MAGISTRATE SHARRATT TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS IN VRO: 585 OF 2018

See the Link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/wy4xzn97hfl6uto/SHARRATT-RO585-2018-TRANSCRIPT.pdf?dl=0 SHARRATT-RO585-2018-TRANSCRIPT.pdf Modified today at 10:56 am Share Download 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10/7/18 1 Copyright in this document is reserved to the State of Western Australia. Reproduction of this document (or part thereof, in any format) except with the prior written consent of th e Attorney General is prohibited. Please note that under section 43 o f the Copyright Act 1968 copyright is not infringed by anything reprodu ced for the purposes of a judicial proceeding or of a report of a judicial proceeding. THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (RESTRAINING ORDERS) MI RO 585 of 2018 NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN and IAN ROBERT JACK MAGISTRATE S. SHARRATT TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS AT MIDLAND ON TUESDAY, 10 JULY 2018, AT 9.38 AM MR N.N.K. CHIN appeared in person. MR W. VOGT appeared for the respondent. MICK MC/CIVIL/MI/RO 585/2018 10/7/18 2 9.38 JSO: Next is file 585 of ’18, Chin v Jack. Nicholas Chin, Ian Jack. HIS HONOUR: No? JSO: No appearance. HIS HONOUR: No appearance of Mr Chin. Has he signed in? No? JSO: No, sir. ....., MS : (indistinct) HIS HONOUR: That was for the other bloke. ....., MS: No (indistinct) HIS HONOUR: No. No. That’s against Chin. That’s Chin the – he has handed up a case where Chin was declar ed to be a vexatious litigant. So I don’t think his own law yer would do that, but give me a look. There’s a lette r with it, isn’t there? ....., MS: There’s just an email. HIS HONOUR: Here (indistinct) I have here a (indistinct) it’s listed for mention at 10. We better wait till 10. I will stand down. All right? There’s no point doin g that (indistinct) trial. JSO: Well, I just found out she’s here, sir. HIS HONOUR: She is? JSO: Apparently. I was just going to inquire with th e prosecutor about it. HIS HONOUR: I won’t act on Chin, especially if their notice is 10. It shouldn’t, but sometimes they do, don’t they? ....., MS: Yes. HIS HONOUR: So I don’t want to go without – specially when there’s a lawyer on foot, and Mr Chin is, as a vexatious litigant, unlikely to fail to appear. Ye s. All right. So we will wait till 10, I think, for that, and if there’s anything that we can conclude, give us a be ll. I won’t be far away. MICK MC/CIVIL/MI/RO 585/2018 10/7/18 3 9.38 VOGT, MR JSO: Yes, sir. (Short adjournment) HIS HONOUR: And is there any other of the mention-only matters ready to proceed? JSO: They’ve just arrived, sir. HIS HONOUR: Okay. All right. I will stand down for a while. JSO: I can get them now, sir, if you’re minded. HIS HONOUR: Can you? JSO: Yes. HIS HONOUR: All right. Get them in. Yes. Is that Chin v Jack? JSO: That’s the one I was referring to. HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Yes. Have a yarn with (indistinct) outside. Thank you. JSO: It’s file 585, sir, of ’18, Chin v Jack. HIS HONOUR: Yes. So you’re Nicholas Ni Kok Chin. CHIN, MR: Yes, sir. HIS HONOUR: And you represent Mr Jack. VOGT, MR: Yes. If it pleases the court, Mr Vogt. HIS HONOUR: Vogt. Thank you, Mr Vogt. Look, we got an email from you this morning with cases attached. I t took a while to print out, and I haven’t really read eithe r of them yet. VOGT, MR: No. Your Honour, I will take you through the application that the respondent makes at this stage of the proceeding. The - - - HIS HONOUR: Are you saying he’s still under that order of Murray J from the – 2012? VOGT, MR: I have a copy of the decision. MICK MC/CIVIL/MI/RO 585/2018 10/7/18 4 9.38 VOGT, MR HIS HONOUR: I’ve got a copy of the decision. It would appear that, on this file, there’s no application f or leave. VOGT, MR: Correct. Well, firstly, I need to establish whether or not, on this file, there was an applicat ion to this court for leave to institute the - - - HIS HONOUR: There isn’t. VOGT, MR: The very proceeding. Then the submission that I make is that, in contempt of the order by the Sup reme Court, the applicant in this application has lodged this application. In fact, there was a prior applicatio n - - - HIS HONOUR: There was? VOGT, MR: - - - for a restraining order. HIS HONOUR: No one even noticed. There’s no flag on the computers. VOGT, MR: Perhaps there ought to be, but, in respect - - - HIS HONOUR: Perhaps there ought to be. I don’t know. VOGT, MR: - - - of the first application, that was brought in contempt of the Supreme Court order of 2 012 - - - HIS HONOUR: I think you’re right. VOGT, MR: - - - and, in the circumstances, this application must be dismissed. HIS HONOUR: I agree. VOGT, MR: If, on that basis - - - HIS HONOUR: We will (indistinct) we will let Mr - - - VOGT, MR: When one reads the application - - - HIS HONOUR: Mr Chin have his say, but yes. VOGT, MR: On the application itself, it demonstrates the misconceived bases upon which the application is br ought, which I need to establish in order to make a later application on behalf of my client, but that applic ation by Mr Chin before this court is stated to be: / 12 CommentsActivity Write a comment Post a comment to start a discussion. @Mention someone to notify them. You added this file 47 mins ago

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE REGISTRAR SOUTHWELL IN MIDLAND MAGISTRATE COURT: VRO 585 OF 2018

See the Link to this transcript at: SOUTHWELL-MID-RO585-2018-TRANSCRIPT.pdf Modified today at 10:59 am 9/8/18 1 Copyright in this document is reserved to the State of Western Australia. Reproduction of this document (or part thereof, in any format) except with the prior written consent of the Attorney General is prohibited. Please note that under section 43 of the Copyright Act 1968 copyright is not infringed by anything reproduced for the purposes of a judicial proceeding or of a report of a judicial proceeding. THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (RESTRAINING ORDERS) MI RO 585 of 2018 NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN and IAN ROBERT JACK REGISTRAR SOUTHWELL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS AT MIDLAND ON THURSDAY, 9 AUGUST 2018, AT 9.11 AM MR N.N.K. CHIN appeared in person. MS NUGENT appeared for the respondent. MICK MC/CIVIL/MI/RO 585/2018 9/8/18 2 9.11 CHIN, MR REGISTRAR: Yes. Good morning (indistinct) Mr Chin? CHIN, MR: Yes, sir. REGISTRAR: Thank you, Mr Chin. Just have a seat. And, yes, you’re appearing for the creditor. NUGENT, MS: Yes. Nugent. REGISTRAR:Miss Nugent. NUGENT, MS :(indistinct) REGISTRAR: My apologies. I made an assumption it was Mister. Thank you. So this is an application by you, Mr Chin - - - CHIN, MR: Yes, sir. REGISTRAR: - - to suspend enforcement of the judgment. CHIN, MR: Yes. REGISTRAR: Okay. Now, firstly, just a bit of background to set the scene. So, Mr Chin, this was a judgment (indistinct) out of a – an application in a restraining orders matter. CHIN, MR: Yes. REGISTRAR: And determined by the magistrate in that matter that, as you had – there was a declaration that you were a vexatious litigant, that you could not institute proceedings without the leave of the court. So - - - CHIN, MR: Yes, sir. REGISTRAR: - - - do you acknowledge that you are – my words – there is an order that says that you are to – well, you are prohibited from instituting any proceedings in any Western Australian court or tribunal without the leave of that court or tribunal. So what is colloquially known as a vexatious litigant. Do you acknowledge that? CHIN, MR: Yes, sir. REGISTRAR: Yes. Okay. CHIN, MR: May I explain that, please. MICK MC/CIVIL/MI/RO 585/2018 9/8/18 3 9.11 CHIN, MR REGISTRAR: Well, no. I just wanted you to acknowledge that, because then that’s a fact. That’s a fact because that’s an order of the Supreme Court. So it raises the first question. CHIN, MR: I – I need - - - REGISTRAR:The first question I want to put to you is this. Given that that order has been made, then it is my preliminary view that you need to get leave of the Magistrates Court before you can actually lodge this application, that is, the application for suspension, and that follows on from the magistrate’s ruling that,in the restraining order, you needed to get leave from the Magistrates Court to actually lodge the – or commence the restraining order matter. So I think it sort of flows on naturally. CHIN, MR:May – may I - - - REGISTRAR:So I just want you to tell my why – why do you think that you can lodge this matter, this application for suspension, given that there is an order that says you are prohibited from instituting any proceedings? And instituting any proceedings in the – by definition in the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act says - - - CHIN, MR: I have explained - - - REGISTRAR: I just want to just set the scene (indistinct) it says that proceedings include: ...any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial or inquiry of any kind in the jurisdiction of the court. Any proceedings also include – or proceedings also include: ...any proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court. So my preliminary view is that you need to get leave before you can actually make this application. CHIN, MR: Can I explain that, sir. REGISTRAR: Yes. Just briefly. CHIN, MR: As I explain in my first submission, dated 11 July 2018, that was communicated to the parties and this court – that I do not have a blanket order made against me, MICK MC/CIVIL/MI/RO 585/2018 9/8/18 4 9.11 CHIN, MR: as per paragraph 149 of the – of Murray Js order or judgment in Registrar – Principal Registrar v Chin (2012). That means that I do not belong – this (indistinct) restraining order case do not belong to the category of (indistinct) that was subject to the Vexatious Proceedings Act order of Murray J. REGISTRAR: Now, that’s a particular reference to the stay of Supreme Court proceedings in (indistinct) action 1981 of 2010. CHIN, MR: That was in relation to the stay of that single Supreme Court proceedings. Any other proceedings is – does not belong to that class. That has been stayed, an d therefore - - - REGISTRAR: Okay. Okay. So I hear you. You say that, according to the (indistinct) that clause 149, and I see that, and it says: The applicant also seeks a stay of the Supreme Cour t proceedings in civil case 1981 of 2010. It is not appropriate for the court to make a blanket order staying any proceedings that have been instituted by a person. The court should consider - - - CHIN, MR: That is the only case. REGISTRAR:The court should consider each existing proceeding and whether or not proceedings should be stayed. So – and then it goes on to quote another (indistinct)case, but the only - - - CHIN, MR: And - - - REGISTRAR: - - - thing about that is in the judgment - - - CHIN, MR: Sir, can I (indistinct) sir. REGISTRAR: (indistinct) in the judgment – on page 1 of the judgment, the result – the result on page 1 of the judgment says: Order that respondent is prohibited from instituting any proceedings – any proceedings – in any Western Australian court (indistinct) / 17

LETTER TO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WA RE: VOID COSTS ORDER OF MAGISTRATE SHARRATT IN VRO 585 OF 2018

MC/CIV/MID/RO/585/2018 Chin v Jack Nicholas N Chin 9 August 2018 at 22:51 To: RE_EnquiriesWA Honourable John Quigley MLA Attorney General Address: 5th Floor, Dumas House 2 Havelock Street WEST PERTH WA 6005 Telephone: (08) 6552-6800 Fax: (08) 6552-6801 e-Mail: Minister.Quigley@dpc.wa.gov.au c.c. to Magistrates Court at Midland. cc. to Vogt Graham Lawyers atten Mr. Will Vogt cc: Legal Practice Complaints Committee cc: info@ccc.wa.gov.au Dear Attorney General Mr. Quigley VRO: 585 OF 2018: CHIN V JACK AT MIDLAND MAGISTRATE COURT - MAGISTRATE SHARRATT COSTS ORDER OF $750.00 ON 10.7.2018 AND REGISTRAR WARREN SOUTHWELL COSTS ORDER OF$500.00 DATED 9.8.2018 I refer to the above matter and would like you to solve the impasse for me in terms of the following: 1) On 3.11.2017 my Builder Ian Jack assaulted me and I reported the assault to the Police WA on 6.11.2018 which resulted in a VRO against Ian Jack. 2) On 28.12.2017 Magistrate Sharratt imposed the VRO 1005/2017 against Ian Jack in my favour, which was made final with a 2 year duration (but as a result of my trying to reinstate that VRO 1005/2017 with VRO 585/2018 as the fear of Ian Jack attacking me again is real as he is bound by his contractual obligations under the HIA Lump Contract to complete his job at our home as the SAT Mediation Agreement dated 8.1.2018 and the current Perth Magistrates Court Proceedings in CIV: 4423 of 2018), I landed myself into this trouble. 3) On 29.5.2018, Magistrate Sharratt removed the 2 year VRO 1005/2017 in stealth without conforming to the provisions of the Restraining Orders Act, 1997 WA. 3) On 10.7.2018, Magistrate Sharratt imposed a void costs order on me for alleged contempt of Court for reinstating VRO 1005/2017 with VRO 585/2018 (which I accomplished under the guidance of an officer of the Midland Court), stating that the latter was without leave of court based on the reason that there was a case of the Principal Registrar v Chin in WA Supreme Court in 2012 against me that I was made a vexatious litigant: but I do not require such leave unless the Magistrate Sharratt do find that the VRO 585/2018 is an abuse of process as per para. 149 and 151 of Justice Murray Judgment to the effect that that proceeding against me is not a blanket order to cover all other cases where I have legitimate claims or cause of actions against any other defendants. 4) Today, 9.8.2018 Mr. Warren Southwell as the Registrar of the Midland Magistrate Court again imposed a cost order on me for refusing my stay of execution application of the Sharratt Void Costs Order stating that I do need to seek court leave for the VRO 585 of 2018 under the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act, 1997 contrary to common law and legislation in force in this State. Mr. Gmail - MC/CIV/MID/RO/585/2018 Chin v Jack Page 1 of 2 https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1?ik=a95a4253c9&view=pt&search=all&permmsgid… 23/08/2018 Southwell refused to accept the fact that the Sharratt Void Costs Order is the special circumstances under the law warranting the stay of the Sharratt Void Costs Order. In fact, I do not have to do anything to it and do not have to comply with it with no legal consequences but Vogt Graham Lawyers is harassing me to no ends for my compliance with the common law of Australia. I cannot take the stress of litigation and would like to avoid it and therefore hope that you would exercise your kindly discretion to stave off all these problems of attacking an elderly person by the harshness of a legal system which does not respond to conscionability or equitable principles. This is reason for my appealing to you instead of going through the court which will be a heartache for me which I cannot bear anymore at this advanced age. 5) I do not need to appeal the Void Costs Order of Magistrate Sharratt and Registrar Warren Southwell as they are bound by the common law of Australia as promulgated by the High Court of Australia as per Kabel v DPP which is followed by the Court of Appeal in Ho v Loneragan: the void costs order of an inferior court with the missing jurisdictional facts are void and not merely voidable and there is no requirement for me to appeal against them. This is one of the principles of the unified common law of Australia pronounced by the apex court of Australia and is unlike the non-unified common law system of the United States of America. . Please find attached my three submissions documents before Magistrate Sharratt and Registrar Southwell. Please tell me what I should do as I am a disabled pensioner and have no means to pay these intimidating void costs orders and I would not like to be subject to elderly abuse by the legal system of Western Australia. Cheers NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN mobile contact: 0421642735. Show quoted text The Crime Corruption Commission of WA

VOID COSTS ORDER OF MAGISTRATE SHARRATT OF THE MIDLAND MAGISTRATE COURT IN VRO 585 OF 2018

MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA APPLICANT’S (NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN) REGISTRY: MIDLAND CASE NO: VRO 585 OF 2018 APPLICANT: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN ADDRESS: 387 ALEXANDER DRIVE, DIANELLA WA 6059 Phone 08 92757440 Mob: 0421642735 Email: nnchin2@gmail.com RESPONDENT: IAN ROBERT JACK SOLICITOR/COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: MR W.G. VOGT ADDRESS: VOGT GRAHAM LAWYERS Suite 1, Level 5, 102, James Street, NORTHBRIDGE WA 6003 Ph: 9328 5999; Fax: 9328 6046 Email: enquiries@vogtgraham.com.au DATED: 11TH JULY, 2018 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS BY APPLICANT FOR HIS CJEA FORM 9 SUSPENSION ORDER APPLICATION DATED AND FILED 1.8.2018 SERVED 2.8.2018 AGAINST MAGISTRATE SHARATT’S VOID COSTS ORDER - MADE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT DATED 10.7.2018 (SUSPENSION ORDER APPLICATION) : FOR HEARING ON THURSDAY 9.8.2018 AT 9.00 AM. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents THE REASONS FOR THE VOID COSTS ORDER DATED 10.7.2018 1 THE REASONS FOR MAGISTRATE’S SHARRATT WANTING IN JURISDICTION OR THE ERROR OF LAW OF MAGISTRATE SHARRATT: 2 Conclusion: 5 THE REASONS FOR THE VOID COSTS ORDER DATED 10.7.2018 1. The Belated Applicant’s Submission supported by the Aggravation resulted in the Void Costs Order which merit the Non-Requirement of Appeal as per the Applicant’s first, but belated submissions served by email and dated 11.7.2018 (the Void Costs Order). 2. The Void Costs Order is caused by the allegedly Fraudulent Cancellation of VRO 1005/2017 and Magistrate Sharratt’s Awareness which forms the Applicant’s Reliance: they had resulted in the Applicant Taken By Surprise as per the belated submissions. 3. This Court is bound by the common-law principle enunciated by the High Court of Australia as per the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in HO -v- LONERAGAN [2013] WASCA 20 at paragraph 32 are in these words (The Error of Law of Magistrate Sharratt): “It has long been held that a judicial order of a superior court, even if made in excess of jurisdiction, is at most voidable and has effect unless and until it is set aside: Scott v Bennett (1871) LR 5 HL 234, 245; Revell v Blake (1873) LR 8 CP 533, 544; Cameron v Cole [1944] HCA 5; (1944) 68 CLR 571, 590 - 591; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597 [151]. The position in relation to inferior courts or tribunals, however, is different. In Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte [1938] HCA 7; (1938) 59 CLR 369, Dixon J, referring to proceedings in a Court of Petty Sessions, emphasised: [T]he clear distinction [which] must be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the manner of its exercise. Where there is a disregard of or failure to observe the conditions, whether procedural or otherwise, which attend to the exercise of jurisdiction or govern the determination to be made, the judgment or order may be set aside and avoided by proceedings by way of error, certiorari, or appeal. But, if there be want of jurisdiction, then the matter is coram non judice. It is as if there were no judge and the proceedings are as nothing. They are void, not voidable (389).” THE REASONS FOR MAGISTRATE’S SHARRATT WANTING IN JURISDICTION OR THE ERROR OF LAW OF MAGISTRATE SHARRATT: 1. The Sharratt Court is wanting in jurisdiction when it ordered the Void Costs Order of $750.00 on 10.7.2018 FOR THE ALLEGED CONTEMPT OF COURT OF THE APPLICANT against the Applicant for the following reasons: 1.1. The Applicant has never been barred or banned by His Honour Justice Murray in Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC (10 January, 2012) but that Court had been misled or lead into the false belief on an error of law and error of facts that the Applicant was ever in contempt of court when he is not (indeed the finding of Magistrate Sharratt on 10.7.2018): the law does not permit such a blanket order at [149] of that wrongly cited case (the Non-Debarment). 1.2. Even if there is Non-Debarment, the learned trial judge His Honour Magistrate Sharratt must first be satisfied that the Applicant (in VRO 585 of 2018 which is a substitute for VRO 1005/2017 (the Application) (is indeed conducting vexatious proceedings pursuant to s. 4(1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act, 2002 (WA)) (the Condition of the VPR Act). 1.3. In this case, the Application is wrongly adjudged by the trial judge to be vexatious when the Condition of the VPR Act is not being fulfilled because the Applicant is merely attempting to reinstate VRO 1005/2017 by substituting it with the new VRO 585/2018 as directed and aided by a Midland Court Officer and he is therefore not even commencing a fresh action at all (the Non-Commencement of a New Action). 1.4. The Prohibited Proceedings as per Murray J in the cited case at [151] does prevent the Commencement of a New Action only in relation to Non-Debarment: however, the VRO 585 of 2018 does not belong to that class of cases as cited at [151] for which s. 6(1) of the VPR Act serves to protect the Respondent – even if the Respondent belongs to that class of person to be protected by s. 6(1) of the VPR Act, then only s. 4(1)(d) of the VPR Act would be invoked to require leave of the trial judge Magistrate Sharratt (the Non-VPR Leave). 1.5. By virtue of the Non-VPR Leave, the learned trial judge does not have the power to grant the Applicant that s.4(1)(d) VPR Leave on 10.7.2018 because on that date he ought to be hearing the Applicant pursuant to s.46 Restraining Orders Act, 1997 (WA) (the RO Hearing Proper) as opposed to the s.46 ROA Leave Hearing (the ROA Leave Hearing) which he should have granted to the Respondent on 29.5.2018 (the Non-Empowerment of the Contempt of Court Costs Order Dated 10.7.2018). 1.6. The Non-Empowerment of the Contempt of Court Costs Order Dated 10.7.2018 resulted in the Non-Cancellation of the VRO 1005/2017 Dated 29.5.2018 because of the missing step to progress from the ROA Leave Hearing to the ROA Hearing Proper which should have occurred consecutively on 29.5.2018 and 10.7.2018 respectively and these events did not happen because of the trial judge errors (the Missing s.46 ROA Hearing on 10.7.2018). 1.7. The Missing S. 46 ROA Hearing on 10.7.2018 is adumbrated by the learned trial judge’s error mistaking that the missing ROA Leave Hearing is synonymous with his decision to Cancel the VRO 1005/2017 on 29.5.2018 (the Mistaken Cancellation of VRO 1005/2017 on 29.5.2018). 1.8. Whilst the Mistaken Cancellation of VRO 1005/2017 does not require the Applicant as the person protected by VRO:1005/2017 to be present but the Missing s.46 ROA Hearing on 10.7.2018 do require the Applicant as the Person being protected by it, to be present: otherwise it would be a denial of natural justice to the Applicant (The VOID Cancellation of VRO: 1005/2017 on 29.5.2018). 1.9. The VOID Cancellation of VRO: 1005/2017 on 29.5.2018 has implications on the proper reading of ss. 16, 31 and 33 of the ROA as the VRO 1005/2017 has been made a FINAL ORDER which has a life-span of two years and cannot be terminated until its expiry date on 28.12.2019 (the VRO 1005/2017 FINAL ORDER OF TWO YEARS DURATION). 1.10. The VRO 1005/2017 FINAL ORDER OF TWO YEARS DURATION is made by the trial judge himself on 28.12.2017 to enable the Respondent to complete the HIA Job but the Respondent has recalcitrantly caused a delay of his SAT Mediation Agreement in CC 2487 of 2017 dated 8.1.2018 and this has escalated into the current proceedings between the Applicant’s spouse Irene Yok Moy Lem as the Owner of the Uncompleted HIA Job and the Respondent in Perth Magistrates Court 4423 of 2018 (the Purpose of VRO 1005/2017). 1.11. Until the Purpose of VRO 1005/2017 has been achieved by the parties as originally envisaged by Magistrate Sharratt himself, the Respondent has no entitlement under the law to have it fraudulently removed without the consent of the Applicant: the basis for its non-cancellation is based on the ground that it the original VRO 1005/2017 is necessary to be in force albeit even beyond its two-year limit period to protect the Applicant and his family members from harm or potential harm because the Respondent is required to be present at 387 Alexander Drive, DIANELLA WA 6059 to complete the HIA Job(the Necessary Protection). 1.12. By reason of the Necessary Protection, the Applicant has no desire at all material times to cause the Respondent any hardship or at all s a consequence of the VRO: 585/2018 as the Respondent is the author of his own hardship as he is the one who caused the delay of the completion of the HIA Job because he had recalcitrantly removed the Building Permit BC:18/0073 which he had obtained from the City of Stirling on 17.1.2018 which was worked out for him with his Implied Authority to his Assistant Fred Hancy through the assistance of the Applicant with his consent and knowledge at all material times on 16.1.2018 (the Respondent’s Recalcitrant Cancellation of the Building Permit to Complete the HIA Job). 1.13. The Necessary Protection must be in force because the Respondent had used the Respondent’s Recalcitrant Cancellation of the Building Permit to Complete the HIA Job as his bargaining tool for the VRO 1005/2017 to be uplifted or removed which the Applicant had refused (The Respondent’s Bargaining Tool). 1.14. The Applicant was not able to accept the Respondent’s Bargaining Tool because the Respondent has been erratic in his conduct and is without integrity in his past misconduct as he had evinced no serious intention to complete the HIA Job even after he had entered into a SAT Mediation Agreement dated 8.1.2018 with Madam Irene Yok Moy Lem who is the Applicant’s spouse (Lack of Faith in the Respondent). 1.15. The Lack of Faith in the Respondent is caused by the Respondent not completing the HIA Job according to the specifications and plans issued by the Consulting Engineers Green Start and not complying with his contractual duties to obtain first building permit, the necessary planning approvals and the development approvals for the HIA Job. He in turn had caused the Applicant’s Spouse Madam Irene Yok Moy Lem to be wrongfully and maliciously prosecuted by the City of Stirling in PE 6810, PE6811, PE6812, PE6813 all of 2018 namely: City of Stirling v Lem Case No. 42045 which is scheduled for hearing at the Perth Magistrates Court on 31.10.2018 (the Misconduct of the Respondent) 1.16. The Misconduct of the Respondent has resulted in the Building Commission of WA Enforcement Division Senior Investigator Ms. Michelle Gaudieri, currently investigating the Respondent’s Misconduct which originates from the Respondent having been prosecuted by the City of Stirling in PE 6817 of 2018 and fined $20,000.00 on 16.2.2018 by Magistrate G. Lawrence for not building according to plans and specifications submitted by him to the City. The Respondent misled the Lawrence Court by not informing it of his contractual duties as explained in the Misconduct of the Respondent and he is also believed to have instigated the City of Stirling to cause the Persecution of the Madam Lem by the City of Stirling albeit, maliciously (the Conviction of the Respondent). 1.17. But for the Conviction of the Respondent, the Applicant’s Spouse Irene Yok Moy Lem would not have to go through the rigmarole of defending the malicious persecutions of the City of Stirling engendered by the Misconduct of the Respondent: the delegated contractual Builder’s Responsibilities of obtaining the necessary building permits and planning and development approvals on time is the reason for the persecution of the owner of the HIA Job (Respondent’s Neglect Caused the Owner to be Persecuted). . . 1.18. It is therefore impossible for the Applicant to avoid the ensuing hardship caused by the reinstatement of the VRO 1005/2017 with the VRO 585/2017 as the fear of potential harm arising from the threats oral, written or implied by the Respondent, is real for the Necessary Protection as cited above as the Respondent is so unpredictable as to what he would do as past experiences have shown for which harm had occurred and may arise again (the Unpredictability of the Respondent). 1.19. Every allegation made above can be proven by documentary evidence by the Applicant even though these Submissions are not evidence in court. The Owner of the HIA Job and her spouse the Applicant are willing to be examined in court in the presence of a Mandarin Language Interpreter for Madam Irene Yok Moy Lem. The Applicant is willing to be cross-examined by the Respondent’s counsel and to provide the necessary documents. But it is not in the nature of the Owner to harbour ill-will against the Respondent despite the Applicant himself having been assaulted by the latter on 3.11.2017 and this assault forms the subject matter of this VRO:1005/2017 which is imposed by the directions of Police WA. The enmity of the Respondent arises because the Owner of the HIA Job was forced to withhold the final payment of the HIA Job Contract Price that was dissipated by the extra costs of professional engineers and architectural expenses for complying with the City of Swan Orders of Ms. Johnson and Mr. Devecchis to rectify the deficiencies of the HIA Job which is faulted upon the Respondent. This had resulted in some overreaching payments made by the Owners who are the Applicant and his Spouse. Whilst Mr. Fred Hancy, the Respondent’s building partner, is ever willing to complete the job the Respondent is the stumbling block for an amicable conclusion of this matter. The Owner is awaiting the processing of the HIA Builders Warranty Insurance Claim pending the settlement of the issues for which the VRO 585 of 2018 must be on to protect the Applicant. Conclusion: Based on the above reasons, the VRO 1005/2017 as substituted by VRO 585/2018 should be reinstated by this Court and the Void Costs Order be and is never enforceable against the Applicant by the Perth Assistant Bailiff who had attached the stated vehicle on 1.8.2018, which does not belong to the Applicant. SIGNATURE OF NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN AS THE APPLICANT: Dated 6th August, 2018.