THE USURPATION OF THE LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

INTRODUCTION:
The Legal Practice Board of Western Australia is being taken for a ride by a group of four people who are at the highest levels of the legal profession. The rest of the 48 members are being kept in the dark as to what that group of four people are doing in the name of the Full Board because there is a loophole in the law that
the Full Board can be constituted by four people who are its members coming together to do a hidden agenda to protect some of their members. The Appellant is a victim by virtue of his being new to the profession and of a different ethnicity and so it is easy to ostracize him. He is being tied with a rope called s.40 of the LP Act
which is an innocent rope. The real bad people are tied with a proper rope called s.39 and being prosecuted and disposed of. They tie the Appellant with s.40 and stop him from practice altogether because he has no way out; he has not committed a wrong but he can be implicated in a “serious offence” for being deficient in his professional knowledge which is of course a false accusation. That is why I call this the phantom deficiency syndrome. In the meantime, they can continue to help themselves to “hurt” innocent people with impunity through the law courts. An example of a victim is an Italian man: Mr. Alessandro Bertini. The false Full Board cannot go about doing the “right thing” by doing the wrong thing first. This is simple logic that every regulator of the legal profession of integrity will understand. I ask for damages for the injury to my reputation and my loss of earnings since the 12.9.2006 and the trauma and pain and sufferings I had to undergo.

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA CACV 105 OF 2008
COURT OF APPEAL MINUTE OF AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Parties to the Appeal:
NI KOK (NICHOLAS) CHIN APPELLANT
And
LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD,WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDENT
Filed the 18th day of May, 2009
Prepared and Filed by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN - Solicitor-litigant in person
No. 387, Alexander Drive Phone & Fax: 08- 9275 7440
DIANELLA WA 6059 Email: nnchin@msn.com
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OPTIONAL MINUTE OF THE PROPOSED RE-AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE ORDERS OF JUSTICE PULLIN IN COMPLIANCE WITH R.32(4)(B) OF
THE SUPREME COURT (COURT OF APPEAL) RULES, 2005, GIVEN ON 15.5.2009 TO BE
FILED AND SERVED BY 29.5.2009.

Index Page No.
GROUND 1:.......................................................................1
1.2. PARTICULARS OF THE SEVEN INHIBITIONS: .................................... 2
1.3. PARTICULARS OF PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE RESPONDENT:.......................3
GROUND 2:...................................................................... 3
2.1. PARTICULARS OF DETRIMENT SUFFERED BY APPELLANT AS A CONSEQUENCE
OF BEING DEFAMED BY THE BOARD: ................................................ 4
The Appellant appeals the decision of the State Administrative Tribunal in VR 107
of 2007 heard before the Panel comprising of His Honour Justice Chaney (then Judge J
Chaney and Acting President) and the Honourable Members, Ms M Jordan and Mr B
Hunt (both Senior Sessional Members). The Panel heard the Appellant on 25.9.2008
and delivered its judgment on 28.10.2008. The Grounds of Appeal are as follows:
GROUND 1:
1. The Tribunal erred in mixed law and facts by wrongly concluding that the Respondent Board had acted appropriately in the public interests under circumstances when it ought, instead, to have arrived at the reasonably legitimate conclusion that the Respondent Board had sought to trifle with the independent law practice of the Appellant on seven successive occasions (the seven inhibitions)under unjustifiable circumstances, to wit: the Board having been involved in a deliberate wrongdoing by
having acted in contumelious disregard of the rights of the Appellant, as follows:
1.1. Re-constituting itself into a false Full Board by Four members acting clandestinely, to go on a frolic of its own, as the agent of the Respondent Board, without the knowledge of the rest of its members, to achieve a private purpose.
1.2. By abusing its discretionary powers under s. 40 of the LP Act for an improper and illegal purpose at the behest of some interested persons, the knowledge of which lies peculiarly within the members of False Full Board.
1.3. By denying the Appellant of his human rights to work and his freedom to choose his own profession.
1.4. By falsely labelling the appellant with the phantom deficiency syndrome which it knows would have its accompanying ostracization and discriminatory effects on the Appellant on grounds of his race, age and personal circumstances?
1.5. By failing to dispense fair economic and blind justice with objective judgments by making value pronouncements of twisted facts of trivialities such that they are taken out of context to represent halftruths and passing them as whole truths (value judgments).
1.6. By failing to use its declarative powers under s. 91 and s.18 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act, 2004 for a proper purpose when it is reasonably apparent to it that the false Full Board had acted in bad faith.
1.7. By so acting in the manner as described in the foregoing sub-paragraphs with persecuting malice.
1.2. PARTICULARS OF THE SEVEN INHIBITIONS:
1.2.1. Ms. F.H. Walter as a member of the Professional Affairs Committee (PAC) activated the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee (LPCC) to make false allegations for an improper recommendation to the PAC in her ambulatory roles as judge and jury for both bodies, resulting in the PAC acting as agent of the Respondent Board, abusing its discretionary powers to trifle with the independent law practice of the Appellant through the seven inhibitions (the first inhibition).
1.2.2. Judge Eckert in the First SAT Decision in VR 137 of 2006 pandered to the whims of the Respondent Board, did unreasonably and illogically confirm the first inhibition on 12.9.2006 and based it on its value judgment, without regard to the need for the provision of a reasoned statement to the Appellant (the First SAT Decision).
1.2.3. Master Sanderson’s erred in disposing of the Appellant’s Appeal of the First SAT Decision in CIV 2110 of 2006 by an unconscionable expunging of the evidentiary materials before him followed by a “devastating” costs order that was subsequently forgiven by the real Full Board by its deciding not to enforce it (the rectifiable procedural error).
1.2.4. The rectifiable procedural error was caused by the human error of the Appellant in making that First SAT Decision Appeal through the General Division of the Supreme Court instead of its proper forum at the Court of Appeal (the latter coming into being with the introduction of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules, 2005). Master Sanderson erred in refusing the Appellant the timely
chance to correct that rectifiable error which resulted in the Appellant becoming traumatised and hence his consequent delay in his subsequent achievement of a successful Leave to Extend time to Appeal in CACV 43 of 2007 (the Leave to Extend Time).
1.2.5. The Leave to Extend Time materialised into the appearance of a Consent Judgment achieved through Justice Steytler on 25.9.2007 resulting from the false Full Board being then cornered into what it could reasonably be expected to believe that it was then in an untenable situation due to the fact that its very existence as the false Full Board was then imminently at risk of being exposed or uncovered.
1.2..6. The false Full Board resurrected itself (in the aftermath of the Steytler Consent Judgment by refusing to honour that consent judgment because the implied compromise had not been properly arranged), into the Inquiry Panel which sat on 3.4.2008 for the purpose of abusing its discretionary powers again using s. 40 of the LP Act through the improper formulation of value judgments as its calumnious attacks on the Appellant by producing the Calumnious Report (the calumny).
1.2.7. Three New members amalgamated with the false Full Board to form a Six-member Approving Committee which clandestinely sat in May 2008 to “stamp its approval” on the usurping False Full Board’s Calumnious Report. They (the three new members) thus duplicate their respective roles as the tainted prosecutor and judge without realising that they also do not form an adequate quorum of the required four members to constitute the false Full Board; they therefore effectively failed to give
their intended authenticity and integrity to that “stamp of approval”.
3
1.2.8. The Second SAT Decision in VR 107 of 2008 erred again in not reversing the calumny of the False Full Board that is reasonably apparent to it as no reasonable decision maker would have arrived at the decision it did.
1.3. PARTICULARS OF PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE RESPONDENT:

1.3.1. Ms. F. H. Walter acted with gross bias and malice at the behest of one Pino Monaco resulting in the seven inhibitions being pursued unrelentingly by the False Full Board which re-incarnated itself in its many shapes and forms, the particulars of which lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the members of the false Full Board of the Respondent.
1.3.2. The false Full Board admitted to its persecuting malice when it was not able to produce its “validating minutes” to show the bona fide of its intentions, its integrity and its authenticity, repeatedly, to the effect that it was indeed not the real Full Board that had acted with the knowledge of all the other 48 members of the Respondent Board.
1.3.3. The six- member Approval Committee of the false Full Board knew that its mission was tainted with gross bias as they do not form the required quorum but they were bent on achieving their ulterior purpose to the detriment of the Appellant.
1.3.4. The wrongs of fellow practitioners complained of by the Appellant were never investigated by the Respondent Board through the LPCC but instead was labelled by the False Full Board as “frivolous allegations against fellow practitioners”. Neither were any positive actions taken by the Respondent Board after the LPCC were intimated by the Appellant as to the falsity of their false allegations.
Those false allegations are in terms of the following:
a) Mr. Pino Monaco manipulated Dr. K.S. Chan and caused her present predicament;
b) Mr. Timothy Robin Thies caused trauma to the family of the Appellant by making frivolous demands for monies that was never owed to him as vindicated in CIV 1903 of 2008;
c) Mr. David Taylor admitting to the facts that CIV 1131 of 2006 was never filed on time in accordance with the Orders of Justice Jenkins in CIV 1142 of 2005.
1.3.5. Commissioning officers of the LPCC like Ms. Coombs and Ms. Cahon to persecute the Appellant by finding faults with him on trivialities.
1,3.6. Erred by deflecting the course of the procedurally-wrong First SAT Appeal in CIV 2210 of 2006 through the General Division of the Supreme Court instead of allowing its correct course through the CACV 43 of 2007 at the Court of Appeal so as to save a lot of heartache for the Appellant.
1. 3.7. Obstruction of justice through the creation of an artificial “institutionalized wall” of the justice system by its attempts to bar rightful complaints to legitimate authorities such as the chief magistrates or the
chief justice, that serves as a “substitute for a Notice of Appeal” by utilizing the value judgment of professional deficiency syndrome using the excuse of disrespect to members of the judiciary.
GROUND 2:
2. The Tribunal erred in mixed law and facts when it failed to reach the reasonably expected conclusion after it had been reasonably apprised of the factual circumstances of the Appellant’s case (by not making a declaration under s.91 of the SAT Act to the effect that the Appellant has been calumniously defamed and injured in his reputation and character by the false Full Board; the false Full Board having been reasonably found to have acted in bad faith under s.18 of the SAT Act) when it was so found to have been usurping the powers of the real Full Board for the oblique purpose of abusing the discretionary powers of the Respondent as conferred by s. 40 of the LP Act, in terms of the following:
2.0.1 By denying the Appellant natural justice through its irrelevant rationalization that it had no powers to award compensation on the defamation issue.
2.0.2. By irrationally and illogically respecting persons instead of respecting the law thereby breaching the fundamental principle of the rule of law; by refusing to tamper with the status quo thereby failing to fulfil its statutory functions to achieve an economic settlement of the issues before it,(fairly: according to the substantial merits of the case; speedily and with less formality and technicality) as required by s.9 of the SAT Act.
2.0.3. By failing to distinguish between the normal and natural “defects” of a new legal practitioners by ascribing the Appellant with the phantom professional deficiency syndrome through entertaining illusions of trivialities, in terms of the following:
2.0.3.1. The Appellant does not appreciate that he could be acting in conflict of interests-situations in his relations with his clients and potential clients.
2.0.3.2. The blurring of the distinction between monies in transit and trust monies kept by the Appellant for MTC;
2.0.3.3. Without realizing the fetish desire of the Board to inappropriately label the appellant as a professional having the proclivity to make false allegations against fellow practitioners like Mr. Timothy Robin Thies, Mr. David Taylor and Mr. Pino Monaco.
2.0.3.4. By imagining that the Appellant has the capacity to disrespect members of the judiciary who are obviously on the wrong path and thereby needs corrections by calling a “spade a spade”; which cannot be solved by mere euphemism.
2.0.3.5. Imagining that Alessandro Bertini is not a victim of the justice system as vindicated by the filed papers in CIV 1764 of 2009 for a s.36 Certiorari Review Order.
2.0.3.6. Imagining that truth and falsehoods are compatible for the ends of justice.
2.0.3.7. Imagining that the SAT Decisions are not free from prejudice and value judgments and that Judges can do away with the essential philosophy for Objective judgments.
2.1. PARTICULARS OF DETRIMENT SUFFERED BY APPELLANT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF BEING DEFAMED BY THE BOARD:
2.1.1. Appellant deprived of his human right to earn his livelihood since the 19.7.2006 and this state of affairs is still continuing without abatement, the quantum of which has been established elsewhere by the Appellant and he also prays for damages for the defamation to be assessed by this Honourable Court together with such other relief as it deems fit.
2.1.2. Appellant is frustrated of his “legitimate expectations” in that his licence as a legal practitioner is reasonably expected to be re-issued to him; his licensor is not reasonably expected to act illegally or unconscionably nor is a public body like the Respondent reasonably expected to be so fickle as to be seen to be blowing “hot and cold” at the same time.
2.1.3. The Appellants suffers mental anguish and trauma for the unjust punishment of the False Full Board unconscionably abusing its discretionary powers unrelentingly using s.40 of the LP Act by requiring him to perform the impossible and yet denies him justice by not prosecuting him faithfully using s.39 of the LP Act instead; at the same time unreasonably refusing to issue him with a Certificate of Fitness for him to go away to another jurisdiction so as to avoid the calamities of having to tolerate the false Full Board deliberate wrongdoings.
2.1.4. The Appellant suffers racial and age discrimination by the false Full Board as provided for under s.42 and s.66ZB of the Equal Opportunity Act, 1984(WA) which has a traumatic scarring effect on his psyche for life.
2.1.5. The Appellants suffers the mental anguish of seeking single-handedly to unravel the calumnious untruths of the value judgments of the seven inhibitions, fearing for his life and his reputation and his maintenance of cordial relations with his professionally elite colleagues.
2.1.6. The whole gamut of sufferings: “whole truths” of rationally derived factual trivialities utilized by the false Full Board maliciously and irrationally turning them into half-truths, innuendos and wilful misrepresentations of concocted “facts”, for the purpose of their formulating value judgments such that a false picture of reality has been hitherto achieved; thus enabling the perpetrators to escape
and causing the innocent Appellant to be imprisoned in a legal abyss. The Appellant shed tears many times before the SAT tribunals to appease his emotional upheaval at the grave injustice done to him by an enlightened Australia.
2.1.7. The Appellants suffers the harrowing experience of seeing innocent people around him becoming victims of the officers of the court through the justice system of WA and was forlornly expressing his sufferings through people like his son Paul and Alessandro Bertini who are being harassed by people knowledgeable in law “to no ends”, to the extent that they can be “cowering and shivering in fear” of
what the courts have in store for them. The false Full Board cannot go about doing the “right thing” by doing the wrong thing first. This is simple logic that every regulator of the legal profession of integrity will understand. In the words of Mr. Bertini: “I believed in the past there was no law in WA, is mafia is the same in Italy where poor people don’t have defence, but now I believe the justices
of the supreme court are there to correct the injustice.”

Signature of the Appellant: ………………………………………………..


SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA CACV 105 OF 2008
COURT OF APPEAL MINUTE OF AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Parties to the Appeal:
NI KOK (NICHOLAS) CHIN APPELLANT
And
LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD, WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDENT
Filed the 7th day of May, 2009
Prepared and Filed by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN - Solicitor-litigant in person
No. 387, Alexander Drive Phone & Fax: 08- 9275 7440
DIANELLA WA 6059 Email: nnchin@msn.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MINUTE OF RE-AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE ORDERS OF
JUSTICE PULLIN GIVEN ON 22.1.2009 AND FURTHER ORDER OF A JUDGE GIVEN ON
1.5.2009 BY WAY OF FACSIMILE IN COMPLIANCE WITH R.32(4)(b)1 OF THE RULES AND
SCHEDULED FOR HEARING ON 15.5.2009 AT 2.15 PM

INDEX PAGE NOS.
THE DECISION APPEALED AGAINST ................................................ 6
1) BOARD DID NOT ACT APPROPRIATELY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: ................... 6
A) THE SEVEN INHBITITIONS TO THE INDEPENDENT PRACTICE OF THE APPELALLANT
BY THE FALSE FULL BOARD ...................................................... 8
B). PARTICULARS OF THE PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE BOARD ....................... 9
C). THE OBLIQUE INTENTIONS OF THE LPCC OFFICERS: ............................ 10
2) BOARD DEFAMED THE APPELLANT: ............................................. 11
2A. FAILURE OF SECOND SAT DECISION TO MAKE OBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS:.............. 11
2B. INCREMENTAL STEPS OF PROGRESSION BY THE APPELLANT AGAINST THE PERSISTENT ONSLAUGHTS OF THE FALSE FULL BOARD: ......................................... 11
2.C. PARTICULARS OF DETRIMENT SUFFERED BY THE APPELLANT RESULTING FROM
THE PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE BOARD ......................................... 12
2.D. FACTS ABOUT NON-ABUSED MTC CHEQUES TAKEN OUT OF THEIR CONTEXT:...........12
2.E. FACTS ABOUT CLIENT’S INSTRUCTIONS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:................. 13
2.F. WRITTEN DIRECTION FROM MTC TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT ........................ 13
2.G. DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRANSIT MONEY AND TRUST MONEY TAKEN OUT OF
CONTEXT: .................................................................... 14
2.H. COMMUNICATIONS WITH JUDICIAL OFFICERS IN RELATION TO MR. THIES TAKEN
OUT OF CONTEXT: ............................................................................. 14
2.I. COMMUNICATION WITH CHIEF JUSTICE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:.................. 15
2.J. LEGITIMATE COMPLAINT TO CHIEF MAGISTRATES TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:..................................................................... 15
2.K. DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE FAIRLY HEARD BEFORE A JUSTICE TAKEN OUT
OF CONTEXT:.................................................................. 16
2.L. ALLEGED FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT OF OTHER PRACTITIONERS
TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT: .................................................... 17
2.M. REFUSAL TO ACCEPT WHOLE–TRUTHS: DAVID TAYLOR MISLED REGISTRAR
POWELL ...................................................................... 17
1 This document contains the original text of the decision maker in 5 pages as required by Justice Pullin to be included herein for ease of reference. Therefore this document actually contains 20 pages (excluding the index) and is therefore intended to be as succinct as possible

2.N. HALF-TRUTH ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF DISLODGING THE APPELLANT’S NAME
FROM CIV 1131 OF 2006: ................................................... 18
2.0. ALLEGED FRIVOLOUS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MR. DAVID TAYLOR TAKEN OUT
OF CONTEXT: ............................................................................. 19
2.P. ALLEGATIONS ABOUT MR. ZELESTIS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:.....................19
2.Q. TRUTH IS STRANGER THAN FICTION IS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT: .................20
2.R. CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATION TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT: ....................20
2.S. RESPECT TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT: ......................21
2.T. LACK OF INSIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING OF PAST CONDUCT TAKEN OUT OF
CONTEXT: .................................................................... 22
2.U. VICTIM OF INJUSTICE MR. BERTINI TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT: 22
THE DECISION APPEALED AGAINST:
The Second SAT Decision in VR 107 of 2007 reported in Chin v West Australian Legal
Practice Board [2008] WASAT 252, heard before His Honour Justice Chaney (then
Judge J Chaney and Acting President) and the Honourable Members, Ms M Jordan
and Mr B Hunt who are both Senior Sessional Members of the Tribunal on 25.9.2008.
Judgment delivered on 28.10.2008. The Two Grounds of Appeal are as
follows:
1) BOARD DID NOT ACT APPROPRIATELY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
The Tribunal erred in mixed law and facts at paragraph 2, 19, 20, 84 and 85 of the Second SAT Decision when it drew the wrong conclusion which states that:
“2.The Tribunal concluded that the Board had acted in accordance with its powers under section 40 of the Legal Practice Act. The Tribunal examined the various matters raised by the Board, and Mr Chin's explanations for that conduct. The Tribunal concluded that the Board acted appropriately, having regard to the protection of the public and the maintenance of professional standards, by imposing the conditions on Mr Chin's practice certificate. Accordingly the application was dismissed.”
“19. We note in passing that Mr Chin's expression of what we understand to be an argument as to the proper construction of the Act is laced with references to matters such as 'a hidden agenda', 'a false ground of a value judgment', 'explicit discriminatory practice', attempts to give 'wrongs the appearance of legality', an absence of good faith on the part of the Board, and 'gross bias'. Subsequently, in the document, Mr Chin asserts malicious conduct by a practitioner who made a complaint against him, ‘surreptitious’ activities by a member of the Professional Affairs Committee of the Tribunal, and inappropriate influence on the Professional Affairs Committee by a complaining practitioner. He refers to the previous decision of this Tribunal on 12 September 2006 in the following way:
The SAT through Judge Eckert therefore compromised the tenets of integrity, impartiality and independence of the respondent by enabling it to
blow 'hot' and 'cold' in one breath; i.e, by giving the applicant his unrestricted status and by withdrawing it thereafter for the purpose of the
unjustified control.”
20. We do not accept Mr Chin's submissions as to the proper construction of s 40 of the LP Act. In our view, the power of the Board to impose conditions does not first require a suspicion or belief that a practitioner is incapable or unfit within the meaning of s 39 of the LP Act to be formed. Section 39(3) of the LP Act provides that where the Board suspects or believes that a practitioner is incapable or unfit, and the public interest or protection of the integrity of the profession requires refusal, suspension or cancellation of a practice certificate, the Board may
apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a hearing and determination under s 188 of the LP Act. It is the Tribunal which then has then power under s 188(9) of the LP Act to refuse, suspend, cancel, or impose conditions on the practice certificate. Section 40 of the LP Act has no work to do in relation to the procedures available under s 39 of the LP Act.”
“
84 The object of the exercise of regulatory powers by the Board, and by the Tribunal standing in its shoes, is the protection of the public and the maintenance of the standards expected of the profession. The object of the exercise of regulatory powers is not punishment. Where the public interest and the maintenance of appropriate professional standards require particular course of action, that requirement must outweigh the personal interests of the practitioner concerned. That is the case here.”
“
85 The various matters referred to above, demonstrate, in our view clearly, that Mr Chin does not have a proper appreciation of, and does not observe, the standards of conduct expected of legal practitioners. We do not consider that Mr Chin should be permitted to practice unsupervised. The conditions imposed by the Board were, in our view, entirely appropriate. It follows that Mr Chin's application for review of those conditions should be dismissed.
Orders
1. The decision of the Legal Practice Board made on 2 May 2008 to impose conditions upon Mr Chin's annual practice certificate is confirmed.

2. The application for review of the Board's decision of 2 May 2008 is dismissed”.
in the following terms:
1.1. The false Full Board as distinguished from a real Full Board is constituted by any four members of the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia who are acting clandestinely for a private interest rather than the public interest and is unable to show its validating minutes as required by s.10 and 11 of the LP Act and rr 15 and 17 of the Legal Practice Board Rules, 2004. This is because its hidden agenda is unknown to the rest of the 48 members of the Legal Practice Board.
7
1.2. The false Full Board abused its discretionary powers by invoking its independent and separate powers using the discriminatory “un-punishing s. 40” instead of “the punishing s.39”contrary to the requirements of ss.164 and 175 of the LP Act via the Legal Complaints Committee (the LPCC) to persecute the Appellant for no wrongs instead of prosecuting him for some tangible wrongs. It thereby tarnished the Appellant’s good reputation and discredited him in the eyes of the public and lowered the professional standards expected of lawyers in WA.
1.3. Ms. Karen Whitney and Ms. C. Coombs of the LPCC at the inception of the persecution case used the epithets “unfit to practice” and “requires supervision” on the Appellant which connotes that the Appellant ought to have been prosecuted under s.39 yet they subsequently contradicted themselves by “not punishing him” under s.40 of the LP Act because they cannot find any wrongs committed by him (the LPCC officers).
1.4. Persecuting malice pervades first in the Professional Affairs Committee of the Board (the PAC) through the instrumentality of the false Full Board which constantly re-constitutes itself and manifests itself in the form of the seven “inhibitions” to the independent practice of the Appellant (the inhibitions).
1.5. A proper judicial determination of the issues (sans the persecuting malice) prosecuted under s. 39 of the LP Act would have served the public interest of the Board better but the false Full Board chose to pursue its shady pursuits of the Appellant with the secret weapon of s.40 to circumvent the legal prosecution
process with a hidden agenda.
1.6. The LPCC officers are reasonably seen to be working at the behest of some unknown and unidentified persecuting members of the PAC appearing as the false Full Board through one elected visible member with a hidden agenda, one Ms. F.H. Walter who played the ambulatory roles of judge, jury and prosecutor and was working at the behest of Mr. Pino Monaco in particular.
1.7. Examples from the transcript of the proceedings of the First SAT Decision are sufficient to justify the Appellant’s fair comments that the learned Judge Eckert had compromised the tenets of her impartiality, independence and integrity of SAT as the decision maker, when she spoke of the Appellant in derogatory terms as follows:
i) “He has no insight either into his conduct or ability”;
ii) “His evidence was evasive, often off point and wordy”;
iii) “He was unable to give a straightforward answer to many questions”;
iv) “His oral evidence was inconsistent with the written papers before it”;
v) “His reluctance to answer questions that do not seem to advance his case”;
vi) “His perception of the truth did not coincide with everyone’s conception of the truth without question”.
1.8. The false Full Board did not, in its good conscience, bind itself with the constraints of the principles of equity when it misinterpreted the LP Act to read down the human rights of the Appellant, thereby causing the mischief which it should have avoided in the public interest.
1.9. The false Full Board is unrelenting in persecuting the Appellant using the illusive weapon in s.40 when it changed course midway by abandoning its original intention to prosecute the Appellant under s.39 of the LP Act because it persecuted first before it started to prosecute and later found that it could not do so
without the available evidence.
1.10. By its improper and shady pursuits using s. 40 as a secret weapon instead of giving fair justice by using s.39, the false Full Board made seven attempts to implicate the Appellant with a bad name through the expediency of the far-fetched notion of the phantom deficiency syndrome by equating it with the common or universal traits of young lawyers (without regard to the Appellant being a mature age young lawyer) (the phantom deficiency syndrome).
1.11. The false Full Board through s.40 could “imprison” the Appellant for life in a “legal abyss” using the legal ingenuities of some of its clandestinely active members by furtively through a false Full Board utilize the phantom deficiency syndrome and its accompanying “ostracization” effects (finding both to be working
synergistically due to the ethnic background of the Appellant) and caused him to be discriminated against in his professional status on the grounds of his race and age.
1.12. The false Full Board went on “a frolic of its own” using s.40 to provide a false front so as to enable it to achieve its hidden objectives.
1.13. The false Full Board formulated value judgements that lacks the necessary, purposive and indispensable philosophy for judges and thereby does not contribute to the purpose of making objective determinations of the facts of the case before it (by contradicting Dr. Peikoff’s philosophy of Objectivism.
2). Objective judgments must be for the real purpose of extracting truths (good, real) from 2 http://www.peikoff.com/ Dr. Leonard Peikoff, the world's foremost authority on Ayn Rand's philosophy, Objectivism said: To save the world is the simplest thing in the world. All one has to do is think.
8 the falsehoods (bad or evil or unreal) and not for any oblique purpose of rewarding the evaders and the guilty and punishing the innocents and the victims.
1.14. Despite the many pleas by the Appellant to the panel of judges in the Second SAT Decision to be wary of the pitfalls in making value judgements, SAT succumbed to that mistake through its lack of caution or its taking precautions to maintain the status quo of our justice system thereby avoiding its statutory role and its given capacity to deliver its services of economic fair blind justice to the public.
1.15. Ms. G. Cahon of the LPCC was lately again commissioned in the aftermath of the Second SAT Decision by the false Full Board to re-litigate matters under s. 39 of the LP Act which was successfully objected to by the Appellant on the ground of res-judicata. The LPCC displays an uncanny tenacity as seen in its persistence and insistence for achieving its seemingly elusive objective.
A) THE SEVEN INHBITITIONS TO THE INDEPENDENT PRACTICE OF THE APPELALLANT BY THE FALSE FULL BOARD
A.1. No person can be punished for no wrongs and the False Full Board knows this and yet pursued it unrelentingly to achieve its hidden agenda. It is morally wrong for the Board to say it does not punish the Appellant when the effects of those seven wrongful inhibitions to his independent legal practice are punishments as clear as day. The false Full Board accomplished its persecuting malice with improper motives as the agent of the unknowing Board.
A.2. The capricious and improper seven inhibitions are practical impossibilities for the Appellant to reasonably perform, consequently they are discriminatory in nature and effects, on the Appellant, and are therefore of null effect in law. The false Full Board through the Monaco undue influence continued to create havoc for the Board resulting in the seven inhibitions, viz:
A.2.1. The First inhibition:
Ms. F.H. Walter caused the impugned recommendation of the LPCC to the PAC. The false Full Board in turn imposed the impugned conditions on the practice certificate of the Appellant on the 19.7.2006 despite the written objections of the Appellant. This became the subject of the Appellant’s Application in VR 137 of 2006 before the State Administrative Tribunal (the First SAT Decision).
A.2.2. The Second inhibition:
The First SAT Decision was made by Judge Eckert when she unreasonably concurred illogically with the First Inhibition by her acclaimed Value Judgment on 12.9.2006. The reasons for this aberrant Decision is contained in the Grounds of Appeal in CACV 43 of 2007 that caused the Board to concede that Appeal in the Fourth Inhibition.
A.2.3. The Third inhibition:
The learned Master Sanderson’s error in disposing of the Appellant’s procedurally-wrong appeal made in error by him with the guidance of the learned Master himself –the appeal from the First SAT Decision made by the Appellant to the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeal in CIV 2210 of 2006 at a time when that Court of Appeal replaced the Full Court of the Supreme Court in 2005. The Supreme Court staff advised the Appellant correctly but Master Sanderson wanted to
hear the CIV 2210 of 20006 himself and refused for it to be removed and he did hear it and he did have it struck off; this put the Appellant into a state of trauma that was to last until he found his way to appeal out of time to the correct forum after writing to the Chief Justice.
A.2.4. The Fourth inhibition:
The Board agreed to a consent judgment with the Appellant through the learned Justice Steytler on 25.9.2007 in CACV 43 of 2007. The reason for conceding the appeal was that counsel for the Appellant Mr. Tim Stephenson requested for the validating Minutes of the First Inhibition and the Board was dumb-founded. This proves that the allegations of the Appellant that PAC and the LPCC were acting in unison and not independently of each other through the clandestine efforts of Ms. F.
H. Walter was being confirmed by the conduct of the false Full Board. It was expected that the real Full Board would subsequently emerge to do justice to the parties but this did not happen as the false Full Board was able to resurrect itself in the aftermath of the Steytler Consent Judgment.
A.2.5. The Fifth Inhibition:
The resurrected false Full Board became the Inquiry Panel which sat on 3.4.2008 and was again unable to produce its validating minutes when requested for by barrister Tim Stephenson as counsel for the Appellant. It unrelentingly re-imposed the impugned conditions on the Appellant’s practice certificate and even refused him a chance to get away from the WA jurisdiction to set up a practice elsewhere. It relied on the res-judicata materials and s.40 because it could not use s.39 against the Appellant to put him into the legal abyss again.
A.2.6. The Sixth Inhibition:
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Six learned members of the tainted Approving Committee clandestinely sat in May 2008 without the knowledge of the Appellant to illegally approve the illegal report of the Fifth Inhibition for the false Full Board. They show culpable ignorance of the fact that 3 of their members ought to have been disqualified on account of gross bias as they had already deliberated in the false Full Board for the determination of the Fifth Inhibition; they cannot approve something of their own creation and if
they were to do so they could be reasonably seen to have been playing ambulatory roles as prosecutor, judge and jury at the same time again.
A.2.7. The Seventh Inhibition:
This is the Second SAT Decision and the subject of this Appeal delivered on 25.9.2008 based on the written judgment by the learned Justice Chaney. His Honour erred when he unreasonably dismissed the Appellant’s Application in VR 107 of 2008 in the light of his own acknowledgement of the existence of the calumny and detraction perpetrated by the false Full Board upon the Appellant. He erred by refusing to use the declarative powers under s.91 of State Administrative Tribunal Act, 2004(the SAT Act) to declare that the false Board had acted in bad faith against the Appellant under s. 18 of the SAT Act upon the invalid ground that it had no jurisdiction to determine issues of compensation in circumstances that he was not required to do so by the Appellant.
B). PARTICULARS OF THE PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE BOARD
B.1. The First Inhibition caused by the PAC being tainted with gross bias through the agency of Ms. F. H.Walter and therefore it is a nullity in law.
B.2. The false Full Board is responsible for the perpetration of the wrongs of the Seven Inhibitions upon the Appellant as it is the false agent of the Board whose authority is being usurped for improper purposes without having regard to the safeguards imposed by the relevant legislations and regulations governing the functions of the Board.
B.3. The false Full Board admitted by its conduct to the effect that it was falsely constituted and was not the real Full Board when it consented to the Steytler Consent Judgment by its inability to produce its validating minute for the first time; yet it knowingly refused to make amends for itself and continued
to be resurrected in other forms and manifestations that caused continuing injustice to the Appellant. Yet, they are made up of the honourable members of the highest echelons of the legal profession.
B.4. Only three out of the 6 panel members in the Sixth Inhibition were qualified to ratify the Fifth Inhibition as the remaining three members were already members of the Fifth Inhibition Panel. Therefore, there was no majority votes achieved in that decision, the Sixth Inhibition remains unratified till today and is of null effect in law.
B.5. The wrongs of Mr. Pino Monaco against Dr. K.S. Chan were never investigated by the LPCC but he was the driving force behind that First Inhibition. This is the first hidden agenda of the false Full Board.
B.6. The issue of Mr. David Taylor using “underhand tactics” to falsify the court records to the effect that the Writ of CIV 1131 of 2006 as required by Justice Jenkins to be filed in a “timely fashion” in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.1 was not so filed and served on 10.2.2006; in reality, it was filed on the 16.2.2006 and
served a day earlier on 15.2.2006 after he had been alerted by the Appellant to do so. This argument by the Appellant is buttressed by the unofficial findings of Justice Simmonds in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2 in the form of the Court records personally observed by him and handed over to the late Nancy Hall.
This issue remains uncontroverted partly due to the Appellant’s timely response letter to the LPCC dated 1.9.2006 caused by the Complaint from Mr. David Taylor against the Appellant under circumstances when the Appellant should have been the complainant and other available evidence that could be verified in the records of CACV 107 of 2008. This is the second hidden agenda of the false Full Board.
B.7. Justice Hasluck’s findings in CIV 1903 of 2008 that Mr. Timothy Robin Thies is guilty of fraud and unconscionable conduct against the Appellant and his son in FR417 of 2007 and FR944 of 2008 and District Court Appeal No.6 of 2006 has put the issue that the Appellant can be professionally deficient only through his proclivity to make “false allegations against fellow practitioners” is now being put to
rest. This is the third hidden agenda of the false Full Board.
B.8. Ms. Cahon as late as the 7.11.2008 was still trying to re-persecute the Appellant on the various and varied matters that have been before that court-like tribunal and the SAT tribunals and they are indeed res-judicata. This is the fourth hidden agenda of the false Full Board.
B.9. The purposeful deflection of the procedurally wrong appeal of the First SAT Decision into the wrong forum of the Supreme Court CIV 2210 of 2006 instead of the Court of Appeal and its consequent striking out by the learned Master Sanderson, coupled with the subsequent denial of natural justice to the Appellant in CIV 1775 of 2008 through the error of that learned Master in relation to the issue of
Mr. David Taylor’s falsification of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 is the fifth hidden agenda (the Third Inhibition) of the false Full Board.
B.10. The learned Master Sanderson denied the Appellant his human right to be entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and an impartial judge in the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil matter in accordance with article 10 for the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights.
B.11. The false Full Board erected the “institutionalized wall” of the justice system in WA by barring the Appellant to obtain right justice by mischievously alleging that the Appellant was tampering with the impartialities, independence and integrity of the justice system which they knew could only be achieved if the Appellants were trying to influence judgments by contacting the trial judges which the Appellants were never wont to do. Its oblique purpose was to prevent the Appellant from complaining to the relevant authorities like the Chief Justice, the Chief Magistrate and the International Bar for redress to set the administration of justice aright. To continue to persecute the Appellant on this ground alone is to deny him absolute privilege or qualified immunity for advancing his legitimate
complaint to an authority, which is a “substitute for a Notice of Appeal.” The Supreme Court of WA is now realizing this and has set up directives obtainable at its website that enabled and encouraged litigants to approach judges to facilitate complaints to the rightful authority.
C). THE OBLIQUE INTENTIONS OF THE LPCC OFFICERS:
The persecuting malice and the exemplified oblique intentions of the employed officers of the LPCC show that the persecuting malice exists in fact in the following terms:
C.1. The LPCC Officers were commissioned to find fault with the Appellant and therefore made the recommendations for the First Inhibition with the collaboration of Ms. F.H.Walter at the behest of Mr. Pino Monaco.
C.2. The First SAT decision by the learned Judge Eckert trialled the First Inhibition and erroneously confirmed it without giving any written judgment except for the illogical reasons that was never meant to be, as contained in the transcript.
C.3. Ms. Coombs was not satisfied with the inequity and null effect of that First Inhibition and exhibited an uncanny desire to have the Appellant struck off the roll without any valid grounds but this was not subsequently approved by the LPCC.
C.4. Ms. G Mc Cahon of LPCC was re-attempting to pre-empt Ms. Coomb’s uncanny desire to repersecute the Appellant for professional misconduct under s. 39 after it found that s.40 might no longer be a useful weapon and she tried to do so using the Thies’ case of allegedly “frivolous allegations against another practitioner” but had to give it up when she found that Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008 had put a lid on it. Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC was displaying the right attitude when she was apprised of Justice Hasluck’s Decision.
C.5. The “phantom deficiency syndrome” equated with the universal traits of young lawyers was used as an expedient by the false Full Board for the persecution of the Appellant. Mr. Dean Elek-Roser of Western Legal as the former lawyer of Mr. Timothy Robin Thies, who had caused much angst to the Appellant and his son Paul has the following exemplified characteristics of young lawyers, (which is easily forgiven by the Appellant but such characteristics of the Appellant is not easily forgiven by
the LPCC), in terms of the following:
C.5.1. Why did Mr. Elek-Roser write to the trial judge of his client’s case Justice Hasluck for the purpose of tampering with his impartialities and independence without copying that letter to the Appellant? (This information was disclosed publicly to the Appellant during the hearing of this Ex-parte Application in CIV 1903 of 2008.)
C.5.2. Why did Mr. Elek-Roser say to the Appellant that the Magistrates Court do not have to abide by the principle of rule of law with regard to the cases before Magistrates Musk and Michelides and Commissioner Herron or was he trying to tell the Appellant that the brand of justice as administered by the justice system of WA is not the preferred kind of blind justice?
C.5.3. Why did Mr. Elek-Roser make demands for monies from the Appellant and his son Paul, which he knew were not legally owed to Mr. Thies, knowing that the learned Commissioner Herron’s, Magistrates Michelides’ and Musk’s Orders were null and void having regard to the facts and the applicable laws that were made available by the Appellant before them and him was being ignored by them because they do not believe in blind justice?
C.5.4. Why did Mr. Elek-Roser refuse service of documents upon himself on behalf of his client Mr. Thies as his solicitor and neglected to obey the common law with regard to the personal service of those documents? (He unwittingly drew the attention of Mr. Thies over the telephone when he 11 was being served with those documents by the Appellant in accordance with the orders of Justice Hasluck on 9.12.2008 upon the request of the Appellant.)
C.5.5. The telephone call was made contemporaneously by him to Mr. Thies in the presence of the Appellant. Before that event, those documents had already been receipted or signed for by his agent at his office during his absence.
C.5.6. He aggravated the situation by refusing to reveal to the Appellant the then current whereabouts of Mr. Thies and he was by his conduct therefore enabling Mr. Thies to escape the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, contrary to his duties as an officer of that Court.
C.5.7. Despite written warnings to Mr. Elek-Roser and Mr. David Taylor, the Appellant withheld from complaining to the LPCC thinking that young lawyers and old lawyers alike are also prone to have the “phantom deficiency syndrome”.
C.5.8. The Appellant is disillusioned by the double standards or the discriminatory conduct of the LPCC i.e. condoning Mr. Elek-Roser’s conduct but came down hard on the Appellant for making minor mistakes which a young lawyer would ordinarily be prone to make whilst both are embarking on an independent practice of their own.
C.5.9. When given a choice not to further complain against Mr. Elek-Roser through Ms. Brookes, the Appellant chose not to do so provided the personal service of the Justice Hasluck Orders in CIV 1903 0f 2008 effected through him as described above, stands resolved.
2) BOARD DEFAMED THE APPELLANT:
2A. FAILURE OF SECOND SAT DECISION TO MAKE OBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS: The Tribunal failed to make objective determinations of the facts which indicate preponderantly that the False Full Board as agent for the Board had defamed the Appellant and injured him in his character and reputation. It erred in mixed law and facts in paragraph 13 & 16 of the SAT decision when it states that:
13. “At the commencement of the hearing, Mr Chin confirmed that he was pursuing a claim for compensation from the Board as a result of its conduct. The Tribunal pointed out to Mr Chin that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for compensation, and the matter was not further pursued…...
16. Apart from his responses to the Board's conclusions, Mr Chin raised other issues in the various documents he lodged in support of his application and in his oral submissions. The issues were not precisely expressed, and in some cases did not bear upon the task confronting the Tribunal.”
as follows:
2A.1. The Tribunal denied the Appellant natural justice by irrelevantly rationalizing that it had no powers to award compensation on the defamation issue whilst it was only required to make a declaration of that issue in accordance with s.91 of the SAT Act.
2A.2. The Tribunal erred in giving a Value Judgment instead of an Objective Judgment because it could not divest itself from its set attitude not to tamper with the status quo and it thereby failed to fulfil its statutory functions in accordance with s.9 of the SAT Act to achieve an economic settlement of the issue, fairly, according to substantial merits of the case, speedily, with little formality and
technicality.
2B. INCREMENTAL STEPS OF PROGRESSION BY THE APPELLANT AGAINST THE PERSISTENT ONSLAUGHTS OF THE FALSE FULL BOARD:
2B.1. The false Full Board’s persistence in its phantom deficiency syndrome argument has been “whittled” down (by incremental steps through the Appellant’s rigorous defence of the seven Inhibitions-steps)to the following remaining characteristics, viz:
2.B.1.1. The Appellant allegedly acting in conflict of interests-situations where none exists,
2.B.1.2. The blurring of the distinction between monies in transit and trust monies kept by the Appellant for MTC;
2.B.1.3. The fetish desire of the Board to label the appellant as capable of making false allegations against fellow practitioners like Mr. Timothy Robin Thies and Mr. David Taylor, the former, now being vindicated by Justice Hasluck findings that Mr. This is guilty of fraud and unconscionable conduct against the Appellant and his son in CIV 1903 of 2008.
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2.B.1.4. It’s readiness to defend Mr. David Taylor for the falsification of court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 currently being fortified in the appeal case of CACV 107 of 2008 against Master Sanderson’s Decision in CIV 1775 of 2008.
2.B.1.5. The inequity of Master Sanderson’s denial of natural justice to the Appellant by taking away his human rights to be treated equally before a Judge in CIV 2210 of 2006. This is matched by the equally false notion of the Board that the Appellant has the capacity of showing disrespect to a Member of the Judiciary.
2.B.1.6. The inability of the LPCC and the Board to assess the injustice done to Mr. Bertini who is an innocent victim of the justice system caused by inefficient regulator of the legal profession barking up the wrong tree blaming it on the Appellant’s phantom deficiency syndrome. This case can now be found be found in CIV 1764 of 2009 – Exparte Application by Alessandro Bertini for Review under
s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004.
2.B.1.7. The learned counsel Peter Quinlan’s assertion before the Appellant in the proceedings of the First SAT Decision to the effect that falsehoods and truth are compatible “foods” for the digestion of the Tribunal without its taking exception to this preposterous logic. This means that the Tribunal is not there to provide the desired blind justice but prefers to keep the view that the law is a respecter of
persons irrespective of whether it is right or wrong justice.
2.B.1.8. Judge Eckert was not required to write a reasoned judgment in the First SAT Decision (and therefore could not be effectively refuted by the Appellant) compared to the written judgment of the learned Justice Chaney in the Second SAT Decision (which is currently being refuted in this document).
2.C. PARTICULARS OF DETRIMENT SUFFERED BY THE APPELLANT RESULTING FROM THE PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE BOARD
2C.1. Deprivation of his human right to earn his livelihood since the 19.7.2006 and this state of affairs is still continuing without abatement.
SC.2. Frustrated of his legitimate expectations in that his licence as a legal practitioner would be issued to him and that his licensor cannot be acting illegally or unconscionably nor reasonably being seen to be blowing hot and cold at the same time.
2.C.3. Suffers mental anguish and trauma for the unjust punishment of the False Full Board unconscionably invoking an un-punishing s.40 requiring him to do the impossible and yet denies him justice by not prosecuting him using s.39 and would not issue him a Certificate of Fitness for him to go away to another jurisdiction.
2.C.4. Suffers racial and age discrimination by the false Full Board under s.42 and s.66ZB of the Equal Opportunity Act, 1984(WA).
2.C.5. The unreasonable persecutor calumniously ignores “whole truths” of rationally derived facts by disguising them irrationally into half-truths, innuendos, and wilful misrepresentations of fictitious matters and changing them into fictions and accept them as fictions; accomplished through a scant regard for their contexts; resulting in their biased formulation of value judgments by discarding the
need for themselves as judges to be equipped with a proper and indispensable philosophy devised for the purpose of determining truth and justice and not for the oblique purpose of projecting falsehoods and calumnies onto the Appellant.
2.C.6. It cast aspersions on the Appellant’s communications with Chief Magistrate and the Chief Justice effected by the Applicant for the just purpose of achieving a better administration of justice and not for the improper purpose of affecting outcomes of matters then currently being judicially determined by specific judges who cannot be interfered with by any interested parties in the interests of justice
and in the due process of the law.
2.D. FACTS ABOUT NON-ABUSED MTC CHEQUES TAKEN OUT OF THEIR CONTEXT: The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 30 and 37 of the Second SAT Decision in that:
“30……..According to the investigation report, the file contained two uncashed cheques dated May and June 2005, one payable to the
Magistrates Court and the other to the practitioner. The inspection was carried out sometime after February 2006, so it would appear that the cheques were many months old.13
in terms of the following:
2.D.1. The two uncashed cheques were sent to the Appellant by MTC and they were not cashed because those monies were no longer required as disbursements for court fees for the filing of the documents for and on behalf of MTC as originally intended.
2.D.2. The Appellant had already informed MTC that those cheques are no longer intended to be so used and that MTC should have them cancelled. If the Appellant were dishonest, he would have simply cashed those cheques and not informed MTC and none would have been wiser. The Appellant had intended to bring them back to MTC anyway when he meet with MTC on the next social visit.
2.E. FACTS ABOUT CLIENT’S INSTRUCTIONS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT: The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 31 of the Second SAT Decision in that:
31.The costs arrangement referred to in the letter of 11 August 2005, and the agreement with the debtor, both involved the receipt of trust monies.
in terms of the following:
2.E.1. The letter of the 11th day of August, 2005 reflects the intentions of the parties as agreed between them via a telephone conversation as indicated in that letter. The Appellant sent that contemporaneous letter to MTC such that no dispute would arise in the future. Although the MTC did not respond by a return mail or facsimile, the accompanying telephone call with him by the Appellant confirms that
both parties were ad idem upon those terms and there were no subsequent issues regarding it. The original intention conveyed by the telephone conversation with MTC was a request by the Appellant for MTC to return that letter signed by him acknowledging that he had read the contents.
2.E.2. The facts are that the debtor of MTC Mr. White was then negotiating for a settlement of that debt collection action initiated by the Appellant on behalf of MTC, with the Appellant.
2.E.3. The terms of the settlement agreement is that the Appellant was to be paid his debt collection fees in monthly instalments as and when each instalment are being paid into the nominated account of the Appellant created for that purpose upon the direction of MTC as evidenced by that letter.
2.E.4. Mr. White was to deposit his monthly instalment payments of his debts then owing to MTC and it was faithfully anticipated by the Appellant that the former would do so faithfully. (The Appellant was then preparing to go for three month stint in Malaysia for the purpose of getting admitted into the Malaysian Bar.) In anticipation of the monthly payments being deposited into his nominated account
during his then pending absence from Australia and that he would not be able to make the timely payment of the monies in transit held for him, the Appellant wrote a few cheques from that account MTC paying him in advance his anticipated income from the debt-repayments of Mr. White whilst he was away in Malaysia.
2.E.5. Upon the return of the Appellant to Australia after the three month stint, he found that Mr. White had missed his last monthly payment of his debt to MTC and that the Appellant had over-paid MTC to the extent of $700.00.
2.E.6. As the Appellant was disabled by the Board to continue acting for MTC on account of Mr. White reneging on his settlement agreement, MTC had to resort to other avenues of obtaining justice for his case against Mr. White.
2.F. WRITTEN DIRECTION FROM MTC TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT
The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 35 of the Second SAT Decision in that:
35. While we accept that Mr Chin is aware of the provisions of s 137 of the LP Act and r 54 of the LPB Rules, we are not satisfied that he understands the proper application of those provisions. His explanation as to his arrangements does not address the apparent way in which he handled funds in relation to his client MTC. It can be noted that, in the matter concerning MTC, Mr Chin did not obtain a written direction from his client in relation to the manner in which he was dealing with the funds. The operation of his 'second account' effectively to facilitate payments which would normally be conducted through a trust account appears to amount effectively to the operation of a trust account while
avoiding the audit and other regulatory requirements of a trust account.
in terms of the following:
2.F.1. The Tribunal assented to the false Full Board mischievously misconceiving that those monies paid by Mr. White were trust monies when they were clearly not. Monies in transit are not required to be paid into a trust account specially opened for the purpose in accordance with the law.
2.F.2. The Legal Profession Act 2008 makes provisions for monies in transit and distinguishes them from trust monies held by solicitors so as to avoid this confusion.
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2.F.3. The Appellant was right to put the monies into another account separate from his own monies and did make his timely arrangements for regular payments to MTC when he anticipates that he would be away from the jurisdiction for three months.
2.F.4. This conduct of the Appellant shows that he was a fair dinkum all the time and this fact was admitted to by the Second SAT Decision.
2.F.5. The Tribunal persisted in making its value judgment of the “phantom deficiency” in the face of the facts that the Appellant was seen to have fully apprehended the provisions the relevant provisions in terms of the keeping of trust account accounts in particular r.54 and of the Legal Practice Board Rules,
2004 and s.137 of the LP Act. The Appellant is obliged to open a trust account only if he were to hold trust monies on behalf of his clients and will do so if the exigencies of the case require him to do so.
He should never be faulted for making this statement unless the false Full Board is making a Value Judgment on this issue.
2.G. DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRANSIT MONEY AND TRUST MONEY TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 36 of the Second SAT
Decision in that:
36. In our view, Mr Chin's response to the concerns in relation to the handling of money for his client MTC does demonstrate an insufficient appreciation of his obligations concerning dealings with money held on behalf of clients.
37. ……..The absence of such suggestion does not, however, lead to the conclusion that Mr Chin does not require supervision in relation to trust monies given his views as to the operation of s 137(2) of the LP Act.”
in the following terms:
2.G.1. The Appellant received monies for work done and generated invoices to that effect. There is no truth that the Appellant accepted payment in advance for work which is not yet completed as staggered payments were indeed being received from clients for part of works already completed although the common law does not forbid solicitors to accept monies (and does not require them to be placed in a trust account for work to be done) as they are not trust monies.
2.G.2. It is therefore a half-truth for the Second SAT Decision to say that the Appellant requires supervision for trust monies and does not understand the basic logic of how and when he is required to operate a trust account. This is a discrimi-natory practice of the Board and a Value Judgement against the Appellant. The Appellant has a degree in Business Management and Accountancy and has taught
Accountancy as a subject for matriculating students for twenty two years in secondary schools. He could not have been so silly as far as trust account is concerned.
2.H. COMMUNICATIONS WITH JUDICIAL OFFICERS IN RELATION TO MR. THIES TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law when it stated at paragraph 42 of the SAT decision that:
“42 We agree with the Board that Mr Chin's conduct in directing correspondence to judicial officers, and the explanation he proffered for doing so, demonstrates a poor understanding of the appropriate method of communication between a legal practitioner and a Court. Our concern in relation to that conduct is heightened by the nature of the allegations of criminal conduct, the foundation for which appears to be that Mr Chin considered the solicitor concerned to be making unjustified demands before agreeing to removal of the caveat. We are not
satisfied that there was any proper foundation for that serious allegation. It is of further concern that no copy of Mr Chin's communication
with the court was sent to Mr Thies.”.
in the following terms:
2.H.1. The Appellant’s communications with judicial officers are misconceived as they have never been directed to the trial judges. The Chief Magistrates or Chief Justice referred to, do have supervising functions over Magistrates and other judges and lawyers as they are themselves the founts of justice.
The Appellant is always aware that the independence, integrity and impartialities of the trial judges are never to be tampered with and he always ensures that their positions are never to be compromised.
2.H.2. Each time a document in the nature of a complaint is being sent to a person with authority to deal with the complaint, it does not require that Mr. Thies or the person complained of ought to be informed or notified of it except for letters sent to the administrative officer of the court that is intended to be brought to the notice of the trial judge; nevertheless Mr. Thies or his solicitors, Western Legal was at all material times notified of them.
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2.H.3. The documents that were sent to these founts of justice act as a substitute for Notices of Appeal which contains issues for the Appellant to litigate upon at a later time and they are intended to serve as contemporaneous evidence of those facts.
2.H.4. These complaints confer absolute privilege or qualified immunity upon the Appellant as if the complainant is the writer of some potentially libellous materials and therefore the Board should not assail him in this regard.
2.H.5. The findings of the learned Justice Hasluck on 7.11.2008 in CIV 1903 of 2008 dispels the previous misconceived notions of the Board that the Appellant was in the habit of making serious false allegations against another legal practitioner, Mr. Thies in particular, and the same argument should apply for the misconceptions of the false Full Board with regard to the allegedly false serious allegations of the Appellant against Mr. David Taylor.
2.I. COMMUNICATION WITH CHIEF JUSTICE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
10. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law when it stated at paragraphs 46 of the SAT decision that:
46 Again, the purpose of the letter to the Chief Justice is not evident on its face. By way of explanation, Mr Chin said at the hearing that, at the time of writing to the Chief Justice, he was suffering depression because of Mr Thies' conduct and because of the costs order, which Mr Chin was not able to meet, having been made against him. He thought that the Chief Justice had responsibility to see that the system of justice is working properly, and hence he was drawing the Chief Justice's attention to the injustices which Mr Chin considered that he was suffering.”
2.I.1. It is reasonably conceived by the Appellant at all material times that in our adversarial system of justice that if the parties are able to bring forth arguments and unassailable facts before the learned Master or any member of the judiciary, the justice system should be working and should not fail him.
2.I.2. If it is reasonably conceivable from the circumstances of the case, that the learned Master or any member of the judiciary had descended into the arena of conflicts and was blinded by the dusts of conflicts then a complaint ought to be made to the supervising judge to see that another suitable judge is being appointed to hear the case so that right justice is being dispensed.
2.I.3. It is the duty of the court to advise the appellant on the procedural error of the Appellant having directed his Appeal of the First SAT Decision to the Court of Appeal instead of the Supreme Court as the Full Court of the Supreme Court by 2005 had become the Court of Appeal. That complaint should then attract the immunity of the Appellant as the complainant.
2.J. LEGITIMATE COMPLAINT TO CHIEF MAGISTRATES TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 56 and 60 in that:
56 We note in passing that amongst the documents relating to this matter attached to Mr Chin's affidavit filed in his appeal against the Tribunal's 2006 decision, are three facsimile letters sent by Mr Chin to the Chief Magistrate dated 21, 25 and 27 September, concerning aspects of different Magistrates' conduct in relation to that claim 60 The second observation that can be made is that the proceedings in the Magistrate's Court concerning the costs order gave rise to further inappropriate communications by Mr Chin to the Chief Magistrate.

in the following terms:
2.J.1. The learned Magistrate Roberts erred in that he was reasonably seen to be in dereliction of his duties by descending himself into the arena of conflict.
2.J.2. The only way out of this administrative error of our justice system is for the Appellant to write to the Chief Magistrate who has supervisory duties under the legislation3 to set aright an administrative matter that had gone awry.
2.J.3. This does not concern a judicial-decision making process which can only be righted by an appeal to a higher court.
2.J.4. The Appellant was right and he did achieve success in what he did and therefore he had served a public interest in ensuring that a member of the judiciary do have to conform to the standards expected of him in discharging his public duties.
2.J.5. The learned Magistrate Nicholls and a court officer of the Midland Magistrates Court subsequently set the administrative error complained of by the Appellant aright. Despite this, the false Full Board
3 Subsections.27 (1) (2) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 states:
(1): The Chief Magistrate may issue written directions (to be called administrative directions) about administrative matters and procedures for the effective and efficient operation of the Court.
(2): The directions must not limit the judicial independence of magistrates.
16 is labelling the Appellant with the “phantom deficiency syndrome” which is Value Judgment the Tribunal cannot divest itself of.
2.K. DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE FAIRLY HEARD BEFORE A JUSTICE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law when it stated at paragraphs 43, 45, 75, 76, 77 & 78 of the SAT decision that:
“43 A second example of the Board's concern was a letter dated 11 January 2007 from Mr Chin to the Chief Justice. That letter concerned a costs order that was made by Master Sanderson in favour of the LPCC as a result of Mr Chin's misconceived application to the Master for leave to appeal against the decision of the State Administrative Tribunal on 12 September 2006. The application should have been made to the Court of Appeal. The Master dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction, and ordered Mr Chin to pay costs. Just what Mr Chin hoped to achieve by the letter to the Chief Justice is not clear. In it, he complains that he is afraid to commence an appeal in the Court of Appeals for fear of a further costs order but, continues: 'I wish that this Honourable Court would allow me to submit my Grounds of Appeal and My Submission to both the Court and to the Respondent, which will show this Court of Appeal that I do have valid grounds for Appealing'”.
45. Mr Chin again wrote to the Chief Justice on 23 January 2007. The letter mentions that the Master had ordered that certain affidavits lodged by Mr Chin should be removed from the file, on the basis of their scandalous contents. That ruling had caused him to become 'disillusioned at the failings of our judicial system'. The letter continues…
75 There are other examples of inappropriate references to judicial officers or their decisions. At [18] above, we referred to Mr Chin's assertion in his statement of issues, facts and contentions that Judge Eckert 'compromised the tenets of integrity, impartiality and independence of the Board'. In the same document, he refers to the costs order made against him by Master Sanderson as 'intimidatory' and as reflecting 'the barest truth'. In his letter to the Chief Justice dated 23 January 2007, he described the costs order made by Master Sanderson as 'injudicious
and improper'.
76 In his oral evidence to this Tribunal, Mr Chin repeated that he considered that Master Sanderson made the order in an intimidatory manner. He said that the order was intimidatory because it had the tendency to prevent him proceeding with his appeal. He said that he always respects judicial officers, but feels constrained to 'speak the truth'.
77 The use of expressions of the type employed by Mr Chin is obviously inappropriate. Expressions used are offensive, and tend to bring the administration of law into disrepute. The beliefs apparently underlying the use of offensive language are themselves a matter of concern in the context of considering Mr Chin's fitness to practice unsupervised. The expressions, and the context in which they are used, suggests a serious lack of appreciation and understanding of the system of administration of justice in which legal practitioners play a critical role.
78 In our view, the offensive references to judicial officers, and the attitude underlying those references, provides strong support for the need for supervision of Mr Chin's practice.
in the following terms:
2.K.1. It is not the mere matter of the learned Master dismissing the Appellant’s Appeal in the wrong forum that matters, it is the fact that the Appellant wanted to remove his appeal to the right forum of Court of Appeal and that he was prevented from doing so by the error of the learned Master.
2.K.2. It is reasonably observed that the learned Master erred by dismissing the Appeal in CIV 2210 of 2006 with the same persecuting malice as exhibited by the False Full Board as he had refused to give his reason for that wrongful dismissal and should have the case transferred to the Court of Appeal or accede to the request of the Appellant to effect that transfer but this did not happen for a reason that
is left to be surmised by an ordinary observer that something is amiss.
2.K.3. Even if the learned Master did have the jurisdiction to hear the matter, he erred by refusing to advise the Appellant on a procedural matter and not on the substantive law by stating his intention to hear the case first and hiding his intention to dismiss it. After hearing the case, he contradicted his earlier
intention to hear it by purposely dismissing it. The Appellant gave prior notice to the Associate of the Learned Master to this effect and it is unreasonable that the case should have been dismissed in this manner.
2.K.4. Further, the Learned Master was unwilling to provide the reasons for dismissing it as being frivolous and vexatious.
2.K.5. The above incident reasonably triggered a fear in the heart of the Appellant who was down with a depressive bouts and his only reasonably relief was to write to the International Bar and to the Chief Justice for a remedy not with the purpose of tampering with the course of justice. It is reasonable for the Appellant to become disillusioned with the justice system due to the unfair justice that has been
meted out to him by the learned Master under the circumstances as explained above.
2.K.6. That intimidating costs order of the Learned Master was subsequently ignored by the real Board in CIV 2210 of 2006 when the circumstances of its coming into being were explained by the Appellant to it. By its conduct the real Board has treated Master Sanderson costs as being of no effect or a nullity
in law. This warrants the Appellant’s conclusion that the costs order was indeed “injudicious and improper”. The false Full Board was not receptive to this truth and prefers to continue to label the Appellant with “phantom deficiency” syndrome. One can see that the real Board would not do things that the False Full Board is wont to do.
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2.K.7. The Appellant must not be punished for speaking the truth as the virtues of justice demands it in the tradition of the law? The law is no respecter of persons? How else may justice be seen to be done?
These are rhetorical questions which the Court of Appeal has to seek answers for?
2.L. ALLEGED FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT OF OTHER
PRACTITIONERS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 48 in that:
“48 The third area of concern identified by the Board related to Mr Chin's tendency to make serious allegations of misconduct directed to other practitioners without a clear and logical foundation

2.L.1. The Appellant does not make any serious allegations against any legal practitioners be it Mr. Pino Monaco, Mr. Timothy Tim Thies or Mr. David Taylor, without foundations.
2.L.2. The Tribunal makes Value Judgments based on half-truths or on matters taken out of their contexts as explained above.
2.M. REFUSAL TO ACCEPT WHOLE–TRUTHS: DAVID TAYLOR MISLED REGISTRAR POWELL
The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 55, 57, 59, 61 & 62 in
that:
55 No application to vary the costs order was made by Mr Chin. Proceedings were subsequently brought in the Magistrate's Court against him for recovery of the $300 the subject of the order. Mr Chin opposed those proceedings. In his statement of defence, Mr Chin accused the
claimant's lawyer, Mr Taylor, of misleading Registrar Powell by not telling the Registrar that Mr Chin was not the lawyer representing the
defendant.
57 Mr Taylor made a complaint to the LPCC against Mr Chin. Mr Taylor's complaint appears to be that Mr Chin had made the serious accusation that Mr Taylor had misled the court. Mr Chin responded to that complaint by letter dated 1 September 2006. He asserted that it was reasonable for him to infer that Mr Taylor did intentionally mislead the Registrar by reason of the history of correspondence concerning
Mr Chin's status as the solicitor on the record in relation to the proceedings. In his response, he also accused Mr Taylor of 'underhanded tactics'.
59 A number of observations can be made about the events set out above. The first is that, even to the point of his hearing before the Tribunal, Mr Chin does not seem to appreciate the effect of having filed a memorandum of appearance on behalf of his client, and the requirements of O8 in relation to removing himself from the obligations as solicitor on the record. Although not specifically relied upon by the Board, it is a situation which tends to affirm the need for supervision of Mr Chin's practice.
61 The third observation that can be made is that Mr Chin did not have a reasonable foundation for his allegation that Mr Taylor had misled the court. The correspondence between Mr Chin and the Court makes it clear that the court was, quite correctly, of the view that Mr Chin continued to bear the obligations of a solicitor on the record up until he either obtained an order that he had ceased to act, or a notice of change of solicitor was filed. Neither of those events had occurred when the Registrar made the order of 12 June 2006. Mr Chin's notice of
ceasing to act, and his correspondence concerning the fact that he had no instructions from the defendant, was all available to the Registrar.
There is no basis for the assertion that Mr Taylor said anything which might have been misleading. It is entirely reasonable to assume that the Registrar was fully aware of Mr Chin's belief that he was no longer acting when he made the order. Mr Chin had been put on very clear notice from the court that he was considered to be the solicitor on the record. That fact is sufficient to support the Registrar's order. Mr Chin being a legal practitioner, his mistaken view as to the position provides no reasonable excuse, in all the circumstances, for his failure to attend the status conference.
62 An allegation that a legal practitioner has misled a court is a very serious allegation. Nothing in Mr Chin's explanation of that allegation,or the materials we have read, suggest any proper foundation for the making of the allegation.”
in the following terms:
2.M.1. The Applicant was not required to make the Application to vary that costs order of $300.00 because there was never any need for doing so as Ms. Hall agreed to discharge the Appellant as the solicitor on record by expressing her intention to file her Notice of Intention to Act in Person in CIV 1131 of 2006 even though there was no need to do so because the Appellant was never on record as the solicitor in that case as confirmed by Barrister Alan Camp who was supposed to have filed that
Memorandum of Appearance for the Appellant and also confirmed by Ms. Tameeka Stewart in her letter to the Appellant dated 24.3.2006. Ms. Nancy Hall followed up that intention and did file that Notice dated 24.7.2006 (See page 168 of CIV 2210 of 2006 dated 16.10.2006).
2.M.2. Mr. Taylor misled Registrar Powell under circumstances when the Appellant was not aware that he the Appellant should have been present before that learned Registrar when that wrongful costs order was made against him on 12.6.2006 that was to become operative by the 3rd July, 2006.
2.M.2. Mr. Taylor knew at all material times that the Appellant was never the solicitor on record for Ms.Hall in CIV 1131 of 2006.
2.M.3. There was the reasonably conceived malice of Mr. Taylor in “getting back” on the Appellant for his refusal to continue to represent Ms. Hall because the former did not comply in a timely fashion with the orders of the learned Justice Jenkins in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.1.
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2.M.4. Mr. Taylor attempted to falsify the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 to the effect that its Writ of Summons was filed on 10.2.2006 when it was actually filed on 16.2.2006 and served on the Appellant as the solicitor for Ms. Hall a day earlier on 15.2.2006 thereby causing Spunter’s Caveats on Ms. Hall properties to cease operation in law by the date of that default thus rendering the Appellant to
become the salvor of those caveated properties which in turn became the salvaged properties of Ms. Nancy Hall. Spunter Pty Ltd was the client of Mr. David Taylor and Mr. and Mrs. The directors of Spunter in accordance with s.244 of the LP Act.
2.M.5. The subsequent Simmonds Discovery in the court records of this fact in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2 (that the court fees of $654.00 was never paid into the court coffers on 10.2.2006 but only on 16.2.2006)was timeously communicated by the learned Justice to Ms. Hall who in turn informed the Appellant to this effect.
2.M.6. Although the Appellant tried to give evidence before the Learned Justice Simmonds if the learned Justice were to consent to his doing so, but the Appellant chose not to do so because he knew it would be unprofessional conduct for him to give evidence in a case of which he had conduct of previously. Justice Simmonds also disallowed him permission to do so.
2.M.7. Further, the court orderly’s demeanour to the Appellant at the relevant time was also discouraging him from doing so and this fact has been recorded in the complaint letter by the Appellant to the Chief Justice.
2.M.8. Mr. Maurice Frederick Law as the Director of Spunter Pty Ltd gave evidence before Magistrate Roberts in CA 2475 of 2006 while making the claim of Registrar Powell’s costs order of $300.00 against the Appellant to the effect that he was goaded by Mr. Taylor to sue the Appellant for an improper purpose and that he was therefore abusing the powers of the court to achieve an oblique purpose.
2.M.9. The Appellant was successful in defending himself appropriately and a successful settlement was achieved without the Appellant having to pay for that improper costs order.
2.M.10. The letter of the Appellant dated the 1.9.2006 to the LPCC read together with the supporting annexed documents clearly explains the situation especially so with regard to Mr. Taylor’s knowledge that the Registrar Powell’s costs order was to become operative by the 3rd of July, 2006 as contained in Registrar’s Powell’s Order dated 12.6.2006.
2.M.11. This Order was sent by Mr. Taylor to the Appellant’s previous address at No.2 Seagull Close, Ballajura in circumstances when the Appellant was already informed by Mr. David Taylor by his facsimile reply dated 21.6.2006 of his new address at No.387, Alexander Drive, Dianella.
2.M.12. This had resulted in the Appellant not becoming aware of that impending costs order until 18.7.2006 when Mr. Mathewdakis who is the new owner of No.2, Seagull Close, Ballajura informed the Appellant about the existence of this letter from Mr. David Taylor (See: pages 184-185 of Notice of OM in CIV 2110 of 2006 filed in Supreme Court dated 16.10.2006 that was expunged by Master Sanderson and re-filed by the Appellant in CACV 43 of 2007).
2.M.7. A proper understanding of this letter dated 1.9.2006 to the LPCC and my email and faxed letter to Mr. David Taylor dated the 31.7.2006, the receipt of which was acknowledged by Mr. Taylor to the effect that he admitted the contents of the letter would reasonably exonerate the Appellant from being labelled with the phantom deficiency syndrome. (See also pages 197 to 204 of above document for the Affidavit of the Appellant sworn 8.8.2006 in Midland Magistrates Court CA 2475 of 2006 together with Annexure A – email letter from Appellant to Mr. David Taylor dated 31.7.2006 and Mr. David Taylor’s reply dated 1.8.2006).
2.N. HALF-TRUTH ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF DISLODGING THE APPELLANT’S NAME FROM CIV 1131 OF 2006:
2.N.1. Mr. David Taylor knew that the Appellant was prevented from attending that conference and he did not so inform Registrar Powell to this effect on 12.6.2006.
2.N.2. He knew that the Memorandum of Appearance of the Appellant was filed by Barrister Alan Camp on behalf of the Appellant only on condition that the said Barrister continues to represent Ms. Hall in that case but that Barrister discontinued his representation and thereby withdrew that Memorandum
of Appearance on behalf of the Appellant.
2.N.3. Ms. Hall was already armed by the Appellant at all relevant times to file her Notice of Appointing herself as the litigant in person in CIV 1131 of 2006 and the Appellant understood that the necessary Notice of Change of Solicitor or Notice to Act in Person had already been filed by Ms. Hall at all material times.
2.N.4. The allegedly clear Notice by Registrar Powell dated 16.5.2006 (see page 182 in CIV 2210 of 2006 filed 16.10.2006) was timeously responded to by the Appellant on 18.5.2006 (see page 183 of the same) and it 19 thereby exonerates him from any blame for not having extricated himself from being wrongly perceived as the solicitor on record for CIV 1131 of 2006.
2.0. ALLEGED FRIVOLOUS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MR. DAVID TAYLOR TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The true “serious allegations” against Mr. David Taylor caused, inter alia, the Appellant to suffer the stigma of the calumny in the following terms:
2.O.1. The Simmonds discovery confirmed the true “serious allegations against Mr. David Taylor.
2.O.2. As a consequence the Appellant as solicitor for the late Ms. Hall refused to accept the initiating process of CIV 1131 of 2006 as there was nothing to defend.
2.O.3. Mr. Taylor chose to mislead the court on this fact and the evidentiary materials is provided for by the Appellant in his affidavit materials filed in CIV 1775 of 2008 which came before the learned Master Sanderson. That decision is currently being appealed against in CACV 107 of 2008. The Appellant will be filing a further Affidavit by 5.6.2009 in that appeal case. It will leave no stone unturned that there had been a falsifications of the of the court records regarding the timely filing and service of that Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 that was in non-compliance with Justice Jenkins Order.
2.O.4. Ms. Hall sought the services of Barrister Alan Camp who could not act for her without a solicitor. The Appellant was persuaded by Barrister Allan Camp to file a Memorandum of Appearance on condition that the latter were to continue to act for Ms. Hall.
2.O.5. The Appellant did not attend the 12th June, 2006 status conference before Registrar Powell because he had moved home from his former address at No.2, Seagull Close, Ballajura to No. 387, Alexander Drive, Dianella, WA 6059 and he had informed Mr. Taylor accordingly of this change of address.
2.O.6. This matter was settled by Magistrates Nicholls and a court officer upon the Appellant complaining to the Chief Magistrate. The information is contained in the Appellant’s letter to the Chief Magistrate dated 21, 25 and 27 September, 2006 who has supervisory authority over other Magistrates under his charge.
2.O.7. The Appellant was justified in having written to the Chief Magistrate because he has the duty as provided by the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 to ensure that the Learned Magistrate Roberts was performing his duties correctly. There was no inappropriate communications with the Chief Magistrate.
2.P. ALLEGATIONS ABOUT MR. ZELESTIS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraph 64 of the SAT Decision in
that:
64 From a review of the minutes of the various meetings concerning Mr Chin, it is clear that Mr Zelestis was not present at the meeting of the Professional Affairs Committee on 19 July 2006, when the initial decision to impose a condition upon Mr Chin's practice certificate was made. It was that decision in respect of which Mr Chin accused Mr Zelestis of 'gross bias'. The allegation would not have been justified even if Mr Zelestis had attended that meeting. It was certainly completely unjustified in circumstances where he did not participate in the decision concerned.
2.P.1. Ms. Coombs alerted the Appellant to the facts concerning the non-involvement of the Honourable Mr. Zelestis for which the Appellant spontaneously admitted that it was a mistake on his part.
2.P.2. Despite this, it may in hindsight be argued by the Appellant that the Honourable Mr. Zelestis Q.C. as the Chairperson of the LPCC should have been aware that its functions under s. 175 of the LP Act had been usurped by Ms. F.H. Walter. She had accepted the improper complaint of Mr. Pino Monaco when it was not her functions to do so and she had acted upon it to the detriment of the Appellant with
malice and improper motives.
2.P.3. Mr. Zelestis should not have condoned Ms. F.H. Walter tainting the decision of the LPCC with gross bias by acting as both judge and prosecutor at the same time.
2.P.4. Mr. Zelestis should have known that the PAC constituted the False Full Board and therefore it did not have the authority to make that first inhibition and if it did, the first inhibition is and was of null effect.
2.P.5. Mr. Zelestis should have put a stop to that first inhibition that brought along in its train the six successive inhibitions that have caused much angst to the Appellant.
2.P.6. Lastly Mr. Zelestis should not have allowed the independence and integrity of its legal officers like Ms.Coombs and Ms. Karen Whitney and later Ms. Cahon to be compromised by the false Full Board knowing that Ms. Walter was co-ordinating the two former legal officers for an improper purpose with persecuting malice.
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2.Q. TRUTH IS STRANGER THAN FICTION IS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 65 in that:
65 Those two specific matters need to be seen in a context where the voluminous papers which were before the Board, and before this
Tribunal, contain repeated allegations of inappropriate conduct by legal practitioners, magistrates and judges. Mr Chin justifies his allegations on the basis that he is 'speaking the truth'. The examples demonstrate that his allegations are not founded in truth. Mr Chin's conduct in this regard is entirely inconsistent with fulfilment of the proper responsibilities imposed upon, and standards expected of, legal practitioners. His failure to appreciate that fact demonstrates his need for supervision.
in the following:
2.Q.1. It was not able to cope up with the sheer complexity of the case that caused it concur in its rash conclusion regarding that “phantom deficiency syndrome ” of the Appellant which are not founded on objective determinations of the facts before it.
2.Q.2. The Appellant speaks the truths which had been confused and misconstrued as falsehoods.
2.Q.3. The voluminous papers that were before it, should not have been taken out of context by it to make a generalisation that the Appellant was not speaking the truth.
2.Q.4. There is never an instance where the Appellant can be pointed out as presenting a falsehood because they are facts assiduously recorded by him to protect their veracity and contemporaneity; and they had been sifted through personally by him, having been first observed by him with a mind that has been tested by a expert - a psychologist Ms. Croxon, that is free from any mental impairment.
2.R. CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATION TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
2R.1. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 66 and 68 in that
66 The Board's concern as to Mr Chin's appreciation of the necessity to avoid conflict of interests arises from its examination of files concerning three men arrested with a fourth man, while travelling in a vehicle. A quantity of
cannabis was found in the vehicle. All four men denied knowledge of it. Two of the men, Mr Tylor, and Mr Fleay,were charged with possession of cannabis with intent to supply. A third, Mr Powell, was charged with possession of small amount of cannabis found in his pocket.
68 In relation to Mr Fleay, Mr Chin wrote to the Court concerning hearing dates, corresponded with the Police in relation to a plea of guilty by Mr Tylor, and appeared in court on his behalf. In relation to MrTylor, Mr Chin's file
contains a memorandum of costs, correspondence to Mr Fleay and Mr Tylor and the Police, various documents elating to the complaints and various exhibits.
it failed to discern the following facts:
2.R.1.1 That the Appellant was mindful and appreciative of his duties as solicitor and counsel to avoid acting in a conflict of interests-situation at all material times.
2.R.1.2. That the appellant was capable of identifying his own interests and the interests of that client who employs him as solicitor and counsel and if he were to find that that two respective interests coincide,he would in that event decide that he should not be acting for any other potential clients whose interests are conflicting with the interests of that particular client he had so identified himself with;
2.R.1.3. That the Appellant was able to tell the difference between the conflicting interests of two or more persons who are being charged for the same criminal offence and the lawyer acting in conflict of interests against the interests of his own client.
2.R.1.4. That the Appellant appreciates the situation where two or more persons who are consulting him at the preliminary stage before the Appellant entered into a contract of legal service with one or more of them and if he finds that these people were having conflicting interests with each other or one another or amongst themselves, then he would have to chose only one as his client and stay clear of acting for the others or he would have to advise the others to seek the services of another solicitor ;
2.R.1.5. In this case, the Appellant had accepted the brief from Mr. Tylor to defend him on his drug dealing charge because that initial consultation with him had revealed that he was the owner of the drug and he had admitted to that crime. Mr. Tylor made this confession independent of Mr. Fleay who in turn had separately admitted that he was not the owner of that self-same drug confiscated by the police.
2.R.1.6. Under the circumstances, there is nothing to prevent the Appellant from communicating with Mr. Fleay and advising him to contact another lawyer to assist him in his defence for a similar charge of the same drug.
2.R.1.7. There is also nothing to prevent the Appellant from advising and researching on the case for both of them before it becomes clear to him at that initial stage of the consultation that Mr. Tylor does not have an interests that conflict with the interests of Mr. Fleay despite the fact that both parties are
being charged with similar offence affecting the same drugs.
2.R.1.8. When Mr. Tylor finally decided to employ the Appellant as his solicitor and counsel, the Appellant’s interests being so employed is then only found to be conflicting with the interests of Mr. Fleay.
21 Although both accused interests were not conflicting with each other, the Appellant was ready to avoid any future confusion and on that basis alone, the Appellant helped Mr. Fleay at his first appearance in court for the purpose of mentioning it so that his case could be heard separately at Collie and
represented by another lawyer.
2.R.1.9. Mr. Tylor was not in an attractive financial position to motivate the Appellant to act as his counsel and he did act for him in the mitigation of his drug dealing crime for the little money he could pay him for this thankless service and for his passion in obtain fair justice for his client. Mr. Fleay had to find
another lawyer.
2.R.2. The Tribunal erred in facts in paragraphs 67 in that:
67 At the time of the arrests, Mr Powell was already one of Mr Chin's clients. All three came to Mr Chin. He opened a file in relation to each. In relation to Mr Powell, Mr Chin corresponded with the Court of Petty Sessions
in relation to Mr Powell's charges, provided advice to Mr Powell, and apparently made a number of appearances of his behalf.
69 In his response to the Complaints Committee dated 12 June 2006, concerning these clients, Mr Chin asserted that he told all three accused that each needed a separate lawyer, 'but all three of them were insistent that I do some legal research for them as the factual circumstances affecting their respective cases are the same'. He said
that, from the outset, he advised each of them to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity. He said that he chose to act only for Mr Tylor. He said that Mr Fleay was getting his own lawyer. He attended Court for both Mr Fleay
and Mr Tylor and wrote a submission for them.

in the following:
2.R.2.1. Mr. Powell was being defended by the Appellant in the Supreme Court at that time for an alleged attack on a policeman in the Crown Hotel in Collie in the case of Powell v Fuller [2005] WASC 91 by the learned Justice Jenkins and he was on leave from jail at the time of his arrest.
2.R.2.2. His arrest was for possession of a smoking implement and a small quantity of cannabis found by the police in his hip pocket whilst he was a passenger in a car together with Mr. Fleay and Mr. Tylor (Mr. Powell’s cannabis case).
2.R.2.3. Mr. Powell’s cannabis case was never represented by the Appellant as he had found help with Legal Aid as he was then a prisoner on leave. He merely accompanied his two friends to see the Appellant.
2.R.2.4. The facts in paragraph 69 are as explained above. There is nothing wrong in the Appellant advising them to plead guilty if they wish to have the matters disposed of quickly without incurring legal costs for defence as the penalty for the crime is not going to be hefty. They have a right to make these choices as a preliminary to engaging separate lawyers for their separate defences. There were no
conflicting interests between themselves at the time when they consulted the Appellant. If the Appellant were to identify his own interests with either one of them which he did when he chose to be so employed by Mr. Tylor, the Appellant’s interests as Mr. Tylor’s lawyer would not be in conflict with the interests of the others.
2.R.3. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 70 in that:
70 The materials located on the files maintained by Mr Chin in relation to all three accused suggest that, while it might have been contemplated that Mr Fleay would obtain separate legal advice, Mr Chin took initial instructions from all three and continued to provide legal services to them notwithstanding their obvious potential conflict. Mr Chin's tendency to justify his conduct provides a basis for concern as to his full appreciation of the requirements confronting a practitioner faced with a conflict of interest. That concern justifies a conclusion that supervision of Mr Chin's practice is appropriate.

in the following terms:
2.R.3.1. It is not wrong for the Appellant to be in conference with the three persons to sift out facts of the case at his initial consultation by them.
2.R.3.2. The facts of the case reveal that no conflicting interests ever exist between Mr. Fleay and Mr. Tylor and Mr. Powell.
2.R.3.3. Despite the above, the Appellant chose not to deal with the other two persons and accepted the brief of only Mr. Tylor and continued in his defence until his case came to a conclusion.
2.R.3.4. As a good natured person that he is, the Appellant gave pointers to the other two persons which made their life easier but did not represent them in court.
2.S. RESPECT TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 70, 72, 73 and 74 in that:
71 The Board's concern as to Mr Chin's understanding of the respect to be afforded to judicial officers stemmed initially from his response of 12 June 2006 to the report from the 2006 Investigation. In the context of responding to a concern expressed in the report as to certain 22 comments made in a judgment by her Honour Jenkins J in an appeal against a criminal conviction where Mr Chin had represented the applicant ,Mr Chin said:
It is my personal belief that (the client) would have won his appeal on the following grounds:
(a) If the appeal judge hearing his case had been a man instead of a woman, Mr Powell would have gained (sic) more sympathy from a man who would understand a man's problem instead of a woman who is simply not quipped to understand a man's problem.
72 When Mr Chin was questioned about that matter at the Board's inquiry on 3 April 2008, he acknowledged that the comment should not have been made, but said:
At the moment I said it, it just came out naturally from me. There was no intention to insult anyone but It was never directed to Jenkins J. I want to apologise to her if it was ever directed to her. She never knew that I insulted her.
73 He later said that although he still believed the comment to be true, he should not have made it. He repeated the substance of those remarks in evidence in these proceedings saying that his comment was justified because 'only a man can understand the problems of a man'.
74 The comment obviously demonstrates an extraordinary and illogical prejudice. Supervision of Mr Chin's practice may well be quite unlikely to eradicate that prejudice. It may, however, go some way towards suppressing the expression of that prejudice, at least in Mr Chin's written communications.

2.S.1. The false Full Board should not be seen to be devising an entrapment to catch the Appellant’s unawares on what appears to be an unreasonably-perceived prejudice on his part.
2.S.2. This falsely-perceived prejudice appears to be the Appellant’s subconscious gender bias against the learned Justice Jenkins which was rather unintentional and which should not be inequitably inhibiting his independent practice as a result.
2.S.3.Who among his brethren of the legal profession is so perfect as to be strong enough to cast that first stone against the Appellant? This is despite the Appellant’s making amends for his unintentional error spontaneously.
2.S.4. There is a psychological explanation for this sub-conscious retort in that the Appellant felt that Mr.Powell should have been given the right justice and there are justifiable grounds for this argument.
2.S.5.Once a person stop questioning innocently about the everyday problems or have the critical faculty of his mind being put out of use, one might say that this person is already dead. How can a dead person be a lawyer?
2.T. LACK OF INSIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING OF PAST CONDUCT TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraph 79 in that:
Insight or understanding, and the need for supervision 79 The final two matters upon which the Board relied in imposing the conditions on Mr Chin's practice certificate was his lack of insight and understanding of the inappropriateness of his past conduct, and the general requirement for supervision of all areas of his practice. These conclusions reached by the Board were based upon the various matters identified in relation to the more specific concerns discussed above.

2.T.1. Based on the premises of the circumstances of this case as described above, the lack of insight and the need for supervision is a Value Judgment that is derived from the error of the Tribunal stemming from its own wishful thinking that all who do not conform to the majority in our system must be “exorcised” and “ostracized” from the justice system of Western Australia.
2.T.2. A spot of “cancer” is being spotted by the Tribunal and the status quo of the “system” must be cleansed and castrated irrespective of whether the Appellant is speaking truths or falsehoods because blind justice will not serve the purpose of protecting our “mates” on a tit-for-tat basis. This is not the kind of right justice that we lawyers have been educated for in the fine tradition of the law.
2.U. VICTIM OF INJUSTICE MR. BERTINI TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT:
The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraph 80, 81 and 82 in that:
80 Mr Chin called evidence at the hearing for this Tribunal from a Mr Alessandro Bertini. Mr Bertini, who gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter, has been receiving assistance from Mr Chin,apparently on a voluntary basis, in relation to a dispute that Mr Bertini is having in the Magistrate's Court against a solicitor who previously acted for Mr Bertini. Mr Bertini's witness statement is brief, but asserts that the justice system does not work because the Legal Practice Board through the LPCC does not uphold the public interest in maintaining its role as the regulator of the legal profession in Western Australia. He complains of the 'injustice' said to have been done to Mr Chin, and
says that he is willing to come as a witness 'to show to this Tribunal that there are injustices that need to be corrected'. Attached to his witness statement are a number of documents relating to his dispute with the solicitor, many of which have been prepared by Mr Chin. Those documents make a number of complaints and allegations against the solicitor in dispute with Mr Bertini.
81 When challenged about the relevance of Mr Bertini's witness statement, Mr Chin argued that it was relevant to demonstrate that the Legal Practice Board is not concerned about members of the public and had not protected Mr Bertini in his dispute with his lawyer. On the other hand, he contended that the assistance he provided to Mr Bertini demonstrated that he is capable of assisting people in need to obtain justice.The Board was not opposed to the Tribunal hearing Mr Bertini's evidence, and accordingly his evidence was accepted.
82 Mr Bertini indicated that Mr Chin had helped him fight his case when he was on the point of giving up by reason of depression concerning the matters of dispute. He said that he had made seven applications to court, all of which had been unsuccessful. The materials produced by Mr Bertini are replete with excessive language, with references to extortion and tricks by lawyers. There are criticisms of a Magistrate acting 23'arbitrarily and without justification'. The papers tend to support, rather than undermine, the concerns which we have identified above about
Mr Chin's mode of practice. The fact that Mr Chin sought to rely upon those materials demonstrates, in our view, his lack of insight or understanding about the concerns which the Board had, and we share, as to his capacity to practice unsupervised.

in the following terms:
2U.1. Mr. Alessandro Bertini’s case revolves around Perth Magistrates Court CA 2881 of 2006 where he is the defendant in his dispute with his former solicitor X.
2.U.2. He is a resourceful person who resents being repeatedly demanded to pay monies which he did not owe this solicitor.
2.U.3. He has many legal advisors and he was telling the Appellant about his legal problem when he was engaged by the Appellant for some painting work for his son’s home. The Appellant gave him some pointers to get him out of his uncomfortable legal problem on a pro-bono basis.
2.U.4. Mr. Bertini allegedly owed solicitor X in the sum of $2,000.00 which is a negotiated settlement of some allegedly outstanding legal fees for which Mr Bertini issued solicitor X with a cheque.
2.U.5. The solicitor did not cash that cheque but instead use it to make a claim against Mr. Bertini for a sum exceeding the Minor Case Provisions $7,500.00.
2.U.6. Mr. Bertini paid solicitors to defend his case for him but he ended paying his solicitors without getting the necessary service and he was not even allowed to join the erring solicitor as a third party in his defence of that action against solicitor X. There are enough evidentiary materials before the court that the case being a Minor Claim should not have been escalated to become a general procedure claim.
2.U.7. Yet, Mr. Bertini did not obtain justice when he appealed to the District Court in Appeal No. 36 of 2008. His appeal was dismissed and he was asked to pay his opponent profits costs contrary to the WA exception to the Chorley principle that a solicitor litigant in person is entitled to claim profit costs in Dobree v Hoffman (1996) WASC.
2.U.8. Mr. Bertini made seven applications before two different magistrates, who erred in their refusals to address the issues of injustice and over-charging of solicitor X. Neither was there any justifiable reasons provided by the Magistrates.
2.U.9. The Magistrates after making the errors are now purportedly aware of the fact that Mr. Bertini does have a valid cause of action against solicitor X and for some unknown reason, that case is being withheld from being proceeded with thus delaying justice to Mr. Bertini. The learned Magistrates are now aware of their own mistakes through some documents prepared on behalf of Mr. Bertini on a pro-bono basis by the Appellant resulting in Mr. Bertini solving his perennial problems with the
courts and this proves that there is no truth in the judgment of the Tribunal that the Appellant has a propensity to make false serious allegations against other practitioners.
2.U.10. The Bibilical truth is: Those who lead others to justice thereby preventing Mr. Bertini from suffering serious damages to his health and his mental well-being, is like a star that shines in the sky forever. This echoes the remark of the Appellant to His Honour Justice Barker, the President of SAT who for some unknown reason was unable to hear the Appellant’s case in VR 107 of 2008 to its successful
conclusion; one surmise that Justice Barker might have avoided the Value Judgment of the Tribunal.
2.U.11. Solicitor X was seen to be taking advantage of the costs orders of the Magistrates in equivocal terms and after having realized that he was not entitled to it and had sought to withdraw it but in the process, he had attracted the error of His Honour DCJ O’Sullivan who dismissed Mr. Bertini’s appeal No.36 of 2008 through misinformation provided to the learned Judge by solicitor X. Mr. Bertini is now left with no choice but to make an application for review orders under s. 36 of the
Magistrates Court Act, 2004 to the Supreme Court in CIV 1764 of 2009.
2.U.12. The latest twist to the injustice for Mr. Bertini is a costs order for allowable costs or out of pocket expenses of about $70.00 which has been falsely claimed by Solicitor X through the Magistrates Court, from the Registrar Decision. It has been appealed to the Magistrates Court and again appealed through the District Court. The null costs order against Mr. Bertini has now swollen. It is
intimidating. The LPCC should have taken cognisance of this case akin to that of Mr. Thies, and nipped it in the bud. There is no justice in sight as justice is not blind but all seeing and all discriminating.
2.U.12. The fact remains, there are so many misdoings by solicitors and yet, they are not being investigated and dealt with in accordance with the law by the Board. Yet the Board is pursuing the Appellant for no misdeeds under the pretext of the “phantom deficiency syndrome”. Most recently, there is good news that a Margaret River practitioner, one Damien Gerard Brennan4, has been found guilty by
the court and is awaiting sentence for taking away the assets of an elderly person.
4 See the report in West Australian online paper on 4.5.2009 at its website:
http://www.thewest.com.au/default.aspx?MenuID=146&ContentID=138993.