EMAIL LETTER TO LPCC INFORMING IT OF HIGH COURT DECISION IN P1 OF 2010 DELIVERED 26.5.2010 AND REQUESTING IT TO STOP MALIGNING ME

LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
Post Office Box Z5293, St Georges Terrace, Perth WA 6831
2nd Floor, Colonial Building, 55 St Georges Terrace, Perth WA 6000
TEL (08) 9461 2299 / FAX (08) 9461 2265 / EMAIL lpcc@lpbwa.com
Atten: Ms. Caroline Brookes
Dear Sirs:
I refer to the above matter and wish to inform you that the High Court had arrived at its decision on 26.5.2010 in P1 of 2010 which implies that if there were no falsifications of the court records by the Mr. David Taylor with regard to the date of filing of CIV 1131 of 2006, I would have succeeded in removing the Spunter’s Caveat. So, the allegations by the LPCC that I have a proclivity to make false allegations of Mr. Taylor are now being vindicated by the decision of the High Court because the proof that I have been maligned is available before the Court of Appeal within the contents of my Yellow Appeal Book.
The High Court dismissed my Application for Special Leave to appeal the Court of Appeal decision in Chin v Hall based on the error of fact and law of Justice Owen in paras. 54 and 55 of that judgment. Please find my attached letter to the learned Registrar Eldred explaining this situation. I am now seeking for my case to be re-opened so that the Affidavit Evidence of Mr. David Taylor in CIV 1131 of 2010 filed on 29.3.2007 together with Annexure DGT14 in my Yellow Appeal Book shows that Mr. David Powell lied in his letter to me dated 11.6.2009 to cover up Mr. Taylor.
It is for the Committee now to take up this matter so that it is seen to be doing its duties to uphold the public interests and that it should no longer continue to support the contention of Mr. David Taylor maligning me.
Yours faithfully
NICHOLAS N CHIN
387, ALEXANDER DRIVE
DIANELLA WA 6059
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Nicholas N Chin [mailto:nnchin09@tpg.com.au]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 9:17 PM
To: 'enquiries@hcourt.gov.au'
Cc: 'nnchin1@gmail.com'
Subject: Special Leave Dispositions in Chin v Hall & Ors [2010] HCASL 104 (26 May 2010)
All the Justices of The High Court of Australia and
All The Registrars of the High Court of Australia.
Your Honours:
Please find my attached letter to the Registrar of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia with regard to the High Court of Australia decisions as indicated delivered on 26.5.2010.
It looks as if the High Court is telling the Court of Appeal of the Western Australia to correct its own decisions with regard to the causal connection between the recovery or preservation of the relevant property and the work of the solicitor right.
Cheers
NICHOLAS N CHIN
387, Alexander Drive
DIANELLA WA 6059
Phone: 08 92757440
Mobile: 0421642735

Chin v Hall & Ors [2010] HCASL 104 (26 May 2010)
Last Updated: 26 May 2010
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
v
AUDREY FRANCES HALL AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE KENNETH DUNCAN HALL & ORS
[2010] HCASL 104
P1/2010
The first respondent obtained judgment from the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Master Sanderson) against the applicant and the second respondent. The judgment required them to remove caveats against the title to two properties. The applicant is a solicitor who contends that he is entitled to maintain a caveat over the properties to protect a statutory charge. The Master found that the first respondent's mortgages had priority over the charge.
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed an appeal, but for a different reason. Owen JA (McClure P and Buss JA concurring) held, not that the mortgages had priority over the charge, but that the charge never arose because the factual precondition to it was not satisfied. That factual precondition was a causal connection between the recovery or preservation of the relevant property and the work of the solicitor. The Court of Appeal held that even if effecting the removal of a caveat constitutes recovery or preservation of property, the removal was caused by the first respondent's successful application for summary judgment, not the applicant's work.
The papers filed in support of the applicant's application for special leave to appeal do not focus on that crucial aspect of the Court of Appeal's reasoning and do not show error in it.
The application is dismissed.
Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.
J.D. Heydon
26 May 2010
V.M. Bell

CALLING FOR JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN TO RECUSE HIMSELF FROM HEARING CIV 1903 OF 2008 AND CIV 1112 OF 2007

Friday, 28 May 2010

The Principal Registrar
Mr. Keith Frederick Chapman
Supreme Court of WA Stirling Gardens, Barrack Street
PERTH WA 6000 Associate: Tel: 08 9421 5302 Fax: 08 92218350
Atten: The Associate to the Honourable Justice Kenneth Martin

The Legal Profession Complaints Committee
Atten: Legal Officer Ms. Caroline Brookes PO Box: Z5293,
St. Georges Terrace, PERTH WA 6831 Facsimile: 9461 2265
Atten: Ms. Caroline Brookes: I shall send you by email a copy of my Affidavit in 21 pages, devoid of all annexure to keep the LPCC informed of the latest developments in this case.

Dear Sir

JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN IN CIV 1112 OF 2010: THIES V CHIN [2010] WASC 111 DELIVERED ON 13.5.2010 AND PUBLISHED ON 25.5.2010.

I am writing this letter to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court to settle an administrative matter of the Supreme Court.

I refer to the above judgment which crossed my Affidavit in 140 pages sworn and filed on 26.5.2010 filed in CIV 1903 of 2008 in response to the Affidavit of Mr. Thies sworn and filed the 12.5.2010.

In my Affidavit I have requested for His Honour to review his ruling in accordance with the common law with regard to his Honour’s refusal to allow me to represent my son Paul Chung Kiong Chin in CIV 1112 of 2007 for which I had posed an immediate objection to it at the time when that ruling was made.

Further in my Affidavit I have made an application for the two cases to be consolidated into one case for the purpose of quieting all claims that arose out of one transaction or event. This is a very cogent reason which the Court should heed having regard to the fact that since I have agreed for Paul to be made a Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2009 and similarly, Mr. Thies should trade it for my being made the Defendant in the CIV 1112 of 2007.

I am now asking for His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin to recuse himself from further hearing of the consolidated case on the ground that His Honour had taken into account irrelevant considerations and had refused to take into account relevant considerations and is deficient in his provision of the reasons of his decisions by paying scant regard to the written submissions of both myself and of my son Paul on inter alia, the following grounds:

a) There is no conflict of interests subsisting between my son’s interests and my own personal interests under the exhaustive circumstances which I have provided for in my Affidavit.
b) At all material times, I have not acted as a solicitor for Paul and I had only acted as a settlement agent for the vendor of the Centenary Lunch Bar with the written informed consent by both parties. The fact that I am divested of my practice certificate does it not mean that I can act as a free agent for anyone without the unnecessary restraints imposed on me.
c) If I had acted as a solicitor for Paul, I agree that I owe Paul legal obligations and public obligations as a solicitor to ensure that my own personal interests do not conflict with the interests of my son Paul.
d) The Acts governing the legal profession as extant in WA do not say that I am acting as a solicitor for my son Paul unless I am being paid a legal fee by my son.
e) The fact that there are two conflicting interests existing between the interests of the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar and the interests of my son Paul does not mean that these conflicting interests cannot be stayed by both parties exercising their free own wills to provide me with a Written Informed Consent which is only limited to the settlement process and none other.
b) It is an error in law on the face of the record for the learned Justice to suggest that I or someone else cannot write on behalf of Paul those documents which he Paul had caused to be filed and served in CIV 1112 of 2007 and in which Paul represented himself as a litigant in person. This is tantamount to saying that Paul cannot obtain the services of a clerk or a scribe-writer.
c) There is no reason why I cannot use my label, Barrister and Solicitor, although I am not a certificated legal practitioner as long I made this fact known or as long as I am acting as a litigant in person in my own case or in the case where I have the sanction of the Supreme Court to represent my son as provided for in the transcript of the proceedings by Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2010 in which I had specifically posed those questions before Justice Hasluck.
d) Given that I am not allowed to act as a litigant in person for my son in CIV 1112 of 2007, Paul had taken note of that fact and had altered all those documents into his own name as a litigant in person. Why in this instance when Paul is being denied natural justice? This denial of natural justice by a judge is itself an abuse of power of the learned Justice himself who then in error sought to convert it into an abuse of process by Paul or by me, acting as litigants in person, without Paul being active, as promised by the opposing party. Paul and I are seeking the services of His Honour as an impartial judge. I cannot understand His Honour’s logic - as it is clear that His Honour is now descending into the arena of conflict and is being blinded by the dust of conflict as a result.
e) The unlawful caveat which my learned friend Mr. Thies had recalcitrantly refused to remove even after he had been paid the coerced settlement monies clearly cannot be based on an arguable interest in land in accordance with the learned Justice Ken Martin’s view.
f) How is it possible for the learned Justice Ken Martin to fall into error by attributing a zero sum debt with the qualities of caveatable interests when section 137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA) and the relevant common law clearly implies that such an interests must be concomitant with some equitable interests in the caveat land.
g) Surely, His Honour could not fall into the error that Mr. Thies can have an equitable interests in the Caveat land if he had never entered into a contractual relationship with Paul in which the nature of the caveat land is properly and exactly described in the varied Solicitor Costs Agreement which Paul entered into with him based on the pre-contractual terms of the my email dated 25.10.2004, having regard to the circumstances affecting the consensus ad idem of both parties to that contract.
h) How is it possible for His Honour to fall into this error unless His Honour is prone to make a pre-judgment of the whole issue and is therefore coming to judge the case with less than an impartial mind?

In view of the circumstances as explained above, the written judgment of His Honour in the
above case clearly indicates albeit strongly so, that it is in the interests of justice that His
Honour should now recuse himself from further hearing this case. If this does not happen, the
litigation is not going to end here, it is going further. In the interests of conserving the resources
or all parties concerned and the courts as well, an immediate abdication by the Learned Justice
is only and the best solution. This is despite my inclination to give the learned Justice the
benefit of the doubt.

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN
c.c.
Mr. Timothy Robin Thies
No.70 King Street,
EAST FREMANTLE WA 6158
(Please find this cover letter attaching to my Affidavit sworn and filed 26.5.2010 in 140 pages in response to your Affidavit sworn 12.5.2010, by way of service upon you).

LETTER TO COURT OF APPEAL REGISTRAR TO RE-OPEN THE CASE IN CACV 107 OF 2008 IN THE LIGHT OF HIGH COURT DECISION IN P1 OF 2010

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Court of Appeal Registrar Eldred
Supreme Court of Western Australia
Court of Appeal
Stirling Gardens, Barrack Street
PERTH WA 6000 Phone: 94215333 Fax: 94215471
Attention: Ms. Maria Santos

Mr. Anthony Prime
Mc Callum Donovan Sweeney
No.16, Irwin Street
PERTH WA 6000
Phone: 9221 2220
Email: mds@mdslaw.com.au

Mr. Maurice Frederick Law
PO Box 399, MIDLAND WA 6936
Or 87, William Street, HERENE HILL WA 6056.
Email: moza@bigpond.com; moza35@bigpond.com;

Dear Sir

CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216

I refer to the above case that was decided by the Court of Appeal on 12 August, by the Court of Appeal comprising of McLURE P, OWEN JA and BUSS JA. In that judgment His Honour Owen J at paragraph 54 and 54 states as follows:

54 I have reviewed the evidence which Chin seeks to adduce and it does not prove his contention. The high point of Chin's evidence is a letter written to him by a registrar of this court dated 11 June 2009 saying: (Page 17)
You state you have a copy of the writ. In that case you will note it has 2 dates on it.
The first is 10 February 2006 with a notation that the fee was $654.20.
The second is the assessment which in its original form shows a date of 10 February 2006 and an assessment no of 201702. That assessment was cancelled after close of business on 10 February 2006 when it was realised by the Court that the cheque tendered for payment was for $654.00 and was therefore 20 cents short.
I assume that fact was forwarded to the plaintiffs' solicitors because on 16 February 2006 the correct amount was paid: $654.00 by credit card and 20 cents cash. The assessment stamp was altered to 16 February 2006 and the new assessment number 202483 entered on the altered stamp.
The assessment number is given on payment.
55 The letter does not establish that the action was not commenced on 10 February 2006. It indicates that the writ was filed on 10 February 2006 and, through an oversight, the filing fee paid was 20 cents short of the proper amount. The underpayment was brought to Spunter's solicitor's attention and the correct amount was paid. This does not mean that the writ was not filed until the correct fee was paid.

However, Mr. David Taylor swore an Affidavit on 29.3.2007 in CIV 1131 of 2006 which is found at pages 46 to 48 of my Yellow Appeal Book in CACV107 of 2008 to the effect that the total sum of filing fees namely $654.00 and 20 cents were received together on the same day in two lots for which a Receipt No. 1348 dated 10.2.2006 were given to Mr. David Taylor by the Supreme Court.

Therefore the letter by Registrar Powell to me dated 11.6.2009 found at page 136 of the Yellow Appeal Book when read together with his other letters to me regarding the same matter indicate that the learned Registrar Powell was trying to falsify the court records and did falsified the court records by stating that the Writ of Summons was issued on 10.2.2006 when it was never done so by the Supreme Court.

Had the court records never been falsified in accordance with s.85 of the Criminal Code, 1903 (WA), I would not have been deprived of my right to exercise my solicitor’s lien as a charge over the estate of the late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall under s.244 of the former LP Act for my work to remove the caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd.

The High Court decision in dismissing my Special Leave Application P1 of 2010 that was delivered on 26.5.2010 refers to the causal connection between my work and the removal of the Spunter’s caveat. It denies that my work has that causal connection. Therefore this issue of the causal connection vis a vis the corrupt act of falsification of court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 has never been decided by the High Court of Australia nor in the Court of Appeal. This issue is never not bounded by the rule of res-judicata and need to be decided again. The question, where is the forum of this non-res judicata issue to be decided. I believe most appropriate forum is still the Court of Appeal.

However, my contention is that if there was no corrupt act in the falsification of the court records, my solicitor work for the late Ms Hall would have been the first one to remove the Spunter’s caveat instead of the learned Master Sanderson having to await the application by Mr. Anthony Prime of Mc Calluim Donovan and Sweeney as solicitors for their client the First Respondent i.e. Mrs. Audrey Francds Hall to remove the Spunter’s Caveat through a summary dismissal. Had there been no such falsifications of the court records as aforementioned, the causal connection would not have been intercepted by Master Sanderson’s summary dismissal which removed the Spunter’s Caveats at a later date instead of a prior removal by my solicitor work. In other words, had there been no falsification of the court records, I would have been paid for my work done for the late Ms. Hall from her estate. A travesty of justice had been done to me and I want to seek your procedural advice as to how I should access this justice.

Please find attached a copy of the High Court decision in my Special Leave Dispositions in P1 of 2010.

Yours faithfully


NICHOLAS N CHIN

REQUEST JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN - THE JUST CONSOLIDATION CIV1112OF2007 INTO CIV1903OF2008 SUCH THAT I COULD BE LITIGANT IN PERSON IN TWO CASES

IN THE SURPEME COURT OF CIV 1903 OF 2008
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
HELD AT PERTH
COMMERCIAL AND MANAGED LIST


In the matter of an application under section
36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 against
His Honour Magistrate Michelides SM in
Proceedings Magistrates Court Proceedings
FR 417 OF 2008, Her Honour Magistrate
Musk, SM in Magistrates Court Proceedings
FR944 of 2007 and Mr. Commissioner
Herron in District Court Appeal 6 of 2008

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN PLAINTIFF

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES FIRST DEFENDANT

PAUL CHUNG KONG CHIN SECOND DEFENDANT


AFFIDAVIT OF NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN IN RESPONSE TO FIRST DEFENDANT’S AFFIDAVIT SWORN 12TH DAY OF MAY, 2010.


Case Manager: The Hon Justice Kenneth Martin
Date of Document: 26th May, 2010
Filed on behalf of: The Plaintiff
Date of Filing: 26 May, 2010

Prepared by:
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin
387, Alexander Drive
DIANELLA WA 6059
Phone: 08 927567440
Mobile: 0421642735


INDEX
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-1 AS EVIDENCE: 4
PROCEDURE UNDER S.36 OF THE MCCP ACT 5
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-2 AS EVIDENCE: 7
APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFF TO BE INCLUDED AS SECOND DEFENDANT IN CIV 1112 OF 2007: 7
REASONS WHY CIV 1903 OF 2008 AND CIV 1112 OF 2007 NEED TO BE CONSOLIDATED: 8
REGISTRAR WILDE’S BASAL CONSENT ORDER IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION, AN ABUSE OF POWER AND A NULLITY: 10
ZERO DEBT CLAIM DOES NOT ENTITLE THE FIRST DEFENDANT TO PROFITS COSTS 10
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE MINOR CASE PROVISIONS 11
PRECONTRACTUAL CORRESPONDENCE – REINFORCES THE INTEGRITY OF THE LAWFUL TERMINATION OF FIRST DEFENDANT’S LEGAL SERVICES ON 21.2.2005 13
PLAINTIFF NEVER IN CONFLICT OF INTERESTS SITUATION AS SETTLEMENT AGENT FOR VENDORS OF CENTENARY LUNCH BAR WITH INFORMED CONSENT: 15
THE UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT: 16
CONCLUSION 18
REASONS WHY NO SECURITY OF COSTS TO BE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF: 19


Annexure Description Page No.
NNC-1 Summons in Chambers and Affidavit in Support thereof by the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 dated and sworn 8.5.2010 and filed 10.5.2010 adopted by Plaintiff as evidence for these proceedings 60
NNC-1A Section 36 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 1
NNC-2A Outline of Written Submissions of the Plaintiff dated and filed 10.5.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2008 adopted by Plaintiff as evidence in these proceedings. 12
NNC-2 Outline of Written Submissions of the Second Defendant dated and filed 10.5.2010 in CIV 1112 of 2007 adopted by Plaintiff as evidence in these proceedings. 14
NNC-3 Minute of Proposed Order by the Plaintiff dated and filed the 3.6.2010 for the Plaintiff to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007 in accordance with Order 83 of the RSC, 1971. 2
NNC-4 Email letter from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant dated 24.3.2007 requiring the latter to release the unlawful Caveat as there was a zero sum debt. 1
NNC-4A-1 NNC-4A-2 Letter dated 2.6.2005 from Ms. Somerville Brown as Legal Officer of the LPCC to the Plaintiff in respect of the Plaintiff having acted as the settlement agent with the informed consent of the purchasers and vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar. 2
NNC-4B-1 to NNC-4B-2 Response Letter dated 3.6.2005 from the Plaintiff to Ms. Somerville Brown of LPCC indicating that the Plaintiff was in effect never the solicitor for his son Paul the Second Defendant in the sale and purchase settlement for the Centenary Lunch Bar as it was then a misconception that I had acted in conflict of conflicts under circumstances where no such situation of conflict of interests ever exist. 2
NNC-5 Facsimile letter from the Plaintiff to Registrar Wilde explaining to her the misapprehension about Justice Templeman’s Order and urgent need for the Second Defendant to enter into a coerced settlement with the First Defendant. 1
NNC-6 Email letter dated 10.4.2007 by the Plaintiff to the First Defendant indicating that he was non-consensual as regards the duress-vitiated compromise that was made known to Registrar Wilde before the consent judgment was entered into between the parties on 7.6.2007. 1
NNC-7-1 to NNC-7-2 Email dated 12.4.2005 of the Plaintiff indicating the involuntariness of the Plaintiff to pay him the coerced settlement sum, receipt of which was acknowledged by the First Defendant. 2
NNC-7A Page 5 of the Affidavit of Plaintiff filed and sworn on 23.7.2008 in CIV 1903 of 2008 which explains how the First Defendant was creating fictitious bills of costs after the disagreement as to the pre-contractual terms arose on 10.11.2007 arose.
NNC-8-1 to NNC-8-5 Facsimile letters dated 11.4.2007, 12.4.2007 and 17.4.2007 to the LPCC depicting the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant in exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Second Defendant by advancing his own interests to achieve the coerced settlement. 5
NNC-9 Email letter dated 24.4.2007 from Plaintiff to Mr. James Woodford as the Associate of Justice Templeman regarding only one example of the lack of integrity of the coerced settlement as the First Defendant never intended to honour his coerced settlement terms. 1
NNC-10 Facsimile letter from the Plaintiff to all parties involved, inter alia Registrar Sue Wilde informing her again of the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant and the nature of coerced settlement that was before her as a Consent Judgment was pending to be delivered by her on 7.6.2007. 3
NNC-11 Email correspondence between the First Defendant and Plaintiff in the aftermath of the coerced Consent Order. 3
NNC-12 Notice of Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 filed by the Plaintiff that came before Justice Hasluck who granted the review Orders pursuant to s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 on 7.11.2008. 5
NNC-13 Further Outline of Submissions by Plaintiff in respect of CIV 1903 of 2008 dated and filed 13.5.2010 to be adopted by the Plaintiff as evidence in this Affidavit. 4

I, Nicholas Ni Kok Chin, of No. 387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA, WA 6059, Western Australia, Barrister & Solicitor (currently not certificated), being duly sworn make oath and say as follows:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled proceedings and swear this Affidavit in response to the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 12.5.2010 in support of his Application for security for costs and associated orders and further to his Affidavit dated 6th October, 2010.
2. The facts herein are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Where I identify the source of facts stated as other than from my own personal knowledge, I believe such facts to be true and correct.
3. When I read the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 6.10.2010 and filed 7.10.2010, I do sense that my learned friend the First Defendant who is the deponent of that Affidavit is reasonably found to be putting words into mine or the Second Defendant’s mouth; he is doing this in order to portray an incorrect impression to this Honourable Court with regard to all matters affecting how the client-solicitor relationship between himself and us had been established according to his view.
4. In fact, what actually transpired indicates that there is no consensus ad idem ever reached between him and us and if there is, he had refused to recognize it. Unless proven otherwise, I would like to caution this Honourable Court that those “impersonating” words should be filtered and scrutinized carefully by this court before accepting them to be the truths.
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-1 AS EVIDENCE:
5. I adopt the contents of the Affidavit of the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 dated 30.4.2010 and sworn 8.5.2010 containing 60 pages, which has not been accepted by His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin on 13.5.2010 in those proceedings perhaps on the premise that the Second Defendant wishes to remain inactive as previously promised by the court before Justice Hasluck (See Annexure: NNC-1).
6. I humbly seek this Honourable Court to review this ruling of His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin as I had objected to it immediately and therefore I should be entitled to a review of it by the learned Justice himself in accordance with the principles of law as enunciated by Le Miere J in the case of Townsend & Ors v Collava & Ors [2005] WASC 4(S) relating to the Power and discretion of a trial judge , failing which I hope to receive reasons for what I honestly believe to be an incorrect and an unjust ruling.
7. My adoption of the Annexure NNC-1 is for the purpose of providing the evidentiary materials which ought to be some of the relevant considerations for this Honourable Court to imbibe in these proceedings.

PROCEDURE UNDER S.36 OF THE MCCP ACT
8. I am the person aggrieved by the Null Consent Orders of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007, the abuse of powers and jurisdictional excesses Orders and Directions of Magistrates Musk in FR944 of 2007, of Commissioner Herron of the District Court in Appeal No.6 of 2008 and of Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007 respectively.
9. Consequently, I applied under Order 56A of the Rules of Supreme Court 1971 (WA) and s.36(1)(c ) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 (WA) (the MCCP Act) to the Supreme Court of WA before Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008 for Review Orders that might have justified Orders for the prerogative Writ of Certiorari (See NNC-12).
10. On 7.11.2008, the learned Justice Hasluck granted me the Review Orders for the prerogative Writ of Certiorari Orders as requested for by me.
11. Justice Kenneth Martin is now hearing the second part of the Review Orders for the Prerogative Writ of Certiorari Orders under subs. 36(4) of the MCCP Act.
11. If Justice Kenneth Martin is satisfied with the review Orders of Justice Hasluck granted under s.36(1) of the MCCP Act, His Honour Justice Martin, if he thinks it just to do so, may order that those the acts, orders or directions of the lower courts not be done or to set them aside as the case requires, or he may issue the necessary consequential orders under subs. 36(4)(c ) of the MCCP Act which need to follow a prior substantial order and the reference here is particularly with regard to Commissioner Herron’s Order in Appeal No.6 of 2008 as per Pera v Pera [2008] FamCAFC 87; (2008) 218 FLR 222 [61] .

12. Their Honour Magistrates Musk and Magistrate Michelides respectively with the advice of the State Solicitor of WA had already agreed to comply with the Review Orders of Justice Hasluck issued under s.36(1); Justice Kenneth Martin now would have to finalize this issue by having his consequential orders made under subs.36(4)(c ) served upon them to make all things complete and perfect in accordance with the law as is extant in Western Australia.
13. The Jurisdictional Excesses Orders and Directions of the District Court, being the abuse of powers of Commissioner Herron in District Appeal No.6 of 2008 is to be revoked by the proposed consequential orders of Justice Kenneth which ought to be made in accordance with subs.36(4)( c) of the MCCP Act.
14. His Honour Commissioner Herron when dealing with an appeal under the MCCP Act ought not to have decided the matter but he did so without jurisdiction as was admitted by Mr. Commissioner in his judgment; he or his representative in the District Court should now remit that appeal if it was at all possible, or remit his Commissioner Herron’s (as an after the event action on the part of the District Court ) to the Supreme Court directed towards Justice Kenneth Martin in accordance with subs.36(7)(a) of the MCCP Act and s.77 of the District Court of Western Australia Act, 1969(WA).
15. S.36 of the MCCP Act is a judicial review power. Its purpose is to replace, and provide a statutory alternative to, the common law relating to judicial review of the acts or omissions of officers of the Court. The intention is to permit judicial review in those situations in which the specified prerogative writs would have been available but also to free the courts from the technical requirements associated with those ancient remedies. It takes away the Supreme Court’s Power issue a prerogative writ in the form of a writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari and substitutes the remedies in subs.36(4) of the MCCP Act. The s.36(1) review Order by Justice Hasluck is an order to the First Defendant to show cause why the relief in subs.36(4) should not be granted by Justice Kenneth Martin in favour of the Plaintiff .
16. Judicial review is a supervisory function that is distinct from an appeal or other review on the merits. Judicial review concerns itself solely with the legality of decisions. The focus is on jurisdictional errors. At common law, the scope of judicial review is determined by the availability of the prerogative writs, which include mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. For all intents and purposes, the right and remedy are indistinguishable at common law.
17. The grounds for the setting aside the Orders of Magistrate Musk, Magistrate Michelides and Commissioner Herron include misconstruing or misapplying the statutory source of the relevant power, failing to take into account a relevant consideration, taking into account an irrelevant consideration, improper purpose, unreasonableness or irrationality and breach of the rules of procedural fairness. For the purpose of Certiorari Orders, it is the non-jurisdictional error of the lower courts in the face of the record that is important and relevant. Registrar Wilde Null Orders, Magistrate Musk summary dismissal of FR944 of 2007, Magistrate Michelides dismissal of my Appeal from Registrar Wilde’s Null Orders are all non-jurisdictional errors on the face of the record .
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-2 AS EVIDENCE:

18. Similarly, I also adopt the contents of the Outline of Written Submission of the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007 containing 14 pages although I believe they are not evidence strictly but they just portray the state of affairs pertaining to the legal position of the Second Defendant and his frame of mind in these proceedings.
19. This document unfortunately had not been accepted by Justice Kenneth Martin on 13.5.2010 on the ground that it is without the signature of Paul but it has now been signed by the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008. His Honour is in error when he ruled that I am not entitled to advocate on behalf of the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007. In order to solve this anomalous situation, I am applying for the two cases to be consolidated for the reasons which I shall be indicating below.
20. Therefore, I humbly pray for the learned Justice Martin to review this ruling made in error on the ground that being an admitted barrister and solicitor does not mean that I must always be acting in that capacity for my son Paul whenever I was doing work for him on a pro-bono basis in accordance with s.12 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 or the similar antecedent provisions of the former LP Act, 2003. I can always be acting for him divested of my professional capacity as a next friend, an amicus curiae of this Honourable Court or as his free agent or even as his father (See Annexure: NNC-2).
21. By virtue of subs.36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2008 (the Act) in CIV 1903 of 2008 through the review orders granted to me 7.11.2008 by Justice Hasluck, I am now the Plaintiff in these proceedings before Justice Kenneth Martin pursuant to the powers granted to him in subs.36(4) of the Act.
APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFF TO BE INCLUDED AS SECOND DEFENDANT IN CIV 1112 OF 2007:

22. As all those matters in CIV 1112 of 2007 concerns the same matters that are to be dealt with in these proceedings to be heard under subs.36(4) of the Act, I am applying for an Order from His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin to consolidate the proceedings in CIV112 of 2007 and CIV 1903 of 2008 into one proceedings known only as CIV 1903 of 2008 (the consolidated matters).
23. I make this Application in the interests of the mutual conservations of the courts and the parties resources pursuant to Sub-rule 83(1) of Order 83 the Rules of Supreme Court, 1971 (WA) which provides as follows:
“Whenever any issues between the same parties can be conveniently tried together, or whenever it appears desirable notwithstanding that the parties are not identical and that the evidence necessary to prove the issues is not identical, the Court may consolidate any number of causes or matters in order to quiet all claims relating to one subject matter, transaction or event, or to substantially similar subject matters, transactions or events.”
REASONS WHY CIV 1903 OF 2008 AND CIV 1112 OF 2007 NEED TO BE CONSOLIDATED:

24. Sub-rule 83(3) of the said Rules provides that this Honourable Court shall make all necessary directions for the pre trial procedure, and for the trial or determination of such consolidated causes or matters to be heard together on the following grounds:

24.1. I was the party involved with the First Defendant at all material times.
24.2. I was the party who introduced the First Defendant to the Second Defendant.
24.3. I was the party who through my inadvertence caused my undue influence to be exerted upon my son the Second Defendant to enter into the varied solicitor costs agreement with the First Defendant, thereby inadvertently allowing the First Defendant to exploit the vulnerabilities of my son.
24.4. It was I who caused the solicitor cost agreement to be varied by initially adding to it the pre-contractual terms as contained in my email to the First Defendant dated 25.10.2004 and by insisting that the First Defendant do provide to me in writing his agreement that all costs charges will have to be approved by me, as the fundamental terms of that contract (the fundamental terms).
24.5. It was I who signed the Varied Solicitors Costs Agreement first and showed it to the Second Defendant for his approval.
24.6. It was I who told the Second Defendant that he would not have to worry about having his property mortgaged to the First Defendant because they could not be so mortgaged or charged to the First Defendant on the ground that whatever property real or personal belonging to the Second Defendant cannot be the subject of such contemplated charge or mortgage by virtue of the fact that if they were to be so, they would have to be specifically mentioned in written form in the varied solicitor costs agreement.
24.7. It was I who allayed the fears of the Second Defendant that he would not be subject to any frivolous or vexatious billings by the First Defendant in that I will have to approve every piece of work to be done by the First Defendant.
24.8. It was I who signed the varied solicitor costs agreement with the First Defendant on an earlier date and it was the Second Defendant who mirrored the signing of that similar varied costs agreement on a later date.
24.9. It was I who informed both the First and Second Defendants that the former cannot have caveatable interests over the 29, O’Dell Street, Thornlie property (the caveat property) of the latter on the ground that the former never have or had an equitable interests over the caveat property; that equitable interests must have been brought about by the enforcement of a either a contractual right or by devolution of law through the enforcement of a personal right by the former over the latter as limited by s.137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA).
24.10. It was I who was the party who tried to solve the legal problem of my son but was entangled in this unending problem of disentangling my son as the Second Defendant from the First Defendant.
24.11. I was at all material times acting as the free agent on a pro bono basis as just like father would do for his son, or as the McKenzie friend of the Second Defendant in his dispute with the First Defendant in court, or as a friend of the court as its amicus curiae.
24.12. The Second Defendant is not the party who had entered into a legal relationship of solicitor and client on a voluntary basis with the First Defendant.
24.13. I as the Plaintiff was voluntarily incorporated into the impugned varied solicitor-client costs agreement as a party by all parties concerned (the impugned agreement).
24.14. The impugned agreement is subject to the fundamental term of the contract that I as the Plaintiff shall have the sole authority to approve all costs or charges for works to be performed by the First Defendant for and on behalf of the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant and such works shall only be performed at the behest of the Plaintiff.
24.15. It was I who initiated the Second Defendant to make that election to terminate the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement on the ground that the First Defendant is found to be breaching the fundamental terms of that Agreement; the Second Defendant being the party who suffers the detriment occasioned by that breach of the First Defendant is entitled by law to make that election NOT TO KEEP THAT AGREEMENT ON FOOT but to sue the First Defendant later for damages of the breach.
24.16. The issues between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant of the one part and the First Defendant of the other part in the first case of CIV1903 of 2008 are common with the issues existing between the same parties in the second case of CIV1112 of 2007; except that the Plaintiff of the former case had inadvertently not been included in the latter case which I term is a misadventure which I am seeking the permission of this Honourable Court to rectify (The common issues).
24.17. The common issues of both cases can be conveniently tried together in one consolidated proceeding in CIV 1903 of 2008.
24.18. Before both cases are consolidated into one proceeding, the Plaintiff does seek an Order from this Honourable Court for the Plaintiff to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 (in exchange for the Plaintiff having formerly agreed to allow his son Paul C K Chin to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008 before Justice Hasluck). This is to be done as per the Minute of Proposed Orders prepared by the Plaintiff to be included in the current proceedings of the First Defendant Application dated 12.5.2010 (See Annexure NNC-3).
24.19. Although the Plaintiff is a qualified barrister and solicitor, he has at all material times never acted as the solicitor for the Second Defendant on the simple ground that worked on a pro-bono basis for his son as any father would naturally do given the circumstances.
24.20. The parties and the issues of both cases are identical and the purpose of the consolidated matters is to quiet all claims relating to one transaction, event or matter and to conserve all the resources of all parties including this Honourable Court, and in the interests of justice such that these matter may be expeditiously settled.

REGISTRAR WILDE’S BASAL CONSENT ORDER IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION, AN ABUSE OF POWER AND A NULLITY:

25) The Consent Judgment Order by Registrar Sue Wilde of the Fremantle Magistrates Court in FR417 of 2007 dated 7.6.2007 referred to in paragraph 2 of the First Defendant’s Affidavit are null orders.
26) The Null Orders stem from the will of the court being deflected by the duress situation created by the First Defendant, which the learned Registrar was apprised of at all material times in relation to FR417 of 2007.
27) The court which create the Null Orders, is constituted by the following members:
• The Second Defendant in FR417 of 2007 who is also the current Plaintiff in CIV 1903 of 2008 (the Plaintiff). This Plaintiff is currently applying to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 to correct the anomaly.
• The Plaintiff in FR417 of 2007 who is currently the First Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008.
• The First Defendant in FR417 of 2007 who is currently the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008 and the First Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007;
• Registrar Sue Wilde being the then Registrar of the Fremantle Magistrates Court who was continually being apprised of the then prevailing duress situation created by the First Defendant deliberated from delivering her Null Orders as from the 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007 because she knew she would be acting out of jurisdiction or abusing her powers in doing so.
28) Registrar Sue Wilde knew at all material times that the First Defendant was trying to crystallize a coerced and illegal settlement or compromise arising from the false claims of the First Defendant of a zero sum debt.
29) Registrar Sue Wilde would not have delivered her Null Orders on the 7.6.2007 had she not been “importunated” by the Plaintiff to do so in the interest of justice in order to avoid calamities befalling the family of the Plaintiff.
30) Registrar Sue Wilde at all material times that the coerced settlement sum of $11,500.00 paid to the First Defendant is illegal and was paid involuntarily by the Plaintiff to the First Defendant.
31) The Null Orders of Registrar of Registrar has no legal basis and cannot be enforced by any court of law in Western Australia on the following grounds:
32) They are being vitiated by duress;
33) They are an involuntary abuse of process by Registrar Wilde.
34) They are made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by Registrar Wilde.
ZERO DEBT CLAIM DOES NOT ENTITLE THE FIRST DEFENDANT TO PROFITS COSTS
35) I refer to pages 13 to 17 of NNC-1 which is a list of documents appended to my Statement of Claim in FR944 of 2007.
36) This is a Minor Claim Case made by the Plaintiff against the First Defendant for a claim of $7,500.00 which is within the jurisdictional limit of the Minor Claim Case Provisions of the MCCP Act.
37) They pertain to evidence before the Registrar Sue Wilde that there is a zero sum debt which had been wrongfully escalated by the First Defendant unconscionably to some $25,000.00 and it therefore constitutes an abuse of the process of court.
38) They explain the reason why there is a delay from 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007 on the part of the learned Registrar Wilde to enter into the Consent Judgment Orders ostentatiously being claimed by the First Defendant exerting the duress upon the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in unison (See NNC-5).
39) The zero-sum debt of the First Defendant does not entitle the First Defendant to any profit costs because it is an abuse of the process of court and even if the zero sum debt can be argued to become the disputed $3,500.00 debt, then and only then will it a Minor Claim which will then require the First Defendant to commence proceedings that comply with Minor Claim Provisions of the MCCP Act.
40) The First Defendant never complied with the Minor Case Provisions of the MCCP Act when he commenced the FR417 of 2007.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE MINOR CASE PROVISIONS
41) Sub-clause 25(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill 2003 reflects the legislative intent of Parliament when enacting the Minor Cases Provisions, states as follows:
“Subclause (5) ensures that where a matter that is within the minor cases jurisdiction is commenced in the general jurisdiction the costs that can be awarded are the very limited costs that would be allowed had the action been commenced in the minor cases jurisdiction. The intention is to ensure that a defendant in a case that could have been commenced in the small cases jurisdiction is not thereby disadvantaged
42) There is no debt ever owing to the First Defendant by the Plaintiff or the Second Defendant or at best there is the disputed debt of $3,500.00.
43) The First Defendant by commencing FR417 of 2007 as a General Procedure Claim instead of a Minor Claim is cost-disadvantaging himself instead of the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant.
44) All costs improperly incurred by the First Defendant himself therefore have to be borne by the First Defendant himself.
45) The First Defendant will have to pay for all the costs and expenses properly incurred by the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in defending FR417 of 2007 under the following circumstances:
46) 31.1. No matter which forum it has gone to, provided it was caused by the First Defendant, in accordance with the provisions of s.25(9) of the MCCP Act which provides:
47) (9) If the Court orders the costs of a self-represented party to be paid by another party, the Court may order that the whole or a part of the expenses or losses incurred by the self-represented party in or in connection with conducting the case be included in the costs.
48) If the court is satisfied under s. 25(10) of the MCCP Act that due to the acts or omissions of the First Defendant whether personally or through his agent i.e. his solicitors Western Legal or his barrister Mr. Scott Ellis:
• costs have been incurred improperly or without reasonable cause; or
• costs have been wasted by undue delay or by any misconduct or default,
• the Court may order all or any of the following —
• The First Defendant to be wholly or partially disentitled to costs from the legal practitioner’s client;
• The First Defendant to repay to the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant (the client) the whole or a part of any costs that the First Defendant has been paid by the client for items other than disbursements;
• The First Defendant to pay to the client the whole or a part of any costs that the client is ordered to pay to another party;
• the First Defendant personally to indemnify any party other than the client against the whole or a part of the costs payable by the indemnified party.
49) If this Honourable Court were to make the order under s.25(10(c ) of the MCCP Act disentitling the First Defendant either wholly or partially to any costs from the Plaintiff or the Second Defendant, the First Defendant is precluded from charging this costs or recovering this costs from the them under subs.25(12) of the MCCP Act.
50) This Honourable Court must not make an order under subs. 25(10) unless it has informed the First Defendant of its proposed order and allowed the First Defendant to call evidence and make submissions in relation to the proposed order.
51) This Honourable Court can only make a costs order under s. subs. 25(1) of the MCCP Act for the successful party only for allowable costs as defined by subs. 31(1)(a)and (b) and subs.31(2) as court fees and service fees paid by the successful party and the costs of enforcing a judgment and not in relation to the party’s other costs in the case.
52) Therefore, it is the duty of the First Defendant to have started the FR 417 of 2007 as a Minor Case under the Minor Cases Provisions so as to ensure that the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant who are the First and Second Defendants in FR417 of 2007 are never thereby cost disadvantaged.
53) Once the First Defendant has been found guilty by this Honourable Court of cost-disadvantaging the First Defendant by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Second Defendant in the FR417 of 2007, the incident of costs would fall on himself. This means that the First Defendant will have to become personally liable for all the improperly incurred costs. These costs could either be improperly incurred or negligently incurred by the First Defendant himself, perhaps in the hope of recovering them from his opponents at a later stage out of malice. They could also be the properly incurred costs of the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant which are incidentally incurred as a result of having to set aright a travesty of injustice or defend and to seek justice from the First Defendant arising out of his wrongs in commencing FR 417 of 2007.
54) On the other hand the Plaintiff started FR944 of 2007 within the Minor Case Provisions and as a result he did not thereby cause the First Defendant any cost disadvantage.
55) Each party would therefore have to bear the costs of their own follies or dishonestly anticipating that this Honourable Court would rather do an injustice and each party become disappointed as a result because our justice system is geared to do the right things by the law irrespective of race or creed of the litigating parties. Each party must therefore beware of their peril occasioned by their greed or by their propensity to do injustice.
PRECONTRACTUAL CORRESPONDENCE – REINFORCES THE INTEGRITY OF THE LAWFUL TERMINATION OF FIRST DEFENDANT’S LEGAL SERVICES ON 21.2.2005
56) The pre-contractual correspondence contains the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor-cost agreement.
57) The Solicitor cost agreement as proposed by the First Defendant initially is varied because of the special insistence of the Plaintiff as contained in the email dated 25.10.2004 requiring the First Defendant do give to him in writing that he had agreed to those fundamental terms.
58) The piece of writing insisted upon by the Plaintiff consist of that signed document by the First Defendant that the Plaintiff must approve all billing/costing given at the time when the Solicitor Cost Agreement is varied.
59) The varied terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement is found in Annexure: H, I and J at pages 93 to 95 of Volume One of the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 6th October, 2009 and they are being mirrored in pages 11 to 13 of the Affidavit of the Plaintiff sworn and filed 23.7.2008; both documents are filed in these proceedings.
60) A breach of the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement by the First Defendant entitles the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant to make an election: the Second Defendant made that election by terminate the retainer of the First Defendant lawfully as from the 21.2.2005. Thus the annoying retaining of the First Defendant had been lawfully removed or the Second Defendant had chosen not to have the Varied Solicitors Agreement to be on foot. The party who is entitled to make this election is the Second Defendant because he is the party who had suffered the detriment of the continuing breach of the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement.
61) I the Plaintiff repeat what I said earlier by referring to page 109 of Vol.1 of the First Defendant’s Affidavit and state that at all material times, my own interests is never in conflict with the interests of the Second Defendant because I was never his solicitor. I was never paid any legal fees in accordance with s.12 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 or other antecedent provisions of the former Legal Practice Act, 2003. In fact our interests have been coinciding and are continuing to coincide irrespective of whether I am a certificated legal practitioner or not a certificated legal practitioner. To construe otherwise, I would require solid reasoning from the First Defendant and not from the arbiter of this dispute, that is Your Honour Justice Kenneth Martin.
62) I was always acting as my son’s free agent. I agree that I was not the solicitor but the settlement agent only for the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar and only with their written informed consent and only for the specific purpose of the settlement of the purchase and sale of Centenary Lunch Bar. To infer otherwise would be misleading this Honourable Court.
63) The First Defendant knows this all along and cannot be seen to be misleading this Honourable Court as well as the Second Defendant on this point.
64) In order to avoid any confusion about conflicting interests and their misconstruction, I therefore sought the services of another independent solicitor to deal with the litigation aspects of the subsequent dispute with the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar and the lot fell on my unfortunate choice that we made in the First Defendant who not caused the loss of the Second Defendant’s legitimate claim for fraud against the Vendors, but has to contend in this endless dispute with the First Defendant who does not want to go away.
65) That DC 2065 of 2007lawsuit being lost because it fell into incompetent hands, but as the father of the Second Defendant, I had wanted to salvage the situation before it got worse by extricating ourselves out of the clutches, with due respect to him, the First Defendant.
66) The parties have been ad idem at the outset but were seemingly not ad idem as from the 10.11.2004 as indicated in pages 116 to 119 of the First Defendant Affidavit Vol.1.
67) The apprehension of this non-ad idem would have alerted the First Defendant to stop further work as he knew very well that he is not going to be paid because he had a change of mind and was refusing to follow the pre-contractual terms as indicated earlier. At that time the First Defendant would have realized there was an agreed sum of $157.00 to be paid to him only after the trial of the case and it was made clear to him that there was no more money to be paid, and he could exercise his choice either to take it or to leave it. Any excuse that he has been working on the case is simply not tenable as he knew from the start that those were the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement dated 25.10.2004.
68) The First Defendant also acknowledged on this date that if any further payment were to be made to him, it will have to be approved by me, failing which he will not be paid. At the time of termination of this retair, all parties were aware that the last disputed Invoice 5023 dated 7.11.2007 delivered 10.11.2007 amounting to $243.00 would make a total debts of $400.00 that was only approved by the Plaintiff at $207.00 for which $50.00 was paid and leaving the balance of $157.00 payable only if the case were to go to trial.
69) The Plaintiff never intended to exploit the First Defendant nor utilize him to do work for no compensable rewards as he was being promised the payment in accordance with the scale costs determinations once the DC 2065 of 2007 came to trial and achieved an outcome that does not depend on the success or the failure of the case.
70) The issue of whether the Plaintiff had entered into a champertous agreement with the First Defendant had been taken up by the First Defendant through the watch dog body the LPCC for which the Plaintiff had satisfy the latter to its utter satisfaction.
71) The Plaintiff was willing to compensate fully for the efforts of the First Defendant but he was in the meantime taking all precautionary efforts to stop the rorting which inevitably occurs if you are not careful with legal practitioners who are not merely the guardians of the law but who can break the law with impunity. One can be frugal but not at the expense of the First Defendant.
72) Since the case never reached the trial stage, so that amount is not payable. Hence there is only a ZERO SUM DEBT as at 21.2.2007 (See: Annexure NNC-4). Despite this, the Plaintiff was willing to give and take and was willing to settle the whole dispute for $1,000.00 in the aftermath of 3.3.2005.
73) The Plaintiff in order to avoid further trouble with the First Defendant decided to settle the dispute with the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar in DC 2065 of 2007 for only $1,000.00. This is a big sacrifice of some $23,000.00 made by the Plaintiff and the First Defendant in order to get away from the clutches of the First Defendant. The First Defendant is forestalling the action and is refusing to return the documents that were handed to him for which he had no lien because he did not create them, and this hindrance effectively prevented the Plaintiff from continuing with the action in DC2065 of 2007. One can see how much the Plaintiff gave him to the First Defendant to avoid any skirmishes with him and he does not realize this.

PLAINTIFF NEVER IN CONFLICT OF INTERESTS SITUATION AS SETTLEMENT AGENT FOR VENDORS OF CENTENARY LUNCH BAR WITH INFORMED CONSENT:
74) On 2.6.2005, the Legal Officer Ms. Somerville Brown of the LPCC wrote to me as a result of my Complaint to it with regard to the conduct of the First Defendant regarding my employing him in DC 2065 of 2005, from which the current dispute arises (See Annexure: NNC-41-1 to NNC-4A-2).
75) Para. 2 of that letter refers to the fact that I had acted only as settlement agent and not as solicitor for the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar of which my son Paul the Second Defendant was the purchaser.
76) There was a misconception then that I had acted for both parties’ vendors and purchaser in conflict of interests as a solicitor.
77) This is not the case, as I have only acted as settlement agent only for the Vendors for the particular purpose of that sale and purchase not as solicitor with their written informed consent.
78) It is not the case that I have acted as solicitor for my son Paul who is the purchaser, with his written informed consent but only as his free agent because I have never received any legal fees from him as provided for in s.12 of the LP Act 2008 or its antecedent provisions in the LP Act 2003.
79) On the 3.6.2005, I have responded satisfactorily to Ms. Somerville Brown that I was not acting under any conflict of interests as I was acting as solicitor for the Vendors and Purchaser with written informed consent and that role by me was only limited to the role as a solicitor-settlement agent.
80) That is my correct role as I was then a restricted practitioner with the legal firm of V. Ozich & Co.
81) Upon hindsight, I would like to repeat that I played a pro-bono role with regard to my son’s interests in the matter and therefore there can never be any allegations of my having acted in conflict of interests in relation to my son’s interests. Further, I have not used any information which I have acquired as the free agent for my son which conflicts with the interests of the Vendors in my role as their settlement agent for them. (See Annexure: NNC-4B-1 to NNC-4B-2).

THE UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT:
82) It is a fundamental term of the contracting parties from the email dated 25.10.2004 that each new work which attracts a bill of costs must be done at the written instruction of the Plaintiff and the parties must know what is coming for it to be approved, failing which there would have been no debts owing.
83) It is reasonable to infer from the conduct of the Plaintiff that if there were consensus ad idem as to the modus operandi of the First Defendant, the Plaintiff would not have objected as he did on 10.11.2007 as indicated at page 118 of the First Defendant’s Affidavit (See Annexure: NNC-6).
84) Invoices 5024, 5025, 5026, 5027 and 5028 are therefore unapproved bills of costs that were drawn up as an after-thought after the First Defendant’s legal services was lawfully terminated on 21.2.2010. However, the First Defendant crystallized the disputed debt as owing as at 3.3.2005 to be $3,500.00 in invoice 5028 as is indicated at page 177.
85) The First Defendant was drawing up fictitious bills after his services was terminated on 21.2.2005 and by 12.4.2007 when he was on the point of receiving the coerced settlement money, he was made aware of the involuntariness of the Plaintiff to settle with him as indicated by the email he received which he sent back from his machine to the Plaintiff (See Annexure: NNC-7).
85.1. See also Annexure NNC-7A for the explanations on how the disagreement as to bills of costs arose and when the services of the First Defendant were lawfully terminated.
85.2. The First Defendant breached the terms of the Varied Solicitors Agreement which entitles the Second Defendant the right to elect as to whether to allow the contract to be on foot and sue for damages or to terminate the contract.
85.3. The Plaintiff and the Second Defendant who suffered the detriment of the breach chose not to allow the contract to be on foot.
85.4. The First Defendant on the hand wanted very much to have the contract on foot… such that he could manipulate the Second Defendant and was trying to poison his mind against his father and was continuing to do work and charging for them thereby escalating the unknown factor which frightens the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant into oblivion.
85.5. Contemporaneous letters were sent by the Plaintiff to the LPCC to seek redress of the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant in refusing to honour the terms of his coerced settlement effected on 13.4.2007 (See Annexure: NNC-8-1 to NNC8-5).
85.6. After the coerced settlement monies were paid to the First Defendant he recalcitrantly refused to remove his strangle-hold caveat but was fishing for more monies to be paid to him. This was communicated to the Associate of Justice Templeman Mr. James Woodford (See Annexure: NNC-9).
85.7. Registrar Wilde was aware at the time of duress vitiated compromise that both the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant were labouring under a misapprehension as to the Order of Justice Templeman and this caused an urgent need for a coerced settlement. The First Defendant took advantage of this situation to maintain that strangle-hold caveat which the First Defendant is not legally entitled to do on the ground that he did not have an equitable interests over the caveat property so as to enable him to hold an caveatable interests under circumstances when there was a zero sum debt and nowhere is it written in the Varied Solicitors Agreement that the caveat property had been properly defined.
85.8. The Plaintiff and the Second Defendant were taken by surprise as he had just come home from Malaysia and was thinking as to why the First Defendant had by that time not complied with Justice Templeman’s Order to commence the action but suddenly FR417 of 2007 was commenced. The unlawful caveat coupled with the misapprehension expedited the coerced compromise. (See Annexure: NNC-4).
85.9. Registrar Wilde delivered her judgment for coerced consent order on the 7.6.2007. Before that happened, the learned Registrar was made aware of the involuntariness of that coerced settlement by the Plaintiff as is evidenced in his facsimile letter to her dated 6.6.2007. (See Annexure: NNC-10-1 to NNC-10-3).
85.10. Registrar Wilde deliberated in delivering her consent judgment as from the 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007. She had delayed in delivering the much wanted consent judgment by the Plaintiff knowing that it is illegal for her to do so and that it would be of null effect in order, but she did so in order to placate the unending escalation costs of the First Defendant. This action is sending shivers into the spinal column of the Second Defendant and the Plaintiff and other family members. (See NNC-10-1 to NNC-10-3).
85.11. After the Consent Judgment was delivered, one can still see the recalcitrance of the First Defendant in not obeying the law of reason that is implanted in every human mind. He is still refusing to remove the caveat strangle-hold he is exerting over the Second Defendant and the Plaintiff. He wants more money to no ends and this happening till today. (See Annexure: NNC-11-1 to NNC-11-3).
85.12. As a Christian, I would like to turn as many cheeks as possible for the First Defendant to slap on and I prayed to God each time for him to have compassion upon me, but all is in vain.
85.13. I am a migrant who come into this country and do experience tremendous difficulty in finding permanent employment in the area of my expertise despite my qualifications. This explains why I am frugal in my ways so as to get by through economic hardships but this does not mean I would like to exploit the First Defendant.
85.14. I always believe there is the sanctity of contract and the freedom to contract. But I am disappointed that whilst I am being disciplined by the Legal Practice Board through the intervention and usurpation of a false full Board, the standards applied to me are never being applied to others and this amazes me.
86) Magistrate Musk summarily dismissed my claim in FR944 of 2007 by denying the Plaintiff natural justice because she based her decision of Registrar Wilde’s Nuyll Consent Orders which she knew all along was made without jurisdiction and is an abuse of process of court deliberately achieved to curtail the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant.
87) All the concomitant costs orders arising from the decision of Registrar Wilde Null Costs Orders is similarly tainted and of null effect including the decision of Magistrate Michelides in hearing the appeal of FR417 of 2007.
88) His Honour refused to grant me extension of time for the delay of the Appeal against Registrar Wilde Null Costs Orders because the Plaintiff had no choice but to access DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 first through Commissioner Herron in sequence first. (See: Notice of Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008).
89) Commissioner Herron heard the Appeal No.6 of 2008 from the decision of Magistrate Musk. He decided that he has no jurisdiction to intrude into Magistrate Musk’s Decision in FR 944 of 2008. Despite this he still insisted in making a legal determination that there was no coerced settlement in Registrar’s Wilde Null Orders. Therefore, His Honour it seems to me is wanting to the cake and yet he wanted to eat it as well. There is therefore no doubt that Mr. Commissioner Herron made a prejudgment and therefore his Orders are made without jurisdiction and are an abuse of the process of court which renders them unenforceable. Incidentally, the solicitor of the First Defendant of Western Legal forewarned me at the commencement of the FR417 of 2007 case that the Magistrates Court at Fremantle does not decide a case in accordance with the law. In effect, he warned me that knowledge of the law is not as important as who you know. I have recorded this statement.

CONCLUSION
90) None of the costs orders made by the courts below are therefore enforceable or are of any legal effect. This Honourable Court has to make a decision in accordance with s.36(4) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 to set aside the judgments of the learned Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007, the judgment of the learned Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2007 and also to set aside the decision of the learned Magistrate Michelides which the appeal decision against Registrar Wilde’s Null Orders in FR417 of 2007. This Court does not have jurisdiction to set aside the Order of Commissioner Herron of the District Court but s.36(4)© does allow this Honourable Court to make consequential Orders for the District Court to remit Appeal No.6 of 2008 to the Supreme Court under subs 36(7) of the Act and s.77 of the District Court Act, 1969 (WA).
91) The argument remains if the originating coerced Consent Order of Registrar Wilde is set aside, Commissioner Herron Decision will collapse into a rubble.
92) There is therefore no reason for me to give security orders for costs as the original ZERO SUM CLAIM would not attract any costs order in the first place.
93) If it is not a zero sum claim, then only it is possible to become a $3,500.00 claim. If it were so, then it would still come under the Minor Claim provisions and this Honourable Court would have to abide by the legislative intent of Sub clause 25(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill 2003 in order to ensure that both the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant is not being cost-disadvantaged by the wrongs of the First Defendant.
94) Since it is the First Defendant who started an action in the General Procedure Claim in FR417 of 2007 instead of using the Minor Claim Provisions to make a claim of a zero sum debt or a $3,500.00 debt, he is thereby merely seen to be cost-disadvantaging himself and he has only himself to blame if he had incurred unnecessary costs.
95) The Plaintiff started his claim in FR944 of 2007 in compliance with the Minor Claim Provisions and he is thereby not cost-disadvantaging the First Defendant and he is not to be blameworthy in this respect.
96) I undertake to pay a proper costs order that does not impinge on profit costs claim by the First Defendant if he were to win these two cases. This is an undertaking by a legal practitioner and he would suffer the detriment of professional misconduct if he were to resile from this undertaking.
REASONS WHY NO SECURITY OF COSTS TO BE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF:
97) It is reasonable for this Honourable Court to make the findings from the facts and history of this case that the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant have been all but bona-fides and had acted reasonably. The same epithet cannot be applied to the First Defendant as his conduct smirks with unethical conduct and streaks of uncanny unconscionability.
98) Having regard to the circumstances and the history of the two cases that are being sought by the Plaintiff to be consolidated, the First Defendant can reasonably be found to be using high-handed and oppressive methods to deny the impecunious Plaintiff, a right to litigate by seeking to a frivolous and vexatious claim for security costs where there are no costs debts due nor payable if the right principles of law have been applied conscientiously without abuse of powers or within their jurisdictional limits.
99) Both Their Honours Magistrates Michelides and Musk have agreed to comply with the review Orders Nisi granted by Justice Hasluck with the advice of the State Solicitor and they would have to be present in these proceedings to upset the Review Orders Nisi granted by Justice Hasluck. The question is whether they will do it and whether they are allowed to approbate or reprobate.
100) Although the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the Commissioner Herron’s decision in Appeal No.6 of 2008, the learned Commissioner’s decision crumbles just as the Magistrates Court decisions crumble. That’s the way the cookie crumbles or that is the expected result without the Plaintiff having to go through the rigmarole of an appeal process again.
101) The First Defendant had caused the Plaintiff’s family members a lot of heart-aches and a lot of resources had been wasted. But for the strenuous efforts of the Plaintiff to seek justice, he would be forever condemned to a life of misery and “unforgivingness” and many lives would have been affected forever.
102) If the Order for security costs applied for by the First Defendant were to be granted by this Honourable Court, a travesty of justice would occur as the Plaintiff’s efforts at seeking fair justice in Advance Australia Fair as a democratic institution in this world would be condemned to the scrap yard and the book shelves.
103) There are no exceptional circumstances for security of costs to be granted because the Plaintiff is not living abroad and is having his abode in Western Australia. Although the Plaintiff is in impecunious circumstances because of the adversity he had undergone by experiencing Australian racism at its worst, yet he is prepared to forgive and let bygones be bygones.
104) There are no profit costs Orders to be ordered against the Plaintiff in favour of the First Defendant even if the former were to lose this case due to the legislative intent of the Parliament of WA when they enacted the MCCP Act as embodied in subclause 25(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill, 2003 which does not cost-disadvantage the Plaintiff who did not abuse the process of court to sue the Defendant without complying with the Minor Claim Provisions.
105) Subs. 36(3) when read with subs. 26(1) of the Act provides the source and scope of this Hourable Court’s Power to make the Review Orders of Justice Hasluck Absolute. That subs.36(3) says that this Honourable Court is duty bound to make those Review Orders of Justice Hasluck Absolute or any other Review Orders to be determined at its discretion subject to the condition that they are just and whether or not they have been applied for by the Plaintiff or not.
106) My last words are:
It is my humble persuasion to this Honourable Court that the grounds in s.36(1)( c) for the grant of Certiorari Orders Absolute has now been established. Having regard to the language and purpose of s.36 of the Act in its broader statutory context, they therefore compels the inevitable conclusion that the Learned Justice Kenneth Martin, as humbly prayed for by the Plaintiff: to pay due regard to His Honour’s need to perform the duties of his oath of office to grant the relief sought for by the Plaintiff as is contained in the powers of subs.36(4) of the Act because they have now been enlivened as a result of the aforesaid grounds having been established. Let it be a lesson to humanity that we do not use our wit to outwit any human for the sake of a few dollars. We must be honest as lawyers and when clients are willing only can we receive.


SWORN by the Deponent at Perth ]
In the State of Western Australia ]
This 26th day of May, 2010 ]……………………………………………..
Before me:
…………………………..
Justice of Peace/ Commissioner of the Supreme Court for Taking Affidavit

DRAFT CHRONOLOGY OF CACV41 OF 2010

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA NO.: CACV: 41 OF 2010

COURT OF APPEAL
Parties to the NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Appellant
Appeal THE LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD
OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRAFT CHRONOLOGY


Date of document: 27 May, 2010
Date of filing: 27 May, 2010.
Filed on behalf of: The Applicant
Prepared by:
Nicholas N Chin Phone: 08 9275 7440
Barrister & Solicitor Fax: 08 9275 5729
387, Alexander Drive Email: nnchin@msn.com;nnchin09@tpg.com.au
DIANELLA WA 6059 Mobile: 0421642735

INDEX PAGE NUMBERS

APPELLANT ACQUIRED QUALFICATIONS FOR INDPENDENT LEGAL PRACTICE 2
PERSECUTION OF APPELLANT BEGAN WITH MR. PINO MONACO THROUGH A PSEUDO BOARD 3
THE LPCC ACTED AT THE BEHEST OF THE PSEUDO BOARD 4
THE PSEUDO BOARD ACT THROUGH ITS PROTAGANIST AND AGENT MS. F.B. WALTER 5
THE PILLAGING AND PLUNDERING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT OF MR. TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES 6
APPELLANT’S APPEAL IN CACV 43 OF 2007 SHORTCHANGED BY A CONSENT JUDGMENT THAT WAS MEANT TO BE ONE 7
PSEUDO BOARD ADMITS THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE LAWFUL DELEGATED AUTHORITY OF THE REAL BOARD AND THEREBY CONSENT TO THE FLAWED CONSENT JUDGMENT 9
SPECIAL DAMAGES CLAIMED BY APPELLANT FOR IMPROPER CLOSURE OF HIS INDPENDENT LAW PRACTICE 10
THE INQUIRY PANEL AND ITS RATIFACTION PANEL ARE AGAIN USURPING THE POWERS OF THE REAL BOARD THROUGH THE PSEUDO BOARD REPETITIVELY 12
MR. GRANT DONALDSON SC ADMITTED THAT THE PSEUDO BOARD HAD NO POWER OR WAS USURPING THE POWERS OF THE REAL BOARD 13
COMPOSITION OF THE RATIFICATION PANEL AS A PSEUDO BOARD 14
THE ROOT OR BASIS FOR COMMISSIONER HERRON’S ORDER HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY THE VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS OF THE TWO MAGISTRATES’S JUDGMENT OCCASSIONED BY THE REVIEW ORDER OF JUSTICE HASLUCK– CAN THE BRANCHES AND STEM OF COMMISSIONER HERRON’S TREE STILL REMAIN STANDING? QUESTION POSED BEFORE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN ON 13.5.2010 IN CIV 1903 OF 2008 14
PERSECUTING MALICE OF LPCC TO PROSECUTE APPELLANT FOR THE COMMON-LAW DEBARRED FURTHER REMEDY OF NON-EXISTENT PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN VR 87 OF 2009 17
CERTIORARI ORDERS NISI AGAINST JUSTICE CHANEY’S RES JUDICATA DECISION IN VR 87 OF 2009 19
CERTIORARI ORDERS NISI AGAINST JUSTICE CHANEY RES JUDICATA DECISION IN VR 87 OF 2009 REFILED AS CIV 1019 OF 20010 THAT WAS DISMISSED BY JUSTICE HEENAN ABOUT TURN DECISION 19
APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEAL IN CACV 41 OF 2010 AGAINST JUSTICE HEENAN DISMISSAL OF CIV 1019 OF 2010 21
RESPONSE LETTER FROM WA PARLIAMENT REGARDING TORTURE OF APPELLANT FOR JUDICARY’S REFUSAL TO LOOK INTO THE LIVE ISSUE OF THE PSEUDO BOARD 22



No. TIME PERIOD EVENTS
APPELLANT ACQUIRED QUALFICATIONS FOR INDPENDENT LEGAL PRACTICE
1. 28.12.2003 The Appellant was admitted by the Supreme Court of Western Australia as a Barrister & Solicitor after having completed the minimum period of 12 months training as an Articled clerk under the supervision of his mentor Mr. V. Ozich a legal practitioner of more than 30 years experience. Prior to his he completed a Bachelor of Economics Degree, a Post Graduate Degree in Business Law and a Bachelor of Laws Degree. He also passed and completed his Articles Training Program Examinations organized by the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia.
2. 7.1.2004 – 7.1.2005 The Appellant completed his employment as a full-time restricted legal practitioner at the legal firm of V. Ozich & Co working under the supervision of his mentor, the said Mr. V. Ozich.
3. 06.1.2005 The Appellant after completion of a 12 month period of supervised legal practice had complied with s. 33(1) of the Legal Practice Act, 2003 (the LPA Act) and therefore qualified for independent legal practice.
4. 14.01.2005 The Appellant wrote to the Respondent Board indicating his intention to a start his own independent legal practice with effect from the 17th day of January, 2005.
5. 17.1.2005 The Appellant started his independent law legal practice under the style of Nicholas N Chin – Barrister & Solicitor, at his home office at No. 2, Seagull Close, BALLAJURA WA 6066.
PERSECUTION OF APPELLANT BEGAN WITH MR. PINO MONACO THROUGH A PSEUDO BOARD
6. 19.01.2005 As a result of helping his former client Dr. Kheng Su Chan die to a perception that she was being plundered and pillaged repeatedly through the legal processes of the courts, Mr. Pino Monaco clandestinely started to exert improper influences on the Professional Affairs Committee of the Legal Practice Board (the PAC) to the detriment of the Appellant. This initiated a series of malicious persecution of the Appellant achieved initially through the “backdoor” of the regulator of the legal profession in WA, instead of the Appellant being prosecuted legitimately through the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee. The PAC need to consist only four members to constitute a Full Board of the Respondent but it could not be properly delegated under the s.10 and 11 of the former LP Act as it is acting in bad faith contrary to s.18 of that Act. It is indeed clandestinely usurping the real functions of the Respondent without the written majority consent of the real Board contrary to regulations 15 and 17 of the Legal Practice Board Rules, 2004 (WA) (the Pseudo Board). The Pseudo Board repeatedly rode rough shod over the basic human rights of the Appellant and this issue is being avoided by the learned Justice for legal determination in VR 107 of 2008 and remains a live issue for the current litigation because it has never been barred by previous litigation on the principle of res judicata (the Pseudo Board live Issue). The Court of Appeal in CACV 105 of 2008 and the High Court in P36 of 2009 consequently could not make a legal determination of the Pseudo Board Live Issue and even the Learned Justice Heenan in CIV 1019 of 2010 erred by ignoring to make a proper legal determination of it.
7. 07.02.2005 Despite the improper influence of Mr. Pino Monaco on the first Pseudo Board, the Admissions & Registrations Committee of the Respondent approved the Appellant’s application for independent legal practice as in accordance with s. 33(1) of the LPAct as from the 17th day of January, 2005 and regulation 40 of the former LPB Rules.
8. 24.02.2005 Mr. Pino Monaco’s initiation of the interference with the independent law practice of the Appellant through a member of the PAC Ms. F.B.Walter caused the first Pseudo Board of the PAC as the decision maker to be tainted with gross-bias as both Ms. F.H. Walter acted both as decision maker and prosecutor at the same time.
9 26.04.2005 The first Pseudo Board of the PAC through the Secretary of the Respondent Board Ms. Mary Anne Paton forwarded the Monaco Complaint to the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee (the LPCC).
THE LPCC ACTED AT THE BEHEST OF THE PSEUDO BOARD
10. 07.02.2006 The LPCC acting at the behest of the First Pseudo Board considered four frivolous and vexatious matters:
a) Mr. Tim Thies who pillaged and plundered both myself and my son Paul CK Chin - non-issues of conflict of interests as the interests of myself and my son Paul coincided at all material times but Appellant was framed as having made false allegations against a fellow legal practitioner – the case being currently vindicated in the proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008 where the Appellant was granted Review orders pursuant to s.36 of the Magistrates Courts Act, 2004 (WA) by Justice Hasluck on 7.11.2008 and is currently being proceeded with a view to finalization through the learned Justice Kenneth Martin.
c) Fitness to Practice – Appellant faulted blamelessly for having inadvertently advertised his professional skills his expertise in an Indian website.
d) Mrs. Mathias undue officiousness caused by the LPCC. Appellant was in the process of learning how to prepare an inchoate will for her whilst he was still in restricted practice when she reneged on her instructions just because she wanted to evade payment of her legal fees for a insurance claim done for her. This resulted in her voluntary efforts to settle the ensuing dispute with the Appellant. However, the LPCC revived her complaint against the Appellant by framing him for a non-existent proposed charge for “dishonesty” under circumstances Mr. Mathias was never defrauded by the Appellant.
e) The Trust Account is again a frame up because it is a non-issue on the ground that Mr. Chang Ming Tang being the director (of a corporate client M & J Metals Pty Ltd) of the Appellant gave explicit instructions to the Appellant that monies collected from a debt settlement by the Appellant on his behalf were not to be deposited into a trust account but were to be transit monies payable immediately to him. These transit monies had been properly accounted for by the Appellant to his client.
11 26.6.2006 The Appellant moved his home office to his new address at No.387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA, WA 6059.
12. 04.07.2006 The Pseudo Board acting through the court like tribunal of the LPCC decided to impose conditions on the Appellant’s practice certificate under s. 40 of the former LP Act based on its perceived and nebulous deficiency of the Appellant’s professional knowledge but was unable to proceed further for the purpose of disciplining the Appellant under s.180 of the SAT Act, unless it were to embarked on a persecution process.
THE PSEUDO BOARD ACT THROUGH ITS PROTAGANIST AND AGENT MS. F.B. WALTER
13. 19.07.2006 Ms. F B Walter’s was indicated by the Minutes to be present at two meetings of the LPCC on the 7th day of February, 2006 and the 4th day of July, 2006. She was also present at the Pseudo Board of the PAC Meeting on the 19th day of July, 2006 when it unreasonably and with persecuting zeal impeded the independent law practice of the Applicant in bad faith and for no rhyme or reason. She acted as prosecutor and decision maker.
14. 12.09.2006 Judge Eckert of the State Administrative Tribunal acceded to the request of Ms. Mary Anne Paton to close down the independent law practice of the Appellant by improperly invoking s.156 of the former LP Act and accepting barrister Peter Quinlan’s suggestion that falsehood and malice is sufficient to deprive the Appellant of his right to independent legal practice.
15. 21.11.2006 The learned Master Sanderson in CIV 2210 of 2006 erred in blocking the appeal of Judge Eckert decision in VR 137 of 2006 caused by a confusion brought about the change in the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules, 2005 which requires an Appeal to be brought to the Court of Appeal instead of the General Division of the Supreme Court. The Appellant could not move his case to the Court of Appeal when he realized his mistake as the Learned Master wanted to hear and dismiss it himself (the blockage of Master Sanderson).
16. 27.11.2006 The blockage of Master Sanderson caused an intimidating costs order on the Appellant which was not enforced by the real Board of the Respondent.
17. 15.12.2006 The LPCC answered the Appellant’s request for information that Ms. FB Walter was the same person, who was present at two meetings of the LPCC dated the 7th day of February, 2006 and the 4th day of July, 2006 when resolutions were carried with regard to the four matters that was the frivolous and vexatious subject of investigation by the LPCC against the Appellant.
18. 22.12.2006 Despite the blockage and intimidation, the Court of Appeal Registrar wrote to Appellant requesting him to apply for extension of time to appeal Judge Eckert’s decision.
19. 04.01.2007 The Appellant filed his Appeal Notice in CACV 1 of 2007 and served it on the Respondent. This action was withdrawn due to then threats of the pending enforcement of the improper costs orders of Master Sanderson.
20. 05.01.2007 The Appellant found the unexplained common denominator – the presence of the Ms. F B Walter at the two meetings of the Pseudo Board of the PAC on 22nd June 2006 and 19th day of July, 2006 and another two meetings of the LPCC on the 7th day of February, 2006 and the 4th day of July, 2006 (See the Appellant’s Affidavit sworn 19th day of March, 2007). Ms. F B Walter coupled as my accuser and judge and her participation resulted in a decision of the Pseudo Board to curb my independent legal practice is therefore tainted with gross bias and therefore null and void.
21. 11.01.2007 Appellant filed his Notice of Discontinuance of CACV 1 of 2007 because he was under threats to pay Master Sanderson’s costs order.
22 17.01.2007 The Appellant was re-assured that our justice system is still working by the Honourable Chief Justice’s letter dated the 11th day of January, 2007.
THE PILLAGING AND PLUNDERING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT OF MR. TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES
23. 22.01.2007 The Appellant was experiencing tremors as a result of the pillaging and plundering of a fellow legal practitioner against himself and his son Paul CK Chin which finally resulted in his ex-parte application for review orders pursuant to s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 being granted in CIV 1903 of 2008 by Justice Hasluck. Both their Honours Magistrates Musk and Michelides voluntarily complied upon the advice of the State Solicitor to comply with the Review Orders. The Appellant were then made Plaintiff in the further proceedings with Mr. Thies being made the Defendant and the case is currently being reviewed by the learned Justice Kenneth Martin to bring it to a final conclusion.
24. 07.02.2007 The Pseudo Board acting through the LPCC since the 4.7.2006 was unable to prosecute the Appellant for professional misconduct under s.180 of the former LP Act and did so inform the Appellant by its letter dated 6th day of February, 2007.
25. 26.02.2007 The Appellant saw his general practitioner doctor again and was given a medical certificate from Dr. Geoffrey Shulman concerning his state of nervous shock caused by the marauding and plundering behaviour of Mr. Timothy Robin Thies.
26. 06.03.2007 The Appellant received information from Respondent to the effect that Ms. FB Walter had declared a conflict of interests “out of an abundance of caution” in response to the Appellant’s alleged accusation that she had acted as the Appellant’s accuser as well as his decision maker against him and therefore the decision of the PAC dated the 19th day of July, 2006 is tainted with gross bias and is therefore a nullity.
APPELLANT’S APPEAL IN CACV 43 OF 2007 SHORTCHANGED BY A CONSENT JUDGMENT THAT WAS MEANT TO BE ONE
27 19.03.2007 The Appellant filed at the Court of Appeal and served on Minter Ellison Lawyers:
1) Appeal Notice in CACV 43 of 2007,
2) Application for Extension to Appeal;
3) Application for Leave to Appeal by Consent,
4) Affidavit of Nicholas Ni Kok Chin in support of my applications sworn 19th day of March, 2007 in 97 pages.
28. 26.03.2007 The Appellant filed at the Court of Appeal and served on Minter Ellison Lawyers as the solicitors for the Respondent Board the Appellant’s case in CACV 43 of 2007.
29 29.3.2007 The Appellant wrote to Minter Ellison Lawyers that the Respondent Board showed malice in refusing Appellant’s Leave to Appeal in CACV 43 of 2007.
30. 05.04.2007 The Court of Appeal Registrar requested for the Appellant’s attendance before a single Judge of Appeal at the Supreme Court at 10.00 am.
31. 27.04.2007 Her Honour Justice McLure ordered that the Appellant’s application for extension of time to appeal be adjourned sini die and that the Appellant do file and serve any further proposed grounds of appeal by the 27th day of May, 2007.
32 18.05.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Respondent requesting it to provide on an urgent basis, a copy of the minute which shows that the Pseudo Board was acting with lawful delegated authority by the real regulator of the legal profession. By the time barrister Tim Stephenson filed papers on behalf of the Appellant at the Court of Appeal in CACV 43 of 2007 on the 25th day of May, 2007, the Pseudo Board refused to respond to this letter. However, the Appellant’s rights are saved and reserved because his counsel used his own copy of the Minute of the Legal Practice Board dated the 4th day of February, 2004 and annexed it to the Appellant’s Affidavit sworn 25.05.2007 to prove his point.
33. 29.05.2007 His Honour Justice Pullin ordered that by 4.00 pm on 5th June, 2007, the appellant do file and serve written submissions (limited to 6 pages) as to why the grounds in paragraph 2.2 should not be struck out on the basis that they do not allege any error of law and therefore involve a question of law.
34. 25.05.2007. The Appellant filed at the Court of Appeal and served on Minter Ellison Lawyers, the settled papers of counsel Barrister Tim Stephenson:
1) Minute of Proposed Grounds of Appeal in 8 pages.
2) Further Affidavit of Nicholas Ni Kok Chin in support of Applications for Extension of Time to Appeal and Leave to Appeal sworn the 25th day of May, 2007 in 49 pages.
35. 31.05.2007 The Appellant filed at the Court of Appeal and serve on Minter Ellison Lawyers his written submission in response to the Order of the learned Justice Pullin dated the 29th day of May, 2007 in 3 pages - as to the reason as to why the Appellant should be allowed to plead facts as well as mixed facts and law and law in his appeal in accordance with subss. 105(2) and 105 (13) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act, 2004.
36. 22.06.2007 His Honour Justice Pullin ordered that:
1) the time be extended for appealing until 19th March, 2007;
2) application for leave to appeal and the appeal be heard together and
3) Costs are reserved.
37 27.6.2008 The Appellant wrote to the Board through its solicitors Minter Ellison providing the conferral materials for the 42 paragraphs to be admitted as new evidence in the Court of Appeal. The Conferral was directed by his Honour Justice Pullin on the 22.6.2007 in the presence of Mr. Craig Gough for Minter Ellison Lawyers and the Appellant but the proposal conferral did not achieve a successful outcome.
38. 04.07.2007 The Appellant complied with the suggestion of the Learned Justice Pullin given on the 22nd day of June, 2007 that he confers with the Respondent. The Appellant’s conferral letter to Minter Ellison Lawyers containing 42 issues dated the 4th day of July, 2007 (containing 22 pages) received two Responses on the 20th day of July, 2007 to the effect that the conferral had failed.
39. 05.07.2007 The Court of Appeal Registrar Ms. Pamela Eldred ordered that the Appellant file his application for leave to adduce additional evidence together with an affidavit in support by 3rd August, 2007.
40 20.7.2008 The Board wrote to the Appellant responding to his letter of the 27.06.2008 bearing the 42 paragraphs which the Appellant intended to introduce as new evidence in the trial of the CACV 43 of 2007 appeal. The Board refused to consent to the admission of the new evidence but conceded that the Appellant should make an application for leave to do so to the Court of Appeal.
41. 23.07.2007 Emily at the office of the Court of Appeal Registrar had been informed by Appellant by telephone that his prior application to adduce new evidence together with his supporting affidavit and written submission totaling 33 pages and dated the 23rd day of July, 2007 sent by way of facsimile is to be replaced by the settled application referred to below.
42 24.07.2007 The Appellant filed at the Court of Appeal and served Minter Ellison Lawyers his Application for Leave to Adduce as evidence in the Appeal the Affidavit of Nicholas Ni Kok Chin sworn 25th May, 2007 in 3 pages as settled by my counsel Barrister Tim Stephenson.
43. 31.07.2007 Respondent consent to the Appellant’s filing the Appellant’s Case Out of Time after the determination of his application to adduce new evidence by the Court of Appeal.
44. 01.08.2007 Appellant sent Draft consent orders to be approved by Respondent in the form as approved by his counsel.
45. 03.08.2007 Both Appellant and Respondent consented to file the Appellant’s case on or before the 31.8.2007 by signing the Consent Notice. The Respondent through Mr. Michael Ferguson of Minter Ellison Lawyers refused to allow additional evidence to be introduced into the CACV 43 of 2007 appeal unless the Appellant filed an application to the Court of Appeal for inducing additional evidence by the 3rd day of August, 2007. Further the conferral materials as presented by the Appellant in his 42 numbered paragraphs was not acceded to by the Board nor consented to as the new evidence which the Appellant intended to introduce.
46. 06.08.2007 Registrar Eldred made programming orders to the effect that the Appellant were to file his written submission for his Application for Leave to rely on additional evidence on appeal by 16.8.2007 and the Respondent was to respond to it by the 22nd day of August, 2007 and that he be heard on the 24th day of August, 2007.
47 16.8.2007 The Appellant’s through his counsel barrister Stephenson filed a written submission on application to adduce further evidence on Appeal.
48 20.08.2007 Appellant served on the Respondent the documents as ordered by Registrar Eldred on 6th day of August, 2007 and which was filed on 16.8.2007 after they have been settled by Barrister Tim Stephenson, as follows:
a) Appellant’s Written Submission
b) Appellant’s List of Authorities.
49 22.8.2007 The Board served through Minter Ellison Lawyers its Written Submission and List of Authorities on the Appellant.
PSEUDO BOARD ADMITS THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE LAWFUL DELEGATED AUTHORITY OF THE REAL BOARD AND THEREBY CONSENT TO THE FLAWED CONSENT JUDGMENT
50 24.8.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Board upon advice by his counsel barrister Stephenson for the following purpose:
a) request for the Minute of the Board which shows that the PAC was given the delegated powers under s.11 of the LPA but the Board was not able to produce this subsequently.
b) requesting for the Board to concede the point that those members of the Board who were present before Judge Eckert of the SAT on the 12.9.2008 and who had requested for the orders of SAT to close down the practice of the Appellant unreasonably and illegally and not in accordance with the provisions of s.155 and 156 of the LPA Act.
51. 29.08.2007 The Appellant’s case in CACV 43 of 2007 was filed by counsel barrister Tim Stephenson on behalf of the Appellant without the Draft Chronology. This document contains the Appellant’s Minute of Grounds of Appeal, The Appellant’s Submission, Appellant’s Legal Authorities, Orders Wanted and Draft Appeal Book Indexes and is made up of 27 pages. Apparently, this document was not filed with the Court of Appeal nor was it served because as the former appeal case was terminated by the Consent Order that was not properly reached between the parties resulting in the current ongoing dispute on the grounds that the outstanding issues as contained in the Appellant’s 42 paragraphs letter dated the 27.6.2007 was not fully thrashed out between the parties.
52. 31.08.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Board inquiring if it was willing to concede to Ground 1 of the Appeal and to agree on a Chronology Statement.
53 4.9.2007 The Board is required to file and serve any answer to the Appellant’s case by the latest date the 25.9.2007.
SPECIAL DAMAGES CLAIMED BY APPELLANT FOR IMPROPER CLOSURE OF HIS INDPENDENT LAW PRACTICE
54 24.9.2007 The Appellant gave prior notice to the Board through its solicitors Minter Ellison Lawyers by way of a facsimile reminding the Board to exercise its own discretion on the question of compensation for the Appellant which had purportedly acted in bad faith contrary to s.18 of the LPA. The Board’s conduct had caused the improper closure of the Appellant’s practice by certain members who was present at the time of the orders delivered by Sat on the 12.9.2008 including the Secretary of the Board who demanded the learned Judge Eckert to provide such wrongful orders without the prior delegated authority of the Board as evidenced by its Minutes and without invoking the proper procedures as prescribed by the legislation through SAT. The Appellant quantified his loss of income as special damages in the sum of $153.56 per day. This special damage is calculated basing upon the income of the Appellant of the previous 74 days prior to the 12.9.2006.
55 25.9.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Chairman of the Board Ms. Anna Liscia explaining why the Board should renew the practice certificate of the Appellant unconditionally and should also allow the Appellant to move to NSW to begin a new life after the Board had conceded the Appeal of the Appellant in CACV 43 of 2007.
56 26.9.2007 The Appellant and the Respondent entered into a Consent Judgment before the President of the Court of Appeal, the learned Justice Steytler on the assumption that the Pseudo Board through the PAC having usurped the lawful authority of the regulator of the legal profession in WA was conceding defeat and the ban on the Appellant’s independent law practice shall be lifted as a consequence. As events transpired, the Appellant was deceived as the Pseudo Board continued to make its appearance in subsequent events and each time it was again unable to deny the illegality of its usurping authority. This is the live issue that was refused to be looked into by Justice Chaney in VR 107 of 2008.
57 10.10.2007 Both the Appellant through his counsel Mr. Stephenson and the Respondent attended Room 211, Supreme Court Building, Stirling Gardens at 10.30 am to settle the appeal book papers and to give further direction on other issues.
23.10.2007 The Chairperson of the Board wrote to the Appellant disclosing the matters with regard to the Appellant’s complaint against Mr. Tim Thies citing the LPCC correspondence to the Appellant dated 4.10.2007 and 18.10.2007 and the Appellant’s response dated 20.10.2007. (The persecuting malice of the LPCC is apparent in the light of Justice Hasluck decision in CIV 1903 of 2008 delivered on 7.11.2008 that Mr. Thies is guilty of fraud and unconscionable conduct towards the Appellant and his son and that the Appellant had acted reasonably. See the written submission of the Appellant before Justice Kenneth Martin on 13.5.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2008 and the written submission of Paul CK Chin in CIV 1112of 2007 on 13.5.2010).
58 26.10.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Board through its Chairperson with regard to his request for a Certificate of Fitness and for the renewal of his practice certificate. In this letter, the Appellant set forth his contentions with regard to the views of Ms. C Coombs of the LPCC affecting the issues of Mr. Timothy Robin Thies as contained in Ms. Coomb’s letter to the Appellant dated the 18th day of October, 2007. (It should be reasonably observed that Ms. Coombs has a predilection not to assist the court or any court-like tribunals in the dispensation of fair justice to the Appellant and is willfully blind to the facts of the case of Mr. Thies which was under her purview and investigation.) (This is persecuting malice)
59 29.10.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Chairman of the Board Ms. Anna Liscia explaining his grievances as to why the Board is not justified in its refusal to issue him with an unconditional practice certificate. (The persecuting malice of the Board is apparent from its refusal to expunge the irrelevant materials affecting the affairs of Mr. Thies). Any person reading the Affidavits would have agreed that Mr. Thies was doing the wrong thing).
60 31.10.2007 The Executive Officer of SAT wrote to the Appellant acceding to the request of the Appellant that the Orders published by the learned Judge Eckert in VR 137 of 2006 be removed from the SAT website.(Why no reason published but only the unreasonable orders)
61 16.11.2007 Ms. Miranda Breisch who replaced Ms. Mary Anne Paton of the Board informs the Appellant that he is required to make a formal application for a practice certificate so as to enable the Board to institute an inquiry pursuant to section 41(1)(b) of the LPA basing on the information that is available before it. The Board also informs the Appellant of its concerns on the 6 criteria as outlined in that letter. (It should be reasonably observed that there is persecuting malice of the LPCC in that Ms. Cahon as its principal legal officer is suggesting that the Appellant be re-prosecuted on 11 matters whereas the Board had limited the duties of the Inquiry Team held on 3.4.2008 to only 6 matters).
62 20.11.2008 The Appellant wrote a facsimile letter to Ms. Miranda Breisch of the Board explaining further his grievances with the Board as contained in his letter to the Board dated the 18.12.2008.
63 21.11.2007 The Appellant wrote to the Board through Ms. Miranda Breisch explaining why the Board is visibly seen to be prejudging the issues as contained in its letter to the Appellant dated the 16.11.2007 and as a result was causing a delay to the issue of the Appellant’s practitioners Certificate. The Appellant also gave NOTICE to the Board that the costs of proving the 6 point criteria will have to borne by the Board on account of the fact that is responsible for the delay in the issuance of the Appellant’s Practitioner’s Certificate (This is persecuting malice).
THE INQUIRY PANEL AND ITS RATIFACTION PANEL ARE AGAIN USURPING THE POWERS OF THE REAL BOARD THROUGH THE PSEUDO BOARD REPETITIVELY
64 17.01.2008 Ms. Miranda Breisch of the Board wrote an email letter to the Appellant informing him that the Inquiry Team of the Board will hear the Appellant’s Application for a Practitioner’s Certificate on the 3rd day of April, 2008 at the Hearing Room of Level 13 of International House at No. 26, St. Georges Terrace.
65 5.2.2008 The Board wrote to Counsel Tim Stephenson regarding its telephone conversation with him regarding the Inquiry Committee hearing scheduled on the 3.4.2008 and enclosing a copy of its letter dated the 16.11.2007 containing the six matters of concern of the Board to be dealt with at the Inquiry Hearing.
66 10.3.2008 Dr. Geoffrey Shulman provided the Appellant with a referral letter indicating that the Appellant did suffer from mild reactive depression (caused by Mr. Thies and the persisting persecuting malice of the Board) but no serious psychiatric illness which would interfere with his work ability. As at this date the Appellant has no psychiatric illness and there is no likelihood of him being predisposed to this in the future.
67 20.3.2008 Dr. Geoffrey Shulman responded to Barrister Tim Stephenson request for specific details about the history of the depressive illness of the Appellant and he formed the opinion that the Appellant does not have true depression but rather neurasthenia together with specific details about the medication prescribed to him.
68 25.3.2008 Psychologist Leonie W Coxon provide evidence to counsel Tim Stephenson a full report of her interview and assessment of the Appellant to the effect that the Appellant, from a psychological and mental health perspective is fit to practice as a Barrister-Solicitor on his own account.
69 28.3.2008 Barrister Tim Stephenson wrote on behalf of the Appellant to the Board to the effect that he is willing to accept a limited practice on his own account if this was proffered to him by the Board, yet the Board refused to concede to this condescension of the Appellant for the sake of accommodating the Board and to avoid the difficulties of further disputation. .
70 31.3.2008 Counsel Tim Stephenson for the Appellant wrote to the Board enclosing the Psychologist Report of Ms. Leonie Coxon.
71 1.4.2008 Counsel Stephenson wrote to the Board enclosing the medical report on the Appellant from Dr. G. Shulman dated 20.3.2008.
MR. GRANT DONALDSON SC ADMITTED THAT THE PSEUDO BOARD HAD NO POWER OR WAS USURPING THE POWERS OF THE REAL BOARD
72 3.4.2008 The Minute of the Inquiry Committee indicates that Mr. G. Donaldson appeared for as counsel for the Board and as agreed he cannot vote and participate in the meeting. There are therefore only 4 members of the Inquiry Committee. Mr. Stephenson as counsel for the Appellant at page 14 line 2 to 5 said:
“…..you ought to have a proper delegation from the board proper to do so and I would simply leave that to you because I don’t know what delegation you gentlemen received from the board in that respect but it may be regrettably, that if the delegation does not permit you to stand outside of the actual inquiry…”
At page 16 line 1 to 5 Mr. Stephenson again said:
“ Could I simply say however in relation to that, it may be – that is my clear understanding of it, if I can put if that way: However, it may be appropriate to check the minutes of – no doubt, minutes. However there was no formal delegation, it was simply that the board has been constituted in the way it has…”
At page 16, line 12-14, Mr. Stephenson again said:
“Having said that, I don’t really see that there is a need for us to proceed until we know. We understand what would happen if there was in fact, no power.”
At page 16 in line 25-26, the Chairman said:
“During this period, if you could obtain those minutes and let us know the position please?”
At page 18, Mr. Donaldson in line 15-45 effectively states that there are no minutes not even draft minutes to evidence that the Inquiry Committee has proper delegated authority to hold that inquiry under s.41(1)(a) of the LPA nor to make any proper decision resulting from that Inquiry.
73 22.4.2008 Mr. C. Colvin SC wrote to the Board through Ms. Miranda Breisch with copies extended to the other members of the Inquiry Committee, namely Mr. R O’Connor QC, Mr. R. Cock QC and Mr. S Penglis enclosing the Report of the Inquiry Committee which did not have the valid authority of the full Board through its authorized minutes contrary to s.11 of the LPA. The Report of the Inquiry Committee is therefore null and void and has no legal effect upon the Appellant. The Inquiry Committee contemplated a Special Committee of the Board to be convened which would comprise of only three valid members who are allowed to sit on the Special Meeting convened on the 2.5.2008. The other three members if they do sit they are already tainted with gross bias as they do not have the valid authority to make the Inquiry under s. 41(1)(b) of the LPA. They cannot then sit at the Special Meeting again as they have acted as prosecutor, judge and jury against the Appellant in both meetings. (This is persecuting malice)
74 29.4.2008 Ms. Miranda Breisch of the Board provided a copy of the transcript (85 pages) of the proceedings of the Inquiry Team heard on the 3.4.2008 to the Appellant.
COMPOSITION OF THE RATIFICATION PANEL AS A PSEUDO BOARD
75 2.5.2008 A special Committee of the Board comprising of Mr. R Cock QC as Chairperson, Mr. R. O’Connor Q.C., Mr. S. Owen-Conway QC, Mr R. Birmingham QC, Mr. R. Mitchell SC and Mr. G. Donaldson SC sat to decide the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee given on 3.4.2008. The Inquiry Committee which made the recommendations comprise of Mr. R O’Connor as the Chairperson, Mr. R. Cock QC a, Mr. C. Colvin SC and Mr. Steven Penglis. It is to be noted that the Inquiry Committee did not have a valid minute in accordance with s.11 of the LPA to prove that it was validly constituted by the Board or that it did not have the approval of the majority of the members of the Board. The Inquiry Committee repeated the mistakes of the PAC that originally imposed the impugned conditions on the Appellant’s practice certificate on the 19.7.2006. The special committee meeting did not comprise the full Board as the quorum of the full board is 4 members and there are only three who were present namely, Mr. S. Owen-Conway QC, Mr. R. Birmingham QC, and Mr. R. Mitchell SC. The other three members of the Special Committee are disqualified because they were members of the Inquiry Committee namely Mr. R. Cock QC., Mr. R. O’Connor QC and Mr. G. Donaldson SC. (The question for this court to determine is whether the majority of the 48 members of the Board agreed to appoint the Special Committee to pass the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee. The onus of proof is on the Board as the knowledge of this matter lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the Board)
76 8.5.2008 The Board wrote to the Appellant informing him of the outcome of the Inquiry Committee in that made the recommendations to the Board when it sat on the 3.4.2008. A special meeting of the Board was convened on the 2.5.2008 to deliberate upon the recommendations of the Board.
THE ROOT OR BASIS FOR COMMISSIONER HERRON’S ORDER HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY THE VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS OF THE TWO MAGISTRATES’S JUDGMENT OCCASSIONED BY THE REVIEW ORDER OF JUSTICE HASLUCK– CAN THE BRANCHES AND STEM OF COMMISSIONER HERRON’S TREE STILL REMAIN STANDING? QUESTION POSED BEFORE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN ON 13.5.2010 IN CIV 1903 OF 2008
77 12.5.2008 The learned Commissioner Herron of the District Court erred in dismissing the DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 which is an appeal against the decision of Magistrate Musk in FR 944 of 2008 given on the 9.1.2008 in favour of Mr. Timothy Robin Thies. Commissioner Herron also erred in holding that he had no jurisdiction to decide that appeal and yet he contradicted himself by his conduct in dismissing that appeal. He also suggested that the Appellant should have appealed against the then allegedly Registrar Wilde’s Duress-vitiated Consent Order in FR 417 of 2007 (the Duress-vitiated Order). This cue from Commissioner Herron prompted the Appellant to launch a separate appeal at the Fremantle Magistrate’s Court against the Duress-vitiated Order before Magistrate Michelides on a subsequent occasion. The learned Magistrate Michelides erred by dismissing the Duress-vitiated Order Appeal by refusing to extend the time for appeal although the circumstances of the case would justify such an extension of time. The three matters at the Magistrates Court and the District Court were brought for the Review of the Supreme Court in CIV 1903 of 2008 before the learned Justice Hasluck who on 7.11.2008 granted the Review Orders application made by the Appellant under s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004.(This is persecuting malice)
78 10.6.2008 Directions Hearing of VR 107 of 2008 was heard before Justice Barker. The learned Justice ordered that within 14 days the Board is to file a statement of issues, facts and contentions and an indexed and paginated Bundle of Documents pursuant to s.24 of the SAT Act providing a statement of reason for decision and documents or other materials relevant to the review decision or internet address of any document.
Similarly within 14 days, the Appellant is to respond to the statement of facts, issues and contentions and similarly provided paginated bundle of documents to that effect and the matter to be adjourned to the 22.7.2008.

79 12.6.2008 The Executive Officer of SAT wrote to the Appellant that the direction hearing of VR107 of 2008 shall be heard on the 22.7.2008.
80 24.6.2008 The Board through its solicitors Minter Ellison Lawyers served upon the Appellant two Bundles of Documents pursuant to s.24 of the SAT Act, 2004.
The Board also served upon the Appellant its statement of facts, issues and contentions.
81 9.7.2008 The Appellant filed his Application under s. 44(b) of the LPA with the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) with his Bundle of Documents containing 172 pages and the same was served on the Board the same day.
82 22.7.2008 The President of SAT made the following orders:
The matter in VR 107 of 2008 is listed for hearing on 25.9.2008 at 10.00 am.
Each witness is to give a signed witness statement to SAT and serve a copy on the Board 14 days before the hearing date.
The Witness are to be available for cross-examination at the hearing date.
83 18.8.2008 The Appellant filed his Affidavit in the Supreme Court in CIV 1775 of 2008 (containing 82 pages) in opposition to the claim of the sister in law of the late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall one Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall. She had filed a Writ claiming for an Order 14 summary judgment that the Appellant and others remove their respective caveats against the property of the late Ms. Hall. The Appellant had staked his claim as a first charge of solicitor lien for the debts of the late Ms. Hall in unpaid legal fees incurred by her in CIV 1142 of 2005 and this caveat was made in accordance with the Appellant’s entitlement for his solicitor’s lien as provided in s.244 of the LPA.
84 19.8.2008 The Appellant filed his Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 at the Supreme Court of WA invoking s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 for a Review Order against the decisions of both the learned Magistrate Michelides and the learned Magistrate Musk. The former affects the appeal against the learned Registrar Wilde’s Duress-vitiated Order in FR 417 of 2007 entered into involuntarily on the 7.6.2007 between the Appellant and his son Paul with Mr. Timothy Robin Thies. The latter case is FR 944 of 2008 which was instituted by the Appellant against Mr. Thies under the Minor Claim provisions of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 which was decided on 9.1.2007 by Magistrate Musk. The Musk’s decision was appealed against by the Appellant to the District Court in Appeal No. 6 of 2008 but was dismissed by the Learned Commissioner Herron on 12.5.2008. These were cases that dealt with the fraudulent and unconscionable conduct of Mr. Thies - a fellow legal practitioner which was investigated by the LPCC. (The learned Judge Chaney made erroneous findings about the alleged deficiency of the Appellant in his professional knowledge in VR 107 of 2008 which is the subject matter of this appeal.) See the case of RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256
at the website: http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/supdcsn.nsf
85 26.8.2008 Mr. Alessandro Bertini filed his Witness Statement in VR 107 of 2008 containing 60 pages alleging that he was subject to plundering and pillaging by an errant solicitor X. He has since make an applicant under s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 in CIV 1764 of 2009 for a review order of his seven magistrates court applications dismissed by the Magistrates Court in CA 2881 of 2006. Justice Jenkins had since granted a review for one of the seven applications whilst dismissing the rest. The review concerns costs orders made without jurisdiction by the Magistrates Court but Justice Mazza had refused to make the grant of the Jenkin’s Order absolute but had obtained an undertaking from Solicitor X not to include any solicitor profit costs as he was a solicitor litigant in person in accordance with the rationale in Dobree v Hoffman.
86 26.8.2008 The Appellant’s filled his submission with regard to his objections to Mr. Thies’ Bill of Costs dated 29.7.2008 pursuant to the null cost order of the learned Mr. Commissioner Herron that was made with jurisdictional error dated 20.5.2008. That Bill of costs was taxed by Deputy Registrar Hewitt on 19.8.2008 despite the written objections of the Appellant. It was without the sanctity of law. The subsequent grant of Review Order by Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008 resulted in Magistrates Musk and Michelides complying with the Review Order Nisi as advised by the State Solicitor resulted in the roots of Commissioner Herron being destroyed. The decision of Commission Herron has therefore been taken off the website of the District Court in Appeal No.6 of 2006.
87 29.8.2008 The Appellant filed his Further Affidavit in Support of the Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 for the grant of Review Orders against the Fremantle Magistrates Court Decision of Magistrates Musk and Magistrates Michelides (98 pages). The transcript of the proceedings in the appeal against the Registrar decision in FR 417 of 2007 which involves the alleged duress-vitiated Consent Order entered into between Mr. Thies and the Appellant and his son Paul, that was claimed to be vitiated by duress by the Appellant was indeed found to be so by Justice Hasluck on the 7.11.2008 in CIV 1903 of 2008.
88 8.9.2008 The Witness Statement of the Appellant together with the List of Documents attached to it was filed with SAT pursuant to the Order of the learned Justice Michael Barker in VR 107 of 2008 given on the 22.7.2008 (78 pages). The matter was subsequently heard before the learned Judge Chaney and its decision is the subject of the Applicant’s Applicant for Leave to Appeal to the Court of the Appeal in CACV 105 of 2008 and his further Application for Special Leave to Appeal to the High Court of Australia in P36 of 2010, both having been dismissed but the Live Issue of the Pseudo Board has never been litigated in these Applications.
89 22.9.2008 The Appellant filed and serve his Outline of Written Submission in 9 pages pending his Application in VR 107 of 2008 be heard before the SAT Panel headed by the learned Judge Chaney on 25.9.2008.
90 25.9.2008 SAT reserved its decision in VR 107 of 2008 upon the application of the Appellant before Deputy President Judge Chaney, Senior Sessional Member Brian Hunt and Senior Sessional Member Margaret Jordan.
91 16.9.2008 The Appellant provide the Magistrate Court in Fremantle hearing the execution of the costs orders of Magistrate Musk and Magistrate Michelides the transcript of the proceedings of CIV 1903 of 2008 dated the 19.8.2008 for a temporary stay of those null costs orders of Magistrates Musk and Magistrate Michelides. The subsequent order of Justice Hasluck given on 7.11.2008 has now stayed the execution of those null costs orders pending the fininalization of CIV 1903 of 2008 at the Supreme Court.
92 28.10.2008 The learned Judge Chaney of SAT delivered his decision in VR 107 of 2008 to confirm the previous decision of Judge Eckert. This SAT decision confirms the decision of the Inquiry Committee that was made in May after the Pseudo Board again made its presence as Inquiry Committee which sat on the 3.4.2008 and again it was unable to explain it lawful authority having been properly delegated under s.11 of the LPA.
93 3.11.2008 The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal in CACV 105 of 2008 against the decision of SAT delivered by the learned Judge Chaney on 28.10.2008 and served a copy of the Notice of Appeal on the same date that it was filed with the Court of Appeal.
94 4.11.2008 The Appellant wrote a 2 page facsimile letter to the Court of Appeal Registrar with copy extended to the Board through Ms. Miranda Breisch of the Board. This letter explains inter alia the 12 points reasons as to why the decision of the SAT panel headed by the learned Judge Chaney delivered on 28.10.2008 should be appealed against to the Court of Appeal by the Appellant and that the Appellant be accorded extension of time to do so having regard to the personal circumstances of the Appellant. As a consequence of this letter, the Appellant was granted an extension of time to file his Appellant’s case by common consent by the latest date the 10.1.2009.
PERSECUTING MALICE OF LPCC TO PROSECUTE APPELLANT FOR THE COMMON-LAW DEBARRED FURTHER REMEDY OF NON-EXISTENT PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN VR 87 OF 2009
95 7.11.2008 The Appellant lodged a complaint with the LPCC by email after he had received the judgment of Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008. The persecuting malice of the Board is found in Ms. Gail McCahon of the LPCC writing to the Appellant regarding her intention to refer the Appellant to that Committee for possible unsatisfactory conduct with regard to the Appellant’s dealings with Mr. Thies particularly concerning the issue as to whether there was a champertous agreement between the Appellant and his son. Apparently, Ms. McCahon was aware of the fact or that she had been so made aware of by the Appellant that the learned Justice Hasluck had on the same day delivered his judgment to grant the review orders against Magistrate Musk and Magistrate Michelides in FR417/2008 and FR 944 of 2008.
96 17.11.2008 The Principal Legal Officer Ms. Gail McCahon of the LPCC wrote to the Appellant stating that she intends that the court-like tribunal deliberate again on the 11 matters that have already been deliberated upon by both the LPCC, the PAC of the Board and SAT on two occasions before the decisions of Learned Judge Eckert and the learned Judge Chaney respectively. She made this decision despite being aware of the following:
The Appellant had appealed against Judge Chaney’s decision in VR 107 of 2008 to the Court of Appeal on the 28.10.2008.
The learned Justice Hasluck had granted review orders to the Appellant and made the findings that Mr. Thies is guilty of fraud and professional misconduct by unconscionable conduct towards the Appellant and his son Paul with regard to CIV 1903 of 2008 that was delivered on the 7.11.2008.
The Appellant had not entered into any champertous agreement with Mr. Thies.
97 20.11.2008 The Appellant responded by email to Ms. Gail McCahon to the effect that those 11 matters cannot be re-litigated as some of them had already been settled by the previous proceedings and are therefore res-judicata whilst the remaining outstanding matters are the subject of the appeal in CACV 105 of 2008 and will be dealt with accordingly. Upon the Appellant’s return from overseas, he had made enquiries with the LPCC to the effect that his response email to Ms McCahon had been received and is receiving her attention.
98 9.12.2008 The Appellant executed the orders of Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008 delivered on the 7.11.2008 on the 9th day of December, 2008 by delivering them to Mr. Timothy Robin Thies. Meanwhile, Mr. Thies through his solicitor is pretending that he had not been personally served with the documents of CIV 1903 of 2008 but an Affidavit has been filed with the Supreme Court to this effect on 24.12.2008.
99 23.12.2008 The Appellant served the Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 and the Judgment of the Learned Justice Hasluck granting the Review Orders against Mr. Timothy Robin Thies inviting for his defence within 21 days on the solicitors for Mr. Thies Mr. Dean Elek Roser.
100 24.12.2008 The Appellant filed his Affidavit of Service in the Supreme Court in CIV 1903 of 2008 on the 24.12.2008 indicating that he had carried out the orders of Justice Hasluck.
CERTIORARI ORDERS NISI AGAINST JUSTICE CHANEY’S RES JUDICATA DECISION IN VR 87 OF 2009
101 30.11.2009 Applicant filed CIV 3068 of 2009 for Certiorari Orders Nisi against Justice Chaney Res Judicata Decisions in VR87 of 2009
4.12.2009 CIV 3068 of 2009 was rejected by the Chief Registrar on grounds that is unlikely to succeed and not because it is frivolous or vexatious as provided for in Order 67 r.5 of the RSC.
14.12.2009 CIV 3068 of 2009 re-lodged, pursuant to Order 67r.5 of the RSC -- dismissed by the Honourable Chief Justice Wayne Martin QC on the ground that the matter is pending decision by the High Court of Australia for Special Leave to Appeal in P36 of 2009
28.12.2009 CIV 3086 of 2009 Application for Certiorari Orders to review the Court of Appeal Decision in Chin v Hall re the error of facts pertaining to the falsification of court records by Mr. David Taylor with the collaboration of judicial officer the learned Registrar Powell as evidenced by his letter dated 11.6.2009 – dismissed by the Honourable Chief Justice, Wayne Martin Q.C on the ground that it already the subject of an Application for Special Leave to Appeal as P1 of 2010 in the High Court of Australia which is currently pending decision.
CERTIORARI ORDERS NISI AGAINST JUSTICE CHANEY RES JUDICATA DECISION IN VR 87 OF 2009 REFILED AS CIV 1019 OF 20010 THAT WAS DISMISSED BY JUSTICE HEENAN ABOUT TURN DECISION
19.12.2009 Appellant filed re-amended CIV 3068 of 2009 known as CIV 1019 of 2010 with the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
5.1.2010 CIV 1019 of 2010 was rejected by the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
6.1.2010 Appellant filed re-Amended CIV 1019 of 2010 with request to be heard by another Justice other than the Chief Justice on the ground of bias with two volumes of documents totalling 520 pages.
20.1.2010 Appellant filed Minute of Proposed Orders in 6 pages in CIV 1019 of 2010.
25.3.2010 Appellant Amended Minute of Proposed Orders in CIV 1019 of 2010 in 6 pages in the light of the dismissal by the High Court of Australia of P36 of 2009 made on 10.3.2010 – caused by the credibility of the trial judge being the learned President of SAT, Justice John Chaney, remaining unimpeached, in both VR 107 of 2008 and CACV 105 of 2008. The deficiency of Justice Chaney’s first judgment re-opens the undecided issues in this Application for Certiorari Orders nisi made for in CIV 1019 of 2010.
25.3.2010 Appellant filed a 22 page Outline of Written Submissions in 3 copies for CIV 1019 of 20120 to be presented at the hearing before the Learned Justice Heenan on 6.4.2010.
29.3.2010 Appellant received a facsimile copy of the letter from Mr. Maurice Frederick Law regarding the falsity of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 that forms one of the subject matter of Justice Chaney’s error as regards the false concept affecting the Applicant’s propensity to make false allegations against fellow practitioners including Mr. David Taylor. This matter is the current subject of the appeal process in P1 of 2010.
29.3.2010 Appellant filed the Supplementary Affidavit of 12 pages annexing 123 pages of evidentiary materials in CIV 1019 of 2010 to further embellish and support his case for his Application for Certiorari Orders nisi against the First and Second Judgments of Justice Chaney.
2.4.2010 Appellant filed in CIV 1019 of 2010 the Amended List of Authorities bearing asterisked cases which will be elaborated in the oral presentation before Justice Heenan.
6.4.2010 Appellant appeared before Justice Heenan for hearing of CIV 1019 of 2010 in court room No.14, Level 14, No.111, St. George’s Terrace, Perth WA 6000 whence an Order was issued by Justice Heenan for the Applicant to serve all relevant documents on the Legal Profession Complaints Committee within 2 days, the LPCC to respond within 10 days and the Application in CIV 1019 of 2010 to be withheld for 14 days pending the response of the LPCC.

7.4.2010 Appellant complied with the Orders of Justice Heenan in CIV 1019 of 2010 dated 6.4.2010 to serve all relevant papers as evidenced by the facsimile cover letter of Appeal to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court marked for the attention of the Associate of Justice Heenan, Mr. Stephen Sommerville dated 7.4.2010. This letter is also copied to the Chief Executive Officer of SAT and to the LPCC.

7.4.2010 Appellant sent a facsimile letter to the Chief Executive of SAT, copied to the LPCC and the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court requesting for the transcript of proceedings of Justice Chaney given for the ambushed decision in VR 87 of 2009 on 4.11.2009 and the proceedings conducted in the absence of the Applicant on 16.2.2010. To date, the requested transcripts have not been provided for by SAT to the Appellant (the request for the 4.11.2009 transcript was made by a telephone request through one Mary of SAT on 8.4.2010 at 9.02 am).
12.4.2010 SAT responded to Appellant by re-listing the directions hearing of the res judicata proceedings in VR 87 of 2009 to be re-scheduled to the 27.4.2010 at 10.30 am.
MAURICE FREDERICK LAW CORROBORATES MY CLAIM FOR FALSIFICATIONS OF COURT RECORDS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006 BY DAVID TAYLOR THAT IS SUBJECT TO APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL IN HIGH COURT IN P.1 OF 2007.
12.4.2010 Mr. Maurice Frederick Law sent the Appellant a copy of the response he received from the LPCC as a result of his letter to the LPCC dated 29.3.2010.
13.4.2010 Appellant responded to paragraph 2.2. of that LPCC letter to Mr. Law by way of email explaining the intricacies of the factual circumstances and the related law with regard to the filing and processing of the filing of a Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 and the methods of payments of court fees and how the law was being circumvented by the learned Registrar Powell acting in collaboration with Mr. David Taylor in falsifying the court records as contained in his special Leave to Appeal to the High Court in P1 of 2007.
14.4.2010 Appellant received an email that the resumed hearing in CIV 1019 of 2010 will be heard on Wednesday 21.4.2010 at 10.30 am at Supreme Court Perth court room 13.1. Level 13, No.111, St. George’s Terrace, Perth WA 6000 when an oral exposition of the asterisked case law in the New List of Authorities will be expected to be made by the Applicant before Justice Heenan.
21.4.2010 Justice Heenan made an about turn decision to absolve the LPCC from responding to his Orders given on 6.4.2010 after he had received a telephone call from the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia. He thereupon dismissed CIV 1019 of 2010 for Certiorari Orders Nisi against the two judgments of Justice Chaney in VR 107 of 2008 and VR 87 of 2009 by giving an incorrect ex-tempore judgement stating that he only dismissed the two judgments of Justice Chaney in VR87 of 2007 dated 4.11.2009 and 10.11.2009.
APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEAL IN CACV 41 OF 2010 AGAINST JUSTICE HEENAN DISMISSAL OF CIV 1019 OF 2010
22.4.2010 The Appellant filed and served his Notice of Appeal in CACV41 of 2010 on the Respondent.
27.4.2010 Appellant wrote to the Associate of Justice Heenan requesting him to review his decision in dismissing CIV 1019 of 2010 in view of the fact that he made a mistake in his draft judgment delivered ex-tempore and lamenting the fact that His Honour had not put his heart and soul into the matter under his consideration.
MANDAMUS APPLICATION BY APPELLANT IN CIV 1604 OF 2010 AGAINST JUSTICE CHANEY AND JUSTICE CHANEY AFFECTING VR107 OF 2008 AND VR87 OF 2009 FOR THE FORMER AND JUSTICE HEENAN AFFECTING CIV 1019 OF 2010
29.4.2010 Appellant filed a Mandamus Application in CIV 1604 of 2010 to compel Justice Heenan and Justice Chaney to do their duties in accordance with their Oath of Office in CIV 1019 of 2010 by the former and VR 107 of 2008 and VR87 of 2009 by the latter respectively. Appellant filed His Notice of Originating Motion in CIV1604 of 2010 in 6 pages together with an Affidavit in Support sworn the same day containing 66 pages).
30.4.2010 Justice Heenan re-wrote the subject judgment of Appeal which was published at the website of the Supreme Court in Re President of the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (SAT), Justice Chaney; Ex parte CHIN [2010] WASC 89 to replace his draft judgment a copy of which was refused by Mr. Stephen Somerville, the Associate to Justice Heenan.
30.4.2010 Appellant sent a facsimile letter to SAT, the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court and to the LPCC informing them of the strategy to solve this complicated matter is to have the Live Issue of the Pseudo Board tried as quickly as possible.
2.5.2010 The International Criminal Court of the United Nations was informed that the refusal of the WA government to delay the legal determination of the Live Issue of the Pseudo Board is the perpetration of an unlawful torture upon a national of Australia contrary to Article 2 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture which provides that no exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification of toture. The torture is any act by which severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental is inflicted on the Appellant for the purpose of coercing him to refrain from suing for his human rights or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. This letter was copied to all members of Parliament of the Government of the Premier Colin Barnett of Western Australia.
JUSTICE CHANEY AND JUDGE PRITCHARD TO PRESIDE OVER HEARING OF VR 87 OF 2009
4.5.2010 Appellant attended directions hearing for VR87 of 2009 on 4.5.2009 after Justice Chaney had recused himself, before the Deputy President of SAT Her Honour Judge Pritchard. She vacated the hearing of VR 87 of 2009 scheduled on 18.5.2010 and re-scheduled a further directions hearing on 13.8.2010. In the meantime, she would like to be informed of further developments in the Supreme Court.
6.5.2010 Appellant wrote to the Court of Appeal Registrar responding to her letter of the same date and also inquiring if the Appellant is required to comply with the timeline to file his Appellant’s case within 35 days or seven weeks from the date the Appeal Notice was lodged.
RESPONSE LETTER FROM WA PARLIAMENT REGARDING TORTURE OF APPELLANT FOR JUDICARY’S REFUSAL TO LOOK INTO THE LIVE ISSUE OF THE PSEUDO BOARD
10.5.2010 Appellant received a response from the Principal Policy Advisor to Minister for Local Government Heritage, Citizenship and Multicultural Interests, the Hon GM (John) Castrilli MLA, from one Mrs. Sheryl Siekierka thanking me for the email communication dated 2.5.2010 as indicated above.
12.5.2010 Appellant received a reply from the Honourable Eric Ripper as Leader of the Opposition and acting on behalf of all Opposition MPs acknowledging receipt of my email as indicated above.
29.6.2010 The first hearing for CIV 1604 of 2010 is scheduled on this date.




NICHOLAS N CHIN – SOLICITOR LITIGANT IN PERSON