am in broad agreement with the recommendations proposed by the Tribunal. Where I disagree with the Tribunal’s recommendations and the findings proposed by the notice of contention is that I consider it is necessary in order properly to exercise the protective jurisdiction to specify in advance and with precision the subject matter of the courses to attend and the way in which successful completion is to be measured. The orders I propose will permit the parties to be heard on those and any other conditions which should be imposed as preconditions to the making of an application by Ms Zhukovska. I am presently minded to impose a condition that no application for a practising certificate be made before satisfactory completion of those conditions and the expiration of 18 months from today: as presently advised, those conditions may be imposed pursuant to s 562(4)(j), as part of “an order that the practitioner not apply for a local practising certificate before the end of a specified period”. I am presently minded to order that any certificate which issues should be subject to the conditions proposed by Ms Zhukovska, namely, not being permitted to hold a principal practising certificate or to become a solicitor/director of any incorporated legal practice until the expiration of two years’ cumulative practice as an employed solicitor. To that I would add that she not hold office as a trustee (or director of a corporate trustee) in relation to client property in that period. To be clear, the effect of the orders I have in mind, as to all aspects of which the Court will permit the parties to be heard, will be that if Ms Zhukovska attends and satisfactorily completes appropriate courses and provides evidence by way of statutory declaration formally acknowledging the instances of professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct found by the Tribunal, and explains the steps she has taken and will continue to take in order to prevent such conduct recurring, then it would be open to the Law Society in determining an application for a practising certificate to conclude that she was a fit and proper person. It would be for the Law Society to make its decision if and when an application is made based on the material before it. As the Law Society points out, that decision would give rise to rights of appeal. But there is no alternative to that course, in the fairly unusual present circumstances where it cannot presently be concluded that Ms Zhukovska will become fit to practise, but where the Law Society has failed to make out a case of probable indefinite unfitness to practise. I turn to costs. Neither party has been wholly successful on appeal. I have concluded that the Law Society was justified in bringing this appeal, but I have also rejected its principal submission that Ms Zhukovska’s name be removed from the roll. It may be that an appropriate exercise of the discretion as to costs be that there be no order as to either party’s costs in this Court, with a view that each pays its and her own costs. As presently advised, I see no proper basis to interfere with the orders as to costs made by the Tribunal. However, the orders I propose will permit the parties to be heard as to costs, both in this Court and in the Tribunal. The orders for the exchange of submissions below contemplate all remaining issues being heard and determined on the papers. If either side wishes to be heard orally, its or her submissions in chief should so state, and explain the reason for that application and the opposing party should indicate in its or her submissions its attitude to a further oral hearing. For present purposes, the only orders I propose are: 1. The Law Society file and serve, within 14 days of today, any submissions as to the conditions to which Ms Zhukovska should be subject, and any submissions as to costs. 2. Ms Zhukovska file and serve, within 28 days of today, any submissions as to the conditions to which Ms Zhukovska should be subject, and any submissions as to costs. 3. The Law Society file and serve, within 35 days of today, any submissions in reply. McCALLUM JA: I share Macfarlan JA’s preference not to express a final view as to the appropriate test to be applied on appeal. Subject to that reservation, I agree with Leeming JA.

THE MALFUNCTION OF THE WESTERN AUSTRALIA GOVERNMENT

C/40552 - Complaint to the Ombudsman Western Australia Irene Yok Moy Lem Thu, Dec 24, 2020 at 9:56 PM To: Mail Ombudsman , Perth Magistrates Court , Chief Magistrate's Office , Chief.Justice.Chambers@justice.wa.gov.au, Minister.Quigley@dpc.wa.gov.au, Minister.Saffioti@dpc.wa.gov.au, admin@dpc.wa.gov.au, Criminal Injuries Cc: fines@justice.wa.gov.au, ferttp , LPCC , amber.jade.sanderson@mp.wa.gov.au, libby.mettam@mp.wa.gov.au, MrGillett68 , michael.mischin@mp.wa.gov.au, Info Service , Stirling , Simon Wheeler Bcc: Info Michelle Bovill Senior Assistant Ombudsman Complaint Resolution Ombudsman Western Australia - Serving Parliament, Serving Western Australians Level 2, Albert Facey House, 469 Wellington Street, Perth Western Australia 6000 T: (08) 9220 7555 F: (08) 9220 7500 Email: mail@ombudsman.wa.gov.au Website: www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au Dear Ms Bovill: PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER'S JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE COMPLAINT CASE NO: C/40552 AS PER S.14 OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER ACT, 1971 (THE ACT) i refer to your last response letter to me dated 16.12.2020 and would like to state as follows: 1. S.13 of the Act provides that the City of Stirling is the the Department and authoritY of the government of WA that is subject to investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman Investigation). 2. Subs.13(1) and (2) (g) provides that the Subject Matter for the Ombudsman Investigation as provided in s.14 of the Act is not applicable to the non-decision of Magistrate Hall in PE6810/6811/6812 of 2018 dated 9.12.2020 (the Non-Decision); 3. The Non-Decision is reasonably clear to the Ombudsman having regard to the Accused five-paragraph letter, particularly emphasizing the nine sub-paragraphs of paragraph 5 dated 28.11.2020 and 27.11.2020 on the topic of the Impossibility of those alleged offences (the Impossibility). 4. Therefore on the basis of the Non-Decision derived from the Impossibility, s. 13 of the Act by any stretch of logic does grant the Ombudsman the required jurisdiction to commence the impugned Ombudsman Investigation: for Ms. Bovill to say otherwise is an excess of jurisdiction and a dereliction of duties of the Ombudsman (the Dereliction). 5. Subs.14(1) of the Act empowers the Ombudsman Investigation as such is "SUBJECT TO THIS ACT" in terms of the Non-Decision, the Impossibility and the Dereliction: if the Ombudsman were to do otherwise, then it as a statutory functionary is contravening the RULE OF LAW THAT AN INFERIOR TRIBUNAL WHO ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION HAS DELIVERED A NON DECISION (Obligation of Ombudsman to Investigate the Subject Matter). 5. Subs.14(2) imposes the Obligation of Ombudman to Investigate the Subject Matter upon the following terms: (a) a failure or refusal of Magistrate Hall on 9.12.2019 to perform the act of acting within his jurisdictional limits as imposed by the law upon him and not otherwise; and (b) the formulation of the proposal of Magistrate Hall on 9.12.2019 to impose his intention of acting beyond his jurisdictional powers by the issuing the unwarranted penalty of the Non-Decision based on the circumstances of the Impossibility which materializes in the fake Penalty Order for $47,600 against the Accused which later originates from the ENFORCEMENT REGISTRY of the Magistrates Court at Perth bearing REFERENCE NOS: 19/419417; 19/419415 AND 19/419416 (Proposal and Intention) ; and (c) The Proposal and Intention when confronted with the rebuttal of the Accused, the Enforcement Registry made a fake recommendation to the Minister of Transport thereby unlalwfully withholding of the Driver Licence of the Accused (Revocation of Driver's Licence). 6. Subs.14(4) does not prevent the Ombudsman Investigation based on the Non-Decision, the Impossibility but makes it an Obligation of Ombudsman to Investigate the Subject Matter, having regard to: (Subsection 14(4): (a) The Accused as the person aggrieved has or had NO RIGHT OF APPEAL, OR REVIEW TO OR BEFORE A TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED UNDER ANY ENACTMENT OR BY VIRTUE OF CROWN PREROGATIVE; (b) The Accused as the person aggrieved has or had NO REMEDY BY WAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN ANY COURT OF LAW. 7. Subs.14(5) provides that notwithstanding Subs.(14(4), the Ombudsman MAY CONDUCT ANY INVESTIGATION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE AGGRIEVED PERSON HAS HAD SUCH REMEDY OF SUBS.14(4) PROVIDED HE IS SATISFIED IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES IT IT NOT REASONABLE FOR HIM TO EXPECT THAT THE ACCUSED OR AGGRIEVED PERSON TO RESORT OR TO HAVE RESORTED TO IT (THE PROVISO). 8. The PROVISO relate to the particular circumstances of the Aggrieved Person to initiate the legal process of making an appeal against the Non-Decision having regard to the Impossibility, the Dereliction and the Obligation of Ombudsman to Investigate the Subject Matter (the Proviso that the Ombudsman Must Investigate). 8. In respect of Subs.14(6) of the Act, the Subject Matter of the Investigation has no nexus to any person taking action as legal adviser or counsel for the Accused or Aggrieved Person (No Nexus between Subject of Investigation with Legal Advice or Counsel). . 9. Subs.14(7) provides: (despite the factual circumstances and laws relating to the Non-Decision, the Impossibility, the Dereliction and the Obligation of Ombudsman to Investigate the Subject Matter, the Ombudsman does have a discretion which must be exercised within the four corners of the law) MAY BE EXERCISED BY HIM (the Statutory Discretionary Powers of the Ombudsman). Yours faithfully IRENE YOK MOY LEM AS THE ACCUSED AND AGGRIEVED PERSON; NICHOLAS N CHIN AS THE SPOUSE OF IRENE YOK MOY LEM (SPOUSE PROTAGONIST). [Quoted text hidden]

RECOMMENDATION OF ROYAL COMMISSION ABOUT REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

What the Gobbo royal commission recommended about regulation of the legal profession Posted: 30 Nov 2020 04:39 PM PST Here is Commissioner McMurdo’s Summary and Recommendations from the Final Report, published yesterday, of the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants. Reproduced below is what it says about regulation of the legal profession. There will be more complaints about barristers in the future. Victorian barristers would be well advised to take out the top up insurance available to members of the Victorian Bar which includes a primary layer insurance against defence costs of disciplinary investigations including by the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner. ‘Legal profession regulation Lawyers have considerable power and authority when representing a client. They have expert knowledge about the law and legal system, and access to their client’s confidential information. Their advice and actions can have a direct and significant influence on their client’s wellbeing, the outcomes the client is able to achieve, and the client’s future. When lawyers deliberately betray their client’s trust or act in ways contrary to their client’s interests, it can have a devastating impact on the client. It is also, as this inquiry has shown, apt to undermine both the integrity of the criminal justice system and public confidence in the legal profession. Legal profession regulation exists to protect consumers and the public, and to support the proper administration of justice. Victoria’s legal profession regulatory framework consists of legislation, the common law, professional conduct rules, support services and ongoing education. These elements work together, requiring lawyers to demonstrate high standards of ethical and legal practice. When lawyers fail to uphold these standards, complaint, investigation and disciplinary mechanisms act to correct and deter the behaviour. Due to the limits of the Commission’s terms of reference, it has not undertaken a wholesale review of legal profession regulation in Victoria. Rather, it has focused on the specific aspects of legal profession regulation that support the ethical conduct of lawyers, and related issues raised by stakeholders the Commission consulted. While Victoria’s legal profession regulatory framework has changed significantly since Ms Gobbo practised as a lawyer, there is scope to further strengthen and improve aspects of it. It is important that lawyers fully understand the duty of confidentiality they owe to their clients and their responsibility to maintain appropriate professional boundaries. It would be beneficial to clarify and harmonise these aspects of the professional conduct rules for solicitors and barristers. Legal ethics education is integral to supporting lawyers’ understanding and application of their ethical duties and obligations in practice, as well as their ongoing professional development. Embedding legal ethics education in lawyers’ continuing professional development, including through the use of practical, scenario-based learning, would support them to understand the common ethical issues that can arise in legal practice and enhance their skills to manage those issues. Strengthening awareness of and access to the various ethical supports that are available to lawyers is also important. When a complaint is made about a lawyer’s conduct, it is critical that the processes for investigating it are not only independent, but also seen to be independent. Under the current model, the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner is responsible for the receipt, management and resolution of complaints about the professional conduct of lawyers. The Commissioner delegates some of their powers regarding the conduct of barristers to the Victorian Bar, including the power to investigate complaints against barristers. While this approach has benefits—including the ability to draw on the practical insights and subject matter expertise of the Victorian Bar regarding accepted standards of legal practice and advocacy—it risks a public perception that the model lacks independence, given that another function of the Victorian Bar is to advocate on behalf of its members. Recognising the importance of public confidence in all branches of the legal profession, the Commission recommends that the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner holds sole responsibility for investigating complaints about barristers, so that there is a single, consistent, independent approach to the management of all complaints regarding lawyers in Victoria. The Commission has also carefully considered the potential benefits and risks of a mandatory requirement for lawyers to report suspected misconduct by other lawyers. While some submitters raised legitimate issues and concerns, the Commission considers that the introduction of such a mandatory reporting requirement would deter misconduct by lawyers, encourage their adherence to high ethical standards, strengthen public confidence in the legal profession, and bring it into line with other professions and fields where mandatory obligations apply, including the health sector and policing. The Commission also recommends reforms to strengthen the rigour of the legal admission process and to support access to independent legal representation for people in police custody. Finally, in light of the events that led to this inquiry, the Commission recommends that legal profession regulators and professional associations work together to develop communications material for the public about lawyers’ professional and ethical obligations, with the aim of restoring and maintaining public confidence in the legal profession and the broader criminal justice system.’

PROPER REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND NOT JUST FAKE REGULATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACCOMPLISHING CRONY'S AGENDA

1 DECEMBER, 2020 BY STEPHEN WARNE What the Gobbo royal commission recommended about regulation of the legal profession Here is Commissioner McMurdo’s Summary and Recommendations from the Final Report, published yesterday, of the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants. Reproduced below is what it says about regulation of the legal profession. There will be more complaints about barristers in the future. Victorian barristers would be well advised to take out the top up insurance available to members of the Victorian Bar which includes a primary layer insurance against defence costs of disciplinary investigations including by the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner. ‘Legal profession regulation Lawyers have considerable power and authority when representing a client. They have expert knowledge about the law and legal system, and access to their client’s confidential information. Their advice and actions can have a direct and significant influence on their client’s wellbeing, the outcomes the client is able to achieve, and the client’s future. When lawyers deliberately betray their client’s trust or act in ways contrary to their client’s interests, it can have a devastating impact on the client. It is also, as this inquiry has shown, apt to undermine both the integrity of the criminal justice system and public confidence in the legal profession. Legal profession regulation exists to protect consumers and the public, and to support the proper administration of justice. Victoria’s legal profession regulatory framework consists of legislation, the common law, professional conduct rules, support services and ongoing education. These elements work together, requiring lawyers to demonstrate high standards of ethical and legal practice. When lawyers fail to uphold these standards, complaint, investigation and disciplinary mechanisms act to correct and deter the behaviour. Due to the limits of the Commission’s terms of reference, it has not undertaken a wholesale review of legal profession regulation in Victoria. Rather, it has focused on the specific aspects of legal profession regulation that support the ethical conduct of lawyers, and related issues raised by stakeholders the Commission consulted. While Victoria’s legal profession regulatory framework has changed significantly since Ms Gobbo practised as a lawyer, there is scope to further strengthen and improve aspects of it. It is important that lawyers fully understand the duty of confidentiality they owe to their clients and their responsibility to maintain appropriate professional boundaries. It would be beneficial to clarify and harmonise these aspects of the professional conduct rules for solicitors and barristers. Legal ethics education is integral to supporting lawyers’ understanding and application of their ethical duties and obligations in practice, as well as their ongoing professional development. Embedding legal ethics education in lawyers’ continuing professional development, including through the use of practical, scenario-based learning, would support them to understand the common ethical issues that can arise in legal practice and enhance their skills to manage those issues. Strengthening awareness of and access to the various ethical supports that are available to lawyers is also important. When a complaint is made about a lawyer’s conduct, it is critical that the processes for investigating it are not only independent, but also seen to be independent. Under the current model, the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner is responsible for the receipt, management and resolution of complaints about the professional conduct of lawyers. The Commissioner delegates some of their powers regarding the conduct of barristers to the Victorian Bar, including the power to investigate complaints against barristers. While this approach has benefits—including the ability to draw on the practical insights and subject matter expertise of the Victorian Bar regarding accepted standards of legal practice and advocacy—it risks a public perception that the model lacks independence, given that another function of the Victorian Bar is to advocate on behalf of its members. Recognising the importance of public confidence in all branches of the legal profession, the Commission recommends that the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner holds sole responsibility for investigating complaints about barristers, so that there is a single, consistent, independent approach to the management of all complaints regarding lawyers in Victoria. The Commission has also carefully considered the potential benefits and risks of a mandatory requirement for lawyers to report suspected misconduct by other lawyers. While some submitters raised legitimate issues and concerns, the Commission considers that the introduction of such a mandatory reporting requirement would deter misconduct by lawyers, encourage their adherence to high ethical standards, strengthen public confidence in the legal profession, and bring it into line with other professions and fields where mandatory obligations apply, including the health sector and policing. The Commission also recommends reforms to strengthen the rigour of the legal admission process and to support access to independent legal representation for people in police custody. Finally, in light of the events that led to this inquiry, the Commission recommends that legal profession regulators and professional associations work together to develop communications material for the public about lawyers’ professional and ethical obligations, with the aim of restoring and maintaining public confidence in the legal profession and the broader criminal justice system.’ See also: English Bar fights for last vestige of self-regulation Rotten one day, perfect the next: Queensland’s complaints system States’ and territories’ disciplinary systems summarised by the government New Legal Services Commissioner to talk on his office’s new direction Sentencing guideline published by English

Rude Lawyers deserve the sanction of a Reprimand and Not a Permanent Ban

see the link here: https://lawyerslawyer.net/2020/11/30/the-tariff-for-rudeness-a-reprimand/amp/?__twitter_impression=true

INVITATION BY BOVILL OF OMBUDSMAN WA TO INFORM HER OF THE MATTERS UNDECIDED BY MAGISTRATE HALL IN HIS AB INITIO VOID DECISION DATED 9.12.2019 RE: UNLAWFUL DRIVER LICENCE OF INNOCENT ACCUSED

Irene Yok Moy Lem Sat, Nov 28, 2020 at 2:07 PM To: Mail Ombudsman , Chief Magistrate's Office , Chief.Justice.Chambers@justice.wa.gov.au, Minister.Quigley@dpc.wa.gov.au, Minister.Saffioti@dpc.wa.gov.au, admin@dpc.wa.gov.au, fines@justice.wa.gov.au, Perth Magistrates Court , LPCC , amber.jade.sanderson@mp.wa.gov.au, libby.mettam@mp.wa.gov.au, michael.mischin@mp.wa.gov.au, Criminal Injuries , MrGillett68 , Info , Stirling , Stevan Rodic , Simon Wheeler Michelle Bovill Senior Assistant Ombudsman Complaint Resolution All parties involved Dear Ms. Bovill: COMPLAINT CASE NO: C/40552: THE LAST PARA OF YOUR LETTER DATED 25.11.2020 I refer to the above matter and your invitation to me to write to you again, which are couched in Your Last Paragraph, in the following words: (Your Invitation): "If you have a complaint about the City of Stirling that relates to matters that have not been the subject of proceedings before a court, it is open to you to write to us and set out those matters for our assessment." By way of Your Invitation, you have admitted to me that the Ombudsman WA has jurisdiction to investigate these matters under s.13 and 14 of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (the Act) and I would therefore like to state that the following matters have not been determined by a court for the Assessment of the Ombudsman (the Assessment by WA Ombudsman): 1) The Undue Influence of the Protagonist Nicholas N Chin (the Protagonist) exerted upon his spouse the accused Irene Lem Yok Moy (the Accused) in relation to the commissioning of Builder Ian Jack to build the New Addition which has since become the subject of the malicious persecution of the Accused by the City of Stirling (the Undue Influence). 2) The Undue Influence caused the Guilty Pleas of the Accused before Magistrate Hall on 9.12.2019 is therefore of null effect as it was not her own free will or volition and the attached documents will attest to the fact that the situation has become so untenable and unbearable to the accused that she should seek solace to plead guilty involuntarily in order to get herself out of the rut not of her own making (the Null Guilty Pleas of the Accused). 3) The abuse of Elders by the City of Stirling through the unlawful suspension of the Driver's Licence caused by the Non-Enforceable Void Penalty Orders of Magistrate Hall in a Non-Coram Judice Trial on 9.12.2020 that limits the human rights of both the accused and her husband in in the context of the Undue Influence and the Null Guilty Pleas of the Accused (The Invasion of Human Rights of Australian Elders Citizens). 4) The Invasion of the Human Rights of Australian Elders Citizens is the subject of my complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission and the International Human Rights Commissions (The Human Rights Complaints). 5) The Impossibility of the Accused to commit those three offences which are the subject of the Malfeasance of the City of Stirling which are based on NINE (NOT LIMITED AS THERE ARE OTHER UNCITED GROUNDS) grounds below: (the Impossibility in Law of Accused Ever Commissioning those Alleged Crimes): 5.1) The indisputability of Existence of the Building Permit approved by the City of Stirling dated 10.10.2016 as the City cannot be seen to blowing hot and cold at the same time; 5.2) The indisputability of Existence of the Planning Approval granted by the City of Stirling dated 10.10.10.2016 as the City cannot be seen to be blowing hot and cold at the same time; 5.3) The indisputability of Existence of the Lawful use of the New Addition for Short Term Stay Accommodation by the Accused as the City cannot be seen to be blowing hot and cold at the same time; 5.4) The malicious Refusal of the Prosecutor to prosecute lawfully the Protagonist instead of the Accused who has no mens rea and no actus rea for those alleged crimes as is evidenced by the Transcript; 5.5) The inherent Defective Building Approval Process of the City of Stirling as found by the Department of Mines & Energy or the Building Commission of WA as applicable only to Western Australia (Mines & Energy) as depicted in p.18 of the CRIS Report; which shows that WA is the only culprit among all the States of Australia; 5.6) The unlawful prosecution caused by the delay of more than 12 months by the Prosecutor in prosecuting the Accused as proscribed by s.21(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2004; when the offences are alleged to have occurred in 2016 but the Prosecution was launched only in February 2018; 5.7) The Non-Interference of the City of Stirling for the internal variations of the New Addition as proscribed by s.61(1)(b) of the Local Planning Regulations 2015 WA; which therefore do not require planning approval; 5.8) The Approval of the New Addition as a Short Term Stay Accommodation in a Single House by the Prosecutor Peter Gillette on 23.2.2018. 5.9) The Double-Jeopardy of Prosecuting Builder Ian Jack in PE6817 of 2018 and the Accused for the same or similar alleged offences under circumstances where there is no proof of abetment or a conspiracy to commit the same crimes by the Owner and the Builder at the same time under circumstances where there is a complete relinquishment of any criminal responsibility by the terms of the HIA Contract by the Accused as Owner to the Builder as Agent for the Owner; 6) The sources of information for the preceding 5 paragraphs of this email are to be obtainable from the attached FOURTEEN documents as listed below as well as the records keep at the Magistrates Court at Perth and at the offices of the City of Stirling and all its agents; which have been supplied by the Protagonists from time to time; if you are in doubts about the veracity of those information, please do not hesitate to contact the writer for clarifications of any points of doubts or for further evidence. Yours faithfully NICHOLAS N CHIN and Irene Yok Moy Lem 387 Alexander Drive, DIANELLA WA 6O59 Ph: 0892757440 Mob: 0421642735 Email: ireneyokmoylem1@gmail.com [Quoted text hidden] [Quoted text hidden] 3 Attachments [Quoted text hidden] 14 attachments JACK-PLANNING APPLICATION 05072016.png 1740K GILLETT-23022018..jpg 3456K LEM-JACK-CTC4423OF2018-ORDER15042019.jpg 3208K LEM-JACK-CTC4423OF2018-ORDER17052019.jpg 2951K TRANSCRIPT-MAGISTRATE WILSON-15102018-TRIAL ON PAPERS OBJECTED TO BY PROSECUTOR.png 83K STIRLING-MALICIOUS-PERSECUTION-CHARGES15052018.jpg 2188K DEMAIO-LEM-TRANSCRIPT-PERSECUTION-22062018.pdf 148K JACK-BUILDING PERMIT10102016.pdf 393K JACK-PE6817OF2018-TRANSCRIPT.pdf 162K cris_building_approvals_process_residential.pdf 2127K HUSTON-TRANSCRIPT-OBJECTED TO NNC AS ACCUSED-02112018.pdf 2016K LEMYM-STATUTORY-DECLARATIONS-FOUR CHARGES STIRLING02022018.docx 18K LPS 2015 REGULATIONS-SCHEDULE 2 PART7 & 8.rtf 157K SPYKER-MITIGATION PLEA-FINAL-05122019.pdf 322K