1. The Pseudo Board decided to prosecute me for no professional misconduct on 19.7.2006 but for my alleged deficiency in my professional knowledge.
2. This constitutes a decision to take away my independent legal practice for the purpose of protecting their cronies who had been pillaging and plundering innocent members of the public. The prime example of their victims are Dr. Kheng Su Chan and many others.
3. This conspiracy involves members of the Pseudo Board, the Law Society of Western Australia principally involving its former Presidents which includes inter alia Mr. Pino Monaco, Judge Eckert, Ken Martin J and Chaney J. The conspiracy embroiled the Legal Profession Complaints Committee and the Professional Affairs Committee, particularly Ms. Walter who is a lawyer directed by some unknown persons. Ms. Coombs, Ms Cahoon and Ms LeMiere, all of them as legal officers of the LPCC are knowingly involved in this conspiracy including Master Sanderson of the Supreme Court of WA.
4. Judge Eckert decided on 12.9.2006 in VR137 of 2006 that I was not guilty of any professional misconduct but was “guilty” of a deficiency in my professional knowledge. Therefore Judge Eckert of SAT re-imposed the conditions originally imposed on 19.7.2006 by taking away my independent status as a lawyer.
5. I appealed the decision of Judge Eckert through Master Sanderson which should have been the Court of Appeal instead. But the rules have changed in 2005 by the introduction of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005. Master Sanderson coaxed me not to transfer my appeal into the Court of Appeal but to have it heard before himself so that His Honour could dismiss it. I was shocked and traumatized by this event, thinking that there is no justice available to me as its door was closed.
6. I wrote to the Chief Justice and was encouraged to appeal. I therefore appealed in CACV 1 of 2007 but was stopped by the Legal Practice Board which was then trying to get me to pay unwarranted costs orders occasioned by Master Sanderson dismissing my case.
7. After some struggles, I was able to appeal again through CACV 43 of 2007 when I got leave to appeal and time to appeal was extended against Judge Eckert’s decision.
8. On 26.9.2007, President Steytler of the Court of Appeal caused a Consent Judgment to be entered between myself as Appellant and the Legal Practice Board as Respondent in CACV 43 of 2007. This consent judgment set aside Judge Eckert’s decision. Therefore, the Pseudo Board is precluded from harping on the same issues that had been the subject of that Consent Judgment i.e. my deficiency in my professional knowledge by the principle of res judicata.
9. In the aftermath, the Pseudo Board dishonoured the terms of that Steytler P Consent Judgment by refusing to grant me my independent legal practice certificate on the ground of the already debarred res judicata issue affecting the “deficiency of my professional knowledge”.
10. The Pseudo Board on 3.4.2008 did conspiratorially and vexatiously caused the re-imposition of the non-independent status of my legal practice without any grounds because it was not able to produce evidence that it had the sanction of the majority consent of the 52 members of the statutory regulator of the legal profession of WA. This is the second time the usurping Full Board in the name of the Pseudo Board had acted without authority and with impunity.
11. The Pseudo Board on 2.5.2008 again did conspire to ratify and confirm the Pseudo Board’s Decision to act without authority to take away from me my status as an independent legal practitioner.
12. I as the Appellant made an application to the State Administrative Tribunal in VR107 of 2008 to stop the conspiracy of the Pseudo Board but His Honour Chaney J conspired with the Pseudo Board to confirm the original decision of the Pseudo Board to take away my independent legal practice status on 27/10/2008 in his judgment in CHIN and WEST AUSTRALIAN LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2008] WASAT 252.
14. The Appellant appealed the decision of Chaney J for leave to appeal before Pullin J but was refused leave to appeal. The Appellant appealed this decision to the High Court in P36 of 2009 which was dismissed. The reason of decision touches the issues of the credibility of Chaney J and this revives my fresh action in our justice system again because the issue of the Pseudo Board was refused determination by Chaney J.
15. The LPCC started a persecution of me on the same issues that had been "harping" upon by the Pseudo Board since the beginning of this saga, in a fresh malicious persecution in VR87 of 2009 that was started by Ms. Cahon and continued by Ms. Le Miere as legal officers of the LPCC. This is a statutory body financed by our government to catch erring lawyers but it is found to be protecting its cronies and catching innocent people instead. Chaney J found me guilty of professional misconduct in an ambushed trial on 4.11.2009 under circumstances when he had written to me that the trial of VR87 of 2009 was scheduled on 10.11.2009. That ambushed trial result was never published by Chaney J and it is taken to have been set aside upon my vehement protestations to the effect that I was given in writing to have the matter re-trialed on 10.11.2009. But I have asked for Chaney J to recuse himself and His Honour did graciously bow out of that case subsequently. That case was subsequently mentioned during directions hearing before Judge Pritchard and is now before Judge Sharp who is the Deputy President of SAT. This denial of natural justice by Chaney J had voided that ambushed judgment dated 4.11.2009 and it is now no longer being published at the SAT website. I am now awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010 before any concrete decision can be made by Judge Sharp on the res judicata extended principle of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 in VR87 of 2009.
16. The Appellant was not barred on the ground of res judicata to bring fresh actions for Mandamus Orders against Chaney J decision in CIV 1019 of 2010 before Heenan J. His Honour dismissed my Application for Prerogative Orders but his Honour later decided in CIV 1981 of 2010 and CIV 1877 of 2010 in my absence on 4.8.2010 that he had no authority to order prerogative orders against fellow judges of the same rank as himself, namely Ken Martin J and Chaney J. The Appellant was then requested by the Court of Appeal Registrar to make his application to the Supreme Court for as Court of Appeal judge to hear those two cases. The first CIV 1981 is about the recusal of Ken Martin J from hearing Michelides No.2 and the second is the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal judgment that had reached the portals of the High Court and came back. The latter concerns how s.33 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 will operate to rectify the otherwise perfect judgment of the Court of Appeal in so far as it relates to the falsifications of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor solicitor. Only a Court of Appeal judge is entitled to make prerogative Orders of Certiorari or Mandamus against judges of the Supreme Court of Western Australia who are consicously or sub-consciously in dereliction of their judicial duties.
17. The Appellant took a Mandamus Orders against Heenan J in CIV 1604 of 2010 but it was rightly dismissed by Le Miere J on the ground that the matters in CACV 41 of 2010 was not before His Honour as the Appellant had already appealed the decision of Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010 to the Court of Appeal in the former case.
18. The Appellant appealed the Order of Heenan J to the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010. This avenue opens the door for the case now pending to be decided by the Court of Appeal. The three issues that are never determined before by Chaney J are now going to be decided by the Court of Appeal:
a) The Pseudo Board
b) The falsifications of the court records by David Taylor Solicitor.
c) The extortion bid by Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor.
19. In the circumstances as explained above, it it reasonably clear to members of the public that the Pseudo Board conspired with the LPCC and others to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice contrary to s.135 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (WA) (the Act).
20. The Pseudo Board also conspired with those parties as alleged for the purpose of preventing the criminal acts of Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor to be prosecuted for the criminal offence of extortion under s.397 of the Act. This matter is now with CACV 75 of 2010.
21. On 23.11.2010 the Court of Appeal through Pullin JA and Newnes JA decided to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the interim security Costs Order of Ken Martin J decision in CIV 1903 of 2008 or the Michelides No.2 decision delivered on 8.7.2010 (against the Appellant) thus stifling the Michelides No.1 prosecution of Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor by the Appellant. But the Court of Appeal in its wise judgment stayed that judgment order by not publishing it and it had acknowledged to the Appellant that it had received the Appellant’s letter containing the Draft proposed Notice of Appeal to the High Court. The purpose of that letter to the Court of Appeal Registrar is to request the Court of Appeal to review its decision its own decision in CACV 75 of 2010 that was delivered by Pullin JA on 23.11.2010 in the presence of the Timothy Robin Thies Solcitor, his counsel Barrister Scott Ellis and the Appellant in the presence of Newnes JA. See the three blogspots of the Appellant which is accessible by Googling “NICHOLASNCHIN”. Incidentally, there are six outstanding costs orders made against the Appellant at various stages of various proceedings which have never been enforced against the Appellant as they are improper costs orders and are therefore nullities. Those void costs orders serves the purpose of intimidating the Appellant from further prosecuting for his rights in the public interests to protect ordinary persons from marauding lawyers.
22. The Pseudo Board conspired with those parties in ............ from being prosecuted for the falsification of records by a public officer contrary to s. 85 of Act. The court had written to the Appellant dated 18.11.2010 that he is agreeing to review the costs orders of Master Sanderson in CIV1775 of 2008. This review will have ramifications in showing that the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 were falsified by David Taylor Solicitor on 10.2.2006 and its effects on the High Court decision in P1 of 2010 affecting CACV107 of 2008.
23. The Pseudo Board conspired with those parties involved in preventing the lawyer falsifying the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 from being prosecuted for the for perjury pursuant to ss.124 and 125 of the Act.
24. In DELLA FRANCA -v- R - Supreme Court Court of Appeal: 09/02/1993 Library No. 930476c, Murray J made the following pointers:
24.1.1. Evidence of conspiracy must be in the form of acts done or words uttered in the absence of the person maligned by a co-conspirator. It is admissible for the purpose of proving the participation of the Pseudo Board in the conspiracy – the deliberations of the Professional Affairs Committee and the then Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee in which Ms. Walter had participated.
24.1.2. Reasonable evidence is available to show that the Pseudo Board is involved in acts or words uttered for the purpose of establishing the combination of the type alleged for the furtherance of its common purpose – to protect their cronies and to take away my independence as a lawyer and this is an act of corruption by public officers.
24.1.3. Quoting at page 3, the High Court in Ahern case quoted in that judgment at 93-4, the following words:
"A conspirator may, in the absence of another person alleged to be a co-conspirator, say or do something carrying with it the implication that the other person is involved. The statement or the act may be admissible in evidence to prove the fact of a conspiracy and, by way of admission, the participation of the maker of the statement or the actor in that conspiracy. But evidence of neither the statement nor the act should, except in the circumstances which we shall elaborate presently, be admitted against “the other person” to prove his participation because it would for this purpose be hearsay or the equivalent of hearsay."
24.1.3. Quoting at page 3, the High Court in Ahern case quoted in that judgment at 93-4, the following words:
"A conspirator may, in the absence of another person alleged to be a co-conspirator, say or do something carrying with it the implication that the other person is involved. The statement or the act may be admissible in evidence to prove the fact of a conspiracy and, by way of admission, the participation of the maker of the statement or the actor in that conspiracy. But evidence of neither the statement nor the act should, except in the circumstances which we shall elaborate presently, be admitted against “the other person” to prove his participation because it would for this purpose be hearsay or the equivalent of hearsay."
24.1.4. There are many references to the fact that members of the Pseudo Board are involved in that conspiracy. I am the victim of this conspiracy which is referred to in the context of that case by Murray J as "the other person". I quote the passage:
“For example, it may be possible in a case of conspiracy to commit armed robbery to conclude from the fact that one accused wearing a disguise was present in a bank at the same time as another accused, similarly disguised, was waiting outside the bank in a motor vehicle with the motor running, that both were engaged in a common enterprise to rob the bank. For the purpose of reaching that conclusion it is permissible to use the acts and declarations of each, even in the absence of the other, not as proof of the truth of any assertion or implied assertion of the participation of the other, but as facts from which the combination might be inferred. Utterances for this purpose may be regarded as facts no less than acts and, indeed, in the United States are sometimes called verbal acts. In the example given it would be possible to reach the conclusion, admitting the evidence for the purpose described and considering it against each accused separately, not only that there was a conspiracy but also that each of the two accused was a participant."
24.1.5. Therefore, it is possible for the public in the public interest to prove that there is indeed a conspiracy to defeat justice wrought by members of the Pseudo Board pursuant to s.35 of the Act. They are lawyers and top lawyers too.
24.1.6. This is a very important task for members of the public to ensure that the regulator of the legal profession in WAfunction efficiently and effectively in the public interest because it is the electorate who must be protected by a good government of Western Australia such that they are not being swindled by dishonest lawyers.
24.1.7. This will prevent the justice system from failing as it is already failing members of the public for a long time. Litigation and justice should not be an expensive affair if lawyers are honest and they must seek to earn an honest living instead of plundering and pillaging innocent members of the public.
24.1.8. Judges in this country have never been tried by members of the public because they are engaged in mysterious works that cannot be delved into let alone be understood or gauged by ordinary persons with an ordinary minds. They are trying members of the public but they have never been tried because they occupy prestigious positions and offices. It is for our politicians's duty to ensure that Judges are efficient and proficient too and are always being kept on their guard. This is one good thing for good governance of Australia.
24.1.9. It takes a lawyer to surmount this monumental task. But lawyers are in a quandary too as they are also involved in a conspiracy to prevent this from happening. This is a rare and exceptional circumstances where a former lawyer is able to help the police to solve these problems caused by persons who are entrusted with the law and who are to there to see that justice be done but is not reasonably seen to being done. No lawyer who had misled the court of appeal in this case should be allowed to get away with it. It is being done before Ken Martin J in Michelides No.2 and this fact cannot be ignored by the Court of Appeal Judges Pullin JA and Newnes JA, who are now becoming aware of this.
24.1.10. The public should not be hoodwinked. If it can happen once, it can happen again and again until some courageous and public spirited person who is independent enough and is willing to perform this heroic task for which his name will go down in the history of Western Australia. It must be remembered that the law does not respect persons but respect the authority of that person who is endowed with authority by our government of the day. If that authority is being abused, that person behind that authority is no longer worthy of our respect.
25.1. Dishonesty is the prime element of a conspiracy to defraud [or to defeat justice] [My emphasis].
25.2. At page 9 Toohey and Gaudron JJ put it at 54, "dishonesty is a characteristic of the means agreed to be employed ……., "the need for there to be an agreement to use dishonest means" (58) to the prejudice of the victim's economic interests [or professional status as an independent lawyer] [My Emphasis]… before they can convict." (59).
25.3. Consistently with that view, at 61 their Honours concluded that:
"In the case of conspiracy to ….. it will ordinarily be sufficient …as to the facts … if the agreed means are to be characterised as dishonest. Alternatively, …. if satisfied as to those facts, they will be satisfied that the agreed means were dishonest. Only in the borderline case will it be necessary for the question whether the means are to be so characterized….."
25.4. At page 10, the view of Toohey and Gaudron JJ is clear. For the purpose of conspiracy to ….. there must be proved to be an agreement made between the alleged conspirators or any two or more of them. The agreement must be one ["to defeat justice"][My Emphasis] i.e it must be one the purpose or object of which is, so that the common intention of the conspirators is, that the victim's financial or economic interests are to be imperilled or prejudiced by dishonest means. Whether the means agreed upon are properly to be characterised as dishonest is a question of law for the trial Judge, who must decide whether any of the means …. may be so characterised according to ordinary notions of dishonesty in that: "... they assert as true something which is false and which is known to be false or not to be believed to be true, or if they are means which the conspirators know they have no right to use or do not believe that they have any right to use the means in question." (60)
25.5. at page 11 ….giving effect to the conspiracy are in fact dishonest according to the ordinary standards of right thinking members of the community. Therefore what was required to be established as the mental element in the crime of conspiracy to … was "the intention to prejudice the interests of a third person by the use of means that are dishonest." …… unnecessary to establish that the offender knew or understood that he or she was acting dishonestly by the standards of ordinary people. ……whether or not the means agreed upon were dishonest was a question of characterisation, a question of law to be determined by the trial Judge, giving the word "dishonesty" its ordinary English meaning:
"It is not for juries by defining dishonesty to hold what is or is not a conspiracy to ….. It is the Judge's task to determine whether the facts relied on …. constitutes a conspiracy ……... If the Judge finds that they do, it is the jury's task to determine whether the relevant facts have been proved so as to make the accused guilty of the offence."
"In most cases of conspiracy to … , to prove dishonest means ….will have to establish that the defendants intended to prejudice another person's right or interest or performance of public duty by: at page 12:
- . making or taking advantage of representations or promises which they knew were false or would not be carried out;
- . concealing facts which they had a duty to disclose; or
- . engaging in conduct which they had no right to engage in.
