WRITTEN ARGUMENT FOR P50 OF 2010 FILED BY ME AT THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA ON 7.1.2011

Form 18 Applicant's summary of argument (rules 26.03.2, 41.05.2 and 41.10.3)

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PERTH REGISTRY No. P50 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE SUPREMECOURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CACV 75 OF 2010 IN CHIN V THIES [2010] WASCA 230 HEARD 23.11.2010 AND DELIVERED 7.12.2010.

BETWEEN:

NI KOK (NICHOLAS) CHIN APPLICANT

and

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES First Respondent

and

PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN Second Respondent

APPLICANT'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

PART I:CASE FOR AN APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE AND HOW THE SPECIAL LEAVE QUESTION ARISES:

CASE FOR SPECIAL LEAVE:  

1.1. The Applicant's case for his application for special leave to appeal the Order of the Court Below are as follows:

1. It applied the Rules strictly, unfairly, inequitably and unreasoningly against the Applicant¹ but it did not so apply the same or similar Rules in a similar manner against the First Respondent².
2. It ignores the righteous and reasonable rulings and decision of the First Judge, Hasluck J of the s.36(1) Magistrates Court, 2004 (WA) Review Proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008³(the first stage) but it gave preference and accepted unreasoningly the plainly wrong interlocutory decision⁴ of the trial judge Kenneth Martin J at the second stage or subs.36(4) Review proceedings by ignoring the acceptable and relevant common law principle of normal approach⁵ that needs to be adopted by any judge in the interpretation of subs.36(4) or the second stage of the s.36 Review Proceedings (the second stage).
3. It refused to reject the stultification of the second stage by the trial judge by unreasonably accepting Commissioner Herron's Costs Orders as valid as it could not see through the false notion of that trial judge to the effect that the Applicant has an inherently weak case as his justifications for the said stultification.
4. It refused to accept the fact that Commissioner Herron's Costs Order is based on the void and duress-vitiated Consent Judgement of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007.
5. It refused to accept the fact that the decisions of the courts below are all respectively void judgements as they are based on the void Registrar Wilde Consent Judgement.
6. It refused to accept the fact that Commissioner Herron had contradicted himself when he admitted that he had no jurisdiction over the Musk FR944 of 2007 case yet His Honour was in jurisdictional error when he volunteered a flawed analysis of the duress issue that was not before him and he thereby made a null costs order against the Applicant. On the contrary, that learned Commissioner Herron should have simply surrendered this task over to the Supreme Court pursuant to the dictates of ss.77 and 78 of the District Court Act, 1969 (WA).
7. It refused to accept the fact that the trial judge had no basis for the stultification as the Security Costs Order against the Applicant, which is made on the wrong (two-pronged) basis:
8. 1.1.7.1. in that there are antecedent debts arising from Commissioner Herron void Costs order which allegedly fulfilled the condition of the RSC⁶ for the existence of the Security Costs Order⁷.
   1.1.7.2. The Applicant's case is allegedly ascribed as being inherently weak when the trial judge knows that it is not the case⁸ on the ground that he refused to take into account the fact that the voluminous irrelevant Defence Affidavit of the First Respondent was filed out of time and that it was not filed in conformance with Hasluck J Order in that it be concise, precise and be related to the issues at hand i.e. it must relate to the pre-contractual correspondence between the Applicant and the First Respondent before his retainer agreement was entered into by the parties and it must also provide an explanation as to why the legal costs claim was of an ever-escalating nature having regard to the fact that his retainer had been terminated by the Second Respondent since the 21.2.2005.

HOW THE SPECIAL LEAVE QUESTIONS ARISE:

2. The Special Leave Questions arise out of the following circumstances:
   1.2.1. His Honour Newnes JA secretly departed from the statutory provisions affecting leave to appeal, without inviting from the First Respondent to make a formal application and in the process His Honour denied the Applicant procedural fairness⁹. This change of status of that Application was arranged between the First Respondent and Newnes JA without the knowledge of the Applicant, which fact was being asserted by the First Respondent in his email correspondence with the Applicant before that event happened.
   1.2.2. The First Respondent had anticipated and had pre-determined the contemplated change of status of the ex-parte Application which will also have costs implications for the Applicant if his Application were to be dismissed by the Court Below. Still the Minor Cases Provisions which applies to the Application source case of FR944 of 2007¹⁰ for the second stage cannot be amenable to any costs orders except for those limited to out of pocket expenses only unless the Applicant is reasonably found by it to have abused the process of court having regard to the legislative intent of Parliament when enacting them.
   1.2.3. The First Respondent was confident that he could make himself a party to the ex-parte application which indicates that he has a way to influence the judiciary¹¹ as he had done so in the past at the first stage but he was stopped by Hasluck J and this is contained in the transcript of those proceedings.
   1.2.4. The Applicant was denied his natural justice by the refusal of the Court Below¹² in its capacity as an appeal court to carry out its adjudicative duties to make proper legal determinations and not to provide deficient reasons for its decisions to the Appellant, on the following issues, affecting the trial judge:

1. the just and proper consolidation of the Gun of Duress Case¹³ with the second stage¹⁴ pursuant to Order 83¹⁵ of the RSC, 1971 WA.
2. The unjustified, unreasonable and unlawful stultification¹⁶ of the second stage.
3. The proper inculcation of the constituent elements of morality¹⁷ into the just administration of the law, which it is bound to do and It does not do so.
4. the just discipline of its courts officer¹⁸ such that the ends of justice is not being defeated, which it does not want to do.
5. its refusal to accord due recognition of the conditions of distress and duress of Registrar Wilde and the circumstances under which her hand had been forced to enter into the compromised sham consent judgement which is the crux and the sole bone of the contention of the second stage.
6. the due recognition of the void judgments of Registrar Wilde Sham Consent cum Duress-vitiated Judgment Order with its consequent ramifications upon the similarly-circumstanced other void judgments of courts below which based themselves upon it.
7. its failure to interpret the Rules fairly and correctly by prejudging that the Applicant had not complied with the Rules in r. 43(2)(g)(i) and r.43(2)(g)(ii) .
8. Its prejudgement that the trial judge had not been biased nor prejudiced against the Applicant by not awaiting the outcome of CIV 1981 of 2010.
9. its void judgement costs orders against the Applicant in favour of the First Respondent without taking into account the Minor Cases Provisions and by taking into account the irrelevant and incorrect consideration that Magistrate Michiledes ordered for the FR944 of 2007 case to become a General Division case having regard to the fact that His Honour Magistrate Michelides was never a judge of that case and had nothing to do with it at all material times;

10. It ignored the the non-consensuality of the solicitor costs agreement entered into between First Respondent of the one part and the Applicant and his son the Second Respondent on the other part on the ground that they have been qualified with the pre-contractual terms and the First Respondent's own written undertaking to the Appellant, particulars of which are already agreed and admitted to by himself;
11. It ignored the fact of the indisputable basis of the ZERO SUM FALSE DEBT CLAIM of the First Respondent in FR417 of 2007;
12. It ignored the need for the statutory compensation for the First Respondent's wrongs against the Second Respondent for his unlawful clogging up of the latter's equity in his home property without a reasonable basis founded upon an equitable and therefore caveatable interests and his persistent recalcitrant attitude not to release it at all material times.
13. It ignored the fact that Barrister Scott Ellis was acting in conflict of interest circumstanced by his having wrongly advised the First Respondent in his defence of FR944 of 2007 and was so paid the sum of $6,000.00. He wanted to redeem his position as he was not insured as a solicitor as he could be personally liable to the First Respondent for his wrong advice as per the judgement of Hasluck J. As such he perpetuated his wrongs by misleading the trial judge that there was no evidence to the effect that Registrar Wilde was involuntary despite having the letter to Registrar Wilde dated 6.6.2007 before him, which letter he knew had caused her involuntariness to enter into the impugned consent judgement.

PART II:  FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION

1. The Court Below discriminates the Applicant and favoured the First Respondent. The Applicant had on a previous occasion lamented the fact that the justice system in Western Australia has now deteriorated and this fact has been made known to all the Parliamentarians¹⁹ of Western Australia.
2. The legal system in Western Australia is therefore being abused by the Court Below. My due respect to their Honours²⁰ who confirmed the decision of Michelides No.2 by the trial judge at the time when His Honour was the subject for my application for Mandamus Orders for his refusal to recuse himself in CIV 1981 of 2010. This case has now been adjourned by Heenan J sini die²¹ and it is now pending hearing before a Court of Appeal Judge at the direction of the Court of Appeal Registrar. Incidentally, both their Honours of the Court below also dismissed my Application for leave to appeal in another related case against the regulator of the legal profession in WA in CACV 105 of 2008 which had seen its days in the High Court in P36 of 2009 and it had came back before Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010 for Mandamus Orders because Their Honours did not determine the issue of the Pseudo Board usurping the functions of the regulator of the legal profession in WA that was left out by the trial judge Justice Chaney. Heenan J was in the right directions but took an about-turn decision by dismissing it when he was contacted by the legal officer of the regulator one Ms. Braesich. The regulator has now decided that it would not be participating in my appeal now pending before the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010 which shall be heard on 11.3.2011. This case concerns the credibility of the trial judge, now the President of SAT who had refused to make a determination of the Pseudo Board that caused the dismissal of CACV 105 of 2008 and he was also involved in persecuting me maliciously in VR87 of 2009. However, the President has now agreed to recuse himself from further hearing VR87 of 2009 which should not be further litigated on the ground of res judicata. I have also gone to the High Court in P1 of 2010 in respect of the falsification of the court records by David Taylor solicitor. I have since came back and my case is receiving attention in CIV 1877 of 2010 as the Attorney General of WA who had suggested to me that I report the criminal activity about the falsifications of court records to the Police. I have three related issues: Timothy Robin Thies extorting monies from me and my son, Lawyer David Taylor falsifying court records to stop me from obtaining my legal fees and the conspiracy of the regulator to protect their cronies²² to stop me from independent practice. I would not want to cause anybody any pain, but God help me, because I am a victim.

PART III: APPLICANT'S ARGUMENT 

The two arguments by the trial judge in favour of the stultification of the second stage is perhaps, being circumvented by Court Below whilst looking for a Rule non-compliance excuse, perhaps, as a method for dismissing the Applicant application for leave to appeal. It turns out that that excuse of a debt and a weak case does not hold water. It must be borne in mind that the First Respondent had caused untold damage to the Applicant and his son the Second Appellant whilst they were in the process of being extorted and the records of these events are replete in the relevant cases. The effects of the shock and trauma occasioned by the extortion of Mr. Thies on both the Second Respondent and his father the Applicant have had tremendous repercussions on both their psyches that will last their lifetimes. Needless to say for the Second Respondent, he already paid for his price as his psychiatrist will tell. Particularly, for the Appellant, the effects of that extortion and criminal intimidation by the First Respondent is having a lasting effect on him. Up until today, and at the time of writing this Summary, the Applicant suffers from incontinence and has to frequent the urinals and the toilets ever so often that this malady he is suffering is going to last a lifetime. He has to keep popping pills to make himself happy and to keep himself calm especially so when he has to keep fighting his case.... as his doctor will tell. Let it beware that legal professionals must not take away from poor working Australians what is not due to him or her and what is not his/her to take... away, and this is akin to stealing....and robbing from him or her. The victim will protect his property with his life.

PART IV:REASONS WHY AN ORDER FOR SPECIAL LEAVE SHOULD BE

GRANTED.

 Australian law in a democratic Australia is there to protect the common people and is not there to protect their friends. Whoever does the wrong thing by the law must be dealt with in accordance with the the law, otherwise the ordinary Australians will not be satisfied that the law is theirs to protect them and that the Australian nations belongs to all and that this nation is a democracy. If there is no, law there can only be chaos. My due respect to this court.

PART V: ANY REASONS WHY AN ORDER FOR COSTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE IN

FAVOUR OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT IN THE EVENT THAT

THE APPLICATION IS REFUSED.

The First Respondent wronged the Applicant and the Second Respondent in the following terms:

1. He has no real intention to provide legal services to the Applicant and his son the Second Respondent and he spent a lot of time investigating the case at the beginning to lay out his plan for this secret purpose.
2. His real intention was only to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Second Respondent as his client and he was not able to do it because the father was there to protect his son the Second Respondent.
3. There was no basis for his claim for legal costs let alone legal services or at most a Minor Claim which the Second Respondent tried to settle at all material times by avoiding problems with the First Respondent but the latter was thinking of extorting some $25k for a NO DEBT CLAIM by way of exploiting the vulnerabilities of his client and eventually to take away his home for nothing. That is the reason for his unflinching desire not to release the caveat stranglehold he had tightly gripped on his victim the Second Respondent for which he has had no caveatable interests.
4. He knew that he had not achieved consensuality in his solicitor-client agreement with both the Applicant and the Second Respondent at all material times but he persisted in the hope that he could break the Applicant and have his way.

PART VI: A TABLE OF THE AUTHORITIES, LEGISLATION OR OTHER MATERIAL ON WHICH THE APPLICANT RELIES, IDENTIFYING THE PAGES AT WHICH THE RELEVANT PASSAGES APPEAR. 

 LIST OF AUTHORITIES

1. Wikipedia Website for the definition of McKenzie friend at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McKenzie_friend.
2. Blogspot of Nicholas N Chin for information of legal documents filed with the Supreme Court of WA regarding current proceeeings at: http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/ ; http://www.nicholasnchin.com/
3. The government of Australia of each State and Territory and the Commonwealth Government of Australia have obligations to protect the human rights of its citizens by preventing them from being tortured by lawyer and members of the judiciary who indiscriminately protect their cronies such as to perpetuate the wrongs against the citizens of Australia. See the United Nations General Assembly at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United Nations General Assembly; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva Conventions; and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?Universal Declarations of Human Rights.
4. See the meaning of Caveatable interests in the article by S. Boyle: Caveatable Interests, Common Lore Distinguished at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v1n1/boyle11.html.

1. See the Supreme Court of WA Website at http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/content/procedure/practicedirections.aspx
   for the PDF document entitled: Consolidated Practice Directions of the Supremne Court of Western Australia, and find r. .22 which provides:
   22. For civil and criminal interlocutory hearings, trials and appeals in the General Division an Outline in electronic format is to be delivered;
   (a) by email to an address [supremecoourt.submissions@justice.wa.gov.au] as an attachment to an email message setting out in its title line the action number and short title of the proceedings.;
   (b) not later than two clear working days before the hearing.
2. Morison, WL - “FULLER, The Morality of Law” [1965] Syd Law Rw 14; (1965) 5 (1) Sydney Law Review 181 – Without morality, our Australian Laws cannot exist.

STATUTES & REGULATIONS:

3. The Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA: Subs. 60(1)(f)(3); 58(1)(a); 59(1), (3), (4) and (6).
4. The Magistrates Court Act, 2004: Subs. 36(1); Subs. 36(4).
5. The Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004: subs. 25(9) and (31)(1).
6. The Transfer of Land Act, 1893 WA ss. 137, 140.
7. The Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA Subs. 391(3); s. 397.
8. The Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill, 20034: Explanatory Memorandum Clause 25(5).
   Subclause (5): ensures that where a matter that is within the Minor cases Jurisdiction is commenced in the general jurisdiction the costs that can be awarded are the very limited costs that would be allowed had the action been commenced in the minor cases jurisdiction. The intention is to ensure that a defendant in a case that could have been commenced in the small cases jurisdiction is not thereby disadvantaged.
   Subclause (8): is derived from Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act, 1975 (UK) and allows a person who represent themselves to recover any expenses or losses incurred if they were successful in recovering costs.
   Subclause (9): is effectively a penalty clause and relieves a person from some or all of costs if the lawyer involved has improperly incurred them or wasted them due to misconduct or default. The lawyer can also be required to make payments to the party if that party is liable to another party due to the actions or omissions of the lawyer.
   Under Subclause (10) a Court cannot make an order under subclause (9) unless it has informed the lawyer and allowed the lawyer to call evidence and make submissions in relation to the proposed order.
   Subclause (11): provides that if an order is made under proposed subsection (9)(c) disentitling a lawyer to costs, the lawyer must not charge and cannot recover the costs concerned.
   Clause 31- Costs
9. It is the intention of the Bill to keep costs payable in relation to minor cases to a minimum.
10. Subclause (1) defines “allowable costs” for the purposes of this proposed section to mean court fees and service fees and the costs of enforcing a judgement.
11. Subclause (2) provides that the successful party in a minor case is entitled to an order in relation to their allowable costs but not in relation to the other party's costs though under subclause (34): the Court can make an order in relation to the other party's costs if satisfied that it is reasonable to make such an order.
12. Supreme Court (Court of Appeal ) Rules 2005 rr. 33(3)(a) and 33(4)(a); r. 43(2)(g) (I) & (ii).
13. Rules of Supreme Court. 1971 (WA) Order 83; Order 25 r.2(g).

CASE LAW

1. RE: MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [NO.2][2010] 169.
2. RE:MICHELIDES, EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256;
3. THIES V CHIN [2010] WASC 111.
4. CHIN V THIES [2010] WASCA 230.
5. RE: AN APPLICATION UNDER THE MAGISTRATES COURT ACT, 2004; EX PARTE BRECKER [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 per Beech J in Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 AT [129]; [2006] 32 WAR 501at 527, Martin CJ observed (citing Gudgeon v Black; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178-179).
13. For the deprivation of natural justice of the Applicant, se Ex parte Fealey (1897) 18 NSWLR(L) 282 AT 288-289;
14. Johnson v Johnson 92000) 201 CLR 488 AT [11], affirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy 92000) 205 CLR 327;
15. Stavin v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 16857 [2006] NSWA 71;
16. Re: JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; [1986] 161 CLR 342 (30 July, 1986);
17. Kanda v Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322 at 337;
18. Livesy v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288, at pp 293-294;
19. DIAGNOSTIC MEDLAB LTD V AUCKLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, WAITEMATA DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD AND ORS HC AK CIV 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 per Asher J.
20. Surfers Paradise Coaches P/L v TSU Chan Lin [2007] NSWSC 475;
21. DEAKIN V WEBB (1904) HCA 57; 1 CLR 585 (3 November, 1904) per Griffith, CJ quoting Hodges J;
22. PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF NSW V OSMOND (1988) 159 CLR 657 per Gibbs CJ at para. 8.

PART VII: INDICATE WHETHER THE APPLICANT SEEKS TO SUPPLEMENT THIS

SUMMARY WITH ORAL ARGUMENT.

Yes.

Dated 12th day of January, 2011

                                                                  ...................(signed).................
                                                                  ( Applicant or Applicant's counsel )

1a) The Applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court Below under subs. 60(1)(f(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA . Such leave may be made ex parte, unless the judge or the master or the Court of Appeal otherwise directs. However, that leave application was made inter-partes for the First Respondent without any formality or consent of the Applicant by His Honour Newnes JA to the detriment of the Applicant because he was ordered to pay for the costs of that application to the First Respondent, implicitly as a punishment contrary to Minor Case Provisions of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004. If it were ex-parte no such costs order could be ordered against the Applicant.

b) The Applicant's application was dismissed on the ground that he did not comply faithfully with r. 43(2)(g)(i) of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) (the Rules) in that the Grounds do not have a reasonable prospect of success and under r. 43(2)(g)(ii) of the Rules on the wrong reasoning that contradict the legal principle that the Substance of the Law do take precedence over Forms instead of vice versa.

2a) The Court Below did not require the First Respondent to conform to r.33(3)(a) and (4)(a) of the Rules to file his Answer to the Applicant's case within seven days together with his submissions, Notice of Contention and Legal Authorities.

b) The Court Below also did not require the First Respondent to comply with r. 22 of the Consolidated Practice Directions of the Supreme Court of Western Australia obtainable at the Supreme Court WA website when the latter delivered his written submissions to the Court of Appeal Registrar and the Applicant simultaneously on 22.11.20010 at 4.48 pm by way of email which did not conform with the requirement of advance notice of that document with two clear days.

3This case is reported on the Website of the Supreme Court of Western Australia as RE MICHELIDES, EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256 also referred to as RE MICHELIDES NO.1.

4This case is similarly reported as RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [NO.2][2010] WASC 169 also referred to as RE MICHELIDES NO.2.

5. RE: AN APPLICATION UNDER THE MAGISTRATES COURT ACT, 2004; EX PARTE BRECKER [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 per Beech J who said the following: “58 However, I do not accept the respondent’s submission that an applicant for prerogative relief who has demonstrated a jurisdictional error must then satisfy the court that the circumstances call for a favourable exercise of discretion. In my opinion, the position is to the contrary. In the setting of an application for prerogative relief, the discretion may be said to be a discretion to withhold relief, rather than a discretion to grant it. So, for example, in Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527, Martin CJ observed (citing Gudgeon v Black ; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179) that an appropriate starting point in the consideration of the exercise of the discretion to grant prerogative relief is that once it is found that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction the court will normally exercise its discretion in the applicant’s favour. Thus, it will normally be for those opposing the grant of relief to point to factors which justify a departure from that approach.”

See also the submissions of the Applicant before the Court Below at his website at: http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2010/07/submissions-for-grounds-of-appeal-in_15.html.

6. Order 25(2)(g) of the Rules of Supreme Court of Western Australia , 1971

7The void judgements of the courts below with their respective consequential unenforceable orders consists of the following:

a) The Involuntary and Sham Consent Judgment entered into between the Appellant and the First Respondent in FR417 of 2007 dated 7.6.2007 for the compromised sum of $11,500.00 nominally legalised to be extorted from the Appellant under conditions of duress acknowledged by Dr. Giles who is the psychiatrist of the Second Respondent and Registrar Susan Wilde of the Fremantle Magistrates Court, in Perth, Western Australia.

b) The extorted sum of $11,500.00 was paid into the bank account of the First Respondent on the 12.4.2007 but was not acknowledged receipt of by the First Respondent as he had deliberately given a wrong bank account number for the Applicant to place the extorted monies into. This gave the First Respondent an opportunity to renege on his written settlement agreement to further escalate the compromised sum of $11,500.00 to $13,500.00 and the failure to pay this further sum caused the First Respondent to refuse to release his caveat stranglehold over the Second Respondent home property at No. 29, O'Dell Street, Thornlie WA 6107 until it was removed by the trial judge in 2010.

c) Registrar Wilde was unwilling to enter into the sham consent judgement because she and all concerned parties were aware of the conditions of duress being exerted by the First Respondent upon the Second Respondent and his father the Applicant until conditions become unendurable when the Second Respondent lost his mind for the second time. This unbearable condition was informed by the Applicant to Registrar Wilde in his letter to her and to all parties concerned dated 6.6.2007 which precipitated that sham Consent Judgement.

d) The Applicant started a Minor Claim case in FR944 of 2007 claiming his $6,000.00 that was extorted by the First Respondent from himself as part of the $11,500.00 that was extorted from both the father and son. This resulted in Magistrates Musk dismissing his claim, resulting in the Applicant appealing that decision to the District Court in Appeal No.6 of 2008 which was dismissed by Commissioner Herron.

e) Commissioner Herron dismissal of Appeal No.6 of 2008 caused the Applicant to appeal the sham Registrar Wilde's Consent Judgment to Magistrates Michelides in FR417 of 2010. He dismissed it resulting in the Applicant making the first stage of the s.36(1) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 Review Proceedings before Hasluck J who granted the Review Orders on an ex-parte basis.

f) The costs orders of the Magistrates Musk and Magistrate Michelides was stayed by Hasluck J but the s.36 Review Proceedings had no jurisdiciton over the District Court Commissioner Herron costs orders.

8The records of the proceedings before the trial judge Kenneth Martin J in the second stage of the Review Proceedings was reasonably apprehended to be biased against the Applicant which caused the latter to call for His Honour's recusal which he had refused to accede. This situation precipitated an Application for Mandamus Orders in CIV 1981 of 2010 that was not heard by Heenan J as he had no jurisdiction for prerogative orders against another judge of the same rank as himself. Therefore the matter is pending hearing before a Court of Appeal Judge as directed by the Court of Appeal Registrar.

9See the transcript of the proceedings before Newnes and Pullin JJA to be read together with the Amended Ground of Appeal of the Applicant in CACV 75 of 2010 for leave to appeal against the decision of the trial judge Kenneth Martin J in the website of the Applicant at: http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/search?q=amended+grounds+of+appeal+

10See the Amended Submissions of the Applicant that was presented before Newnes and Pullin JJA which details the case of the Applicant at his website at: http://wwwnicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2010/11/cacv75-of-2010-amended-submissions-with.html. See footnote No.6 for an analysis of the legislative intention of Parliament with regard to the Minor Cases Provisions of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings), Act, 2004.

11See the email correspondence between the First Respondent and the Applicant posted at the blogspot of the Applicant at: http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2010/08/lawyer-timothy-robin-thies-threatens-to.html..

12http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2010/07/submissions-for-grounds-of-appeal-in_15.html

13The First Respondent abused his position as the solicitor for the Second Respondent and the Applicant by starting the CIV1112 of 2007 case in the Supreme Court for refusing to remove his unlawful caveat against the home property of the Second Respondent for which he does not have caveatable interests. He used this as his gun of duress to extort the sum of the Sham Compromised Debt of $11,500.00 from the Applicant himself in the Fremantle Magistrates Court CA FR417 of 2007 for an ever-escalating sum of a ZERO SUM FALSE DEBT of some $25k. The Appellant's son's vulnerabilities caused the Applicant to settle the extorted monies in the sum of $11,500.00 but Registrar Wilde who entered into that Consent Judgment was unwilling to allow this extortion to happen. The extorted monies was paid to the First Respondent on 12.4.2007 with the duress-vitiated settlement deed entered into by the non -consensual parties arranged by the First Respondent through the Second Respondent's psychiatrist Dr. Giles. In the meantime, Registrar Wilde was constantly being updated with the duress situation until her hand was forced to enter into that duress-vitiated Compromised Consent Judgment by the letter of the Applicant addressed to her and to all parties concerned dated 6.6.2007, under untenable conditions, on 7.6.2007. This is the involuntary consent judgment of Registrar Wilde that forms the basis of the costs orders of Magistrates Musk in FR944 of 2007 which was appealed to the District Court before Commissioner Herron in DC Appeal No,.6 of 2008. The Sham Consent Judgment of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007 was finally appealed to Magistrate Michelides at the cue given to the Applicant by Commissioner Herron. FR944 of 2007 is a separate Minor Case Provision Action taken by the Applicant separately against the First Respondent claiming for the $6,000.00 extorted by the First Respondent from the Applellant himself. This case is the source of the s.36 Magistrates Court Act,2004 Review Proceedings before the First Judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in CIV 1903 of 2008 and also referred to as Michelides No.1. Michelides No.2 is the second stage of the s.36 Review Proceedings before Justice Ken Martin who stultified those Review Proceedings by a Security Costs Order against the Appellant. This interim decision was appealed to the Court Below and its decision is now the subject of P50 of 2010 for Special Leave Application to the High Court of Australia.

14The s.36 Review Proceedings, sourced from the FR944 of 2007 was started by the Applicant against the First Respondent. It was caused by the First Respondent wielding his extortion Gun case in FR417 of 2007 seeking a Frivolous and Vexatious ZERO SUM FALSE DEBT claim of some $25k that was compromised under conditions of duress for $11,500.00. The Applicant sought for the return of his $6,00.00 extorted from himself in a separate action in FR944 of 2007 and it is for the courts below to reinstate the Second Respondent to his former position once the court found that the First Respondent had been guilty of exploiting the vulnerabilities of his own client, the Second Respondent. In actual fact, the Applicant had to pay the extorted sum of $11,500.00 from his own pocket as his son the Second Respondent had been an involuntary client of the First Respondent, such a client solicitor relationship having been induced by the undue influence exerted by the father upon his son, the Second Respondent.

15. Order. 83 of the Rules of Supreme Court of Western Australia, 1971concerns the Consolidation of pending causes and matters provides the following:

1. Causes may be consolidated

Whenever any issues between the same parties can be conveniently tried together, or whenever it appears desirable notwithstanding that the parties are not identical and that the evidence necessary to prove the issues is not identical, the Court may consolidate any number of causes or matters in order to quiet all claims relating to one subject matter, transaction or event, or to substantially similar subject matters, transactions or events.

2. Consolidation with action removed from another court

In the exercise of jurisdiction under this Order the Court may order the consolidation with any action pending in the Supreme Court of any action remitted or removed to the Supreme Court from any other court.

3. Directions

The Court shall make all necessary directions for the pre trial procedure, and for the trial or determination of such consolidated causes or matters.

16The trial judge can only imposed the Security Costs Order against the Applicant on two grounds:

a) the inherently weak case of the Applicant which does not hold water.

b) the Order 25 r. 2(g) argument which provides as follows:

“(g)is in default in respect of any costs ordered to be paid by him in any proceedings previously brought by him against the same defendant or another defendant for substantially the same cause of action or in relation to substantially the same subject matter;”

17Morison, W L --- "Fuller, The Morality of Law" [1965] Syd Law Rw 14; (1965) 5(1) Sydney Law Review 181

18The learned Barrister Scott Ellis as counsel for the First Respondent misled the trial judge to the effect that there was no evidence before the court that Registrar Wilde was involuntary in entering the sham Consent Judgment in FR417 of 2007 which become the bone of contention in the s.36 Review Proceedings.

19. http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2010/05/all-parliamentarians-in-western.html.

20. http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWSupC/1835/34.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=abuse

Sydney Herald on Abuses of Law: Source: Sydney Herald, 20 April 1835 at [1] in the following words:

“The abuses of English Law have, ... engaged the attention of nearly all the editorial Pens in London. A dead set has been made against the "Black Sheep of the Law," men whose roguery in all its branches has been detected and exposed with great ability …....partaking not of the principle of Justice, but of the spirit of mischievous litigation, have … occasioned deep disgust in every reflecting mind ... the facilities enjoyed by the disreputable part of the profession, to frustrate just and legal suits by chancery, and the enormous expences [sic] incurred by prosecuting them, have been the scandal of the profession, and the bane of society. a preponderance has been given to wealth, which if not directly, has all the means indirectly of impeding the course of Justice, or of preventing its application to less powerful members of the social compact. Like a bird in the toils of the fowler, the suitor when once entangled in the meshes of the legal net, forfeits his liberty and his property. The beacon that it led him upon the Rocks disappears, through the carelessness or the incapacity of the dispensers of Justice; the legal pilot frequently becomes helpless through ignorance or something worse, and the suitor is generally left an impoverished member of society.”

21 . RE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EX PARTE CHIN [2010]WASC212. Comment: Judging from the reaction of Heenan J, I believe he has now resiled from his former position when he dismissed CIV 1019 of 2010.

22 http://wwwnicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2010/12/conspiracy-of-pseudo-board-taking-away.html

CONSPIRACY OF THE PSEUDO BOARD - TAKING AWAY MY INDEPENDENT STATUS AS A LAWYER FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THEIR CRONIES

1. The Pseudo Board decided to prosecute me for no professional misconduct on 19.7.2006 but for my alleged deficiency in my professional knowledge.

2. This constitutes a decision to take away my independent legal practice for the purpose of protecting their cronies who had been pillaging and plundering innocent members of the public.  The prime example of their victims are Dr. Kheng Su Chan and many others.

3.  This conspiracy involves members of the Pseudo Board, the Law Society of Western Australia principally involving its former Presidents which includes inter alia Mr. Pino Monaco, Judge Eckert,  Ken Martin J and Chaney J.  The conspiracy embroiled the Legal Profession Complaints Committee and the Professional Affairs Committee, particularly Ms. Walter who is a lawyer directed by some unknown persons.  Ms. Coombs, Ms Cahoon and Ms LeMiere, all of them as legal officers of the LPCC are knowingly involved in this conspiracy including Master Sanderson of the Supreme Court of WA.     

4. Judge Eckert decided on 12.9.2006 in VR137 of 2006 that I was not guilty of any professional misconduct but was “guilty” of a deficiency in my professional knowledge.  Therefore Judge Eckert of SAT re-imposed the conditions originally imposed on 19.7.2006 by taking away my independent status as a lawyer.

5. I appealed the decision of Judge Eckert through Master Sanderson which should have been the Court of Appeal instead.  But the rules have changed in 2005 by the introduction of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005.  Master Sanderson coaxed me not to transfer my appeal into the Court of Appeal but to have it heard before himself so that His Honour could dismiss it. I was shocked and traumatized by this event, thinking that there is no justice available to me as its door was closed.

6.  I wrote to the Chief Justice and was encouraged to appeal.  I therefore appealed in CACV 1 of 2007 but was stopped by the Legal Practice Board which was then trying to get me to pay unwarranted costs orders occasioned by Master Sanderson dismissing my case.

7.  After some struggles, I was able to appeal again through CACV 43 of 2007 when I got leave to appeal and time to appeal was extended against Judge Eckert’s decision.

8. On 26.9.2007, President Steytler of the Court of Appeal caused a Consent Judgment to be entered between myself as Appellant and the Legal Practice Board as Respondent in CACV 43 of 2007.  This consent judgment set aside Judge Eckert’s decision.  Therefore, the Pseudo Board is precluded from harping on the same issues that had been the subject of that Consent Judgment i.e. my deficiency in my professional knowledge by the principle of res judicata.

9.  In the aftermath, the Pseudo Board dishonoured the terms of that Steytler P Consent Judgment by refusing to grant me my independent legal practice certificate on the ground of the already debarred res judicata issue affecting the “deficiency of my professional knowledge”. 

10. The Pseudo Board on 3.4.2008 did conspiratorially and vexatiously caused the re-imposition of the non-independent status of my legal practice without any grounds because it was not able to produce evidence that it had the sanction of the majority consent of the 52 members of the statutory regulator of the legal profession of WA.  This is the second time the usurping Full Board in the name of the Pseudo Board had acted without authority and with impunity.

11.  The Pseudo Board on 2.5.2008 again did conspire to ratify and confirm the Pseudo Board’s Decision to act without authority to take away from me my status as an independent legal practitioner.

12. I as the Appellant made an application to the State Administrative Tribunal in VR107 of 2008 to stop the conspiracy of the Pseudo Board but His Honour Chaney J conspired with the Pseudo Board  to confirm the original decision of the Pseudo Board to take away my independent legal practice status on 27/10/2008 in his judgment in CHIN and WEST AUSTRALIAN LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2008] WASAT 252.

14. The Appellant appealed the decision of Chaney J for leave to appeal before Pullin J but was refused leave to appeal.  The Appellant appealed this decision to the High Court in P36 of 2009 which was dismissed.  The reason of decision touches the issues of the credibility of Chaney J and this revives my fresh action in our justice system again because the issue of the Pseudo Board was refused determination by Chaney J.  

15. The LPCC started a persecution of me on the same issues that had been "harping" upon by the Pseudo Board since the beginning of this saga, in a fresh malicious persecution in VR87 of 2009 that was started by Ms. Cahon and continued by Ms. Le Miere as legal officers of the LPCC.  This is a statutory body financed by our government to catch erring lawyers but it is found to be protecting its cronies and catching innocent people instead.  Chaney J found me guilty of professional misconduct in an ambushed trial on 4.11.2009 under circumstances when he had written to me that the trial of VR87 of 2009 was scheduled on 10.11.2009. That ambushed trial result was never published by Chaney J and it is taken to have been set aside upon my vehement protestations to the effect that I was given in writing to have the matter re-trialed on 10.11.2009.  But I have asked for Chaney J to recuse himself and His Honour did graciously bow out of that case subsequently.  That case was subsequently mentioned during directions hearing before Judge Pritchard and is now before Judge Sharp who is the Deputy President of SAT. This denial of natural justice by Chaney J had voided that ambushed judgment dated 4.11.2009 and it is now no longer being published at the SAT website.  I am now awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010 before any concrete decision can be made by Judge Sharp on the res judicata extended principle of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 in VR87 of 2009.

16. The Appellant was not barred on the ground of res judicata to bring fresh actions for Mandamus Orders against Chaney J decision in CIV 1019 of 2010 before Heenan J.   His Honour dismissed my Application for Prerogative Orders but his Honour later decided in CIV 1981 of 2010 and CIV 1877 of 2010 in my absence on 4.8.2010 that he had no authority to order prerogative orders against fellow judges of the same rank as himself, namely Ken Martin J and Chaney J.  The Appellant was then requested by the Court of Appeal Registrar to make his application to the Supreme Court for as Court of Appeal judge to hear those two cases.  The first CIV 1981 is about the recusal of Ken Martin J from hearing Michelides No.2 and the second is the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal judgment that had reached the portals of the High Court and came back.  The latter concerns how s.33 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 will operate to rectify the otherwise perfect judgment of the Court of Appeal in so far as it relates to the falsifications of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor solicitor.   Only a Court of Appeal judge is entitled to make prerogative Orders of Certiorari or Mandamus against judges of the Supreme Court of Western Australia who are consicously or sub-consciously in dereliction of their judicial duties.

17. The Appellant took a Mandamus Orders against Heenan J in CIV 1604 of 2010 but it was rightly dismissed by Le Miere J on the ground that the matters in CACV 41 of 2010 was not before His Honour as the Appellant had already appealed the decision of Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010 to the Court of Appeal in the former case.  

 18. The Appellant appealed the Order of Heenan J to the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010.  This avenue opens the door for the case now pending to be decided by the Court of Appeal.   The three issues that are never determined before by Chaney J are now going to be decided by the Court of Appeal:

a) The Pseudo Board

b) The falsifications of the court records by David Taylor Solicitor.

c) The extortion bid by Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor.

19. In the circumstances as explained above, it it reasonably clear to members of the public that the  Pseudo Board conspired with the LPCC and others to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice contrary to s.135 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (WA) (the Act).

20. The Pseudo Board also conspired with those parties as alleged for the purpose of preventing the criminal acts of Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor to be prosecuted for the criminal offence of extortion under s.397 of the Act.  This matter is now with CACV 75 of 2010.

21.  On 23.11.2010 the Court of Appeal through Pullin JA and Newnes JA decided to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the interim security Costs Order of Ken Martin J decision in CIV 1903 of 2008 or the Michelides No.2 decision delivered on 8.7.2010 (against the Appellant) thus stifling the Michelides No.1 prosecution of Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor by the Appellant.  But the Court of Appeal in its wise judgment stayed that judgment order by not publishing it and it had acknowledged to the Appellant that it had received the Appellant’s letter containing the Draft proposed Notice of Appeal to the High Court.  The purpose of that letter to the Court of Appeal Registrar is to request the Court of Appeal to review its decision its own decision in CACV 75 of 2010 that was delivered by Pullin JA on 23.11.2010 in the presence of the Timothy Robin Thies Solcitor, his counsel Barrister Scott Ellis and the Appellant in the presence of Newnes JA.  See the three blogspots of the Appellant which is accessible by Googling “NICHOLASNCHIN”.   Incidentally, there are six outstanding costs orders made against the Appellant at various stages of various proceedings which have never been enforced against the Appellant as they are improper costs orders and are therefore nullities.  Those void costs orders serves the purpose of intimidating the Appellant from further prosecuting for his rights in the public interests to protect ordinary persons from marauding lawyers.     

22. The Pseudo Board conspired with those parties in ............ from being prosecuted for the falsification of records by a public officer contrary to s. 85 of Act. The court had written to the Appellant dated 18.11.2010 that he is agreeing to review the costs orders of Master Sanderson in CIV1775 of 2008.  This review will have ramifications in showing that the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 were falsified by David Taylor Solicitor on 10.2.2006 and its effects on the High Court decision in P1 of 2010 affecting CACV107 of 2008.  

23. The Pseudo Board conspired with those parties involved in preventing the lawyer falsifying the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 from being prosecuted for the for perjury pursuant to ss.124 and 125 of the Act.

 24. In DELLA FRANCA -v- R - Supreme Court Court of Appeal: 09/02/1993 Library No. 930476c, Murray J made the following pointers:

24.1.1. Evidence of conspiracy must be in the form of acts done or words uttered in the absence of the person maligned by a co-conspirator.  It is admissible for the purpose of proving the participation of the Pseudo Board in the conspiracy – the deliberations of the Professional Affairs Committee and the then Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee in which Ms. Walter had participated.

24.1.2. Reasonable evidence is available to show that the Pseudo Board is involved in acts or words uttered for the purpose of establishing the combination of the type alleged for the furtherance of its common purpose – to protect their cronies and to take away my independence as a lawyer and this is an act of corruption by public officers.
24.1.3. Quoting at page 3, the High Court in Ahern case quoted in that judgment at 93-4, the following words:
"A conspirator may, in the absence of another person alleged to be a co-conspirator, say or do something carrying with it the implication that the other person is involved. The statement or the act may be admissible in evidence to prove the fact of a conspiracy and, by way of admission, the participation of the maker of the statement or the actor in that conspiracy.  But evidence of neither the statement nor the act should, except in the circumstances which we shall elaborate presently, be admitted against “the other person” to prove his participation because it would for this purpose be hearsay or the equivalent of hearsay."

24.1.4. There are many references to the fact that members of the Pseudo Board are involved in that conspiracy.  I am the victim of this conspiracy which is referred to in the context of that case by Murray J as "the other person". I quote the passage:  

“For example, it may be possible in a case of conspiracy to commit armed robbery to conclude from the fact that one accused wearing a disguise was present in a bank at the same time as another accused, similarly disguised, was waiting outside the bank in a motor vehicle with the motor running, that both were engaged in a common enterprise to rob the bank.  For the purpose of reaching that conclusion it is permissible to use the acts and declarations of each, even in the absence of the other, not as proof of the truth of any assertion or implied assertion of the participation of the other, but as facts from which the combination might be inferred. Utterances for this purpose may be regarded as facts no less than acts and, indeed, in the United States are sometimes called verbal acts.  In the example given it would be possible to reach the conclusion, admitting the evidence for the purpose described and considering it against each accused separately, not only that there was a conspiracy but also that each of the two accused was a participant."

24.1.5. Therefore, it is possible for the public in the public interest to prove that there is indeed a conspiracy to defeat justice wrought by members of the Pseudo Board pursuant to s.35 of the Act.  They are lawyers and top lawyers too.

24.1.6. This is a very important task for members of the public to ensure that the regulator of the legal profession in WAfunction efficiently and effectively in the public interest because it is the electorate who must be protected by a good government of Western Australia such that they are not being swindled by dishonest lawyers.  

24.1.7. This will prevent the justice system from failing as it is already failing members of the public for a long time.  Litigation and justice should not be an expensive affair if lawyers are honest and they must seek to earn an honest living instead of plundering and pillaging innocent members of the public.

24.1.8. Judges in this country have never been tried by members of the public because they are engaged in mysterious works that cannot be delved into let alone be understood or gauged by ordinary persons with an ordinary minds.  They are trying members of the public but they have never been tried because they occupy prestigious positions and offices.  It is for our politicians's duty  to ensure that Judges are efficient and proficient too and are always being kept on their guard.  This is one good thing for good governance of Australia.

24.1.9. It takes a lawyer to surmount this monumental task. But lawyers are in a quandary too as they are also involved in a conspiracy to prevent this from happening.  This is a rare and exceptional circumstances where a former lawyer is able to help the police to solve these problems caused  by persons who are entrusted with the law and who are to there to see that justice be done but is not reasonably seen to being done.  No lawyer who had misled the court of appeal in this case should be allowed to get away with it.  It is being done before Ken Martin J in Michelides No.2 and this fact cannot be ignored by the Court of Appeal Judges Pullin JA and Newnes JA, who are now becoming aware of this. 

24.1.10. The public should not be hoodwinked.  If it can happen once, it can happen again and again until some courageous and public spirited person who is independent enough and is willing to perform this heroic task for which his name will go down in the history of Western Australia.   It must be remembered that the law does not respect persons but respect the authority of that person who is endowed with authority by our government of the day.  If that authority is being abused, that person behind that authority is no longer worthy of our respect.    

25. R -v- CARATTI & ORS – Library No. 980317 06/16/1998 – per Murray J again gives the police force some pointers:
25.1. Dishonesty is the prime element of a conspiracy to defraud [or to defeat justice] [My emphasis]. 
25.2. At page 9 Toohey and Gaudron JJ put it at 54, "dishonesty is a characteristic of the means agreed to be employed ……., "the need for there to be an agreement to use dishonest means" (58) to the prejudice of the victim's economic interests [or professional status as an independent lawyer] [My Emphasis]… before they can convict." (59).
25.3. Consistently with that view, at 61 their Honours concluded that:

"In the case of conspiracy to ….. it will ordinarily be sufficient …as to the facts … if the agreed means are to be characterised as dishonest. Alternatively, …. if satisfied as to those facts, they will be satisfied that the agreed means were dishonest. Only in the borderline case will it be necessary for the question whether the means are to be so characterized….."

25.4.  At page 10, the view of Toohey and Gaudron JJ is clear. For the purpose of conspiracy to ….. there must be proved to be an agreement made between the alleged conspirators or any two or more of them. The agreement must be one ["to defeat justice"][My Emphasis] i.e it must be one the purpose or object of which is, so that the common intention of the conspirators is, that the victim's financial or economic interests are to be imperilled or prejudiced by dishonest means. Whether the means agreed upon are properly to be characterised as dishonest is a question of law for the trial Judge, who must decide whether any of the means …. may be so characterised according to ordinary notions of dishonesty in that:

"... they assert as true something which is false and which is known to be false or not to be believed to be true, or if they are means which the conspirators know they have no right to use or do not believe that they have any right to use the means in question." (60)

25.5. at page 11 ….giving effect to the conspiracy are in fact dishonest according to the ordinary standards of right thinking members of the community. Therefore what was required to be established as the mental element in the crime of conspiracy to … was "the intention to prejudice the interests of a third person by the use of means that are dishonest." …… unnecessary to establish that the offender knew or understood that he or she was acting dishonestly by the standards of ordinary people. ……whether or not the means agreed upon were dishonest was a question of characterisation, a question of law to be determined by the trial Judge, giving the word "dishonesty" its ordinary English meaning:

"It is not for juries by defining dishonesty to hold what is or is not a conspiracy to ….. It is the Judge's task to determine whether the facts relied on …. constitutes a conspiracy ……... If the Judge finds that they do, it is the jury's task to determine whether the relevant facts have been proved so as to make the accused guilty of the offence."

"In most cases of conspiracy to … , to prove dishonest means  ….will have to establish that the defendants intended to prejudice another person's right or interest or performance of public duty by: at page 12:  

• . making or taking advantage of representations or promises which they knew were false or would not be carried out;
• . concealing facts which they had a duty to disclose; or
• . engaging in conduct which they had no right to engage in.

25.6.  “…. it will often be sufficient to prove that the defendants used dishonest means merely … showing that the defendants intended to engage in a particular form of wrongful conduct."

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

387, ALEXANDER DRIVE

DIANELLA WA 6059

Phone: 08 92757440

Mobile: 0421642735 or  0431398973

Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin1@gmail.com