JUSTICE FOR A FORMER LAWYER IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA: January 2010

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA CACV 105 OF 2008
COURT OF APPEAL MINUTE OF AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Parties to the NI KOK (NICHOLAS) CHIN APPELLANT
Appeal
LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD, WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDENT

Filed the 12th day of February, 2009

Prepared and Filed by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN - Solicitor-litigant in person
No. 387, Alexander Drive Phone & Fax: 08- 9275 7440
DIANELLA WA 6059 Email: nnchin@msn.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MINUTE OF AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE ORDERS OF JUSTICE PULLINS GIVEN ON 22.1.2009

THE DECISION APPEALED AGAINST:
The Appellant appeals the decision of the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) in VR
107 of 2007 which case was reported in Chin v West Australian Legal Practice Board
[2008] WASAT 252, (the Second SAT decision). It was heard by the SAT Panel; this
comprises of His Honour Judge J Chaney (Acting President) and the Honourable
Members who are Ms M Jordan (Senior Sessional Member) and Mr B Hunt (Senior
Sessional Member) (the Tribunal). It heard the Appellant on 25.9.2008 and delivered
its judgment on 28.10.2008. The Grounds of Appeal are as follows:

BOARD DID NOT ACT APPROPRIATELY:
1. The Tribunal erred in mixed law and facts at paragraph 2, 19, 20, 84 and 85 of the Second SAT Decision when it drew the wrong conclusion which states that:

“2.The Tribunal concluded that the Board had acted in accordance with its powers under section 40 of the Legal Practice Act. The Tribunal examined the various matters raised by the Board, and Mr Chin's explanations for that conduct. The Tribunal concluded that the Board acted appropriately, having regard to the protection of the public and the maintenance of professional standards, by imposing the conditions on Mr Chin's practice certificate. Accordingly the application was dismissed.”

“19. We note in passing that Mr Chin's expression of what we understand to be an argument as to the proper construction of the Act is laced with references to matters such as 'a hidden agenda', 'a false ground of a value judgment', 'explicit discriminatory practice', attempts to give 'wrongs the appearance of legality', an absence of good faith on the part of the Board,
and 'gross bias'. Subsequently, in the document, Mr Chin asserts malicious conduct by a practitioner who made a complaint against him, ‘surreptitious’ activities by a member of the Professional Affairs Committee of the Tribunal, and inappropriate influence on the
Professional Affairs Committee by a complaining practitioner. He refers to the previous decision of this Tribunal on 12 September 2006 in the following way:

The SAT through Judge Eckert therefore compromised the tenets of integrity, impartiality and independence of the respondent by enabling it to blow 'hot' and 'cold' in one breath; i.e, by giving the applicant his unrestricted status and by withdrawing it thereafter for the purpose of the unjustified control.”

20. We do not accept Mr Chin's submissions as to the proper construction of s 40 of the LP Act. In our view, the power of the Board to impose conditions does not first require a suspicion or belief that a practitioner is incapable or unfit within the meaning of s 39 of the LP Act
to be formed. Section 39(3) of the LP Act provides that where the Board suspects or believes that a practitioner is incapable or unfit, and the public interest or protection of the integrity of the profession requires refusal, suspension or cancellation of a practice certificate, the Board may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a hearing and determination under
s 188 of the LP Act. It is the Tribunal which then has then power under s 188(9) of the LP Act to refuse, suspend, cancel, or impose conditions on the practice certificate. Section 40 of the LP Act has no work to do in relation to the procedures available under s 39 of the LP Act.”

“84 The object of the exercise of regulatory powers by the Board, and by the Tribunal standing in its shoes, is the protection of the public and the maintenance of the standards expected of the profession. The object of the exercise of regulatory powers is not punishment. Where the public
interest and the maintenance of appropriate professional standards require particular course of action, that requirement must outweigh the personal interests of the practitioner concerned. That is the case here.”

“85 The various matters referred to above, demonstrate, in our view clearly, that Mr Chin does not have a proper appreciation of, and does not observe, the standards of conduct expected of legal practitioners. We do not consider that Mr Chin should be permitted to practice unsupervised.
The conditions imposed by the Board were, in our view, entirely appropriate. It follows that Mr Chin's application for review of those conditions should be dismissed.

Orders
1. The decision of the Legal Practice Board made on 2 May 2008 to impose conditions
upon Mr Chin's annual practice certificate is confirmed.
2. The application for review of the Board's decision of 2 May 2008 is dismissed”.

in the following terms:
a) The Board abused its discretionary powers by its wrongful and unconscionable invocation of its independent and separate powers derived from the un-punishing s. 40 instead of the punishing s.39. It does so without regard to the proper functions of the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee (the LPCC) as provided for by s.164 of the Legal Practice Act, 2003 (WA) (the Act).
b) The legal officers of the LPCC Ms. Karen Whitney and Ms. C. Coombs stated at the inception of their persecution case that the Appellant is “unfit to practice” and therefore “requires supervision”. This fact entitles the Appellant to be punished under s. 39 of the Act. This did not happen.
c) It is to be reasonably observed from the transpired events that some form of persecuting malice pervades in the affairs of the Professional Affairs Committee of the Board (the PAC) which constantly re-constitutes itself and manifests itself in the seven inhibitions to the independent practice of the Appellant referred to below (the inhibitions).
d) Common sense dictates that a proper judicial determination without persecuting malice should have been made against the Appellant under s.39 of the Act as the history of the Board never anticipates such a public body to practice whim-worship by abusing its own powers under s.40 without any warrantable circumstances.
e) Further, the employed legal officers of the LPCC are reasonably seen to be working at the behest of some unknown and unidentified persecuting members of the PAC through one elected visible member Ms. F.H. Walter. The evidence indicates that she was participating in both the meetings of the PAC and the LPCC both as judge and prosecutor for the purpose of initiating that first of the series of seven inhibitions at the behest of a complaining and influential practitioner Mr. Pino Monaco who has an axe to grind because of his own wrongdoings to Dr. K.S. Chan and who has been exerting undue influence on the PAC. He was once the President of the Law Society of WA being also the principal partner of the legal firm of Godfrey Virtue & Co.
f) The Appellant was justified in his comments with regard to the First SAT Decision in respect of the error of the learned Judge Eckert. A few examples of her errors gleaned from the relevant transcript would put that statement of the Appellant in perspective with regard to her having compromised the tenets of her impartiality, independence and integrity in the First SAT Decision when she spoke what should be reasonably construed as derogatory terms of the Appellant as follows:
i) He has no insight either into his conduct or ability;
ii) His evidence was evasive, often off point and wordy;
iii) He was unable to give a straightforward answer to many questions;
iv) His oral evidence was inconsistent with the written papers before it;
v) His reluctance to answer questions that do not seem to advance his case;
vi) His perception of the truth did not coincide with everyone’s conception of the truth without question.
g) The Board allows its independence, impartialities and integrity to be usurped through the improper and unwarranted Monaco complaint through its PAC and not through the LPCC under s. 175 of the Act. It perverted the course of justice.
h) The Board did not, in its good conscience, bind itself with the constraints of the principles of equity through not misinterpreting the Act by reading down the human rights of the Appellant, thereby avoiding the mischief caused by an improper interpretation of that Act.
i) The Board is reasonably seen to be unrelenting in persecuting the Appellant using s.40 when it is reasonably seen to have changed its original course of action by first exhibiting an original malicious intention to persecute the Appellant under s.39 of the Act but later abandoning it when it found that this would not work as a result of receiving the response of the Appellant to its allegations. Investigations also revealed that the Appellant could not be faulted for any professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct or illegal conduct.
j) By using s. 40, the Board is making seven attempts to implicate the Appellant in the alleged professional deficiency of his professional knowledge having regard to the results of the co-ordinated efforts of Ms. Karen Whitney and Ms. Coombs in finding that the Appellant has the common or universal traits of new legal practitioners who have gone through the mill and are just embarking an independent practice of their own (the phantom deficiency syndrome).
k) By using s. 40, the Board could devise a measure to wield that dangerous or lethal weapon in s.40 against the Appellant to “imprison” him for life by lowering him into a “legal abyss” through an improper utilization of that phantom deficiency syndrome knowing fully well that the accompanying “ostracization” effect of the legal society in WA would have that deleterious consequence upon him having regard to his personal circumstances. Anyone who wielded such a dangerous weapon unconscionably upon another must eventually have that dangerous weapon recoiling upon its user. The Appellant must not be blamed for his unwitting exhibitions of any tendency of being malicious or unkind to his neighbour, himself, nor is this his wrongly-perceived rationalization or justifications for any erring conduct on his part. He is struggling to survive against those heavy assaults upon his character brought about unconscionably by the Board by blaming him “faultlessly” and he is now defending his livelihood.
l) The Board had improperly and unconscionably (by wilful ignorance or by sheer negligence caused by the sheer complexity of the Appellant’s case before it) failed to see the “woods for the trees”.
m) By its consistently labelling the Appellant with the incriminating “phantom deficiency syndrome” its persecuting members had in the process been improperly re-constituting themselves into the appearance of the Full Board equipped with the appearance of having the laudable object of maintaining standards in the legal profession basing it upon their ill-conceived notion of protecting the public. The persecuting malice does not make sense to the majority of the Board’s 48 members resulting in their inability to obtain their assent to their value judgments in the illegal inhibitions against the Appellant (the false Full Board).
n) These value judgements are reasonably seen to be not based on a purposive and indispensable philosophy for judges for the purpose of making objective determinations of the facts of the case before it as they contradicts Dr. Peikoff philosophy of Objectivism. Objective judgments must be for the real purpose of extracting truths (good, real) from the falsehoods (bad or evil or unreal) and not for any oblique purpose of rewarding the evaders and the guilty and punishing the innocent and the victims.
o) The inevitable result of an expected objective judgment is contrary to what is made available by the Second SAT Decision which had been implored by the Appellant to be objective and it failed although it was so imbued with its purposive intent to be objective.
p) All these seven value judgments are reasonably seen to be making a mockery of those universal traits of the Appellant as a newly qualified independent legal practitioner.
q) The hidden agenda of the False Full Board is seen first in the surreptitious conduct of the said Ms. Walter of the PAC who executed that first inhibition. She had the LPCC under her control to achieve what she wanted.
r) Ms. G. Cahon was lately again commissioned in the aftermath of the Second SAT Decision by the persecuting members to re-litigate matters under s. 3res-judicata matters - these have already been determined by that court-like tribunal of the LPCC, the PAC and SAT in 2006 leading to the Steytler Consent judgment, the Report of the Inquiry Panel, the ratification of that report and the Second SAT Decision.
THE SEVEN INHBITITIONS TO THE INDEPENDENT PRACTICE OF THE APPELALLANT BY THE FALSE FULL BOARD
s) The persecuting members of the Board through the Monaco undue influence continued to wreak havoc on the Board resulting in the seven inhibitions viz:
l.1. the first inhibition resulted in the recommendation of the LPCC to the PAC which caused the false Full Board to impose the impugned conditions on the practice certificate of the Appellant on the 19.7.2006 and which became the subject of the Appellant’s Application in VR 137 of 2006 before the State Administrative Tribunal (the First SAT Decision).
l.2. the second inhibition resulting from the First SAT decision headed by the learned Judge Eckert in VR 137 of 2006 which unreasonably concurred with the first inhibition, delivered on the 12.9.2006, the details of which are contained in the Grounds of Appeal of the Appellant filed in CACV 43 of 2007.
l.3. the third inhibition resulting from the learned Master Sanderson’s error in disposing of the Appellant’s procedurally-wrong appeal (to the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeal in CIV 2210 of 2006). Instead of striking it off for no reason, the Learned Master could have easily solved it by allowing the Appellant to move that case to its proper forum in the Court of Appeal upon the request of the Appellant to do so.
l.4. the fourth inhibition resulting from the consent judgment of the learned Justice Steytler on 25.9.2007 in CACV 43 of 2007 to the first inhibition. This was caused by the Board’s admission that the first inhibition was determined by the false Full Board. A real Full Board would have the validating minutes of the Board as required by s.10 and 11 of the Act and rr 15 and 17 of the Legal Practice Board Rules, 2004. The false Full Board is tainted with the gross bias of Ms. F. H. Walter.
l.5. the fifth inhibition resulting from the persecuting members of the Board re-constituting themselves into the Inquiry Panel which sat on 3.4.2008 to determine the Application of the Appellant for an unconditional practice certificate and also for a certificate to move to another jurisdiction in the aftermath of the Steytler consent judgment. This false Full Board persisted in relying on the “res-judicata” materials by refusing to admit that it is not a real Full Board as contemplated by the relevant legislation.
l.6. the sixth inhibition resulting from 6 members of the Approving Committee sitting sometime in May 2008 to approve the report the illegal fifth inhibition knowing fully well that 3 of its members are disqualified on account of gross bias and it is aware of its status as a false Full Board.
1.7. the seventh inhibition is the Second SAT Decision delivered by His Honour Judge Chaney on 25.9.2008 which unreasonably dismissed the Appellant’s Application in VR 107 of 2008 in the light of its own acknowledgement of the existence of the calumny and detraction perpetrated by the false Full Board upon the Appellant. It refused to use its declarative powers under s.91 of State Administrative Tribunal Act, 2004(the SAT Act) to make a declaration that the Board had acted in bad faith against the Appellant under s. 18 of the Act. It did this upon the invalid ground that it had no jurisdiction to determine issues of compensation which it was not required to do so by the Appellant.
t) No person can be punished for no wrongs. It is morally wrong for the Board to say it does not punish the Appellant when the effects of those seven wrongful inhibitions to his independent legal practice are punishments are as clear as day. This is reasonably clear because the persecuting members accomplished their persecuting malice through the improper motives and malice of its persecuting members who went on a “frolic of their own” as the agent of the Board appearing as the real Full Board when they are not.
u) The capricious and improper seven inhibitions are practical impossibilities for the Appellant to perform and are therefore of null effect in law.
JURISDICTION TO MAKE OBJECTIVE DETERMINATIONS OF FACTS FOR CALUMNY AND DETRACTION BY TRIBUNAL:
2. The Tribunal erred in mixed law and facts in paragraph 13 & 16 of the SAT decision when it states that:

13. “At the commencement of the hearing, Mr Chin confirmed that he was pursuing a claim for compensation from the Board as a result of its conduct. The Tribunal pointed out to Mr Chin that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for compensation, and the matter was not further pursued…...

16. Apart from his responses to the Board's conclusions, Mr Chin raised other issues in the various documents he lodged in support of his application and in his oral submissions. The issues were not precisely expressed, and in some cases did not bear upon the task confronting the Tribunal.”

as follows:
a) The Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to award compensation for the damages of the calumny and detraction. However, it is endowed with declarative powers under s.91 of the SAT Act to make such a declaration and could then refer the issue of compensation to the Supreme Court.
b) The Tribunal erred because it was not psychologically receptive to the legitimate grouses of the Appellant which inter-alia are as follows:
i. The existence of the improper motives and malice of the false Full Board which was masquerading as the real Full Board which caused the inhibitions is apparent to it.
ii. The fact that the persecuting malice of the false Full Board lies peculiarly within the knowledge of those persecuting members who successively initiated the inhibitions predisposes the reversal of the onus of proof in law upon the real Full Board after the Appellant had established the preliminaries of his case in this Appeal.
iii. The persecuting malice of the false Full Board caused the co-ordinated activity of the PAC and the LPCC.
iv. The false Full Board through its improperly constituted Inquiry Panel in the aftermath of the Steytler Consent Judgment continued to refuse to act in good faith to restore the Appellant to his former position that existed before the first inhibition.

WHITTLED DOWN-PHANTOM DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
h) That fictitious concept concerns the false Full Board’s wrong perception of the many and varied matters which are constantly being whittled down in the continual proceedings by the Appellant against the Board to its few remaining characteristics, viz:
A) The Appellant allegedly acting in conflict of interests-situation where none exists,
B) The false Full Board’s failure to distinguish between monies in transit and trust monies kept by the Appellant for MTC;
B) The false Full Board’s seeming blindness to see the truthful allegations against Mr. Thies for fraud and unconscionable conduct, now vindicated for the Appellant by the judgment of the learned Justice Hasluck;
C) The false Full Board’s seeming blindness to accept the fact that Mr. David Taylor’s misled Registrar Powell in CIV 1131 of 2006 and caused the wrongful costs order against the Appellant that was already accepted by Mr. Taylor as a result of the response letter of the Appellant to the LPCC dated 1.9.2006 read together with the annexed documents;
D) The falsifications of the court records that CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed on 10.2.2006 and this is no longer being disputed by Mr. Taylor. This is the reason why that action did not get off the ground. Spunter Pty Ltd, Mr. Maurice Frederick Law and Mrs. Cheryl Law have been served with the appeal papers in CAC 107 of 2008 attesting to the facts as contained in sub-paragraphs C and D above and if they were untruths, they would have been objected to by them.
E) The persecuting members continuing refusal to accept the Appellant’s justifications for the error and inequity of the learned Master Sanderson’s in CIV 2210 of 2006 when the Appellant made the procedural mistake of appealing to the Supreme Court instead of to the Court of Appeal under the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules, 2005, whilst the majority of the Board members did so by agreeing not to implement the intimidating cost orders of the learned Master.
F) The injudicious manner of the false Full Board concluding that the Appellant is capable of showing disrespect to members of the Judiciary which is a far-fetched notion and a value judgment in itself.
G) The facts of the case of Mr. Bertini shows the Board’s non-functionality as the regulator of the legal profession caused by the false Full Board victimizing innocent and faultless persons like the Appellant instead.
H) Mr. Peter Quinlan as counsel for the Board has all along been presenting a picture of untruths regarding the attributes of the Appellant and is not relenting (See transcript of proceedings in 100 pages in VR 107 of 2008).
i) The controversy affecting Mr. Taylor is the subject of the Appellant’s current appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 caused by the learned Master Sanderson’s error in dismissing CIV 1775 of 2008 in the face of Justice Simmonds Discovery in CIV 1142 No.2, without giving an adequate reason for his judgment, despite the availability of evidence before him.
i) Continuing explicit discriminatory practice by the persecuting members of the Board in the aftermath of the Steytler Consent Order on account of his age and ethnicity.
j) The Board’s attempts to give the appearance of legality to its wrongs are exemplified by the Thies’ case through Ms. Cahon’s of the LPCC’s continuing efforts to re-persecute the Appellant in the face of Justice Hasluck’s Decision and the guilty-flee conduct of Mr. Thies. This has now abated.
m) Further examples are those of Mr. David Taylor in relation to the injustice meted out to Ms. Nancy Hall which is one of the causes of her early death having regard to Mr. Taylor’s non-compliance with Justice Jenkins’ Orders in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.1;
n) Mr. David Taylor’s subsequent acceptance of the fact that the Appellant was not the solicitor on record for Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall in CIV 1131 of 2006 as reinforced by the revelation of Ms. Tameeka Stewart’s (associate to Registrar Powell) is still not accepted or is unheeded by the persecuting members of the Board.
o) The fact of Mr. Taylor having the wrongful costs order of $300.00 made by the learned Registrar Powell against the Appellant resulted in the learned Magistrate Roberts at the Midland Magistrates Courts descending into the “arena of conflict” and taking part in the proceedings against the Appellant. That action was commenced by Mr. Maurice Frederick Law who was in turn goaded by Mr. Taylor to persecute the Appellant maliciously. This was settled by Magistrate Nicholls and the relevant court officer through the good offices of the Chief Magistrate. The Board refused to accept this fact and the Tribunal could not see this fact but they are clearly explained in the Appellant’s letter to the LPCC dated 1.9.2006 together with the annexed documents.
p) The surreptitious activity of Ms. F.H. Walter in the PAC refers to the consequence of the inappropriate influence of Mr. Pino Monaco that caused that first inhibition.
q) The First Sat Decision made a value judgment by unreasonably concurring with that null and void first inhibition without providing a written judgment to that effect unlike that of the Second SAT Decision which had been prevailed upon by the Appellant to do so. The Appellant can now negate each of the specific grounds advanced by the learned Judge Chaney but he could not do so in the First SAT Decision except by reference as to what is contained in the transcript of the proceedings for all the discrepancies arising from the error of Her Honour Judge Eckert which are contained in the Grounds of Appeal in CACV 43 of 2007.
r) The updating source of the “phantom deficiency” is constantly changing. This reflects the non-objectivity of the persecuting members in unrelentingly continuing to go on a “frolic of their own”.
s) The initial burden of proof on the part of the Appellant should be sufficiently discharged by evidence of the persecuting malice of the persecuting members and the particulars of detriment suffered by Appellant that was caused by the calumny and detraction, in the following terms:

A: PARTICULARS OF THE PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE BOARD

i. The gross bias of Ms. F. H. Walter as the decision maker in both the PAC and the LPCC caused the first inhibition to be practiced upon the Appellant by the false Full Board; the result of her acting as both judge and prosecutor. The first inhibition is therefore a nullity in law.
ii. The persecuting members of the Board who re-constituted themselves as the false Full Board went on a “frolic of their own” and were unable to obtain the assent of the majority of the 48 Board Members due to the inherent safeguard of the legislation being in place.
iii. This failure of the false Full Board to persecute the Appellant successfully in its first inhibition caused it to consent to the Steytler Consent judgment.
iv. The fifth inhibition occurred on 3.4.2008 when the false Full Board sat as the Inquiry Panel to persecute the Appellant.
v. The sixth inhibition occurred sometime in May 2008 when only three of the persecuting members out of its 6 members were qualified to ratify the null Panel Inquiry decision because they did not satisfy the quorum of 4 knowing full well that the Panel Inquiry team is a false Full Board. The others are disqualified because they cannot ratify their own decision.
vi. The wrongs of Mr. Pino Monaco against Dr. K.S. Chan were never investigated by the LPCC but Mr. Pino Monaco was allowed by it to exert inappropriate influence on the PAC to create that first inhibition. This shows the partisanship of the Board.
vii. Mr. David Taylor used “underhand tactics” to falsify the court records that CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed on 10.2.2006 and this resulted in that case never getting off the ground. This fact is supported by Justice Simmonds Discovery of the court records which was communicated contemporaneously to Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2. This was not investigated by the Board. Mr. Taylor had accepted this fact situation.
viii. The Appellant becomes the salvor of Ms. Hall’s Mt. Lawley and Hazelmere properties under s.244 of the Act and was therefore entitled to his solicitor’s lien over the salvaged properties of the late Ms. Hall. This case was dismissed by the learned Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008 without any adequate reason and this matter is pending appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 as indicated above.
ix. The Appellant is the salvor of the Ms. Hall’s properties in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.1 due to the non-compliance of Mr. David Taylor with the orders of Justice Jenkins in a timely fashion. Mr. Taylor falsified the court records in this regard and this is one of the causes of the early death of Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall. The matter is under review in CACV 107 of 2008.
x. The learned Justice Pullins (when hearing the Application of the Appellant to stay the execution of the Learned Master Sanderson Order in CIV 1775 of 2008 on the 6.2.2009) does recognise the said solicitor’s lien of the Appellant, in that Mr. Anthony Prime as the solicitor and counsel for the Plaintiff Mrs. Hall must give the Appellant and the Court of Appeal a written undertaking to put into a trust account the court-defined quantum of the Appellant’s solicitor’s lien for payment to the Appellant should the Appellant be successful in CACV 107 of 2008.
xi. The Board seeming blindness in its refusal to recognise the fraud and unconscionable conduct of Mr. Timothy Robin Thies perpetrated upon the Appellant and his son Paul. The learned Magistrates Michelides and Musk dismissed the Appellant’s case against Mr. Thies in FR 417 of 2007 and FR 944 of 2008. The learned Commissioner Herron dismissed the Appellant’s appeal to the District Court No.6 of 2008 which is an appeal against Magistrate Musk’s decision. Since Justice Haluck’s decision was announced, Commissioner Herron’s decision had disappeared from the District Court judgment website.
xii. Ms. Cahon as late as the 7.11.2008 was still trying to re-persecute the Appellant on the various and varied matters that have been before that court-like tribunal and the SAT tribunals although they constitute matters which are res-judicata and have been so objected to by the Appellant.
xiii. Justice Hasluck findings as indicated above caused an about-turn in the attitude of the LPCC as is represented by the recent correspondence of the Appellant with Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC.
xiv. The illegal striking out of the incorrectly-filed Affidavit of the Appellant in CIV 2210 of 2006 in the Appellant’s attempt to appeal the First SAT Decision was occasioned by the learned Master Sanderson’s error in his refusal to have it transferred to the proper forum of the Court of Appeal. This error occurred despite the learned Master having been duly requested to do so by the Appellant. The Learned Master erred by striking it out only for the purpose of having it struck out and on the invalid grounds of its alleged frivolity and vexatiousness. The learned Master erred by contradicted himself by acknowledging that he was without jurisdiction to hear that case yet he assumed that he had the jurisdiction to dismiss it and made costs orders that were of an intimidating nature against the Appellant. However, the Board accepted the Appellant’s explanation of this ludicrous situation and thereby had by its conduct dispensed with the appellant having to pay the Learned Master Sanderson’s costs order. Despite the above, the Second SAT Decision persisted in delivering a value judgment on this issue.
xv. The learned Master denied the Appellant his human right to be entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and an impartial judge in the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil matter in accordance with article 10 for the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights.
xvi. Any reasonable person faced with an “institutionalized wall” against him as explained by the above circumstances whilst seeking justice would have resorted to write to the Chief Justice, the Chief Magistrate and the International Bar for redress and not for the mischievously-alleged purpose of tampering with the impartialities, independence and integrity of the justice system. The Appellant did not write to the trial judges but to those supervisory judges with the aim of setting the administration of justice aright. To continue to persecute the Appellant on this ground is to deny him absolute privilege or qualified immunity for advancing this legitimate complaint to an authority, which is a “substitute for a Notice of Appeal.” Despite this, the Second SAT Decision made a value judgment of this issue.
INSTANCES OF THE OBLIQUE INTENTION OF THE EMPLOYED OFFICERS OF THE LPCC
xvii. The persecuting malice and the exemplified oblique intentions of the employed officers of the LPCC shows that the persecuting malice exist in fact in the following terms:
A. Ms. Karen Whitney and Ms. Coombs of the LPCC were commissioned to find fault with the Appellant and therefore made the recommendations for the first inhibition.
B. The First SAT decision by the learned Judge Eckert trialled the first inhibition and erroneously confirmed it without giving any written judgment except for the wrong reasons as contained in the transcript.
C. Ms. Coombs was not satisfied with the inequity and null effect of that first inhibition and unintentionally expressed her intention to have the Appellant struck off the roll without any valid grounds but this was not subsequently approved by the LPCC.
D. Ms. G Mc Cahon was pre-empting her intention to re-persecute the Appellant for professional misconduct on the various cases before it by using Mr. Thies’ case of “serious allegations” against another practitioner as its main thrust.
E. This attempt at re-persecution was objected to on the grounds of res-judicata and the decision of Justice Hasluck somewhat stopped the persecuting malice of the LPCC.
F. Ms. Caroline Brookes is displaying the right attitude to investigate the judgment of Justice Hasluck’s decision.
D. The Appellant had hitherto refrained from thinking that other practitioners could also be afflicted with the universal traits of the “phantom deficiency syndrome” in terms of the solicitor of Mr. Thies, Mr. Dean Elek-Roser of Western Legal who caused much angst to the Appellant and his son Paul in terms of the following:
i) Why did Mr. Elek-Roser write to the trial judge of his client’s case Justice Hasluck for the purpose of tampering with his impartialities and independence without copying that letter to the Appellant?
ii) Why did he say to the Appellant that the Magistrates Court do not have to abide by the principle of rule of law with regard to the cases before Magistrates Musk and Michelides and Commissioner Herron?
iii) Why did he make demands for monies from the Appellant and his son Paul, which he knew were not legally owed to Mr. Thies, knowing that the learned Commissioner Herron’s, Magistrates Michelides’ and Musk’s Orders were null and void having regard to the facts and the applicable laws that were made available by the Appellant before them and him?
iv) Why did he refuse service of documents upon himself on behalf of his client Mr. Thies as his solicitor and neglected to obey the common law with regard to the personal service of those documents when he unwittingly drew the attention of Mr. Thies over the telephone made contemporaneously by him in the presence of the Appellant when he was served with those documents pertaining to the orders of Justice Hasluck on 9.12.2008. They have already been receipted by his clerk confirming that he was still the solicitor for Mr. Thies. He subsequently denied that he was so employed as the solicitor for Mr. Thies for the purported purpose of avoiding that personal service of Justice Hasluck’s Orders and aggravated the situation by further refusing to reveal the then current whereabouts of Mr. Thies. He did this to enable the guilty-flee conduct of Mr. Thies to take effect for the purpose of avoiding personal service of the court documents contrary to the dictates of the law and his duties and obligations an officer of the court?
v) Despite the above, and despite having given written warnings to Mr. Elek-Roser to this effect, the Appellant withheld from complaining to the LPCC on other professional misconduct of Mr. Elek-Roser so as not to harm his neighbour and thinking that other solicitors cannot be guilty of the “phantom deficiency syndrome” but he was disillusioned at the discriminatory conduct of the LPCC because the Appellant was singled out by the LPCC for this universal traits of new legal practitioners just embarking on independent practice ?
vi) Most recently, when given the choice not to further complain against Mr. Elek-Roser through Ms. Brookes, the Appellant chose not to do so provided the personal service of the Justice Hasluck Orders dispute with him stands resolved.
E. The LPCC knew that the phantom deficiency syndrome is a universal trait amongst legal practitioners of the Appellant’s level of experience that has been abused by the LPCC for the purpose of entrapping him into an untenable position and also for the purpose of discriminating him on the ground of his age and ethnicity by not prosecuting him under s.39 of the Act and by not letting him go when it cannot so prosecute him but by “un-punishing” him under s.40 instead.
F. By the 24.12.2008, the State Solicitor of WA filed a Notice of Intention to Abide by the Decision of Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008 indicating that the learned Magistrates Musk and Michelides do intend to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court invoked under s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 by the Appellant to review their respective decisions in FR 944 of 2007 and FR 417 of 2007; thus beginning the first step in setting aright the injustice caused by the fraud and unconscionable conduct of Mr. Thies.
G. The LPCC intended its Ms. Cahon to persecute the Appellant again for writing to Magistrate Musk to the effect that fraud had been perpetrated upon the Magistrate Court through the learned Magistrate Musk by Mr. Thies. That Supreme Court decision finally vindicates the Appellant’s forlorn protestations that he had never made false allegations against Mr. Thies and Mr. David Taylor to the LPCC which had hitherto fallen on deaf ears.
xii. The Board lacks good faith in entering into the Steytler Consent Judgment because it had no desire to carry out its public function as the regulator of the legal profession honestly caused by the persecuting members wishing to go on a “frolic of their own” and it had done nothing to stop them.

B: PARTICULARS OF DETRIMENT SUFFERED BY THE APPELLANT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE PERSECUTING MALICE OF THE BOARD

i. The Appellant is being deprived of his human right to earn his livelihood since the 19.7.2006 and this state of affairs is still continuing.
ii. He is being frustrated of his legitimate expectations in that that his licence as a legal practitioner would be issued to him and that the licensor cannot be acting illegally or unconscionably nor reasonably being seen to be blowing hot and cold at the same time.
iii. He suffers the unjust punishment caused by the Board’s unreasonable justification for its unlawful invocation of s.40 of the Act for an ulterior purpose without having regard to the personal circumstances of the Appellant which renders it impossible for the Appellant to conform to the unnecessary and onerous discriminatory conditions.
iv. He was abused by the persecuting members of the Board for leading him to believe that he was unfit to practice and therefore requires supervision but frustrate him by refusing him the avenues of law required by s. 39 of the Act. It justifies its unlawful conduct to the effect that the Appellant need not be punished and yet it sought to punish him by denying him his human right to independent practice and left him without a remedy indefinitely knowing that the conditions so imposed upon him cannot be performed as an impossibility. It exacerbates that impossibility knowingly by refusing him to leave the WA jurisdiction by not issuing him with a Certificate of Fitness which he has duly requested for.
v. If it were not fictitious that the Appellant is unfit to practice or needs to be supervised in practice then s.39 is the raison d’etre for the invocation of the Board’s powers under s.40 of the Act, to inhibit the independent practice of the Appellant lawfully and it did not do so accordingly; it does thereby with persecuting malice injures the reputation and good name of the Appellant and is continuing to do so and has thus caused him to suffer consequent damages. It is thereby reading down the human rights of the Appellant by not avoiding the mischief caused by its literal constructions of s.39 and 40 of the Act.
vi. He suffers discrimination by the Board under s.42 of the Equal Opportunity Act, 1984(WA) on the ground of his race being an ethnic Chinese and s.66ZB of that Act, on the ground of his age being currently 63 years of age. The false Full Board discriminate the Appellant and would not ordinarily inhibit the independent practice of another practitioner under similar circumstances. It chose to do so on its own whim -for no apparent rhyme or reason under the pretext of “phantom deficiency syndrome”.
vii. He suffers the pains of subjecting himself to the Board’s persistent efforts in calumniously ignoring “whole truth” of the various and varied matters before the Board disguised in the “phantom deficiency syndrome”; the persistent and irrational utilization by the Board of half-truths, innuendos, and misrepresentations of fictitious matters, all of which are accomplished through a scant regard for their contexts, resulting in the formulation of its own value judgments; these are lacking in their overriding consideration for the prevailing need for judges to be equipped with a proper philosophy devised for the purpose of determining truth and justice and not for projecting falsehoods and calumnies onto the Appellant.
viii. He suffers the pains of the Board justifying its calumny on the ground of the “phantom deficiency syndrome” against him. He was blamed for having written to the Chief Magistrate and the Chief Justice without regard to the fact that these important people do have important powers which they could use in the event that they considered the Appellant’s complaint do have substance. They ignored the forlorn state of Appellant as a “drowning man who would grasp any straw” and instead maliciously branded him with the non-existent tampering with the impartialities and the independence of those judges.
ix. He suffers the pains of the false Full Board calumniously disregarding the fact that the effective administration of justice requires that absolute privilege attaches to the copy letters of the Appellant’s complaint sent to both the Chief Justice and to the Chief Magistrate under circumstances that justifies the Appellant’s motives for bringing to these founts of justice, information regarding the manipulation of the seats of justice under their care and supervision; instead the Board ended up in stigmatizing the Appellant with the “phantom deficiency” by its value judgments.

4. The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 30 and 37 of the Second SAT Decision in that:

“30……..According to the investigation report, the file contained two uncashed cheques dated May and June 2005, one payable to the Magistrates Court and the other to the practitioner. The inspection was carried out sometime after February 2006, so it would appear that the cheques were many months old.

37. ……..The absence of such suggestion does not, however, lead to the conclusion that Mr Chin does not require supervision in relation to trust monies given his views as to the operation of s 137(2) of the LP Act.”

in terms of the following:
a. The two uncashed cheques were sent to the Appellant by MTC because they were no longer required as disbursements for court fees for the filing of the documents for and on behalf of MTC that were originally intended.
b. The Appellant had already informed MTC that those cheques are no longer intended to be so used and that MTC should have them cancelled. If the Appellant were dishonest, he would have simply cashed those cheques and not informed MTC and none would have been wiser. The Appellant had intended to bring them back to MTC anyway when he meet with MTC on the next occasion. This is a value judgement of the Second SAT decision that gives a wrong impression to the Court of Appeal.

5. The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 31 of the Second SAT Decision in that:

31.The costs arrangement referred to in the letter of 11 August 2005, and the agreement with the debtor, both involved the receipt of trust monies.
MTC INSTRUCTIONS AND TRANSIT MONIES
in terms of the following:
a) The letter of the 11th day of August, 2005 reflects the intentions of the parties as agreed between them via a telephone conversation as indicated in that letter. The Appellant sent that contemporaneous letter to MTC such that no dispute would arise in the future. Although the MTC did not respond by a return mail or facsimile, the accompanying telephone with him by the Appellant confirms that both parties were ad idem upon those terms and there were no subsequent issues regarding it.
b) The facts are that the debtor of MTC Mr. White was then negotiating for a settlement of that debt collection action initiated by the Appellant on behalf of MTC, with the Appellant.
c) The terms of the settlement agreement is that the Appellant was to be paid his debt collection fees in monthly instalments as and when each instalment are being paid into the nominated account of the Appellant created for that purpose upon the direction of MTC as evidenced by that letter.
d) Mr. White was to deposit his monthly instalment payments of his debts then owing to MTC and it was faithfully anticipated by the Appellant that the former would do so faithfully. (The Appellant was then preparing to go for three month stint in Malaysia for the purpose of getting admitted into the Malaysian Bar.) In anticipation of the monthly payments being deposited into his nominated account during his then pending absence from Australia and that he would not be able to make the timely payment of the monies in transit held for him, the Appellant wrote a few cheques from that account MTC paying him in advance his anticipated income from the debt-repayments of Mr. White whilst he was away in Malaysia.
e) Upon the return of the Appellant to Australia after the three month stint, he found that Mr. White had missed his last monthly payment of his debt to MTC and that the Appellant had over-paid MTC to the extent of $700.00.
f) As the Appellant was disabled by the Board to continue acting for MTC on account of Mr. White reneging on his settlement agreement, MTC had to resort to other avenues of obtaining justice for his case against Mr. White.
WRITTEN DIRECTION FROM MTC
6. The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 35 of the Second SAT
Decision in that:

35. While we accept that Mr Chin is aware of the provisions of s 137 of the LP Act and r 54 of the LPB Rules, we are not satisfied that he understands the proper application of those provisions. His explanation as to his arrangements does not address the apparent way in which he handled funds in relation to his client MTC. It can be noted that, in the matter concerning MTC, Mr Chin did not obtain a written direction from his client in relation to the manner in which he was dealing with the funds.
The operation of his 'second account' effectively to facilitate payments which would normally be conducted through a trust account appears to amount effectively to the operation of a trust account while avoiding the audit and other regulatory requirements of a trust account.

in terms of the following:
a) The Tribunal assented to the false Full Board mischievously misconceiving that those monies paid by Mr. White were trust monies when they were clearly not. Monies in transit are not required to be paid into a trust account specially opened for the purpose in accordance with the law.
b) The Legal Profession Act 2007 (not yet promulgated) makes provisions for monies in transit and distinguishes them from trust monies held by solicitors so as to avoid this confusion.
c) The Appellant was right to put the monies into another account separate from his own monies and did make his timely arrangements for regular payments to MTC when he anticipates that he would be away from the jurisdiction for three months.
d) This conduct of the Appellant shows that he was a fair dinkum all the time and this fact was admitted to by the Second SAT Decision.
e) The Tribunal persisted in making its value judgment of the “phantom deficiency” in the face of the facts that the Appellant was seen to have fully apprehended the provisions the relevant provisions in terms of the keeping of trust account accounts in particular r.54 and of the Legal Practice Board Rules, 2004 and s.137 of the Act. The Appellant has a choice to open a trust account only if he were to hold trust monies on behalf of his clients and will do so if the exigencies of the case require him to do so. He should never be faulted for making this statement unless the false Full Board is making a value judgment on this issue.

7. The Tribunal erred in facts in the relevant part of paragraph 36 of the Second SAT
Decision in that:

36. In our view, Mr Chin's response to the concerns in relation to the handling of money for his client MTC does demonstrate an insufficient appreciation of his obligations concerning dealings with money held on behalf of clients.

in the following terms:
a) The Appellant received monies for work done and generated invoices to that effect. There is no truth that the Appellant accepted payment in advance for work which is not yet completed as staggered payments were indeed being received from clients for part of works already completed although the common law does not forbid solicitors to accept monies (and does not require them to be placed in a trust account for work to be done) as they are not trust monies.
b) It is therefore a half-truth for the Second SAT Decision to say that the Appellant requires supervision for trust monies and does not understand the basic logic of how and when he is required to operate a trust account. This is a discrimi-natory practice of the Board and a value judgement against the Appellant. The Appellant has a degree in Business Management and Accountancy and has taught Accountancy as a subject for matriculating students for many years. He could not have been so silly as far as trust account is concerned.
RESPECT ACCORDED TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
8. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law when it stated at paragraph 42 of the SAT decision that:

“42 We agree with the Board that Mr Chin's conduct in directing correspondence to judicial officers, and the explanation he proffered for doing so, demonstrates a poor understanding of the appropriate method of communication between a legal practitioner and a Court. Our concern in relation to that conduct is heightened by the nature of the allegations of criminal conduct, the foundation for which appears to be that Mr Chin considered the solicitor concerned to be making unjustified demands
before agreeing to removal of the caveat. We are not satisfied that there was any proper foundation for that serious allegation. It is of further concern that no copy of Mr Chin's communication with the court was sent to Mr Thies.”.

in the following terms:
a) The Appellant’s communications with judicial officers are misconceived as they have never been directed to the trial judges. The Chief Magistrates or Chief Justice referred to, do have supervising functions over Magistrates and other judges and lawyers as they are themselves the founts of justice. The Appellant is always aware that the independence, integrity and impartialities of the trial judges are never to be tampered with and he always ensures that their positions are never to be compromised.
b) Each time a document in the nature of a complaint is being sent to a person with authority to deal with the complaint, it does not require that Mr. Thies or the person complained of ought to be informed or notified of it except for letters sent to the administrative officer of the court that is intended to be brought to the notice of the trial judge; nevertheless Mr. Thies or his solicitors, Western Legal was at all material times notified of them.
c) The documents that were sent to these founts of justice act as a substitute for Notices of Appeal which contains issues for the Appellant to litigate upon at a later time and they are intended to serve as contemporaneous evidence of those facts.
d) These complaints confer absolute privilege or qualified immunity upon the Appellant as if the complainant is the writer of some potentially libellous materials and therefore the Board should not assail him in this regard.
e) The findings of the learned Justice Hasluck on 7.11.2008 in CIV 1903 of 2008 dispels the previous misconceived notions of the Board that the Appellant was in the habit of making serious false allegations against another legal practitioner, Mr. Thies in particular, and the same argument should apply for the misconceptions of the false Full Board with regard to the allegedly false serious allegations of the Appellant against Mr. David Taylor.

MASTER SANDERSON INTIMIDATING COSTS ORDER
9. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law when it stated at paragraphs 43, 45, 75, 76, 77 & 78 of the SAT decision that:

“43 A second example of the Board's concern was a letter dated 11 January 2007 from Mr Chin to the Chief Justice. That letter concerned a costs order that was made by Master Sanderson in favour of the LPCC as a result of Mr Chin's misconceived application to the Master for leave to appeal against the decision of the State Administrative Tribunal on 12 September 2006. The application should have been made to the Court of Appeal. The Master dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction, and ordered Mr Chin to pay costs. Just what Mr Chin hoped to achieve by the letter to the Chief Justice is not clear. In it, he complains that he is afraid to commence an appeal in the Court of Appeals for fear of a further
costs order but, continues: 'I wish that this Honourable Court would allow me to submit my Grounds of Appeal and My Submission to both the Court and to the Respondent, which will show this Court of Appeal that I do have valid grounds for Appealing'”.

45. Mr Chin again wrote to the Chief Justice on 23 January 2007. The letter mentions that the Master had ordered that certain affidavits lodged by Mr Chin should be removed from the file, on the basis of their scandalous contents. That ruling had caused him to become 'disillusioned at the failings of our judicial system'. The letter continues…

75 There are other examples of inappropriate references to judicial officers or their decisions. At [18]
above, we referred to Mr Chin's assertion in his statement of issues, facts and contentions that
Judge Eckert 'compromised the tenets of integrity, impartiality and independence of the Board'. In the
same document, he refers to the costs order made against him by Master Sanderson as 'intimidatory' and
as reflecting 'the barest truth'. In his letter to the Chief Justice dated 23 January 2007, he described the
costs order made by Master Sanderson as 'injudicious and improper'.

76 In his oral evidence to this Tribunal, Mr Chin repeated that he considered that Master Sanderson made
the order in an intimidatory manner. He said that the order was intimidatory because it had the tendency
to prevent him proceeding with his appeal. He said that he always respects judicial officers, but feels
constrained to 'speak the truth'.

77 The use of expressions of the type employed by Mr Chin is obviously inappropriate. Expressions used
are offensive, and tend to bring the administration of law into disrepute. The beliefs apparently underlying
the use of offensive language are themselves a matter of concern in the context of considering Mr Chin's
fitness to practice unsupervised. The expressions, and the context in which they are used, suggests a
serious lack of appreciation and understanding of the system of administration of justice in which legal
practitioners play a critical role.

78 In our view, the offensive references to judicial officers, and the attitude underlying those references,
provides strong support for the need for supervision of Mr Chin's practice.

in the following terms:
a) It is not the mere matter of the learned Master dismissing the Appellant’s Appeal in the wrong forum that matters, it is the fact that the Appellant wanted to remove his appeal to the right forum of court of appeal and that he was prevented from doing so by the error of the learned Master.
b) It is reasonably observed that the learned Master erred by dismissing the Appeal in CIV 2210 of 2006 with the same persecuting malice as exhibited by the persecuting members as he had refused to give his reason for that wrongful dismissal instead of transferring it to the Court of Appeal or accede to the request of the Appellant to effect that transfer.
c) Even if the learned Master did have the jurisdiction to hear the matter, he erred by refusing to advise the Appellant on a procedural matter and not on the substantive law by stating his intention to hear the case first and hiding his intention to dismiss it. After hearing the case, he contradicted his earlier intention to hear it by purposely dismissing it. The Appellant gave prior notice to the Associate of the Learned Master to this effect and it is unreasonable that the case should have been dismissed in this manner.
d) Further, the Learned Master was unwilling to provide the reasons for dismissing it as being frivolous and vexatious.
e) The above incident reasonably triggered a fear in the heart of the Appellant who was down with a depressive bouts and his only reasonably relief was to write to the International Bar and to the Chief Justice for a remedy not with the purpose of tampering with the course of justice. It is reasonable for the Appellant to become disillusioned with the justice system due to the unfair justice that has been meted out to him by the learned Master under the circumstances as explained above.
f) That intimidating costs order of the Learned Master was subsequently ignored by the real Full Board when the circumstances of its coming into being was explained by the Appellant to it. This warrants the Appellant’s conclusion that the costs order was indeed “injudicious and improper”. The false Full Board was not receptive to this truth and prefers to continue to label the Appellant with “phantom deficiency” syndrome.
g) The Appellant must not be punished for speaking the truth as the virtues of justice demands it in the tradition of the law? The law is no respecter of persons? How else may justice be seen to be done? These are rhetorical questions which the Court of Appeal has to seek answers for?

LETTERS TO CHIEF JUSTICE
10. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law when it stated at paragraphs 46 of the SAT decision that:

46 Again, the purpose of the letter to the Chief Justice is not evident on its face. By way of explanation, Mr Chin said at the hearing that, at the time of writing to the Chief Justice, he was suffering depression because of Mr Thies' conduct and because of the costs order, which Mr Chin was not able to meet, having been made against him. He thought that the Chief Justice had responsibility to see that the system of justice is working properly, and hence he was drawing the Chief Justice's attention to the injustices which Mr Chin considered that he was suffering.”

a) It is reasonably conceived by the Appellant at all material times that in our adversarial system of justice that if the parties are able to bring forth arguments and unassailable facts before the learned Master, the justice system should be working and should not fail him.
b) If it is reasonably conceivable from the circumstances of the case, that the learned Master had descended into the arena of conflicts and is blinded by the dusts of conflicts kicked up by the conflicts then a complaint ought to be made to the supervising judge to see that another suitable judge is being appointed to hear the case so that right justice is being dispensed.
c) It is the duty of the court to advise the appellant on the procedural error. That complaint should then attract the immunity of the Appellant as the complainant.

11. The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 48 in that:

“48 The third area of concern identified by the Board related to Mr Chin's tendency to make serious allegations of misconduct directed to other practitioners without a clear and logical foundation

a) The Appellant does not make any serious allegations against any legal practitioners be it Mr. Pino Monaco, Mr. Timothy Tim Thies or Mr. David Taylor without foundations.
b) The Tribunal makes value judgments based on half-truths or on matters taken out of their contexts as explained above.
COSTS ORDER CAUSED BY DAVID TAYLOR
12. The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 55 & 57 in that:

55 No application to vary the costs order was made by Mr Chin. Proceedings were subsequently brought in the Magistrate's Court against him for recovery of the $300 the subject of the order. Mr Chin opposed
those proceedings. In his statement of defence, Mr Chin accused the claimant's lawyer, Mr Taylor, of misleading Registrar Powell by not telling the Registrar that Mr Chin was not the lawyer representing the defendant.

57 Mr Taylor made a complaint to the LPCC against Mr Chin. Mr Taylor's complaint appears to be that Mr Chin had made the serious accusation that Mr Taylor had misled the court. Mr Chin responded to
that complaint by letter dated 1 September 2006. He asserted that it was reasonable for him to infer that Mr Taylor did intentionally mislead the Registrar by reason of the history of correspondence concerning
Mr Chin's status as the solicitor on the record in relation to the proceedings. In his response, he also accused Mr Taylor of 'underhanded tactics'.

in the following terms:
a) The facts of the case was clear to the Tribunal as explained above in that Mr. Taylor misled Registrar Powell under circumstances when the Appellant was not aware that he should have been present before that learned Registrar when that wrongful costs order was made against him.
b) Mr. Taylor knew at all material times that the Appellant was never the solicitor on record for Ms. Hall in CIV 1131 of 2006.
c) Further, there was the reasonably conceived malice of Mr. Taylor in “getting back” on the Appellant for his refusal to continue to represent Ms. Hall because the former did not comply in a timely fashion with the orders of the learned Justice Jenkins in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.1 having regard to his attempted falsifications of the court records that he did so comply.
d) The subsequent Simmonds Discovery in the court records of this fact in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2 was timeously communicated to Ms. Hall who informed the Appellant to this effect but the Appellant could not give evidence before the Learned Justice Simmonds as it was unprofessional conduct for him to do so having regard to the court orderly’s demeanour to the Appellant at the relevant time.
d) Mr. Maurice Frederick Law’s evidence before Magistrate Roberts was to the effect that he was goaded by Mr. Taylor to sue the Appellant inappropriately for the wrongful costs order of Registrar Powell and the Appellant was successful in defending himself when a settlement was reached on a subsequent date.
e) The letter of the Appellant dated the 1.9.2006 read together with the supporting annexed documents clearly explains the situation especially so with regard to Mr. Taylor’s knowledge that the Registrar Powell’s costs order was to become operative by a certain date in July, 2006 and that letter was sent by Mr. Taylor to the previous address of the Appellant resulting in his not becoming aware of that impending costs order.
f) A proper understanding of this letter would reasonably exonerate the Appellant from being labelled with the phantom deficiency syndrome.
LETTER TO CHIEF MAGISTRATE
13. The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 56 and 60 in that:

56 We note in passing that amongst the documents relating to this matter attached to Mr Chin's affidavit filed in his appeal against the Tribunal's 2006 decision, are three facsimile letters sent by Mr Chin to the
Chief Magistrate dated 21, 25 and 27 September, concerning aspects of different Magistrates' conduct in relation to that claim

60 The second observation that can be made is that the proceedings in the Magistrate's Court concerning the costs order gave rise to further inappropriate communications by Mr Chin to the Chief Magistrate.

in the following terms:
a) The learned Magistrate Roberts erred in that he was reasonably seen to be in dereliction of his duties by descending himself into the arena of conflict.
b) The only way out of this administrative error of our justice system is for the Appellant to write to the Chief Magistrate who has supervisory duties under the legislation to set aright an administrative matter that had gone awry.
c) This does not concern a judicial-decision making process which can only be righted by an appeal to a higher court.
d) The Appellant was right and he did achieve success in what he did and therefore he had served a public interest in ensuring that a member of the judiciary do have to conform to the standards expected of him in discharging his public duties.
c) The learned Magistrate Nicholls and a court officer of the Midland Magistrates Court subsequently set the administrative error complained of by the Appellant aright. Despite this, the false Full Board is labelling the Appellant with the “phantom deficiency syndrome” which is a value judgment the Tribunal cannot divest itself of.

UNNECESSARY TO EXTRICATE FROM CIV1131 OF 2006
14. The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraphs 57 & 61 in that:

59 A number of observations can be made about the events set out above. The first is that, even to the point of this hearing before the Tribunal, Mr Chin does not seem to appreciate the effect of having filed a memorandum of appearance on behalf of his client, and the requirements of O 8 in relation to removing himself from the obligations as solicitor on the record. Although not specifically relied upon by the Board, it is a situation which tends to affirm the need for supervision of Mr Chin's practice.

61 The third observation that can be made is that Mr Chin did not have a reasonable foundation for his allegation that Mr Taylor had misled the court. The correspondence between Mr Chin and the Court makes it clear that the Court was, quite correctly, of the view that Mr Chin continued to bear the obligations of a solicitor on the record up until he either obtained an order that he had ceased to act, or a notice of change of solicitor was filed. Neither of those events had occurred when the Registrar made the order of 12 June 2006. Mr Chin's notice of ceasing to act, and his correspondence concerning the fact that he had no instructions from the defendant, was all available to the Registrar. There is no basis for the assertion that Mr Taylor said anything which might have been misleading. It is entirely reasonable to assume that the Registrar was fully aware of Mr Chin's belief that he was no longer acting when he made the order. Mr Chin had been put on very clear notice from the court that he was
considered to be the solicitor on the record. That fact is sufficient to support the Registrar's order. Mr Chin being a legal practitioner, his mistaken view as to the position provides no reasonable excuse, in all the circumstances, for his failure to attend the status conference.

62 An allegation that a legal practitioner has misled a court is a very serious allegation. Nothing in Mr Chin's explanation of that allegation, or the materials we have read, suggest any proper foundation for the making of the allegation.”

in the following terms:
a) Mr. Taylor did mislead the learned Registrar Powell because he sent the letter affecting the conference on 12.6.2006 to the Appellant’s previous address at No.2, Seagull Close, Ballajura instead of at No. 387, Alexander Drive, Dianella WA 6059 when he was already notified of this change of address.
b) He knew that the Appellant was thus prevented from attending that conference and he did not so inform Registrar Powell to this effect.
c) He knew that the Appellant was not the solicitor on record for CIV 1131 of 2006 because he was not willing to do so on account of Mr. Taylor’s attempted falsification of the court records that CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed on 10.2.2006 when it did not happen.
d) He knew that the Memorandum of Appearance of the Appellant was filed by Barrister Alan Camp on behalf of the Appellant only on condition that the said Barrister continues to represent Ms. Hall in that case but he discontinued his representation and thereby withdrew that Memorandum of Appearance on behalf of the Appellant.
e) There was no requirement for the Appellant to file an application to extricate himself out of having been appointed by Ms. Hall as the solicitor for her in CIV 1131 of 2006 as he had received information from the Associate to Registrar Powell Ms. Tameeka Stewart that he was not the solicitor on record for that case and this was confirmed by barrister Alan Camp.
f) Ms. Hall was already armed by the Appellant at all relevant times to file her Notice of Appointing herself as the litigant in person in CIV 1131 of 2006 and the Appellant was not aware of this default of Ms. Hall if it ever was a default.
g) The allegedly clear Notice by Registrar Powell was timeously responded to by the Appellant and it thereby exonerates him from any blame for not having extricated himself from being wrongly perceived as the solicitor on record for CIV 1131 of 2006.
h) It is assumed that the SAT Tribunal was required to be provided by the Board with all records pertaining to the matter of the false serious allegations against Mr. David Taylor. The letter of the Appellant to the LPCC dated 1st of September, 2006 is relevant to this issue.

PARTICULARS OF THE INCORRECT LABELLING OF THE “PHANTOM DEFICIENCY” WITH REGARD TO ALLEGED FALSE SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MR. DAVID TAYLOR
The true “serious allegations” against Mr. David Taylor caused, inter alia, the Appellant to suffer the stigma of the calumny in the following terms:
i. The Simmonds discovery confirmed the true “serious allegations against Mr. David Taylor.
ii. As a consequence the Appellant as solicitor for the late Ms. Hall refused to accept the initiating process of CIV 1131 of 2006 as there was nothing to defend.
iii. Mr. Taylor chose to mislead the court on this fact and the evidentiary materials is provided for by the Appellant in his affidavit materials filed in CIV 1775 of 2008 which came before the learned Master Sanderson. That decision is currently being appealed against CACV 107 of 2008.
iv. Ms. Hall sought the services of Barrister Alan Camp who could not act for her without a solicitor. The Appellant was persuaded by Barrister Allan Camp to file a Memorandum of Appearance on condition that the latter were to continue to act for Ms. Hall.
v. Barrister Alan Camp later refused to act for Ms. Hall and promised that the Memorandum of Appearance filed by Barrister Allan Camp on behalf of the Appellant would be withdrawn and was indeed withdrawn or was never filed.
vi. Mr. Taylor misled Registrar Powell that the Appellant was on record for CIV 1131 of 2006 and did cause the wrongful costs order of $300.00 to be made against the Appellant by Registrar Powell for which the Appellant denied responsibility.
vii. The Appellant did not attend the 12th June, 2006 status conference before Registrar Powell because he had moved home from his former address at No.2, Seagull Close, Ballajura to No. 387, Alexander Drive, Dianella, WA 6059 and he had informed Mr. Taylor accordingly of this change of address. Yet, he was served with the initiating process of CIV 1131 of 2006. This resulted in Mr. Taylor persuading his client Mr. Maurice Fredrick Hall to sue the Appellant at the Magistrates Court at Midland for the wrongful costs order. Mr. Taylor was at fault and he was instrumental for procuring the wrongful costs order against the Appellant in absentia.
viii. Mr. Taylor then complained to the LPCC that the Appellant made false allegations that Mr. Taylor used “underhand tactics” resulting in the Appellant’s letter and annexure of documents dated 1.9.2006. The facts of the case were confirmed by Barrister Allan Camp to the LPCC.
ix. The Learned Magistrate Roberts made a biased decision in respect of the wrongful costs orders of $300.00 and this matter was settled by Magistrates Nicholls and a court officer upon the Appellant complaining to the Chief Magistrate. The information is contained in the Appellant’s letter to the Chief Magistrate dated 21, 25 and 27 September, 2006 who has supervisory authority over other Magistrates under his charge.
x. The Appellant was justified in having written to the Chief Magistrate because he has the duty as provided by the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 to ensure that the Learned Magistrate Roberts was performing his duties correctly. There was no inappropriate communications with the Chief Magistrate.
xi. Indeed Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall was provided with a copy of the Notice of Ceasing to Act and a Notice for Appointing herself as a Litigant in person. Why it was not in the court records requires some explanations.

MR. ZELESTIS

15. The Tribunal erred in both mixed facts and law in paragraph 64 of the SAT Decision in that:

64 From a review of the minutes of the various meetings concerning Mr Chin, it is clear that Mr Zelestis was not present at the meeting of the Professional Affairs Committee on 19 July 2006, when the initial decision to impose a condition upon Mr Chin's practice certificate was made. It was that decision in respect of which Mr Chin accused Mr Zelestis of 'gross bias'. The allegation would not have been justified even if Mr Zelestis had attended that meeting. It was certainly completely unjustified in circumstances where he did not participate in the decision concerned.

a) Ms. Coombs alerted the Appellant to the facts concerning the non-involvement of the Honourable Mr. Zelestis for which the Appellant spontaneously admitted that it was a mistake on his part.
b) Despite this, it may in hindsight be argued by the Appellant that the Honourable Mr. Zelestis Q.C. as the Chairperson of the LPCC should have been aware that its functions under s. 175 of the Act had been usurped by Ms. F.H. Walter. She had accepted the improper complaint of Mr. Pino Monaco when it was not her functions to do so and she had acted upon it to the detriment of the Appellant with malice and improper motives.
c) Mr. Zelestis should not have condoned Ms. F.H. Walter tainting the decision of the LPCC with gross bias by acting as both judge and prosecutor at the same time.
d) Mr. Zelestis should have known that the PAC constituted the False Full Board and therefore it did not have the authority to make that first inhibition and if it did, the first inhibition is and was of null effect.
e) Mr. Zelestis should have put a stop to that first inhibition that brought along in its train the six successive inhibitions that have caused much angst to the Appellant.
f) Lastly Mr. Zelestis should not have allowed the independence and integrity of its legal officers like Ms. Coombs and Ms. Karen Whitney and later Ms. Cahon to be compromised by the false Full Board knowing that Ms. Walter was co-ordinating the two former legal officers for an improper purpose with persecuting malice.

16. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 65 in that:

65 Those two specific matters need to be seen in a context where the voluminous papers which were before the Board, and before this Tribunal, contain repeated allegations of inappropriate conduct by legal practitioners, magistrates and judges. Mr Chin justifies his allegations on the basis that he is 'speaking the truth'. The examples demonstrate that his allegations are not founded in truth. Mr Chin's conduct in this regard is entirely inconsistent with fulfilment of the proper responsibilities imposed
upon, and standards expected of, legal practitioners. His failure to appreciate that fact demonstrates his need for supervision.

in the following:
a) It was not able to cope up with the sheer complexity of the case that caused it concur in its rash conclusion regarding that “phantom deficiency” of the Appellant which are not founded on objective determinations of the facts before it.
b) The Appellant speaks the truths which had been confused and misconstrued as falsehoods.
c) The voluminous papers that were before it should not be taken out of context to make a generalisation that the Appellant was not speaking the truths.
d) There is never an instant where the Appellant can be pointed out as presenting a falsehood because they are facts assiduously recorded by him to protect their veracity and contemporaneity and they had been sifted through personally by him having been first observed by him with a mind that has been tested by a psychologist Ms. Croxon that is free from any mental impairment.
NON-EXISTENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATION
17. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 66 and 68 in that

66 The Board's concern as to Mr Chin's appreciation of the necessity to avoid conflict of interests arises
from its examination of files concerning three men arrested with a fourth man, while travelling in a
vehicle. A quantity of cannabis was found in the vehicle. All four men denied knowledge of it. Two of the
men, Mr Tylor, and Mr Fleay, were charged with possession of cannabis with intent to supply. A third, Mr
Powell, was charged with possession of a small amount of cannabis found in his
pocket.

68 In relation to Mr Fleay, Mr Chin wrote to the Court concerning hearing dates, corresponded with the
Police in relation to a plea of guilty by Mr Tylor, and appeared in court on his behalf. In relation to Mr
Tylor, Mr Chin's file contains a memorandum of costs, correspondence toMr Fleay and Mr Tylor and the
Police, various documents relating to the complaints and various exhibits.

it failed to discern the following facts:
a) Whether the Appellant was mindful and appreciative of his duties and solicitor and counsel to avoid acting in a conflict of interests-situation at all material times.
b) Whether the appellant is identifying his own interests with the interests of that client who employs him as solicitor and counsel such that their respective interests coincide and in that event, he should not be acting for any other potential clients whose interests are conflicting with the interests of that particular client he had so identified himself with;
c) The difference between the conflicting interests of two or more persons who are being charged for the same criminal offence and the lawyer acting in conflict of interests against the interests of his own client.
d) Whether two or more persons who are consulting him at the preliminary stage before he entered into a contract of legal service with one or more of them do have conflicting interests with each other or one another or amongst themselves;
e) In this case, the Appellant had accepted the brief from Mr. Tylor to defend him on his drug dealing charge because that initial consultation with him had revealed that he was the owner of the drug and he had admitted to that crime independent of Mr. Fleay who had admitted that he was not the owner of that self-same drug confiscated by the police.
f) There is nothing to prevent the Appellant from communicating with Mr. Fleay and advising him to contact another lawyer to assist him in his defence for a similar charge of the same drug.
g) There is also nothing to prevent the Appellant from advising and researching on the case for both of them before it becomes clear to him at that initial stage of the consultation that Mr. Tylor does not have an interests that conflict with the interests of Mr. Fleay despite the fact that both parties are being charged with similar offence affecting the same drugs.
h) When Mr. Tylor finally decided to employ the Appellant as his solicitor and counsel, the Appellant’s interests being so employed is not found and should not be so found to be conflicting with the interests of Mr. Fleay. On that basis alone, the Appellant helped Mr. Fleay at his first appearance in court for the purpose of mentioning it so that his case could be heard separately at Collie and represented by another lawyer.
i) Mr. Tylor was not in an attractive financial position to motivate the Appellant to act as his counsel and he did act for him in the mitigation of his drug dealing crime for the little money he could pay him for this thankless service and for his passion in obtain fair justice for his client.

18. The Tribunal erred in facts in paragraphs 67 in that:

67 At the time of the arrests, Mr Powell was already one of Mr Chin's clients. All three came to Mr Chin.
He opened a file in relation to each. In relation to Mr Powell, Mr Chin corresponded with the Court of
Petty Sessions in relation to Mr Powell's charges, provided advice to Mr Powell, and apparently made a
number of appearances of his behalf.

69 In his response to the Complaints Committee dated 12 June 2006, concerning these clients, Mr Chin
asserted that he told all three accused that each needed a separate lawyer, 'but all three of them were
insistent that I do some legal research for them as the factual circumstances affecting their respective
cases are the same'. He said that, from the outset, he advised each of them to plead guilty at the earliest
opportunity. He said that he chose to act only for Mr Tylor. He said that Mr Fleay was getting his own
lawyer. He attended Court for both Mr Fleay and Mr Tylor and wrote a submission for them.

in the following:
a) Mr. Powell was being defended by the Appellant in the Supreme Court at that time for an alleged attack on a policeman in the Crown Hotel in Collie in the case of Powell v Fuller [2005] WASC 91 by the learned Justice Jenkins and he was on leave from jail at the time of his arrest.
b) His arrest was for possession of a smoking implement and a small quantity of cannabis found by the police in his hip pocket whilst he was a passenger in a car together with Mr. Fleay and Mr. Tylor.
a) Mr. Powell’s drug cannabis case was never represented by the Appellant as he had found help with Legal Aid as he was then a prisoner on leave. He accompanied his two friends to see the Appellant.
b) The facts in paragraph 69 are as explained above. There is nothing wrong in the Appellant advising them to plead guilty if they wish to have the matters disposed of quickly without incurring legal costs for defence as the penalty for the crime is not going to be hefty. They have a right to make these choices as a preliminary to engaging a lawyer for their separate defences. There is no conflict of interests issue here.

19. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 70 in that:

70 The materials located on the files maintained by Mr Chin in relation to all three accused suggest that,
while it might have been contemplated that Mr Fleay would obtain separate legal advice, Mr Chin took
initial instructions from all three and continued to provide legal services to them notwithstanding their
obvious potential conflict. Mr Chin's tendency to justify his conduct provides a basis for concern as to his
full appreciation of the requirements confronting a practitioner faced with a conflict of interest. That
concern justifies a conclusion that supervision of Mr Chin's practice is appropriate.

in the following terms:
a) It is not wrong for the Appellant to be in conference with the three persons to sift out facts of the case at his initial consultation by them.
b) The facts of the case reveal that no conflicting interests ever exist between Mr. Fleay and Mr. Tylor and Mr. Powell.
c) Despite the above, the Appellant chose not to deal with the other two persons and accepted the brief of only Mr. Tylor and continued in his defence until his case came to a conclusion.
d) As a good natured person that he is, the Appellant gave pointers to the other two persons which made their life easier.
FAR-FETCHED NOTION OF NO RESPECT TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
20. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraphs 70, 72, 73 and 74 in that:

71 The Board's concern as to Mr Chin's understanding of the respect to be afforded to judicial officers
stemmed initially from his response of 12 June 2006 to the report from the 2006 Investigation. In the
context of responding to a concern expressed in the report as to certain comments made in a judgment by
her Honour Jenkins J in an appeal against a criminal conviction where Mr Chin had represented the
applicant ,Mr Chin said:
It is my personal belief that (the client) would have won his appeal on the following grounds:
(a) If the appeal judge hearing his case had been a man instead of a woman, Mr Powell would have gained (sic) more sympathy from a man who would understand a man's problem instead of a woman who is simply not equipped to understand a man's problem.
72 When Mr Chin was questioned about that matter at the Board's inquiry on 3 April 2008, he
acknowledged that the comment should not have been made, but said:
At the moment I said it, it just came out naturally from me. There was no intention to insult anyone but
It was never directed to Jenkins J. I want to apologise to her if it was ever directed to her. She never
knew that I insulted her.

73 He later said that although he still believed the comment to be true, he should not have made it. He
repeated the substance of those remarks in evidence in these proceedings saying that his comment was
justified because 'only a man can understand the problems of a man'.

74 The comment obviously demonstrates an extraordinary and illogical prejudice. Supervision of Mr
Chin's practice may well be quite unlikely to eradicate that prejudice. It may, however, go some way
Towards suppressing the expression of that prejudice, at least in Mr Chin's written communications.

a) the false Full Board should not be seen to be devising an entrapment to catch the Appellant’s unawares on an what appears to be an unreasonably-perceived prejudice on his part.
b) This falsely-perceived prejudice appears to be the Appellant’s subconscious gender bias against the learned Justice Jenkins which was rather unintentional and which should not be inequitably inhibit his independent practice as a result.
c) Who among his brethren of the legal profession is so perfect as to be strong enough to cast that first stone against the Appellant? This is despite the Appellant’s making amends for his unintentional error spontaneously.
d) There is a psychological explanation for this sub-conscious retort in that the Appellant felt that Mr. Powell should have been given the right justice and there are justifiable grounds for this argument.
e) Once a person stop questioning about the everyday problems or have the critical faculty of his mind being put out of use, one might say that this person is already dead. How can a dead person be a lawyer?

21. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraph 79 in that:

Insight or understanding, and the need for supervision
79 The final two matters upon which the Board relied in imposing the conditions on Mr Chin's practice
certificate was his lack of insight and understanding of the inappropriateness of his past conduct, and the
general requirement for supervision of all areas of his practice. These conclusions reached by the Board
were based upon the various matters identified in relation to the more specific concerns discussed above.

a) Based on the premises of the circumstances of this case as described above, the lack of insight and the need for supervision is a value judgment that is derived from the error of the Tribunal that stems from its own wishful thinking that all who do not conform to the majority must be exorcised and ostracized from the justice system of Western Australia.
b) A spot of “cancer” is being spotted and the system must be cleansed and castrated irrespective of whether he is speaking truths or falsehoods. This is not the kind of right justice that we lawyers have been educated for in the fine tradition of the law.
MR. BERTINI
24. The Tribunal erred in mixed facts and law in paragraph 80, 81 and 82 in that:

80 Mr Chin called evidence at the hearing for this Tribunal from a Mr Alessandro Bertini. Mr Bertini, who
gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter, has been receiving assistance from Mr Chin,
apparently on a voluntary basis, in relation to a dispute that Mr Bertini is having in the Magistrate's Court
against a solicitor who previously acted for Mr Bertini. Mr Bertini's witness statement is brief, but asserts
that the justice system does not work because the Legal Practice Board through the LPCC does not uphold
the public interest in maintaining its role as the regulator of the legal profession in Western Australia. He
complains of the 'injustice' said to have been done to Mr Chin, and says that he is willing to come as a
witness 'to show to this Tribunal that there are injustices that need to be corrected'. Attached to his witness
statement are a number of documents relating to his dispute with the solicitor, many of which have been
prepared by Mr Chin. Those documents make a number of complaints and allegations against the solicitor
in dispute with Mr Bertini.

81 When challenged about the relevance of Mr Bertini's witness statement, Mr Chin argued that it was relevant to demonstrate that the Legal Practice Board is not concerned about members of the public and
had not protected Mr Bertini in his dispute with his lawyer. On the other hand, he contended that the
assistance he provided to Mr Bertini demonstrated that he is capable of assisting people in need to obtain
justice. The Board was not opposed to the Tribunal hearing Mr Bertini's evidence, and accordingly his
evidence was accepted.

82 Mr Bertini indicated that Mr Chin had helped him fight his case when he was on the point of giving up
by reason of depression concerning the matters of dispute. He said that he had made seven applications to
court, all of which had been unsuccessful. The materials produced by Mr Bertini are replete with excessive
language, with references to extortion and tricks by lawyers. There are criticisms of a Magistrate
acting 'arbitrarily and without justification'. The papers tend to support, rather than undermine, the
concerns which we have identified above about Mr Chin's mode of practice. The fact that Mr Chin sought
to rely upon those materials demonstrates, in our view, his lack of insight orunderstanding about the
concerns which the Board had, and we share, as to his capacity to practice unsupervised.

in the following terms:
a) Mr. Alessandro Bertini’s case revolves around Perth Magistrates Court CA 2881 of 2006 where he is the defendant in his dispute with his former solicitor X.
b) He is a resourceful person who resents being repeatedly demanded to pay monies which he did not owe this solicitor.
c) He has many legal advisors and he was telling the Appellant about his legal problem when he was engaged by the Appellant for some painting work for his son’s home. The Appellant gave him some pointers to get him out of his uncomfortable legal problem on a pro-bono basis.
d) Mr. Bertini allegedly owed solicitor X in the sum of $2,000.00 which is a negotiated settlement of some allegedly outstanding legal fees for which Mr Bertini issued solicitor X with a cheque.
e) The solicitor did not cash that cheque but instead use it to make a claim against Mr. Bertini for a sum exceeding the Minor Case Provisions $7,500.00.
f) Mr. Bertini paid solicitors to defend his case for him but he ended paying his solicitors without getting the necessary service and he was not even allowed to join the erring solicitor as a third party in his defence of that action against solicitor X. There are enough evidentiary materials before the court that the case being a Minor Claim should not have been escalated to become a general procedure claim.
g) Yet, Mr. Bertini did not obtain justice when he appealed to the District Court in Appeal No. 36 of 2008. His appeal was dismissed and he was asked to pay his opponent profits costs contrary to the WA exception to the Chorley principle that a solicitor litigant in person is entitled to claim profit costs in Dobree v Hoffman (1996) WASC.
h) Mr. Bertini made seven applications before two different magistrates, who erred in their refusals to address the issues of injustice and over-charging of solicitor X. Neither was there any justifiable reasons provided by the Magistrates.
i) The Magistrates after making the errors are now purportedly aware of the fact that Mr. Bertini does have a valid cause of action against solicitor X and for some unknown reason, that case is being withheld from being proceeded with thus delaying justice to Mr. Bertini. The learned Magistrates are now aware of their own mistakes through some documents prepared on behalf of Mr. Bertini on a pro-bono basis by the Appellant resulting in Mr. Bertini solving his perennial problems with the courts and this proves that there is no truth in the judgment of the Tribunal that the Appellant has a propensity to make false serious allegations against other practitioners.
j) The Bibilical truth is: Those who lead others to justice thereby preventing Mr. Bertini from suffering serious damages to his health and his mental well-being, is like a star that shines in the sky forever. This echoes the remark of the Appellant to His Honour Justice Barker, the President of SAT who for some unknown reason was unable to hear the Appellant’s case in VR 107 of 2008 to its successful conclusion thereby avoiding the value judgment of the Tribunal.
k) Solicitor X was seen to be taking advantage of the costs orders of the Magistrates in equivocal terms and after having realized that he was not entitled to it sought to withdraw it but in the process, he had attracted the error of His Honour DCJ O’Sullivan who dismissed Mr. Bertini’s appeal No.36 of 2008 through misinformation provided to the learned Judge by solicitor X. Mr. Bertini is now left with no choice but to make an application for review orders under s. 36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 to the Supreme Court.
l) The fact remains, there are so many misdoings by solicitors and yet, they are not being investigated and dealt with in accordance with the law by the Board. Yet the Board is pursuing the Appellant for no misdeeds under the pretext of the “phantom deficiency syndrome”.

Signature of the Appellant: ………………………………………………..

JUSTICE FOR A FORMER LAWYER IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Pages

Monday, January 25, 2010

GANODERMA LUCIDEM AT GANO-VITAL

Friday, January 15, 2010

DETAILED GROUNDS OF APPEAL - CACV105 OF 2008

About Me