CONSPIRACY OF THE PSEUDO BOARD - TAKING AWAY MY INDEPENDENT STATUS AS A LAWYER FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THEIR CRONIES

1. The Pseudo Board decided to prosecute me for no professional misconduct on 19.7.2006 but for my alleged deficiency in my professional knowledge.

2. This constitutes a decision to take away my independent legal practice for the purpose of protecting their cronies who had been pillaging and plundering innocent members of the public.  The prime example of their victims are Dr. Kheng Su Chan and many others.

3.  This conspiracy involves members of the Pseudo Board, the Law Society of Western Australia principally involving its former Presidents which includes inter alia Mr. Pino Monaco, Judge Eckert,  Ken Martin J and Chaney J.  The conspiracy embroiled the Legal Profession Complaints Committee and the Professional Affairs Committee, particularly Ms. Walter who is a lawyer directed by some unknown persons.  Ms. Coombs, Ms Cahoon and Ms LeMiere, all of them as legal officers of the LPCC are knowingly involved in this conspiracy including Master Sanderson of the Supreme Court of WA.     

4. Judge Eckert decided on 12.9.2006 in VR137 of 2006 that I was not guilty of any professional misconduct but was “guilty” of a deficiency in my professional knowledge.  Therefore Judge Eckert of SAT re-imposed the conditions originally imposed on 19.7.2006 by taking away my independent status as a lawyer.

5. I appealed the decision of Judge Eckert through Master Sanderson which should have been the Court of Appeal instead.  But the rules have changed in 2005 by the introduction of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005.  Master Sanderson coaxed me not to transfer my appeal into the Court of Appeal but to have it heard before himself so that His Honour could dismiss it. I was shocked and traumatized by this event, thinking that there is no justice available to me as its door was closed.

6.  I wrote to the Chief Justice and was encouraged to appeal.  I therefore appealed in CACV 1 of 2007 but was stopped by the Legal Practice Board which was then trying to get me to pay unwarranted costs orders occasioned by Master Sanderson dismissing my case.

7.  After some struggles, I was able to appeal again through CACV 43 of 2007 when I got leave to appeal and time to appeal was extended against Judge Eckert’s decision.

8. On 26.9.2007, President Steytler of the Court of Appeal caused a Consent Judgment to be entered between myself as Appellant and the Legal Practice Board as Respondent in CACV 43 of 2007.  This consent judgment set aside Judge Eckert’s decision.  Therefore, the Pseudo Board is precluded from harping on the same issues that had been the subject of that Consent Judgment i.e. my deficiency in my professional knowledge by the principle of res judicata.

9.  In the aftermath, the Pseudo Board dishonoured the terms of that Steytler P Consent Judgment by refusing to grant me my independent legal practice certificate on the ground of the already debarred res judicata issue affecting the “deficiency of my professional knowledge”. 

10. The Pseudo Board on 3.4.2008 did conspiratorially and vexatiously caused the re-imposition of the non-independent status of my legal practice without any grounds because it was not able to produce evidence that it had the sanction of the majority consent of the 52 members of the statutory regulator of the legal profession of WA.  This is the second time the usurping Full Board in the name of the Pseudo Board had acted without authority and with impunity.

11.  The Pseudo Board on 2.5.2008 again did conspire to ratify and confirm the Pseudo Board’s Decision to act without authority to take away from me my status as an independent legal practitioner.

12. I as the Appellant made an application to the State Administrative Tribunal in VR107 of 2008 to stop the conspiracy of the Pseudo Board but His Honour Chaney J conspired with the Pseudo Board  to confirm the original decision of the Pseudo Board to take away my independent legal practice status on 27/10/2008 in his judgment in CHIN and WEST AUSTRALIAN LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2008] WASAT 252.

14. The Appellant appealed the decision of Chaney J for leave to appeal before Pullin J but was refused leave to appeal.  The Appellant appealed this decision to the High Court in P36 of 2009 which was dismissed.  The reason of decision touches the issues of the credibility of Chaney J and this revives my fresh action in our justice system again because the issue of the Pseudo Board was refused determination by Chaney J.  

15. The LPCC started a persecution of me on the same issues that had been "harping" upon by the Pseudo Board since the beginning of this saga, in a fresh malicious persecution in VR87 of 2009 that was started by Ms. Cahon and continued by Ms. Le Miere as legal officers of the LPCC.  This is a statutory body financed by our government to catch erring lawyers but it is found to be protecting its cronies and catching innocent people instead.  Chaney J found me guilty of professional misconduct in an ambushed trial on 4.11.2009 under circumstances when he had written to me that the trial of VR87 of 2009 was scheduled on 10.11.2009. That ambushed trial result was never published by Chaney J and it is taken to have been set aside upon my vehement protestations to the effect that I was given in writing to have the matter re-trialed on 10.11.2009.  But I have asked for Chaney J to recuse himself and His Honour did graciously bow out of that case subsequently.  That case was subsequently mentioned during directions hearing before Judge Pritchard and is now before Judge Sharp who is the Deputy President of SAT. This denial of natural justice by Chaney J had voided that ambushed judgment dated 4.11.2009 and it is now no longer being published at the SAT website.  I am now awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010 before any concrete decision can be made by Judge Sharp on the res judicata extended principle of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 in VR87 of 2009.

16. The Appellant was not barred on the ground of res judicata to bring fresh actions for Mandamus Orders against Chaney J decision in CIV 1019 of 2010 before Heenan J.   His Honour dismissed my Application for Prerogative Orders but his Honour later decided in CIV 1981 of 2010 and CIV 1877 of 2010 in my absence on 4.8.2010 that he had no authority to order prerogative orders against fellow judges of the same rank as himself, namely Ken Martin J and Chaney J.  The Appellant was then requested by the Court of Appeal Registrar to make his application to the Supreme Court for as Court of Appeal judge to hear those two cases.  The first CIV 1981 is about the recusal of Ken Martin J from hearing Michelides No.2 and the second is the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal judgment that had reached the portals of the High Court and came back.  The latter concerns how s.33 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 will operate to rectify the otherwise perfect judgment of the Court of Appeal in so far as it relates to the falsifications of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor solicitor.   Only a Court of Appeal judge is entitled to make prerogative Orders of Certiorari or Mandamus against judges of the Supreme Court of Western Australia who are consicously or sub-consciously in dereliction of their judicial duties.

17. The Appellant took a Mandamus Orders against Heenan J in CIV 1604 of 2010 but it was rightly dismissed by Le Miere J on the ground that the matters in CACV 41 of 2010 was not before His Honour as the Appellant had already appealed the decision of Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010 to the Court of Appeal in the former case.  

 18. The Appellant appealed the Order of Heenan J to the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010.  This avenue opens the door for the case now pending to be decided by the Court of Appeal.   The three issues that are never determined before by Chaney J are now going to be decided by the Court of Appeal:

a) The Pseudo Board

b) The falsifications of the court records by David Taylor Solicitor.

c) The extortion bid by Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor.

19. In the circumstances as explained above, it it reasonably clear to members of the public that the  Pseudo Board conspired with the LPCC and others to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice contrary to s.135 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (WA) (the Act).

20. The Pseudo Board also conspired with those parties as alleged for the purpose of preventing the criminal acts of Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor to be prosecuted for the criminal offence of extortion under s.397 of the Act.  This matter is now with CACV 75 of 2010.

21.  On 23.11.2010 the Court of Appeal through Pullin JA and Newnes JA decided to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the interim security Costs Order of Ken Martin J decision in CIV 1903 of 2008 or the Michelides No.2 decision delivered on 8.7.2010 (against the Appellant) thus stifling the Michelides No.1 prosecution of Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor by the Appellant.  But the Court of Appeal in its wise judgment stayed that judgment order by not publishing it and it had acknowledged to the Appellant that it had received the Appellant’s letter containing the Draft proposed Notice of Appeal to the High Court.  The purpose of that letter to the Court of Appeal Registrar is to request the Court of Appeal to review its decision its own decision in CACV 75 of 2010 that was delivered by Pullin JA on 23.11.2010 in the presence of the Timothy Robin Thies Solcitor, his counsel Barrister Scott Ellis and the Appellant in the presence of Newnes JA.  See the three blogspots of the Appellant which is accessible by Googling “NICHOLASNCHIN”.   Incidentally, there are six outstanding costs orders made against the Appellant at various stages of various proceedings which have never been enforced against the Appellant as they are improper costs orders and are therefore nullities.  Those void costs orders serves the purpose of intimidating the Appellant from further prosecuting for his rights in the public interests to protect ordinary persons from marauding lawyers.     

22. The Pseudo Board conspired with those parties in ............ from being prosecuted for the falsification of records by a public officer contrary to s. 85 of Act. The court had written to the Appellant dated 18.11.2010 that he is agreeing to review the costs orders of Master Sanderson in CIV1775 of 2008.  This review will have ramifications in showing that the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 were falsified by David Taylor Solicitor on 10.2.2006 and its effects on the High Court decision in P1 of 2010 affecting CACV107 of 2008.  

23. The Pseudo Board conspired with those parties involved in preventing the lawyer falsifying the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 from being prosecuted for the for perjury pursuant to ss.124 and 125 of the Act.

 24. In DELLA FRANCA -v- R - Supreme Court Court of Appeal: 09/02/1993 Library No. 930476c, Murray J made the following pointers:

24.1.1. Evidence of conspiracy must be in the form of acts done or words uttered in the absence of the person maligned by a co-conspirator.  It is admissible for the purpose of proving the participation of the Pseudo Board in the conspiracy – the deliberations of the Professional Affairs Committee and the then Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee in which Ms. Walter had participated.

24.1.2. Reasonable evidence is available to show that the Pseudo Board is involved in acts or words uttered for the purpose of establishing the combination of the type alleged for the furtherance of its common purpose – to protect their cronies and to take away my independence as a lawyer and this is an act of corruption by public officers.
24.1.3. Quoting at page 3, the High Court in Ahern case quoted in that judgment at 93-4, the following words:
"A conspirator may, in the absence of another person alleged to be a co-conspirator, say or do something carrying with it the implication that the other person is involved. The statement or the act may be admissible in evidence to prove the fact of a conspiracy and, by way of admission, the participation of the maker of the statement or the actor in that conspiracy.  But evidence of neither the statement nor the act should, except in the circumstances which we shall elaborate presently, be admitted against “the other person” to prove his participation because it would for this purpose be hearsay or the equivalent of hearsay."

24.1.4. There are many references to the fact that members of the Pseudo Board are involved in that conspiracy.  I am the victim of this conspiracy which is referred to in the context of that case by Murray J as "the other person". I quote the passage:  

“For example, it may be possible in a case of conspiracy to commit armed robbery to conclude from the fact that one accused wearing a disguise was present in a bank at the same time as another accused, similarly disguised, was waiting outside the bank in a motor vehicle with the motor running, that both were engaged in a common enterprise to rob the bank.  For the purpose of reaching that conclusion it is permissible to use the acts and declarations of each, even in the absence of the other, not as proof of the truth of any assertion or implied assertion of the participation of the other, but as facts from which the combination might be inferred. Utterances for this purpose may be regarded as facts no less than acts and, indeed, in the United States are sometimes called verbal acts.  In the example given it would be possible to reach the conclusion, admitting the evidence for the purpose described and considering it against each accused separately, not only that there was a conspiracy but also that each of the two accused was a participant."

24.1.5. Therefore, it is possible for the public in the public interest to prove that there is indeed a conspiracy to defeat justice wrought by members of the Pseudo Board pursuant to s.35 of the Act.  They are lawyers and top lawyers too.

24.1.6. This is a very important task for members of the public to ensure that the regulator of the legal profession in WAfunction efficiently and effectively in the public interest because it is the electorate who must be protected by a good government of Western Australia such that they are not being swindled by dishonest lawyers.  

24.1.7. This will prevent the justice system from failing as it is already failing members of the public for a long time.  Litigation and justice should not be an expensive affair if lawyers are honest and they must seek to earn an honest living instead of plundering and pillaging innocent members of the public.

24.1.8. Judges in this country have never been tried by members of the public because they are engaged in mysterious works that cannot be delved into let alone be understood or gauged by ordinary persons with an ordinary minds.  They are trying members of the public but they have never been tried because they occupy prestigious positions and offices.  It is for our politicians's duty  to ensure that Judges are efficient and proficient too and are always being kept on their guard.  This is one good thing for good governance of Australia.

24.1.9. It takes a lawyer to surmount this monumental task. But lawyers are in a quandary too as they are also involved in a conspiracy to prevent this from happening.  This is a rare and exceptional circumstances where a former lawyer is able to help the police to solve these problems caused  by persons who are entrusted with the law and who are to there to see that justice be done but is not reasonably seen to being done.  No lawyer who had misled the court of appeal in this case should be allowed to get away with it.  It is being done before Ken Martin J in Michelides No.2 and this fact cannot be ignored by the Court of Appeal Judges Pullin JA and Newnes JA, who are now becoming aware of this. 

24.1.10. The public should not be hoodwinked.  If it can happen once, it can happen again and again until some courageous and public spirited person who is independent enough and is willing to perform this heroic task for which his name will go down in the history of Western Australia.   It must be remembered that the law does not respect persons but respect the authority of that person who is endowed with authority by our government of the day.  If that authority is being abused, that person behind that authority is no longer worthy of our respect.    

25. R -v- CARATTI & ORS – Library No. 980317 06/16/1998 – per Murray J again gives the police force some pointers:
25.1. Dishonesty is the prime element of a conspiracy to defraud [or to defeat justice] [My emphasis]. 
25.2. At page 9 Toohey and Gaudron JJ put it at 54, "dishonesty is a characteristic of the means agreed to be employed ……., "the need for there to be an agreement to use dishonest means" (58) to the prejudice of the victim's economic interests [or professional status as an independent lawyer] [My Emphasis]… before they can convict." (59).
25.3. Consistently with that view, at 61 their Honours concluded that:

"In the case of conspiracy to ….. it will ordinarily be sufficient …as to the facts … if the agreed means are to be characterised as dishonest. Alternatively, …. if satisfied as to those facts, they will be satisfied that the agreed means were dishonest. Only in the borderline case will it be necessary for the question whether the means are to be so characterized….."

25.4.  At page 10, the view of Toohey and Gaudron JJ is clear. For the purpose of conspiracy to ….. there must be proved to be an agreement made between the alleged conspirators or any two or more of them. The agreement must be one ["to defeat justice"][My Emphasis] i.e it must be one the purpose or object of which is, so that the common intention of the conspirators is, that the victim's financial or economic interests are to be imperilled or prejudiced by dishonest means. Whether the means agreed upon are properly to be characterised as dishonest is a question of law for the trial Judge, who must decide whether any of the means …. may be so characterised according to ordinary notions of dishonesty in that:

"... they assert as true something which is false and which is known to be false or not to be believed to be true, or if they are means which the conspirators know they have no right to use or do not believe that they have any right to use the means in question." (60)

25.5. at page 11 ….giving effect to the conspiracy are in fact dishonest according to the ordinary standards of right thinking members of the community. Therefore what was required to be established as the mental element in the crime of conspiracy to … was "the intention to prejudice the interests of a third person by the use of means that are dishonest." …… unnecessary to establish that the offender knew or understood that he or she was acting dishonestly by the standards of ordinary people. ……whether or not the means agreed upon were dishonest was a question of characterisation, a question of law to be determined by the trial Judge, giving the word "dishonesty" its ordinary English meaning:

"It is not for juries by defining dishonesty to hold what is or is not a conspiracy to ….. It is the Judge's task to determine whether the facts relied on …. constitutes a conspiracy ……... If the Judge finds that they do, it is the jury's task to determine whether the relevant facts have been proved so as to make the accused guilty of the offence."

"In most cases of conspiracy to … , to prove dishonest means  ….will have to establish that the defendants intended to prejudice another person's right or interest or performance of public duty by: at page 12:  

• . making or taking advantage of representations or promises which they knew were false or would not be carried out;
• . concealing facts which they had a duty to disclose; or
• . engaging in conduct which they had no right to engage in.

25.6.  “…. it will often be sufficient to prove that the defendants used dishonest means merely … showing that the defendants intended to engage in a particular form of wrongful conduct."

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

387, ALEXANDER DRIVE

DIANELLA WA 6059

Phone: 08 92757440

Mobile: 0421642735 or  0431398973

Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin1@gmail.com

 

AMENDED ERRATUM TO CHRONOLOGY IN CACV 75 OF 2010 SUBJECT OF COURT OF APPEAL DECISION ON 23.11.2010 BY PULLIN JA AND NEWNES JA

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA           NO.: CACV: 75 OF 2010

 

COURT OF APPEAL

In the matter of an ex-parte Application made pursuant to subs. 60(1)(f)(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 (WA) by the Applicant for Leave to Appeal the Interlocutory Decision of Justice Kenneth Martin (the Second Judge) now made inter-partes.  This Void judgment is the subject matter of this appeal dated first heard on 17.6.2010 and delivered on 8.7.2010 and is hereafter referred to in this document as the “Security Costs Order Case”.  

And

In the matter of a prior concomitant jurisdictional error of the Second Judge dated 13.5.2010, which is also the subject matter of this Appeal.  It is hereafter referred to as the “Mandate Exclusion Case.”

And

In the matter of the Unanimous Mandate of the court having been granted to the Applicant for the purpose of allowing him to defend his son, Paul.  That Mandate is being reasonably seen as not being delimited to the mediation process only.  However, that Mandate was unreasonably retracted by the Second Judge without any justifying circumstances (the Mandate).  

And

In the matter of the Mandate having arisen from the issue of the joinder of Paul in the first stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings as the Second Defendant whilst the Respondent and Applicant were similarly joined as the First Defendant and Plaintiff respectively.  This would give the Applicant the reasonable opportunity to seek the court’s permission for the amalgamation of Civ 1112 of 2007 or the Duress-Caveat Case into the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in accordance with Order 83 of the RSC so as to achieve the public interest of finality in these proceedings (the Consolidation).

And

In the matter of Justice Newnes having granted the Applicant Leave to Amend the Appellant’s Case on 15.10.2010 within 21 days

 NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN                                                            -APPLICANT

V.

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES                                                   - FIRST RESPONDENT

PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN                                      - SECOND RESPONDENT

AMENDED ERRATUM TO CHRONOLOGY FILED 1^ST NOVEMBER, 2010          

Date of document:                             15^th November, 2010.

Date of filing:                                     15^th November, 2010.

Filed on behalf of:                              The Applicant

Prepared by:

Nicholas N Chin                                 Phone & Fax: 08 9275 7440

387, Alexander Drive                        Email: nnchin@msn.com;nnchin1@gmail.com

DIANELLA WA 6059                       Mobile: 0421642735

No	Date	EVENT
	Instructions	Insert the relevant description of Events between the rows as indicated, for example: Item 21A between rows number 21; item 30A between rows number 30 and 31.
19A	10.5.2010	Outline of Written Submission filed by Paul CK Chin as the Second Respondent in the Duress-Caveat Case of CIV 1112 of 2007 before Ken Martin J prior to the Mandate Exclusion Case decision delivered on 13.5.2010. This document is found at pages 82 to 93 of the Affidavit of the Appellant in Event 23A as described below.  The learned trial judge denied the First Defendant in that case his natural justice in that Paul as a litigant in person is disallowed to argue his own case.  It is stayed as an abuse of process of court according to the learned trial judge.  It is a neither a here nor there situation for Paul: his father is not allowed to help him as a father or as a McKenzie friend and he is not allowed to plead his own case.  The result is a Void Judgment of the Mandate Exclusion Case decision.  The Appellant agrees and has made amends for his misconception in that he should not have use the label counsel or solicitor or barrister but could only use the label “Lawyer” if he were to make any representations on behalf of the Second Respondent.
19B	10.5.2010	A similar Outline of Written Submissions to that as indicated in Event 19A above, but this time couched in the name of the Appellant was accepted by Ken Martin J for the second stage of the proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008.  This document is labeled as NNC-2A and is found at pages 82 to 93 of Event 23A.  Ken Martin J however did not accept the common law principle indicated at page 4 in footnote 9 to the effect that the Appellant need not enter the Duress Caveat Case as a party but he could enter it through the s.36 Review Case of Civ 1903 of 2008 case, failing his application for consolidating the two cases into one.  There is no reason given by the learned trial judge as to why he had refused this reasonable application for the just consolidation of the two cases so that justice can be seen to be done.  The issue of the Appellant never having acted in conflict of interests (as indicated in footnote 5 and footnote 10) for the second Respondent Paul at all material times, is never responsively addressed by the First Respondent nor is there any logical transgression of this argument of the Appellant except for the some irrationalities, with due respect to the trial judge Ken Martin J.
21A	14.5.2010	Order of Ken Martin J delivered on 13.5.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2008 dated 14.5.2010 found at page 79 of bundle of documents.  This bundle is filed by Appellant in his Application dated 28.6.2010 (the CIV1981 of 2010 documents) for the recusal Mandamus Orders of the trial judge (Order of Ken Martin J).
23A	26.5.2010	Appellant filed his Affidavit containing 140 pages in response to Respondent Affidavit sworn 12.5.2010 in his application for security orders in CIV 1903 of 2008.  This event is in compliance with the Order No.2 of the Order of Ken Martin J. The Affidavit materials was not considered by the by Ken Martin J in the Security Order Case.  This is an indication of the inadequacy of the reasons for judgment as the trial judge refused to take into account relevant considerations and did take into account irrelevant considerations.  This voided the Security Order Case judgment.
24A	10.6.2010	First Respondent complied with Order No. 3(a) of the Order Ken Martin J Order by filling his Outline of submissions dated 10.06.10 and is found at pages 87 to 92 of the CIV 1981 of 2010 documents. The Respondent, however, DID NOT COMPLY with Order 3(b) of Ken Martin J’s Order.  This is a material non-compliance by the First Respondent to Order of Ken Martin J as justice is required to be seen to be specifically done and it is not done. The Respondent had escaped from filing the affidavit materials that should materially respond to the Affidavit materials filed by the Appellant as indicated in Document No. 23A above dated and sworn 26.5.2010.  Without such a responsive affidavit, the First Respondent should be taken to have admitted to all the materials that are contained in the No.23A Document.  The trial judge discriminated the Applicant by dispensing with the due compliance of his Order No. 3(b) of the First Respondent but does not give such a dispensation to the Appellant. This is evidence of the apprehended bias of Ken Martin J.
25A	24.6.2010	The Appellant complied with Order No.4 of the Order of Ken Martin J by filing and serving his Outline of Submission dated 24.6.2010 labelled as NNC-12-7 found at pages 95 to 112 of the CIV 1981 of 2010 documents.  The learned trial judge denied the Appellant natural justice by ignoring the submissions of the Appellant when he delivered his judgment on 8.7.2010.  This denial of natural justice which makes the Security Order Case a nullity is being reflected in the inadequate reason for decision of that Security Case Order Judgment.
26	28.6.2010	Insert the underlined words in item No. 26 as follows: Applications for Prerogative Orders filed by Applicant in CIV 1981 of 2010 to prohibit the Second Judge from continuing to hear the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings on account of the learned trial judge’s apprehended bias in 126 pages.  It is the result of his Mandate Exclusion Decision Case and the then pending Security Order Decision that was finally delivered on 8.7.2010.
30A	22.7.2010	The Respondent was required by the learned trial judge in Order No.5 of the Ken Martin J’s Order dated 13.5.2010 to file within 14 days after the determination of the Security Order Application delivered on 8.7.2010.   The Respondent DID NOT COMPLY with the learned trial judge order to file and serve a Minute setting out matters that the Respondent accepts should be the subject of the Plaintiff’s s.36 Magistrates Court Act application as well as a draft agreed chronology of events for comments by the Appellant and his son Paul, the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008.  This non-compliance of the Respondent is also done with the tacit approval of the learned trial judge.  Order No. 5 is ordered by Ken Martin J against the Respondent and the latter’s compliance with it is not contingent and should not be made contingent upon the outcome of the Security Order Case and its ramifications on the ground that the Appellant had made an application for the trial judge’s recusal in CIV 1981 of 2010 on 28.6.2010.  This date predates the date of delivery of the judgment of the Security Order Case on 8.7.2010.  The trial judge was notified of the existence of the CIV 1981 of 2010 case on 17.6.2010 and this fact is recorded in the transcript.  Therefore, if the learned trial judge were to issue an order no.5, which order should be complied with by the party who is directed to obey.  The opposing party i.e. the Appellant is already appealing the impugned judgments.  If there were no appeal to the impugned judgments, there would then be justification for No.5 to be stayed for want of prosecution.
36	15.11.2010	Counsel for the First Respondent barrister Scott Ellis misled the Court in the Review Case before Ken Martin J on 17.6.2010 to the effect that Registrar Wilde was voluntary in entering the impugned Consent Judgment in FR417 of 7.6.2007.  This is not the case as both the learned trial judge and barrister Ellis have before them the Affidavit of the Appellant as described in Event 23A above.   This is the three page facsimile letter of the Appellant sent simultaneously by the Appellant to Registrar Wilde and to four others informing them that the impugned Consent Judgment scheduled to be entered into by Registrar Wilde on the following day is contaminated by duress.  This result in the Void Consent Judgment upon which the respective decisions of Magistrates Musk, Michelides and Commissioner Herron rest.  If the source is a jurisdictional error, every decision that rests upon it or that give effect to that source judgment is in turn a Void Judgment including the two Void Judgments of Ken Martin J in the Mandate Exclusion Case and the Security Order Case.  The only exception if the august and righteous judgment of Justice Hasluck in the first stage of that Review Case of CIV 1903 of 2008.  The evidence for this complaint in five pages is sent by way of facsimile to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee dated 15.11.2010 and copied to the Registrar of the Court of Appeal for the attention of the Justices in CACV 75 of 2010.   But for the court having been misled by barrister Scott Ellis as contained in page 33 of the transcript of those proceedings on 17.6.2010, at least the Security Order Case would not have been dismissed by the trial judge.

                         

Signed by: ………………………………… ….

CHRONOLOGY FILED IN CACV 75 OF 2010: SUBJECT OF DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL ON 23.11.2010 BY PULLIN JA AND NEWNES JA

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN                                                 -APPLICANT

V.

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES                                                   - FIRST RESPONDENT

PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN                                      - SECOND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AS APPROVED BY COURT  OF APPEAL REGISTRAR IN HER EMAIL DATED 26.10.2010 AT 10.50 AM.       

Date of document:                             1st November, 2010.

Date of filing:                                     1st November, 2010.

Filed on behalf of:                              The Applicant

Prepared by:

Nicholas N Chin                                 Phone & Fax: 08 9275 7440

387, Alexander Drive                        Email: nnchin@msn.com;nnchin1@gmail.com

DIANELLA WA 6059                       Mobile: 0421642735

No	Date	EVENT
1	SYNOPSIS	1.                  The Applicant sought Prerogative Relief in terms of subs. 36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 before Justice Hasluck through FR944 of 2007 before Magistrate Musk for the purpose of claiming the $6,000.00 that was unlawfully demanded from him personally by the Respondent. This sum was paid together with another sum of $5,500.00 that was demanded from the Applicant’s son, Paul.  Both sums were paid by the Applicant himself.  Paul remains till today an involuntary participant in the solicitor-client relationship entered into by the Applicant with the Respondent. This Minor Claim Case was dismissed by Magistrate Musk and it became   the source of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings begun solely by the Applicant in CIV 1903 of 2008 (the source of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings) 2.                  The Respondent started the CIV1112 of 2007 to defend the unlawful lodgment of his Caveat on Paul’s home property without the necessary caveatable interests in order to facilitate himself in the process of unlawfully demanding monies from the Applicant for a Zero Sum Debt in FR 417 of 2007. 3.                  This Caveat case is the “gun” of that unlawful demand and is thus the handmaid of the duress situation because Paul and his parents were frightened that Paul’s home property would be taken away from him.   4.                  The unlawful demands for the Zero Sum debt was the result of the escalating profits costs of the Respondent which keep rising from a Zero Sum till it reached the astronomical figure of some $25k and anybody faced with that situation from a solicitor who is the Respondent, would be worried that the unsettled Zero Sum Debt would eventually become so burdensome that it would be best to settle it with the sham compromise sum of $11,500.00 (the sham compromise) paid by the Applicant to the Respondent under the guidance of Paul’s psychiatrist and the involuntary Consent Order of Registrar Wilde of the Fremantle Magistrate’s Court (the duress-handmaid Caveat Case). 5.                  The duress that precipitated that sham compromise resulted Applicant’s fear that was caused by the especial vulnerability of his son Paul and his predisposition to mental injury, that had already occurred twice in the past at the material time, such fear being synergistically engendered by the magical and mysterious ability of the Respondent to escalate a Zero Sum Debt in FR417 of 2010 into some $25k and the fear of Paul losing his home as a result of the uncertainties of the law affecting caveatable interests.     6.                  As a result of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings being heard before the First Judge, the Appellant was given leave or mandate as a lawyer (but not as a barrister & solicitor or as a legal practitioner as he is without a current practice certificate) by His Honour Justice Hasluck to represent his son Paul in the two stages of those proceedings, the second stage being before His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin (The Mandate).   7.                  The First Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings was presided by Justice Hasluck and the Second Stage was presided by Justice Kenneth Martin. 8.                  The function of the Second Judge is to use his discretion to withhold the relief granted by the First Judge if there were any justifying circumstances.  9.                  The Second Judge is in jurisdictional error when he stultified or stifled the second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings by issuing the Disputed Security Costs Order which is the subject of this Interlocutory Appeal process through His Honour retracting the Mandate without justifying circumstances.
2	24.7.2008	Applicant filed his Notice of Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 for the First Stage of Prerogative Relief in 5 pages together with his Affidavit in Support dated 23.7.2008 in 267 pages
3	19.8.2008	The First Stage for Prerogative Relief directions hearing before the First Judge, the transcript of which had the effect of staying the execution of the costs of courts below at Fremantle.
4.	29.8.2008	Applicant filed his First Supplementary Affidavit sworn the same day in support of the First Stage for Prerogative Relief in 98 pages.
5	18.9.2008	Applicant filed his Second Supplementary Affidavit sworn the same day, in Support of the First Stage for Prerogative Relief in 37 pages.
6	15.9.2008	The First Judge provided a copy of the transcript of the proceedings heard on the 19.8.2008 to Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007 thus staying the execution of the costs orders in the Fremantle Magistrates Courts below on 20.9.2008: namely the Costs Orders of Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2008 and Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007.
7.	7.11.2008	The Prerogative Relief Proceedings proceeded in an ex-parte fashion as prescribed the s.36, before the First Judge resulting in its transcript in 34 pages and a lengthy judgment  cited as RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256 which  include Orders to make to make the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief proceedings inter partes thus paving the way the way for mediation process presided by Registrar Rimmer, which is reasonably perceived to have been botched as a result of the Respondent non-compliance with the requirements of the First Judge as embraced within the transcript of 17.6.2009.
8	11.5.2009	Applicant wrote to the Principal Registrar requesting for the Prerogative Relief Proceedings to be continued as the Orders for service of the necessary documents had been served upon the Respondent’s solicitors on 9.12.2008.
9.	17.6.2009	The transcript of the proceedings in 51 pages shows how the First Judge issued Orders for mediation proceedings in conformity with the Minute of Proposed Orders filed by the Respondent, in terms of the following: a) The Applicant be made Plaintiff in the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief proceedings; b) Paul Chung Kiong Chin be made the Second Defendant in those proceedings. c) The Respondent be similarly made the First Defendant. d) The Second Defendant remains inactive in all future proceedings including the mediation process and shall not be liable nor be responsible for any future costs orders. e) The Plaintiff act on behalf of the Second Defendant (in the whole proceedings not limited to the mediation process), who can only be communicated with through the Plaintiff. f) The First Defendant to file a concise and precise Show-Cause Affidavit that narrows down the dispute to the core issues as defined: f.1. whether the solicitor-client costs agreement dated 3.11.2004 had been modified by prior email communications between the parties; f.2. the reasons why legal costs of a relatively uncomplicated matter had been escalated by the Respondent to some $25k in the face of the Respondent’s legal service having been terminated since the 20.2.2005. g) time for compliance be specifically made the essence of the Order for the  Show Cause Affidavit of Respondent be filed within 21 days, in readiness for the mediation process; but this was not complied with by the Respondent as it was delayed until the mediation process had passed.
10	22.6.2009	Letter from Applicant to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court making an Application for Mediation copied to the Associate of Justice Hasluck.  This letter requires the Registrar to exercise his discretion to disclose this application to the Respondent as the Applicant gives his consent for the Registrar to do so.  In his cover email letter to the Associate of Justice Hasluck, the Applicant noted that he would be away from the jurisdiction and was expressing his fear that his son Paul would be intimidated by the Respondent during his absence for a month and hence the reason for his not sending the Respondent a copy of that letter. But he gave the Registrar to exercise his discretion to inform the Respondent accordingly.
11.	10.8.2009	Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 8.7.2009 requesting for the Appellant’s leave for extension of time till the 24.7.2009 to file the Show-Cause Affidavit: yet Respondent did not file his Show Cause Affidavit by the appointed date but only filed it by 7.10.2009.
12	11.9.2009	Mediation Conference was not helped by the then non-existence of the Show Cause Affidavit as intended by the First Judge.  That conference was held before Registrar Rimmer and the Respondent offered to settle the dispute amicably for $3,000.00 provided the Applicant withdrew his Complaint to the LPCC; the offer if accepted by the Applicant, would mean that he had to bear  the three-fold consequences of that inapposite settlement, in the following terms: a)                  the Applicant is denied the opportunity to win his dispute with the regulator of the legal profession which imposes a restriction on his independent legal practice, which is currently before the Court of Appeal in CACV41 of 2010 which has only three issues: a.1. The existence of the Pseudo Board ; a.2. The vindication of Applicant’s rights against Mr. Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor.  a.3. The falsifications of court records by David Taylor Solicitor b) the denial of the Appellant’s son Paul his right to compensation for Mr. Thies clogging up his equity by his wrongful caveat would be travesty of justice that remains unresolved and it is against the public interests that a court officer should be allowed to get away scot free for exploiting his involuntary client’s vulnerabilities and advancing his own personal interests ahead those of his supposed client, as a result; b) the denial of the Applicant for the restitution of the sum of    $11,500.00 which was taken forcefully from him by way of duress in a sham compromise through the involuntary Consent Judgment of Registrar Wilde, effected unconscionably by the Respondent.  The public would have conceived that our legal system condones the pillaging and plundering of innocent members of the public by a solicitor who is an officer of the court. c) The Applicant decided that the mediation conference was unfair to him and he therefore rejected it. d)  The Respondent did not file a Show Cause Affidavit that depicts the essence of justice intended to be done by the First Judge in  the Show Cause Affidavit.  This document should deal with cores issues and its ramifications on the issue of the sham compromise, which the First Judge indicated is a crucial issue that His Honour’s mind was “open” to, in the transcript.
13	16.9.2009	Email letter from Applicant to the Principal Registrar copied to the Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC informing them of the results of the mediation conference held before Registrar Rimmer on 11.9.2010.
14.	3.10.2009	Applicant wrote to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia copied to the Respondent to achieve the two fold purpose: a)      Requesting for the transcript of the proceedings in duress-handmaid case that was heard before Justice Templeman on 8.2.2007 regarding the unlawful caveat of Mr. Thies on the home property of Paul, when Paul appeared in person. b)      Informing the recipients of that letter that it was the Appellant’s understanding from what transpired before Justice Hasluck in primary case for Prerogative Relief that the Applicant was given the mandate to pursue the removal of the unlawful caveat’s case acting in his capacity as lawyer for his son Paul with appropriate disclaimers to the effect that the Applicant is without a practice certificate but has never been struck off the roll of barristers and solicitors.
15.	6.10.2009	Respondent ultimately filed his Show Cause Affidavit after a delay of 16 weeks as from the date of the Order of the First Judge who specifically made time of the essence whilst refining its quality as indicated in the transcript dated 17.6.2009 in the following terms:  a) a strict compliance of 21 days at pages 45 and 48.  b) it must serve the needs of the mediation process and also for future trials if necessary. c) it must be concise and precise but what was filed consists of much irrelevant materials spanning over 540 pages. d) counsel of Respondent was suggesting that the First Judge and the Mediator should read the irrelevant “many foot high” Affidavit materials filed in the courts below which had confused their Honours Magistrates Musk and Michelides in FR417 of 2007 and FR944 of 2008 respectively, but this was not accepted by the First Judge.   e) The exact words of the First Judge affecting the core issues that needed to be addressed by the Respondent at page 41 relates to how the legal costs could escalate in the circumstances are: “whether the contractual relationship with the Respondent was terminated in the way which might have precluded further costs being incurred or as a subsidiary point, whether in some way the costs agreement was qualified by some exchange of emails.”   f) the joinder of Paul Chin as the Second Defendant with the condition that he is to remain inactive and therefore he could not be communicated with except through the Applicant who will be acting for him at all stages of the proceedings as Plaintiff in the Prerogative Relief proceedings represents the mandate given by the Court to the Applicant, which the Second Judge erred by retracting it (the Mandate).   g)  The fact that the Mandate is meant not only for the mediation process but is applicable for all stages of the Prerogative Relief proceedings is clear from the transcript. h) There is no abuse of court process for the Applicant to represent his son Paul in the duress handmaid case as there is a common law principle which allows the Applicant to enter it through the original Civ 1903 of 2008 case or through amalgamating it with the duress-handmaid case. i) The Applicant expressed his intentions to represent his son Paul in the duress-handmaid case and prepared documents to that effect with the disclaimer that he is still a lawyer-litigant in person though he admitted to his mistakes in using “solicitor” and “barrister” in those documents. (See Column 1 of r. 5a(2) of the Legal Profession Regulations, 2009). j) The Applicant is currently being prosecuted by the regulator for the non-strict liability of the subs. 13(1) representation of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 that he was entitled to be engaged in legal practice whilst he was labouring under a mistake of fact by using his stamp which contains those words “barrister & solicitor” on those documents he had prepared as lawyer litigant in person in the duress-handmaid case.  Strangely, there is no prosecution number as that prosecution notice is not lodged with the Magistrates Court at Perth. A telephone call to the Magistrates Court at Perth confirm this anomalous situation.
16	8.10.2009	Applicant filed his Summon in Chambers Application to act as the lawyer for his son Paul under the mistaken belief that he is allowed to used his title as barrister & solicitor as per the mandate of Justice Hasluck given him on 17.6.2009 in the first stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings.  (See Column 1 of r.5 (2) of the Legal Profession Regulations, 2009 which I was not aware of until recently. However, this Application is made with the appropriate disclaimer that the Applicant was acting as a lawyer litigant in person.)
17	22.1.2010	Facsimile and email letter to Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC attaching my letter dated 20.10.2009 copied to the Respondent that I intended to act for my son either as a lawyer-litigant in person or as the lawyer acting for him as “counsel” or “legal practitioner” or “solicitor” or “barrister” with the appropriate disclaimers in CIV 1112 of 2007 for the duress-handmaid caveat case as I have been given the mandate to do so by Justice Hasluck.  I also referred to other documents that I sent to the LPCC in 15 pages answering the Respondent’s complaint in 15 pages dated 29.10.2009 pertaining to this and other matters.
18	6.5.2010	Applicant wrote a letter to Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC informing it of the events that transpired during the hearing of both the CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 before His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin in relation to my perceived bias of that Second Judge against him and therefore he was not a suitable judge to hear the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings. .
19	6.10.2010	The delayed Show Cause Affidavit confused the minds of the court and caused the injustice to the Applicant and his son Paul and this is indicated in the subsequent errors of the Security Order Decision and the Mandate Exclusion Decision of the Second Judge that are the subject of this current Interlocutory Appeal before Justice Newnes.
20	29.10.2009	The Draft Order before Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2009 was extracted by the Applicant.
21	12.5.2010	Applicant was served with a copy of the Respondent’s Summons for Security of Costs, Proposed Variation of First Judge’s Orders in the Respondent’s Minute of Proposed Directions in 27 pages. The Variations Orders sought to revive the Null Costs Orders of the Court below which was not allowed by the Second Judge but there is a veiled threat in that judgment to stultify further the Prerogative Relief Proceedings.
22	12.5.2010	The Applicant complained to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee in 27 pages as indicated above, by way of facsimile to Ms. Caroline Brookes.
23	12.5.2010	Applicant was taken by surprise that the Second Judge showed a personal interests in the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings and was therefore acting in conflict of interests; this is show by the great haste in which the proceedings for the Security Costs Order was being processed by His Honour in the following terms: a)      The Mandate Exclusion Decision was made on 13.5.2010 and published on the 25.5.2010, just one day after the Applicant was served with the Security Order Application by the Respondent.   b)      The Second Judge erred in not having adequately considered the Applicant’s Response Affidavit filed and dated on 26.5.2010 to the Security Order Application dated and filed 12.5.2010. This Response Affidavit is in 140 pages crossed the Mandate Exclusion Decision. c)      The Second Judge heard the Security Order Decision on 17.6.2010 and delivered his decision on 8.7.2010 but the Mandate Exclusion Decision was delivered on 13.5.2010 but published on 25.5.2010.  d)      The Mandate Exclusion Decision therefore is an index of the error of the Second Judge of his being predisposed with a “prejudging mind” in terms of the following: d.1. that the Applicant is not entitled to be engaged in protecting his own interests or his son’s interests as a lawyer but not as a barrister & solicitor d.2. being a lawyer and not a legal practitioner he is not a court officer because he does not hold a current practicing certificate. d.3. being a lawyer and not a legal practitioner, he owes no public duty to be fair to the Respondent and therefore he is not acting in conflict of interests for his son and he thereby can plead for his son Paul before the Second Judge and as his son’s McKenzie friend. d.3. that all these proceedings are not primarily for the return of $6,000.00 but for serving the public interests that the Respondent must not be seen to be exploiting the vulnerabilities of his potential clients or his own clients. d.4. that the case against the Respondent is one of the three core issues in the Applicant’s dispute with the regulator of the legal profession in which he is vindicating his rights in order to  seek a return to his position as an independent legal practitioner.
24	28.5.2010	Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC responded to the Applicant to the effect that she had received all documents relating to the Appellant’s email in terms of the following: a)      dated 17.5.2010 commenting on the Mandate Exclusion Decision; b)      dated 19.5.2010 re: Outline of Written Submissions of Paul Chung Kiong Chin dated 10.5.2010 before the Second Judge and his Summons in Chambers dated 30.4.2010 which shows that Paul had resorted to become a litigant in person in the duress-handmaid case when his father was excluded to represent him in the Mandate Exclusion Decision delivered on 13.5.2010. c)      The Second Judge erred in being irrational by denying Paul his natural justice to use the plaint written by his father and his father’s friends as he chose to appear as a litigant in person despite the unanimous mandate given to his lawyer father by the First Judge in the Prerogative Relief Proceedings. d)      27.5.2010 annexing a copy of the Mandate Exclusion Case.
25.	17.6.2010	The Second Judge heard and delivered his Security Order Decision on 8.7.2010.  It is based on the unmet Costs Order of Commissioner Herron in District Court Appeal No.6 of 2008 which the First Judge acknowledged that had no jurisdiction to interfere but the Second Judge does have jurisdiction to order for it to be heard before him under the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in the manner as prescribed by subs. 36(4) of the Act i.e. pursuant to s.77 of the District Court Act, 1969.  It must be remembered that a taxing master can go against the original costs order if it is found by him to be unlawful or contravening the law.
26.	28.6.2010	Application for Prerogative Orders filed by Applicant to prohibit the Second Judge from hearing the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in 126 pages resulting from his Mandate Exclusion Decision Case and the Security Order Decision.
27	8.7.2010	The Second Judge delivered his Security Order Case in RE MICHELIDES NO.2 [2010] WASC 169 in 11 pages together with the transcript of those proceedings.
28	11.7.2010	Applicant filed Notice of Appeal in CACV 75 of 2010 at the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and served it by posting it on the Respondent at his last known address in accordance with the substitute service by the First Judge.
29	16.7.2010	Applicant filed his Appellant’s case in 56 pages with amended indices and amended Orders Wanted.
30	20.7.2010	Paul Chung Kiong Chin was depressed by the injustice meted by the Second Judge and he left Australia for Malaysia as he was feeling unwell because he was deprived of just compensation for the unlawful caveat of the Respondent which was finally removed by the Second Judge and he was denied his natural justice both as a litigant in person and the representation of his lawyer father through the Mandate Exclusion Case.
31.	24.7.2010	The Applicant and his spouse left for Malaysia in an emergency flight upon hearing that their son Paul Chung Kiong Chin had become seriously ill in Malaysia perhaps caused by the further intimidation of the Respondent demanding for another sum of $650.00 upon circumstances where there was no order as to costs given by the Second Judge.  They were there for two months and only return to Perth by 27.9.2010.
32	4.8.2010	His Honour Justice Heenan heard the Prerogative Relief Application for the recusal of the Second Judge together with another application for the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal in CIV 1877 of 2010.  The latter pertains to the falsification of court records by lawyer David Taylor in CIV1131 of 2006 and the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal in CACV107 of 2008 made pursuant to s.33 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935.  These two cases were heard with the Applicant being absent from the jurisdiction for which Justice Heenan delivered a written judgment on 11.8.2010 cited as RE: JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EXPARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 212 in 5 pages, explaining the law that a Justice of the General Division having the same rank as Justice Chaney, Justice Ken Martin and Master Sanderson cannot make prerogative orders against another justice of the same rank.  This judgment is an indirect admission that Justice Heenan did not have the jurisdiction to dismiss the Applicant’s Application for prerogative Orders in CIV 1019 of 2010 and therefore that dismissal which is now the subject of an appeal in CACV41 of 2010 is therefore void in law.  The Registrar of the Court of Appeal had therefore been informed accordingly.
33	7.10.2010	The Applicant was served by the regulator of the legal profession in WA a Court hearing Notice with a Written Plea by Accused in Form 5 together with a Prosecution Notice in Form 3 issued under the Criminal Procedure Act, 2004 and Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 together with two charges that the Applicant had contravened s. 13(1) of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 in relations to proceedings before the Second Judge in the Mandate Exclusion Case together with the relevant Statements of Material Facts.  The time for hearing for these two criminal charges is scheduled to be heard on 26.11.2010 at 10.00 am.
34	11.10.2010	The Applicant wrote to the Chairperson of the Legal Practice Board claiming that he had a defence to those criminal charges of having represented that he was entitled to engage in legal practice in so far as it concerns the mandate given to him by the First Charge on 17.6.2009 to enter into the duress-handmaid case to defend his son Paul under special circumstances that was caused by the difficulties posed by the Respondent in refusing to release the strangle-hold caveat he had held over his son’s property under unjustifiable circumstances.
35	15.10.2010	Applicant appeared in the Court of Appeal in CACV 75 of 2010 before a Justice of Appeal, His Honour Justice Newnes who granted leave to the Applicant to amend his Appellant’s Case filed on the 16.7.2010 as indicated above.  The Respondent was present and was granted leave to be present although it was an ex-parte Application for Leave to appeal the interlocutory decision of the Security Order Case and the Mandate Exclusion Case of the Second Judge. The Court adjourned the matter till the 23.11.2010 at 10.30 am to re-consider the Amended Appellant’s Case which ought to have been filed by the Applicant by the latest date 5.11.2010.  There was no order as to costs as the Applicant made submissions relating to the relevancy of the legislative intention of Parliament when it enacted the Minor Cases Provisions of ss. 25 and 31 of the Magistrates Courts (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004, which negates any liability for costs of any party (no matter at what courts it may be, of any litigation) who had been dragged into court proceedings which had not been commenced within with the provisions of the Minor Cases Provisions and who are thereby cost-disadvantaged as a result.