MAYNES V CASEY

MAYNES V CASEY There are 5 ways for one person to pass property on to another person: 1. a gift 2. an act of inheritance through a signed and witnessed Will & Testament. 3. a signed contract of sale 4. a signed and sealed court order 5. a crime. Every court order removes property from one man and gives it to another. Whether through a fine, the removal of property of some kind, the jailing of a man’s body. Our common law guarantees that only a man or woman in the role of a Stipendiary Magistrate or a Justice can do that. And that person must have a Commission sealed with the Royal Seal which holds the power of the Magna Carta and the Habeas Corpus Act 1862, guaranteeing justice has been done. For that Stipendiary Magistrate or Justice to prove they have that lawful authority to take your property, they must sign the order and it must carry the seal of the common law jurisdiction, the Law of the Land of the Commonwealth of Australia. 23rd December 2010: Judge Margaret Sidis, a coram in a civil law jurisdiction, stated on paper: “The plaintiffs are to pay the defendants’ costs of the proceedings as assessed or agreed.” A Coram is a person that is not a judge, acting as a judge. Coram Margaret Sidis did not, and has never, signed that order. In fact, no justice or Stipendiary Magistrate has signed that order to this day. 27th July 2012: Sally Nash, from SALLY NASH & CO LAWYERS, on behalf of Geoffrey John Casey & Samuel Ian Casey, began an action to recover $141,196.59 from us. 1st November 2012: Registrar Tesoriero of the Federal Magistrates Court, stated on paper that we were bankrupt. No Stipendiary Magistrate or Justice signed that document, nor was it sealed. It was a piece of paper with typing on it. In a phone conversation with a particular judge in that court during the following week, he stated, no judge has signed that order and no judge will sign that order. The High Court of the Commonwealth of Australia stated in 4 CLR (important) cases that a Registrar does not have the power to authorise an order and cannot constitutionally be given that power. Therefore, unless a stipendiary magistrate or a justice, signs the order, it is null and void and any action that proceeds is criminal. November 2012 to current 2013: Using that null and void piece of typing, unsigned by any judge in the Federal Court: 1. Geoffrey & Samuel Casey’s lawyer Sally Nash, appointed trustees over our estate - Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe of PPB Advisory. 2. Paul Devery, the General Manager of Cowra Shire Council, and Bill West, Mayor of Cowra Shire Council, sacked Sue from her elected position as a Councillor. 3. Janine Finlayson, Editor of the Cowra Guardian viciously and with intent maligned the good name of Sue in that newspaper. 4. Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe of PPB Advisory, placed a caveat over our property, taking our interest in our land, but leaving us to continue paying the mortgage. 5. Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe of PPB Advisory offered our property to a neighbour, Alison Le Mesurier, a mate of Geoffrey Casey. 6. Westpac Bank froze our wage account. On being informed of the null and void order, Larnie Mulford, the manager, contacted us 2 weeks later with an order signed by Registrar Tesoriero, from Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe of PPB Advisory. That bank still holds approx $2,500 of our wages & refuses to release it. 7. Geoffrey & Samuel Casey’s lawyer Sally Nash & Co, who is now also acting for Scott Darren Pascoe and Andrew John Scott., forwarded a document, wherein Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe of PPB Advisory, issued a NOTICE TO VACATE, signed by Scott Darren Pascoe. 8. Vesna Bosancic, a Compliance Investigator Enforcement Officer from ITSA (Insolvency & Trustee Service Australia) has been harassing us stating we needed to fill out government forms listing all our assets. Vesna was informed that she was using that null & void order to make her demands and 2 weeks later she too had received an order signed by the Registrar, from (you guessed it) Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe of PPB Advisory. 9. Sally Nash, acting for Scott Darren Pascoe and Andrew John Scott, filed a Claim to seize our property and have us removed. The order used here was also signed by the Registrar but was a different document to that supplied by the Westpac Bank. 10. Scott Darren Pascoe and Andrew John Scott have taken our names off the Certificates of Title to our land and replaced them with their own. There is absolutely no mention of their positions or the company they worked for. These 2 men now claim ownership of our property. 11. The Sheriff of New South Wales, Orange office, Sergeant Michael Carpenter, has stated in writing – “All occupants are hereby given notice that they must vacate the premises prior to 11:00:00 AM on Tuesday 8 October 2103, otherwise action will proceed to evict you without further warning. There is no further extensions to this time frame unless initiated by the Plaintiff.” Later November 2012: An article in the Cowra Community News, edited by ex-councillor , entitled $20,000 Out Of Pocket. (you can read this article at the end of this newsletter). 1. In this article Geoffrey Casey stated “costs for he and his son….amounted to about $20,000.” 2. Geoffrey Casey stated that “he will not receive any of that money, but will be out of pocket by $20,000.” 3. Geoffrey Casey stated that the costs of $141,196.59 belonged to his solicitors. 4. Geoffrey Casey had contracted with defence barrister Julian Trebeck from YELDHAM PRICE O’BRIEN LUSK, a major legal firm specialising in the areas of professional liability, legal malpractice and insurance litigation. Currently at 17th September 2013: We are expected to voluntarily vacate our home for 37 years on the orders of an unsigned piece of paper with typing on it. These are the facts Geoffrey Casey has presented: 1. Judge Margaret Sidis ordered that we should pay Geoffrey John Casey and Samuel Ian Casey’s costs pending an assessment or an agreement. 2. Geoffrey John Casey is a solicitor. He knows that anything he states in public can be used against him and therefore must be the truth. 3. Geoffrey John Casey has stated in public that his costs are $20,000. 4. Geoffrey John Casey has not given us a bill or a costs assessment for that amount. 5. Geoffrey John Casey has stated that the demanded $141,196.59 is owed to his defence solicitors. 6. That does NOT include his costs. 7. Judge Margaret Sidis did not order us to pay YELDHAM PRICE O’BRIEN LUSK, nor did we hold a contract to pay them. Remember Geoffrey John Casey – in that article – stated twice, that the $141,196.59 is NOT his money. If it is not his debt, then why is the actual debtor not the one suing us? Our personal belief is this – 1. Geoffrey John Casey holds or did hold legal indemnity (insurance) as a solicitor. 2. The legal firm he employed in this matter was and/or is a firm acting for that insurance indemnifier. 3. YELDHAM PRICE O’BRIEN LUSK specialize in professional liability, legal malpractice and insurance litigation – not common law trespass matters. 4. Geoffrey John Casey did not have to pay YELDHAM PRICE O’BRIEN LUSK before starting this matter because they have already been paid by that insurance indemnifier. 5. Geoffrey John Casey is suing us to recover the insurance companies costs. 6. Geoffrey John Casey is acting in fraud as a third party collector for that debt. Geoffrey John Casey, in concert with the principals of YPOL, Simon Lusk and Robert Finnigan, Sally Nash, Andrew John Scott and Scott Darren Pascoe – is now asking for the amount of • $142,589.26 • PPB’s future estimated costs of $56,141.51 • our mortgage with the Commonwealth Bank of $138,000 • other unidentified costs Scott and Pascoe have valued our estate at $685,000, half its real value. • They will seize our livestock and equipment to be sold. • They will sell our tools of trade. • As bankrupts, our wages will be held at $40,000 per year for 3 years. • Anything over that amount they seize. • We are ’allowed’ a vehicle to the value of $6,000. • We can not travel without permission. • We will have a sad and sorry credit rating for 7 years. In the event we behave ourselves, the bankruptcy will finalize after 3 years. If we don’t, they can keep us bankrupt as long as they want. So this is our case for you all to consider. • Judge Sidis ordered us to pay the defendant’s costs. • She did not sign that order so it has no authority, but they have acted on it. • Defendant’s costs are $20,000 • Defendants have not asked us to pay their costs. • Defendants are bankrupting us on behalf of other persons. • Those other persons want $142,589.26 and other costs. • Our property has 12 individual titles, 2 – 3 of which could cover the supposed debt, yet they have seized the whole 12. • The potential total of their gain may be in the vicinity of $1 million. I stated at the start of this document that there are 5 ways for one person to pass property on to another person: 1. a gift Lindsay & I have not given our hard-earned home to Geoffrey Casey and his mates. 2. an act of inheritance through a signed and witnessed Will & Testament. Neither Geoffrey Casey or his mates are in our wills. 3. a signed contract of sale We have not sold our home and land to Geoffrey Casey and his mates, nor do we plan to. 4. a signed and sealed court order The court orders at every stage of this fraud remain unsigned by any man or woman holding any lawful commission under seal. 5. theft. We believe we are the victims of the crime of fraud and theft. Every man and woman in Cowra is now being given the chance to act as the Jury in a real-life crime that is being perpetrated against an ordinary couple in this community by a man who believes he has the power to do so. That man is a solicitor named Geoffrey John Casey. Geoffrey John Casey and Samuel Ian Casey are using the legal system to steal our wealth. We are in our early 60’s and have spent our lives working hard. Geoffrey John Casey may not be getting any of that $142,589.26, as he has publicly stated, but as the agent of this crime, as the person whose name is making it appear legal – I wonder what his share of the $1 million bonus will be? Michael Carpenter, the Sheriff from Orange will apparently be assisting in the theft by throwing us off our property at 11am on Tuesday 8th October 2013 and he will bring the police. Michael Carpenter will be doing that for a man who has never sent us a bill for his costs and using the authority of a piece of paper with typing on it. Common law is about the living folk protecting and defending other living folk from harm by criminals. We invite you all to be at our property on the morning of the 8th October, to simply watch & record a real crime in action. Bring a video cam, recording devices, etc. Please bring your own food, drink and toilet paper – we can supply the ‘long drop’ and a working barbecue.! 16km between Woodstock and Wyangala Dam on the dam road – turn at the signs. For more information, you are very welcome to Email: flora@reachnet.com.au Phone: 02 6345 1254 Sue & Lindsay (Sam) Maynes Berkeley Bullfrog Road Woodstock NSW 2793 ------------------------------------------------ You may all ask – why don’t you just pay the amount, why give yourself grief? The answer is simple, the debt is not ours and Geoffrey John Casey has stated that in public. We will not be made to pay a debt that does not belong to us. That would mean we have to agree to be robbed. That we will not do. This whole case is part of a class action seeking direction in the International Courts of Human Rights. Each of the people listed have been placed on their Vicarous Liability to provide the lawful authority by which they have pushed this crime against us. When the class action wins over there, each of them will be asked to answer that question in front of a real judge in a court of the People of the Commonwealth of Australia. Our trust and faith is in our LORD God who said in Romans 14:10: “So then each of us shall give account of himself to God.” The men & women of Cowra and District are invited to be witnesses in a real live drama! Maynes v Casey $20,000 out of pocket Solicitor debunks rumour of windfall in disqualified councillor’s court saga COWRA solicitor, Geoff Casey, has scotched a rumour gaining currency in the community that he will receive some or all of the $141,196.59 being sought from disqualified Cowra Shire councillor. Sue Maynes, and her husband Sam. The judgment is the result of the couple’s failed trespass action against Mr Casey and his son, and appeals to higher courts. Mr Casey, of Garden & Montgomerie, has told CCN that he will not receive any of that money, but will be out of pocket by about $20,000 now that the trespass action has been finalised in favour of he and his son, Sam Casey. Trespass proceedings were initiated by Mr and Mrs Maynes after Sam Casey tried to serve them with statements of claim when Cowra Shire Council sued for non-payment of rates, Mr Casey says. The co-defendants named in the Maynes’ action were Cowra Shire Council and Geoff and Sam Casey, claiming more than $750,000 for trespass and breach of privacy. The three parties defended the proceedings, says Mr Casey, but the Mayne’s the dropped proceedings against Cowra Shire and were ordered to pay its costs. Mr Casey says costs for he and his son to attend the six-day hearing in Sydney, including travel, accommodation and general expenses and loss of earnings from their work, amounted to about $20,000. In a Letter to the Editor received by CCN this week, Mr Casey says the hearing before Justice Dianne Truss, in the Sydney District Court, returned a verdict for both father and son against Mr and Mrs Maynes, who were directed to pay costs. But the couple then appealed to the New South Wales Supreme Court, Mr Casey writes “They lost the appeal. They were directed to pay the costs of the application,” his letter states. “(They) then sought leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. “They were refused leave and orders to pay the costs of that application. “Our solicitors (for Geoff and Sam Casey) then filed with the (New South Wales) Supreme Court a bill of costs which resulted in the costs being assessed at $141,196.59.” Mr Casey has told CCN that that sum, the subject of the Maynes’ bankruptcy judgment, is owed to his defence solicitors and not to him. http://www.cowracommunitynews.com/viewnews.php?newsid=2330&id=1

NOTICE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER: BY LE THUAN PHAM

Notice of a Constitutional Matter served on the Attorneys General, Federal and State Inbox x chas x 5:23 AM (2 hours ago) to fire, info, Ben, FKLegal, Tamar_Hopkins, senator.brandis, office, robert.clark, Attorney, Minister.Misch., agd, Brian.Wightman, corbell, john.elferink, Paul, priscilla, office, greg.barber, Colleen, sue.pennicuik, richard.dalla-., christine.camp., vplrc, andrew.homer, helen.mason Dear Attorneys General, Federal and State, 1. You are hereby notified and served with a Notice of a Constitutional Matter on the conduct of the Australian Judiciary including the High Court Australia; 2. We believe it to be a conspiracy to pervert the Crimes Act 1914 s42, s43, s44, inter alia; 3. We seek to know if the Commonwealth will comply with its own laws, leaving aside international laws and treaties; 4. We seek to know if the Attorney General and the Commonwealth Senate will continue to conspire to pervert the Australian Constitution, in their attempt to profit from their proceeds of their crime against humanity, including Aborigines, Refugees and other Australians. Reply to Robert Alan Thorpe (Djuran Bunjileenee Borun Mundundarung) 175/110 Elizabeth St, Richmond 3121 PS. to the YouthLaw Centre, we seek that you provide us with the legal documents and any appeals you are seeking against the Williams (?) decision, against your client and he can contact us asap ====================== IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA [Melbourne] REGISTRY No. of 2012 BETWEEN: Robert Alan Thorpe (Djuran Bunjileenee Borun Mundundarung) First Plaintiff Krauatatungalung Tjapwhurong Aborigines People Second Plaintiff(s) and Denise Weybury (Registrar High Court Australia) First Defendant Rosemary Musolino (Registrar High Court Australia) Second Defendant Attorney General (Commonwealth Australia) Third Defendant Robert William Clark, Attorney General (State of Victoria) Fourth Defendant President of Australian Human Rights Commission (Commonwealth Australia) Fifth Defendant Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VIC) Sixth Defendant Simon Paul Whelan (Court of Appeal Victoria) Seventh Defendant Peter Norman Vickery (Court of Appeal Victoria) Eighth Defendant Geoffrey Arthur Akeroyd Nettle (Supreme Court Victoria) Ninth Defendant Marcia Ann Neave AO (Supreme Court Victoria) Tenth Defendant Gregory Howard Garde AO (Supreme Court Victoria) Eleventh Defendant Karin Leigh Emerton (Supreme Court Victoria) Twelfth Defendant Nemeer Mukhtar (Supreme Court Victoria) Thirteenth Defendant President VCAT Victoria (VCAT Victoria) Fourteenth Defendant Prothonotary (Supreme Court Victoria) Fifteenth Defendant Dep President Ian Lulham (VCAT Victoria) Sixteenth Defendant S/Member Cremean (VCAT Victoria) Seventeenth Defendant Principal Registrar (VCAT Victoria) Eighteenth Defendant Judicial Registrar Mark Pedley (Court of Appeals Vic) Nineteenth Defendant Shane Marshall (Federal Court Australia) Twentieth Defendant NOTICE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER 1. The Appellant gives notice that this proceeding involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation within the meaning of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Nature of constitutional matter 2. The constitutional issue raised by the Plaintiff’s application to the High Court Australia pursuant to COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 75, (the Constitution), and JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 38, inter alia, on a Question of Law relating to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Commonwealth), Charter for Human Rights and Responsibility Act 2006 (VIC), inter alia, is the jurisdiction of High Court Australia, to make a bare declaration as to the privileges, powers and immunities of the High Court Registrars, Supreme Court of Victoria, and Court of Appeal, administrative and or judicial arm of Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Supreme Court Victoria, and Inconsistent Interpretation of the Charter, pursuant to s 36 and 39 of the Charter, inter alia; The determination and or lack determination of this issue may raise for consideration s 109, 75, 98, 107, 108, 117, 118 of the Constitution, inter alia. Facts showing that s 78B Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) applies 3. For over 200 years of Australia’s colonization of The Great Southern land of Australia, a history of genocide and murder and rape of Aborigines peoples exists; 4. The new form of genocide is for the Australian Judiciary to collude with Executive branch of the Commonwealth and or the States, using as a private vigilante militia, in the form of the Federal and State Police forces to terrorise and murder Aborigines and Refugees, as well as other Australians; 5. And not to be properly investigated by statutory bodies and or the Judiciary; 6. Aborigines, Refugees and Australians alike need protection from the Australian Judiciary and their vigilante police forces and court officials; 7. The Conspiracy by the High Court Australia, and its registrars, Mussolino and Weybury, inter alia, to deny the Aborigines peoples (and Immigrants and refugees) access to an effective legal, and or lawful remedy; by abusing Rule 6.07 of the high Court Rules 2004; inter alia; 8. The tactic is to refuse to give reasons for judgements, in order to abuse the legal and lawful process of legal and lawful remedies under any statutory laws. 9. On March 4th 2013, I and Mr Le Tuan Pham submitted an Application to Show Cause, together with a Notice of a Constitutional Matter, a Summons, An Affidavit(s) in support and Outline of submission. 10. The Registrar Weybury indicated that she would apply Rule 6.07; 11. We sought her reasons why she would apply that rule, and she refused to provide any reasons; 12. I and Mr Pham feel vilified that we should be forced to comply with an ultra vires action of an Officer of the court in conspiring to pervert the Crimes Act 1914 s42, s43, s44, inter alia; 13. Keifel J authorised the Registrar’s unlawful racial discrimination and vilification; once again WITHOUT proper and lawful reasons; 14. Weybury refused to return to us other documents than the Notice to Show Cause, thus we have no way to confirm what the Registrar showed to the Kiefel J; 15. In an earlier Notice To Show Cause, the other Registrar Musolino, also played her game of perverting the Crimes Act 1914 s42, s43, s44, inter alia; 16. Crennan J also authorised the Registrar’s unlawful racial discrimination and vilification; once again WITHOUT proper and lawful reasons. 17. It is an abuse of judicial immunity that doesn’t apply, because unlawful discrimination based on race and disability amounts to “acting in BAD faith”. 18. We are amazed that two female voices on the High Court Australia do not understand unlawful discrimination; It’s what the Supreme Court of India, Justices Arijit Pasayat and Aftab Alam, New Delhi, Jan 6 2008 (UNI) The Supreme Court, a decolonised highest court of India, would call an “application of the mind to the matter”; 19. In other words, Crennan and Kiefel JJ were engaging in unlawful racial discrimination and vilification; once again WITHOUT proper and lawful reasons; there is no possible other reasons. 20. In Reggie Wurridjal, Joy Garlbin And Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation V The Commonwealth Of Australia And Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust, the Honorable Justice Michael Kirby suggesting that the Aboriginality of the applicants influenced the High Court decision. 21. In Reggie Wurridjal, Joy Garlbin And Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation V The Commonwealth Of Australia And Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust, the High Court erred on the false assumption that the Commonwealth would act honorably on justice compensation, thereby engaged not only in unlawful discrimination based on races, but also vilification based on race; 22. Kirby J seems to echo the following principle: 23. Mandamus will lie for an abuse of discretion where discretion has been exercised arbitrarily and capriciously or where discretion has been exercised in bad faith, Peavey Co. V. Corcoran 714 S.W.2d 943. In such instances the abuse amounts, in effect, to no discretion. Mandamus is warranted when the abuse is clear or results in a manifest injustice, Reis V. Nangle 349 S.W.2d 943. Mandamus will lie when an official refuses to act when he has a duty to act and refuses to do so. 24. In Tomasevic v Travaglini & Anor [2007] VSC 337 (13 September 2007), Justice Bell indicates that it is the duty of the judicial officer to assist the unrepresented litigant, when inept and corrupt lawyers in Legal Aid and other community legal centres, refuse to act on the written law, namely the Charter for Human Rights and Responsibility Act 2006 (VIC), inter alia 25. The conspiracy to pervert the rule of law and the Crimes Act 1914 s42, s43, s44, inter alia, has filtered down to the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Victorian Court of Appeal; 26. Applications by Mr Le Tuan Pham pursuant to the Charter to Court of Appeal, Whelan and Vickery, Nettle and Neave have refused to answer the question of an interpretation of the Charter or an interpretation of other statutes pursuant to the Charter; 27. When Mr Pham asked to have the orders and reasons authenticated by Whelan and Vickery, Nettle and Neave, the Court of Appeal refused to the do so; 28. Whelan and Vickery, Nettle and Neave refused to release an undoctored transcripts of proceedings; 29. The Plaintiff instructed Mr Pham to submit an application under the Administrative Law Act, for himself and the Aborigines people; 30. The prothonotary conspired to remove the Plantiff’s name from the proceedings without his consent; 31. An appeal from the Associate Justice Mukhtar as to the validity of the Prothonotary’s ultra vires action to the Supreme Court Judge Emerton; 32. Emerton J refused to consider the facts and evidence in the Appeal Book, including the Plaintiff’s Affidavit; 33. Emerton J allowed the Victorian Attorney General, Robert Clark and his lawyers, to interfere with proceedings and conspired with the Real Estate Agent, Mr Tony Rachele, in order to rort money from the defendant Ms Minh Nguyen; 34. Emerton J could not get the facts correct and had to be told by the lawyers of the Attorney General of her ineptitude; 35. When the Plantiff was in Queensland, Mr Pham asked that Emerton J allow the Plaintiff enough time to come speak for himself, 36. Emerton J refused without reasons; 37. According the Supreme Court of India, Emerton J is applying her mind to the matter in a way that breaches the Discrimination Act in perverting the Crimes Act 1914 s42, s43, s44, inter alia; 38. Emerton J was brazenly ultra vires because the High Court Australia authorised unlawful disctimination based on race in Reggie Wurridjal, Joy Garlbin And Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation V The Commonwealth Of Australia And Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust; 39. Emerton J and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal including the President of VCAT (Garde J) and the Deputy President I. Lulham denied Mr Pham medical care and hospitalisation by refusing his medical certificate from a major hospital; Application of the mind to the matter; 40. Breaches of the Charter: inter alia 8. Recognition and equality before the law (1) Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law. (2) Every person has the right to enjoy his or her human rights without discrimination. (3) Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination. 41. 13. Privacy and reputation A person has the right- (a) not to have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and (b) not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked. 42. 24. Fair hearing (1) A person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. 43. 10. Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment A person must not be- (a) subjected to torture; or (b) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; or (c) subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without his or her full, free and informed consent. 44. An attack on Mr Pham is an attack on the Plaintiff, the Aborigines peoples and other Australians; 45. The Plantiffs are denied competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing; 46. In addition to denying Mr Pham the ability to seek medical assistance, Victorian Supreme court Judge Williams, has indicated that the conduct of the Victorian Police cannot be properly investigated internally or by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing; 47. All this stems from the ultra vires decision of the High Court Australia in Reggie Wurridjal, Joy Garlbin And Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation V The Commonwealth Of Australia And Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust, and the conduct of the Crennan, and Kiefel JJ in abusing the rule 4.06 of the High Court Rules 2004. 48. Authorities: a. Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34 (8 September 2011) b. Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Limited [2010] HCA 32 c. Gurnett v The Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [No 2][126] d. University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) e. Tomasevic v Travaglini & Anor [2007] VSC 337 (13 September 2007) f. Mandamus will lie for an abuse of discretion where discretion has been exercised arbitrarily and capriciously or where discretion has been exercised in bad faith, Peavey Co. V. Corcoran 714 S.W.2d 943. In such instances the abuse amounts, in effect, to no discretion. Mandamus is warranted when the abuse is clear or results in a manifest injustice, Reis V. Nangle 349 S.W.2d 943. Mandamus will lie when an official refuses to act when he has a duty to act and refuses to do so. FILED: Robert Alan Thorpe (Djuran Bunjileenee Borun Mundundarung) Human Rights Defender TO: The Respondents AND TO: George Brandis QC Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia senator.brandis@aph.gov.au, AND TO: Greg Smith MP Attorney-General of New South Wales office@smith.minister.nsw.gov.au, AND TO: Robert Clark MP Attorney-General of Victoria robert.clark@parliament.vic.gov.au, AND TO: Jairod Bleigie MP Attorney-General of Queensland Attorney@ministerial.qld.gov.au, AND TO: Michael Mischin MP Attorney-General of Western Australia Minister.Mischin@dpc.wa.gov.au, AND TO: John Rau MP Attorney-General of South Australia agd@agd.sa.gov.au, AND TO: Brian Wightman MP Attorney-General of Tasmania Brian.Wightman@dpac.tas.gov.au, AND TO: Simon Corbell MLA Attomey-General of the Australian Capital Territory corbell@act.gov.au, AND TO: Johan Wessel Elferink MLA Attomey-General of the Northern Territory of Australia john.elferink@nt.gov.au, …………..……………………… 3 attachments — Download all attachments HC_form-21_08102013.rtf HC_form-21_08102013.rtf 122K View as HTML Download HC_Notice_of_A_Constitutional_Matter_08102013_2.rtf HC_Notice_of_A_Constitutional_Matter_08102013_2.rtf 157K View as HTML Download HC_Form-12_08102013_3.rtf HC_Form-12_08102013_3.rtf 182K View as HTML Download chas x 5:47 AM (1 hour ago) to fire, bcc: me Dear Rogerio, Berto, Hilda Zhang, Helen Tsigounis, Friends, Stooges and other, 1. its taken a while but the papers are almost done, 2. If you have received the attachment the arguments are almost complete 3. As I said, there are 7 high court judges, you want them all to taint their name!! 4. I have named Crennan and Kiefel, so you just have to get to the Chief justice. 5. Just replace your own names and add your cases, and file them

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA - BY SUE MAYNES

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wTiTq8clLSehp-HWvRODlJ4N23UFD-jWYzESZxA99CQ/edit?usp=sharing

WA GOVERNMENT WATCHDOG UNDER REVIEW

Government watchdog under reviewThe West Australian

... after Chief Justice Wayne Martin described Mr Wauchope as "unaccountable". ... Justice Martin warned Mr Wauchope was an official "not subject to ministerial ...

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Solicitor’s duty of care to the non-client: the law summarised

The Australian Professional Liability Blog

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Solicitor’s duty of care to the non-client: the law summarised Posted: 30 Sep 2013 05:14 PM PDT In Carey v Freehills [2013] FCA 954, the firm prevailed. Justice Kenny helpfully summarised the law in relation to the circumstances in which a solicitor will be found to have a duty of care to a person who has not retained him or her: ’310                      Generally speaking, solicitors do not owe a duty of care to persons who are not their clients: see, for example, Hill v van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 (‘Hill v van Erp’) at 167 (Brennan CJ).  A solicitor owes a duty of care to a client who has retained that solicitor.  Freehills owed a duty of care to WPC and WPM, who had retained Mr Shearwood; but neither company is a cross-claimant.  In Hill v van Erp at 167, Brennan CJ said: Generally speaking, … a solicitor’s duty is owed solely to the client subject to the rules and standards of the profession.  That is because the solicitor’s duty is to exercise professional knowledge and skill in the lawful protection and advancement of the client’s interests in the transaction in which the solicitor is retained and that duty cannot be tempered by the existence of a duty to any third person whose interests in the transactions are not coincident with the interests of the client. 311                      Where a solicitor’s conduct demonstrates an assumption of responsibility, with known reliance by the plaintiff, a duty of care may arise by reason of an implied professional retainer agreement: see, for example, IGA Distribution Pty Ltd v King and Taylor Pty Ltd[2002] VSC 440 at [231] (Nettle J); Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 (‘Pegrum v Fatharly’) at 95 (Ipp J), 101-102 (Anderson J, Kennedy J agreeing); and Meerkin & Apel v Rossett Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 54 at 62 (Charles JA, Callaway and Batt JJA agreeing). 312                      There are, however, circumstances in which a duty of care on the part of a solicitor may arise independently of a retainer.  Thus, a duty of care has been said to arise in the context of negligent misstatement causing loss: see Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 and Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241, at 252 (Brennan CJ).  A duty of care has also been recognised as being owed by a solicitor to a beneficiary of a client’s will, in the absence of reliance by the third party beneficiaries: seeHill v van Erp at 166-168 (Brennan CJ), 172-173 (Dawson J), 234 (Gummow J).  Significantly, however, there the High Court emphasised the coincidence of interest between the client and the beneficiaries.  InBlackwell v Barroille Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 347 (‘Blackwell v Barroille’) a Full Court of this Court held that a solicitor owed a duty of care to the client’s trustee in bankruptcy as a result of the reliance by the trustee on the solicitor.  See further, Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy and Others (1999) 48 NSWLR 1 at 45-48 [188]-[205] and Hawkins v Clayton(1988) 164 CLR 539 at 578 (although Deane J’s analysis there depended on treating proximity as a determinative factor, an approach that has since been rejected: see below). 313                      Where a duty of care is claimed to have a risen in anew circumstance or with respect to a new category of relationships, Australian law now requires a multi-factorial approach in assessing whether a duty of care has indeed arisen.  As the New South Wales Court of Appeal noted in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649 (‘Caltex v Stavar’) 675 [101], the High Court has rejected the doctrine of proximity as a determinative factor in deciding whether a duty of care existed, as well as “the two stage approach in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 based on reasonabl[e] foreseeability, the expanded three stage approach in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 [(‘Caparo v Dickman’)] and any reformulation of the latter two”.  See, for example, Hill v van Erp at 210 (McHugh J), 237-239 (Gummow J),Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 193-194 [9]-[10] (Gleeson CJ), 197-198 [25]-[27] (Gaudron J), 208-213 [70]-[83], 216 [93] (McHugh J), 268 [245]-[247], 273 [255], 285 [280]-[287] (Kirby J), 303 [330]-[335] (Hayne J), 319 [389], 324 [398]-[400], 326 [406] (Callinan J); Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 at 577-580 [43]-[53] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan(2002) 211 CLR 540 at 583 [99] (McHugh J), 625 [234]-[236] (Kirby J); andStuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215 at 260 [132] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 314                      Caltex v Stavar has become an exemplar of the multi-factorial approach, partly because Allsop P helpfully set out, in a non-exhaustive list (at 676 [103]), the “salient features” in the evaluative task of imputing a duty of care in novel circumstances, including its scope and content.  In Caltex v Stavar Allsop P said (at 675 [100]) that the current approach: … recognises what has been said to be the use of foreseeability at a higher level of generality and the involvement of normative considerations of judgment and policy.  This approach requires not only an assessment of foreseeability, but also attention to such considerations as control, vulnerability, assumption of responsibility and nearness or proximity. His Honour continued (at 676 [102]): This rejection of any particular formula or methodology or test the application of which will yield an answer to the question whether there exists in any given circumstance a duty of care, and if so, its scope or content, has been accompanied by the identification of an approach to be used to assist in drawing the conclusion whether in novel circumstances the law imputes a duty and, if so, in identifying its scope or content.  If the circumstances fall within an accepted category of duty, little or no difficulty arises.  If, however, the posited duty is a novel one, the proper approach is to undertake a close analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the putative tortfeasor by references to the “salient features” or factors affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury. 315                      In connection with the “foreseeability” factor, Allsop P specifically said (at 677 [106]) that: In a novel area, reasonable foreseeability of harm is inadequate alone to found a conclusion of duty.  Close analysis of the facts and a consideration of these kinds of factors will assist in a reasoned evaluative decision whether to impute a duty.  Whilst simple formulae such as “proximity” or “fairness” do not encapsulate the task, they fall within it as part of the evaluative judgment of the appropriateness of legal imputation of responsibility. 316                      The list of “salient factors”, which Allsop P identified, was not intended to be exhaustive: Caltex v Stavar at 676 [104].  See alsoMakawe Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council [2009] NSWCA 412 at [17], [92]-[94]; Hoffmann v Boland [2013] NSWCA 158 (‘Hoffmann v Boland’) at [31] (Basten JA), [127]-[130] (Sackville AJA, Barrett JA agreeing).  It is unnecessary to make findings about all the factors in the list.  This point was reiterated in Hoffmann v Boland at [31], where Basten JA said that Allsop P’s “salient features”: … provide a valuable checklist of the kinds of factors which can be of assistance.  They do not constitute mandatory considerations, failure to address which will constitute error of law; nor do they lead to a formula which will provide a result in a particular case.  Each involves considerations of varying weight; some will be entirely irrelevant.  What is necessary is to focus upon the considerations which are relevant in the circumstances of the particular case. 317                      By reference to the factors mentioned in Caltex v Stavar and other relevant factors in this case, the Court must assess the circumstances in order to determine whether or not the law will impute a duty of care and, if so, its scope and content.  I interpolate that, generally speaking, where the alleged duty of care owed by a solicitor to a non-client conflicts with a duty of care towards the client, a duty of care to the non-client is unlikely to be established.  See, for example, Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 448 at [338].’