SUPPORT AFFIDAVIT APPLICATION FOR CERTIORARI ORDERS NISI IN CIV 1877 OF 2010 FOR REVIEW OF MASTER SANDERSON'S JURISDICTIONAL ERROR IN CIV1775 OF 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA OM NO:1877 OF 2010
HELD AT PERTH
In the matter of the wrongful removal of the Applicant’s
Caveats in the Hazelmere and Mt Lawley Properties of
late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall by Master Sanderson in
CIV 1775 of 2008.

And
In the matter of the falsifications of the court records in
CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor Solicitor.

And

In the matter of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the
Supreme Court of Western Australia in CACV107 of 2008,
particularly at paras. 54 and 55 relying on the letter of
Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009.

And

In the matter of the Rationale of the High Court in Special
Leave Dispositions of the High Court of Australia in P1
of 2010 providing the legal basis for the causal connection
between the Applicant’s Solicitors Work in CIV 1142 of
2006 and the removal of the caveats of Spunter’s Pty Ltd
in order to enable the Applicant to establish a statutory first
charge over the salvaged properties under s.244 of the former
Legal Practice Act, 2003.

EX PARTE: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
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Date of document: 9th June, 2010
Date of filing: 9th June, 2010
Filed on behalf of: The Ex parte Applicant
Prepared by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Phone: 08 92757440;
387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA Mobile: 0421642735
WA 6059 Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin09@tpg.com.au


AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF ORIGINATING MOTION FOR CERTIONARI ORDERS AGAINST THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF MASTER SANDERSON IN CIV 1775 OF 2008
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Annexure Description Pages
1 Notice of Originating Motion against the Summary Judgment of Master Sanderson in CIV1775 of 2008 3
2 Affidavit in Support of my Notice of Originating Motion as indicated in Doc 1 above.
3 Judgment of Master Sanderson in Audrey Frances Hall as the executrix of the estate of Kenneth Duncan hall v Chin [2008] WASC 255. 4
4. Extracts of the Affidavit of David Taylor Solicitors sworn and filed 27.3.2007 in CIV 1131 of 2006 at pages 46, 47 and 48 of the Yellow Appeal Book filed and served by Applicant in CACV107 of 2008 on 22.6.2009. 3
5 Letter from Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009 addressed to the Applicant responding to his letter dated 5.6.2006 and using the ruse that there was a mistake in the belated payment of 20 cents made on 16.2.2006 instead of 10.2.2006. This letter misled Justice Owen in his judgment in Doc.6 below at paragraphs 54 and 55 which relied upon this letter. 1
6 Judgment of Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Chin v Hall [2009] WASCA 216 (See particularly paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment of Justice Owen). 19
7 Judgement of High Court of Australia in Special Leave Dispositions in CHIN V HALL & ORS [2010] HCASL 104 (26 May, 2010) giving the rationale that there must be causal connection between the removal of the Spunter Caveats and the Solicitor’s Works in CIV 1142 of 2006. 1
8. Letter from Applicant to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee dated 1.6.2010 attaching a six page Complaint against David Taylor Solicitor dated 2.6.2010. 8
9 Letter from Applicant to Mr. Anthony Prime of McCallum Donovan Sweeney as solicitors for the Plaintiff in CIV 1775 of 2008 explaining the inequity of enforcing the costs orders of Master Sanderson in CIV1775 of 2008 and Justice Owen in CACV107 of 2008. 1

I, Nicholas Ni Kok Chin, of No. 387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA, WA 6059, Western Australia, Barrister & Solicitor (currently not certificated), being duly sworn make oath and say as follows:
1. I am the Applicant in the above entitled proceedings and swear this Affidavit (Doc.2) in support of my Application for Certiorari Orders (Doc.1).
2. The facts herein are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Where I identify the source of facts stated as other than from my own personal knowledge, I believe such facts to be true and correct.
3. The learned Master Sanderson denied me natural justice and is in jurisdictional excesses when he refused to take into consideration the relevant matter of the fraud upon the court in CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor Solicitor who falsified the court records, in his judgment (See Doc.3).
4. David Taylor Solicitor swore an Affidavit in CIV 1131 of 2006 on 29.3.2007 in which he perjured himself when he stated a material fact which he knows to be false to the effect that he did file the Writ of Summons in that case on 10.2.2006 when he actually did so on 16.2.2006 (See Doc. 4).
5. Registrar Powell in his response letter to the Applicant dated 11.6.2009 knowingly conspired with David Taylor Solicitor to commit a corrupt act as a judicial officer by falsely stating that CIV 1131 of 2006 was commenced on 10.2.2006 instead of the actual date of 16.2.2006 (See Doc. 5).
6. Doc 4 and Doc 5 show the conflicting evidence provided by Registrar Powell in his letter dated 11.6.2009 to the effect that the Writ of CIV 1131 of 2006 was deposited with the Supreme Court Registry together with part payment of the fees paid on 10.2.2006 does not tally with the sworn evidence of David Taylor Solicitor that all fees were fully paid on 10.2.2006. This discrepancy misled Justice Owen in the Court of Appeal.
7. The corrupt act of Registrar Powell misled the Court of Appeal to deliver a wrong judgment particularly at paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment of Justice Owen of the Court of Appeal in CACV 107 of 2008, which effectively denied the Applicant his right to his just emolument as a legal practitioner for a statutory charge against the salvaged Hazelmere and Mt. Lawley properties of the late Nancy Cloonan Hall (See Doc. 6).
8. The High Court of Australia in the Special Leave Dispositions of P1 of 2010 provides the rationale of the law that there must be a causal connection between the Applicant’s Solicitor Work and the Removal of the Caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd in order to justify the Applicant’s statutory charge of the salvaged properties under s.244 of the Legal Practice Act, 2003 which does not justify the removal of the Applicant’s caveat as it provides a first charge over them (See Doc. 7).
9. As the trial judge in CIV 1775 of 2008 had refused to litigate the issue of the fraud being practiced by David Taylor Solicitor in CIV 1131 of 2006 upon this Honourable Court, this issue must now be litigated in this Certiorari Application to order to enable the Applicant to seek justice in accordance with the law (See Doc.8).
10. This Honourable Court must not allow a travesty of justice to continue to occur and must stop the improper costs order of the trial judge which was made without a legal basis. The Costs Order of Justice Owen is also being nullified by virtue of the fact that His Hour had been misled by the letter of the Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009 (See Doc. 9).

SWORN by the Deponent at Perth ]
In the State of Western Australia ]
This 9th day of June, 2010 ]……………………………………………..
Before me:
…………………………..
Justice of Peace/ Commissioner of the Supreme Court for Taking Affidavit

APPLICATION FOR CERTIORARI ORDERS NISI IN CIV 1877 OF 2010 FOR REVIEW OF MASTER SANDERSON'S JURISDICTIONAL ERROR IN CIV1775 OF 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA OM NO:1877 OF 2010
HELD AT PERTH
In the matter of the wrongful removal of the Applicant’s
Caveats in the Hazelmere and Mt Lawley Properties of
late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall by Master Sanderson in
CIV 1775 of 2008.
And
In the matter of the falsifications of the court records in
CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor Solicitor.
And
In the matter of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the
Supreme Court of Western Australia in CACV107 of 2008,
particularly at paras. 54 and 55 relying on the letter of
Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009.
And
In the matter of the Rationale of the High Court in Special
Leave Dispositions of the High Court of Australia in P1
of 2010 providing the legal basis for the causal connection
between the Applicant’s Solicitors Work in CIV 1142 of
2006 and the removal of the caveats of Spunter’s Pty Ltd
in order to enable the Applicant to establish a statutory first
charge over the salvaged properties under s.244 of the former
Legal Practice Act, 2003.

EX PARTE: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
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Date of document: 11th June, 2010
Date of filing: 11th June, 2010
Filed on behalf of: The Ex parte Applicant
Prepared by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Phone: 08 92757440;
387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA Mobile: 0421642735
WA 6059 Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin09@tpg.com.au

NOTICE OF ORIGINATING MOTION

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TAKE notice that the Supreme Court will be moved at [Perth] on Wednesday 4th day of August, 2010 at the hour of 10.30 in the fore noon, or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, by counsel on behalf of NICHOLAS NI KOK for Certiorari Orders Nisi to be made absolute, in terms of the following:

1. Registrar David Powell covered-up for David Taylor Solicitor’s falsifications of the Court Records in CIV 1131 of 2006.
2. Registrar David Powell committed a corrupt act in accordance with subs. 27(3)(c) of the Crime Corruption Commission Act, 2003 as a result of the cover-up.
3. David Taylor Solicitor committed perjury in accordance with s.124 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913.
4. Justice Owen was misled by Registrar Powell’s corrupt act as contained in his letter dated 11.6.2009 and relied upon by him in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment in CACV 107 of 2008.
5. The ruse of the belated payment of court fees by David Taylor Solicitor in CIV 1131 of 2006 in having its purported and fraudulent intended legal effect for the commencement date of 10.2.2006 instead of 16.2.2006 in CIV 1131 of 2006 misfired, and thereby it became a fraud committed upon the court by David Taylor Solicitor.
6. The fraud upon the court has the effect of repulsing the Applicant to stop his further solicitor work until the fraud is corrected by the wrong doer - this stoppage of work legally and synergetically created the causal connection between the Applicant’s solicitor work and the final removal of the Caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd.
7. Master Sanderson’s summary judgment in CIV 1775 of 2008 therefore did not remove the Spunter’s Caveat.
8. The Costs Orders of Master Sanderson and of the Court of Appeal in CACV107 of 2008 be stayed pending the determination of this Application.
9. The Applicant be entitled to a first statutory charge under s.244 of the former Legal Practice Act, 2003 for his Solicitor Work in CIV 1142 of 2006 on the salvaged Hazelmere and Mt Lawley Properties thereby justifying his caveatable interests in Caveat J614059.
10. Damages and Other relief this Honourable Court may deem fit.
11. Costs.
And Further take Notice, that the grounds of this application are:
1) The letter of Registrar David Powell dated 11.6.2009 to the Applicant in response to the latter’s letter dated 5.6.2009 (at page 136 of the Yellow Appeal Book of the Applicant in CACV 107 of 2008 filed and served 22.6.2009) is a cover-up by Registrar Powell for Mr. David Taylor who falsified the court records by David Taylor Solicitor in CIV 1131 of 2006 (Registrar Powell’s Cover-Up).
2) Registrar Powell’s Cover-Up is a corrupt act in accordance with s.27(3)(c ) of the Crime Corruption Commission Act, 2003 because Registrar Powell is reasonably found to have conspired with David Taylor Solicitor contrary to s.121 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (WA) (the Criminal Code) (Registrar Powell’s Corrupt Act).
3) David Taylor Solicitor conspires with Registrar Powell by swearing an Affidavit on 27.3.2007 to the effect that he filed the Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 on 10.2.2006 at the Registry of the Supreme Court of WA by paying the court fees in two sums of $654.00 with a cheque and 20 cents in cash on 10.2.2006 and he thereby falsified the court records in that case to this effect, contrary to s.85 of the Criminal Code (David Taylor Solicitor’s Falsification of Court Records).
4) Were there the non-existent Registrar Powell’s Corrupt Act and the non-existent David Taylor Solicitor’s Falsification of Court Records, Justice Owen judgment in CACV107 of 2008 would not have been misled in his judgment in CACV 107 of 2008 (Justice Owen being Misled by Registrar’s Powell’s Corrupt Act).
5) Justice Owen is being Misled by Registrar’s Powell’s Corrupt Act is reasonably seen at paragraphs 54 and 55 of Justice Owen’s judgment to the effect that the Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 was deposited with the Supreme Court Registry on 10.2.2006 but due to a purported mistake by David Taylor Solicitor in not paying the 20 cents component of the full court fees of $654.20 on time, the purported payment of $654.00 made with a cheque of $654.00 was replaced with a credit card payment of $654.00 and a 20 cents cash payment made at the belated date of 16.2.2006 (the Ruse of a Belated Payment of Court Fees).
6) The Ruse of a Belated Payment of Court Fees caused Master Sanderson to act in excess of his jurisdiction and to deny the Applicant his natural justice thereby causing the Applicant to lose the causal connection between his Solicitor Work in CIV 1142 of 2006 for and on behalf of the late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall and the Removal of the Caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd in accordance with the High Court Special Leave Dispositions in P1 of 2010 (the Rationale of the High Court).
7) The Rationale of the High Court empowers the Applicant to have a first charge over the salvaged Hazelmere and Mt. Lawley Properties of the late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall and the Applicant should therefore not be subject to the tyrannical and unjustified Costs Orders of both Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008 and CACV107 of 2008 threatened to be enforced by Mr. Anthony Prime as solicitor for the Plaintiff in CIV1775 of 2008 (the Tyrannical Costs Orders).
8) The issue of the fraud upon the court by David Taylor Solicitor in CIV 1131 of 2006 has been refused litigation by Master Sanderson and is therefore never res judicata and needs to be litigated again in this Application.
9) The ensuing tyrannical Costs Orders by Master Sanderson and Justice Owen is a wrong exercise of discretion for costs by the former and an error of law and facts by Justice Owen.
DATED the 11th day of June, 2010.

………………………………………………………….
(Signed)
Applicant, as the solicitor litigant in person.
This NOTICE was taken out by the Applicant as the solicitor litigant in person and whose address for service is as indicated above.

FOOTNOTES TO WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY PLAINTIFF IN CIV1903 OF 2010 RESPONDING TO FIRST DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

See: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72: the High Court upheld the decision of
Stein J who made no order as to costs on the grounds of public interest.
See also: Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865: The latter case illustrates that the awarding of costs is a matter of
judicial discretion and that public interest is only one factor in the exercise of that discretion. The other factors are:
the Plaintiff has virtually no interests but is acting pro bono for his son and the Second Defendant and the case raise
novel questions of law.
See the case of McWilliam and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2005] AATA 1148 (11 November 2005) at para. 35 per Deputy President of AATA, SA Forgie quoting the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597 the reasoning of Gaudron and Gummow JJ, with whom McHugh concurred, in the following words:
"... a decision involving jurisdictional error has no legal foundation and is properly to be regarded, in law, as no decision at all. Once that is accepted, it follows that, if the duty of the decision-maker is to make a decision with respect to a person’s rights but, because of jurisdictional error, he or she proceeds to make what is, in law, no decision at all, then, in law, the duty to make a decision remains unperformed. Thus, not only is there no legal impediment under the general law to a decision-maker making such a decision but, as a matter of strict legal principle, he or she is required to do so. ..."

Beazley J in the quoted case, refers to the following factors to be taken into account by the court whether to order security for costs [my emphasis within brackets and in italics]:
(i) whether the application for security has been brought in a timely fashion [well, it did not].
(ii) the strength and bona fides of the case: [the First Defendant does not have a bona fide claim in FR417 of 2007 nor in FR944 of 2007 nor in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008];
(ii) whether the poor financial situation of the applicant results from the respondent’s conduct [ the reverse is the case].
(iv) whether the application for security is oppressive, in the sense of denying of an person without means or organization a right to litigate[it is oppressive having regard to the circumstances].
(v) whether there is anyone supporting the applicant who is likely to benefit and be willing to provide the security [None, except for his learned Counsel barrister Scott Ellis, who must be cautioned by this Court, lest he be reasonably found to be misleading this Court on a frivolous and vexatious case for the Firs6t Defendant].
Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59.
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/just

Counsel Scott Ellis for the First Defendant explained the delay by likening it to a situation of a cobbler not finding the time to make shoes for his own children. Contrast this situation with the more stringent test required by His Honour Magistrate Michelides denying me natural justice by refusing to accept the reasons for the delay in my appeal against the Null Order of Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment. My reason for delay is that I have to access justice through an appeal of Magistrate Musk’s decision in FR944 of 2007 through Commissioner Herron first at the District Court and then after getting the cue from learned Commissioner, I had then to come back to Magistrate Michelides to do the Appeal in FR417 of 2007.
This pre-judgment of the learned Justice Kenneth Martin took into account irrelevant matters and did not take into account relevant matters without making Orders from which the Plaintiff could appeal against. Some of the matters are untrue and is defamatory as it cast aspersions on the character of the Plaintiff.
In re: Michelides ex parte Chin, Justice Hasluck at para. 144 did explain that the Plaintiff had justifications for his delay in appealing Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment after having gone to the District Court before Commissioner Herron and come back, in the following terms:
“I am of the view also that, in this complicated area of the law concerning challenges to or the setting aside of perfected judgments, the applicant did not act unreasonably in seeking to commence fresh proceedings (FR 944/07) with the result that time went by before he reverted to what is arguably the correct course, namely, an appeal against the registrar's decision in the original proceedings (FR 417/07). There is therefore an explanation for delay before Magistrate Michelides sufficient to justify an extension of time.”
See S.36(4)( c) of the Magistrates Court Act which provides:
(c) make any necessary consequential orders.

See s.36(7) of the MCA which provides as follows:
“(7) If, when dealing with an appeal under the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 , the District Court considers that a review order ought to be made it may —
(a) remit the appeal to the Supreme Court under the District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 section 77; or
(b) adjourn the appeal to enable an application to be made to the Supreme Court —
(i) under subsection (1); or
(ii) under the District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 section 76.

See also s. 77 of the District Court may remit to Supreme Court which provides:
“Where it appears to a District Court judge that any action or matter brought before the Court ought from its nature, or magnitude, or by reason of the question of law involved to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court, he may make an order, remitting the action or matter to the Supreme Court.”

See pages 506 to 510 of Vol.2 of the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 6.10.2009 when the treating psychiatrist crossed out paragraph 5 (iv) of the settlement agreement and the former was found to be exerting undue pressure on the latter who signifies that the Second Defendant was “appearing” to sign freely and voluntarily.
The statement by Justice Kenneth Martin at paragraph 5 of the pre-judgment in the following words is therefore misconceived: “Materials filed in this action indicate that Mr. NK Chin is not respecting those constraints.”
See: Diagnostic Medlab Ltd V Auckland District Health Board, Waitemata District Health Board, Counties-Manukau District Health Board And Ors Hc Ak Civ 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 per Asher J:
[122] A conflict of interest arises when a person carries out a particular function with two or more interests in conflict. In administrative law, a conflict of interest exists when a person has a private interest in a decision where that person also has a public role. In such a case the person's public role and private interest are in conflict. The result can be a poor decision because private concerns that has nothing to do with the public duty have influenced the decision.
[123] The concept of a conflict of interest is well known in the common law. It has developed particularly in the context of professional and fiduciary duties, the classic example being a solicitor's duty not to be in a conflict of interest with a client. It is also well understood in public law where its usual expression is under the heading of bias or apparent bias.

Prohibition on engaging in legal practice when not entitled
(1) In this section —
legal work means —
(a) any work in connection with the administration of law; or
(b) drawing or preparing any deed, instrument or writing relating to or in any manner dealing with or affecting —
(i) real or personal estate or any interest in real or personal estate; or
(ii) any proceedings at law, civil or criminal, or in equity;
public officer has the meaning given in The Criminal Code.
(2) A person must not engage in legal practice in this jurisdiction unless the person is an Australian legal practitioner.
Penalty: a fine of $20 000.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to engaging in legal practice of the following kinds —
(a) legal practice engaged in under the authority of a law of this jurisdiction or of the Commonwealth;
(b) legal practice engaged in by an incorporated legal practice in accordance with Part 7 Division 2;
(c) the practice of foreign law by an Australian-registered foreign lawyer in accordance with Part 8;
(d) appearing or defending in person in a court;
(e) drawing or preparing a transfer under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 ;
(f) a public officer doing legal work in the course of his or her duties;
(g) a person doing legal work under the supervision of an Australian legal practitioner, as a paid employee of a law practice or in the course of approved legal training;
(h) legal practice of a kind prescribed by the regulations.
(4) It is a defence to a prosecution for an offence against subsection (2) in relation to the doing of legal work to show that the person who did the legal work has not directly or indirectly been paid or remunerated or promised or expected pay or remuneration for the work so done (the unpaid work ).
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the person directly or indirectly receives, expects or is promised, pay or remuneration for or in respect of other work or services relating to, connected with or arising out of the same transaction or subject matter as that to which the unpaid work relates.
(6) A person is not entitled to recover any amount in respect of anything the person did in contravention of subsection (2).
(7) A person may recover from another person in a court of competent jurisdiction, as a debt due to the person, any amount the person paid to the other person in respect of anything the other person did in contravention of subsection (2).
(8) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the application (with or without specified modifications) of provisions of this Act to persons engaged in legal practice of a kind referred to in subsection (3) (other than subsection (3)(a) and (b)).

This issue is reserved for another forum in Civ 1604 of 2010 where the Plaintiff is seeking Mandamus Orders and CACV 41 of 2010 where the Plaintiff is appealing to the court of appeal on the ground that the trial judge had refused to decide the issue of the Pseudo Board which had unlawfully usurped the lawful authority of the real regulator of the legal profession. Although this matter had reached the High Court of Australia but this issue had never been decided in any fora before.

Those paragraphs of that Affidavit have headings which are specifically entitled as:
1) Applications by Plaintiff to be included as Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007; and
2) Reasons why CIV1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 needs to be consolidated.
Boyle, S in her article in the Murdoch Law School Electronic Journal found at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v1n1/boyle11.html entitled: CAVEATABLE INTERESTS - THE COMMON LORE DISTINGUISHED said at para.1 that:
“proprietary interest in land will always be sufficient to found a caveatable interest, but a proprietary interest is not necessary for the establishment of a caveatable interest. Consequently, an equitable interest of the sort often dismissed as in the nature of a claim in personam, a mere personal right, is a caveatable interest”.
At para.2 of that article, she further identified four categories of caveatable interests in relation to s.137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA) in the following terms:
“The section identifies four categories of caveatable interests. They are:
(a) any estate or interest in land under the operation of this Act;
(b) any estate or interest under any:
i) unregistered instrument;
ii) document; or
iii) writing
in any lease mortgage or charge;
(c) any estate or interest in any equitable mortgage or charge by a deposit without writing; and
(d) any estate or interest which arises
i) by devolution in law; or
ii) otherwise.”

If Mr. Thies did not have a caveatable interest in the Caveat property, he has no legal basis for his caveat and it must be ordered to be removed together with the concomitant damages as quantified to be made good by him. He can only have the caveatable interest if he has an equitable mortgage or charge over that Caveat property. The only way for him to get an equitable charge or equitable charge over that Caveat Property is for him to enter into a costs agreement with the name of the Caveat property specifically identified in that agreement, failing which he can never be said to have an equitable charge or an equitable mortgage. The law is clear on this point. See the case of: Surfers Paradise Coaches P/L v TSU Chan Lin [2007] NSWSC 475.

Beech J in the case of BASHFORD -v- BASHFORD [2008] WASC 138 at paragraph 50 said the following:
“ 50 The balance of convenience is a factor to be considered in an application to extend the operation of a caveat. However, interlocutory removal of a caveat will be unusual where an arguable case as to the existence of a caveatable interest has been demonstrated. That is because the purpose of a caveat is the protection of a proprietary interest. Removal of the caveat will, in many cases, have the effect of destroying the benefit of the proprietary interest claimed in the caveat: Custom Credit (50).

Id at footnote No.17..
In the case of Ex-parte Brecker as indicated below, Beech J said at paragraph 59, the following words:
“59 Underlying this approach to the exercise of discretion may be the fundamental significance of a finding of excess of jurisdiction. As Hayne J observed in Re McBain; ex parte Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372 at 473 [284] (Gummow and Gaudron JJ agreeing at [80]), leaving aside the decisions of superior courts of record, the act of a public authority that is beyond power is as a general rule of no legal effect. Thus it is that a finding of excess of jurisdiction will, absent facts or circumstances justifying the contrary, lead to a setting aside of the act or decision by way of certiorari.”
CJE Opinion No. 92-1 of The Massachusetts Judicial Branch: Judicial Ethics Opinions: Hearing De Novo Retrials of Cases Tried by Judge's Father,an ADA, and Trials Involving The District Attorney's Staff found at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/92-1h.html, quoting the relevant text as follows:
The relevant Canons of Judicial Ethics are Canons 3(C)(1) and (3)(D), which provide in relevant part:

(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where: . .
(d) . . . a person within the third degree of relationship …(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . .
.
Justice Hasluck in Re: Michelides exparte Chin at paragraph 145 said:

“145 It emerges, then, that it is arguable, having regard to these matters, that Magistrate Michelides ought to have extended time for an appeal against the registrar's decision. It is arguable that he ought then to have set aside the consent judgment upon the basis that the underlying agreement, being the agreement reflected in the settlement deed, was voidable for duress. It is arguable, having regard to the passage from Seaman, that in a case of allegedly unconscionable conduct, it is open to challenge the validity of a prior judgment in fresh proceedings (such as action FR 944/07), and it may amount to a jurisdictional error by a judicial officer to disregard that possibility.”

A red herring introduced by my learned friend, the First Defendant:
Eastland Technology v Whisson (2003) 28 WAR 308 at 311.

His Honour Beech J at paragraph 58 of Ex parte Brecker said:
“58 However, I do not accept the respondent's submission that an applicant for prerogative relief who has demonstrated a jurisdictional error must then satisfy the court that the circumstances call for a favourable exercise of discretion. In my opinion, the position is to the contrary. In the setting of an application for prerogative relief, the discretion may be said to be a discretion to withhold relief, rather than a discretion to grant it. So, for example, in Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527, Martin CJ observed (citing Gudgeon v Black; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179) that an appropriate starting point in the consideration of the exercise of the discretion to grant prerogative relief is that once it is found that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction the court will normally exercise its discretion in the applicant's favour. Thus, it will normally be for those opposing the grant of relief to point to factors which justify a departure from that approach.”

His Honour Beech J said at paragraph 57 in Ex-parte Brecker, the following words:
“57 I accept that consideration of the approach taken by courts in relation to the exercise of discretion to grant prerogative relief may be of assistance in considering the exercise of power under s 36(4) in circumstances where the ground upon which an act is sought to be set aside is that it was done without jurisdiction.”

Order 5 of Justice Hasluck in Re: Michelides exparte Chin states as follows:
“This review order operates as a stay of the proceedings specified in Order 1 until further order by this Court.”

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF IN CIV 1903 OF 2010 RESPONDING TO FIRST DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION

IN THE SUPREME COURT CIV 1903 OF 2008
OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN PLAINTIFF

AND

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES FIRST DEFENDANT

AND

PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN SECOND DEFENDANT

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF (IN RESPONSE TO FIRST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS), FILED AND SERVED PURSUANT TO ORDER NO. 4 OF JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN DELIVERED ON 13.5.2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of Document: 24th June, 2010
Date of Filing: 24th June, 2010
Filed and prepared by the First Defendant on his own behalf as self-representing litigant:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
387, Alexander Drive Phone & Fax: 618 9275 7440
DIANELLA WA 6059 Email: nnchin@msn.com

(PLEASE NOTE: THE NUMBERING SYSTEM OF THIS DOCUMENT (EXCEPT FOR THE CONCLUSION) FOLLOWS THE NUMBERING SYSTEM OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT SUBMISSIONS DATED FILED AND SWORN 10.6.2010 FOR EASE OF REFERENCE).

1. The Plaintiff seeks:

(a) No Order for Security of Costs is necessary as this is a public interests litigation instituted by the Plaintiff to uphold the public interests that solicitors do not advance their own personal interests ahead of their own client’s interests through exploiting the vulnerabilities of their clients. The First Defendant is reasonably perceived to be using the proposed security order for costs to intimidate the Plaintiff such that he may desist from pursuing this action. Having regard to the prevailing circumstances, on the other hand, it is for the First Defendant to provide the court with the security of costs to the Plaintiff.

(b) No Orders should be made discharging so much of the Orders of Justice Hasluck on 7.11.2008 per the request of the First Defendant as there were none of such orders that need to be relevantly discharged on the following grounds:

b.1. The First Defendant does not have an entitlement for profit costs even if he were to win the case by engaging counsel to do so, as it would be contrary to the Minor Cases Provisions of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2005 and the legislative intent of Parliament when enacting these provisions (The MCCPA).

b.2. The First Defendant is reasonably found to have abused and is abusing the process of court by commencing an unconscionable, frivolous and vexatious claim with a ZERO SUM DEBT. The test for this frivolity is that it is unlikely to succeed if the court processes in the courts below were transparent and were decision within the jurisdictions of those public authorities which made those decisions.

b.3. Registrar’s Wilde duress-vitiated Consent Judgment entered into involuntarily by her in FR417 of 2007 is the result of the involuntary promptings of the Plaintiff and it is therefore of null legal effect and unenforceable at law on the ground that she, the decision-maker, was at all material times apprised of the duress-situation by the Plaintiff (Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment).

b.4. Registrar Wilde entered into the Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment knowing that it is vitiated by duress for the purpose of avoiding the then inevitable apprehended calamity befalling the family members of the Plaintiff, particularly the Second Defendant, evidence of which had been provided in the courts below.

2.1. The personal circumstances of the Plaintiff does not fall under items 1, 2 and 3 of Order 25 r.2 of the RSC, 1971 (WA), in accordance with the principle of law as quoted by the First Defendant in the case of KP Cable Investment Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 at 197-198 . Therefore, the relevant particular circumstances of the Plaintiff do not warrant this Honourable Court to order for security of costs:

2.1.1 The Plaintiff is not ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that that Plaintiff may be temporarily visiting his children or his relatives out of the jurisdiction.

2.1.2. The Plaintiff is not about to depart from the jurisdiction as the Plaintiff lives permanently in Western Australia and is an Australian Citizen;

2.1.3. The Plaintiff does not enjoy within the jurisdiction some privilege which renders him immune, wholly or partially, from the normal processes of execution;
2.2. This Honourable Court has discretion not to grant security for costs as provided for by Order 25 r.3 by having regard to the prima facei merits of the Plaintiff’s claim i.e. the circumstances of the Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment and the subsequent coerced settlement which is never a compromise.
3. The First Defendant does not present any relevant matters for the consideration of this Court for an Order for Security Costs to be issued against the Plaintiff. The common law position that it is just and reasonable that the First Defendant who has caused the Plaintiff to incur the costs of litigation should reimburse the Plaintiff for the cost liability incurred by the Plaintiff; caused by the frivolity and vexatiousness of the First Defendant’s Zero sum false debt claim which unfortunately had un-meritoriously received the sanction of the lower courts. This ridiculous situation is contrary to what would normally have been the case because courts from time immemorial have always been extremely reluctant to depart from the rule that ‘costs follow the event’ (the usual costs rule).
4. The Plaintiff’s case is very strong and the cogent evidence provided by him is unassailable before this Court. Justice Hasluck had performed his duties admirably under subs. 36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 (the MCA). He is now functus officio. Justice Kenneth Martin is now performing the judicial functions as provided for under subs. 36(4) of the MCA. His Honour is required to implement the recommendations of Justice Hasluck only if he were to consider it “just” to do so. “Just” means:
“Legally right; conformity with that which is lawful or fair; affording no undue advantage [to the other party or one of the party]; appropriate ”.
4.1. The benefit of the Affidavit Evidence of the First Defendant sworn 6.10.2009 does not address the issue identified at paragraph 139 of Justice Hasluck, which I need to quote below in order to indicate to this Court its exact nuances of meanings (that happens to be incorrectly conveyed by the First Defendant), in the following terms (the Affidavit Evidence):
“139 I feel obliged to emphasize again that at this stage I have heard from one side only and it should not be thought that I have arrived at any conclusion as to whether the respondent's final claim can be justified or not. However, the fact is that I have before me also the transcripts of various hearings and at no stage does it seem that any information or answer was provided to any of the courts as to how it came about that a claim for legal costs could be increased so dramatically in respect of comparatively uncomplicated civil proceedings, and in circumstances where the clients had purported to terminate the retainer. The nature of the services performed by the respondent and the reason why the termination of the retainer was apparently disregarded does not appear to have been explained in the earlier proceedings.”
4.a.1. The Affidavit Evidence did not fit in with the time-constraint which was made the essence of the Order of Justice Hasluck under circumstances which had caused much heartache to the Plaintiff when implementing Justice Hasluck Orders, caused by the First Defendant’s efforts to evade service of the required documents for the purpose of bringing him to answer the claim of the Plaintiff at the second stage of the MCA s.36 due process of law (the heartache).
4.a.2. After undergoing the heartache, this Honourable Court through the learned Justice Kenneth Martin in the interests of justice did allow the admission of the Affidavit Evidence without requiring an explanation for the delay or there was insufficient explanation for the delay . This is one instance of a reasonably observable bias of the learned Justice.
4.a.3. In the aftermath, as usual, the First Defendant is reverting to his usual former self of escaping with impunity by continuing to mislead this court; this state of affairs is reflected by the efforts of the former solicitor of the First Defendant Mr.Dean Elek-Roser who is reasonably found to be secretly attempting to communicate with the learned Justice Hasluck; but that learned Justice was able to commendably exercise his judicial duties independently. The First Defendant is now misleading this court again by introducing voluminous irrelevant information of evidence of unwanted and un-required work that was performed by him ceaselessly, purportedly, for the benefit of his victim after the termination of his retainer. He pays scant regard to the reverberations of Justice Hasluck’s statement in para. 139 as quoted by him, which the Plaintiff reasonably comprehended in these terms:
“It is a baffling situation when one looks at the situation of the First Defendant who is continuing to proffer no reasonable explanations in the courts below and even now before Justice Kenneth Martin with regard to his un-matching and fantastic costs escalations in a relatively uncomplicated legal proceedings, that was never quelled by the timely termination of his retainer by his client, the Second Defendant?”
4.a.4. In other words, the only relevant information which this Court should now reasonably look at in that Affidavit evidence in the words of the Plaintiff are:
“…the timely elimination of the annoying and inadvertent retainer entered into non-consensually, by the victim, which retainer, being the source of Mr. Thies’ unfounded claim for the legal costs of unwanted works, which, escalates disproportionately and unconscionably …albeit… uncontrollably …for the benefit of the exploiting lawyer…as if there is discernibly a design in it, as it was engineered by a stronger party against a weaker party for the purpose of exploiting the vulnerabilities of the weaker party.”
4.b.1. The crucial issue therefore before this court is not the duress-vitiated compromise of the proceedings in FR417 of 2007 but that a lawyer had escalated a ZERO SUM DEBT unconscionably and uncontrollably under circumstances of duress for the purpose of exploiting the vulnerabilities of his victims and also for advancing his own personal interests over the interests of his own clients. This is professional misconduct within the terms of the relevant legislation.

4.b.2. Another instance of the apprehended bias of the learned Justice Kenneth Martin stated as a pre-judgment at para.5 in his judgment of Thies v Chin [2010]WASC 111 delivered 13.5.2010 and published 25.5.2010 (the pre-judgment) upon the issue of the Zero Sum debt false claim and the legal impossibility of charging that false debt claim by First Defendant on the caveat property of the Second Defendant, in the following words:

“… unmet legal fees said to be secured by a charge over [Paul Chin] property”[My emphasis].

4.b.3. Magistrate Michelides’ decision in FR417 of 2007 in dismissing the Plaintiff’s appeal against Registrar Wilde Order can only mean that it is also tainted as a null order due to its jurisdictional excesses.

4.b.4. It is a common sense notion that anything that bases itself upon a false foundation is bound to collapse if that foundation were to collapse. Similarly, Commissioner’s Herron’s decision in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 is without jurisdiction because of the post decision conduct of the District Court of Western Australia. It is presumably withdrawn by it as it was published only temporarily at the District Court Website at http://www.districtcourt.wa.gov.au/ and in Austlii at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WADC/. There are three other cases decided by the learned Commissioner that are still being published. Therefore, an inference must be reasonably drawn as to why that impugned judgment has now been withdrawn i.e. it is no good law. The learned Commissioner is no longer a judicial officer of the District Court of Western Australia.

4.b.5. The learned Commissioner, with due respect to him, made what I would call a preposterous proposition and then acted it out by first denying that he had NOT the jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2007. Yet, he did decide on the issue of coerced compromise as a non-void compromise and he aggravated the situation by irrationally and unreasonably making a costs order against the Plaintiff. Any reasonable person would then infer that that costs order is without jurisdiction and is therefore a null order just as Registrar Wilde Order is but under different circumstances. The difference between the two is the voluntariness of each decision-maker who came to that decision and their respective purposes intended to be achieved by their decisions.

4.b.6. Is it true that our justice system in Western Australia is being taken for a ride by Mr. Thies and that anomalous situation is verging on the ridiculous and incredulous?

4.b.7. Which public spirited judge, if he is fair-minded enough, would not agree that this anomalous situation needs rectification? It is clear that Commissioner Herron was on a sojourn here from another state in Australia as the District Court website does not provide a clue as to the history of Commissioner Herron and the mysterious disappearance of his decision. A search of the District Court of Western Australia decisions in Austlii also reveals no result. There seems to be some strange goings on which is rather inexplicable…..

4.b.8. The decision of Magistrate Michelides and Commissioner Herron are capable of being relieved by the remedy of the ancient writ of Certiorari now embedded into s.36 of the MCA on the grounds that they are unreasonable and irrational decisions made without jurisdiction.

4.b.9. Magistrate Michelides denied the Plaintiff natural justice by shutting his mind to my argument for my delay in appealing FR417 of 2007 whereas Justice Kenneth Martin allowed took no significant notice of the delay of the First Defendant in failing to file his Affidavit Evidence in CIV 1903 of 2008 on time on the ground of the cobbler analogy ground as indicated earlier. A very interesting though contrasting situation which indicates an apprehended but subconscious bias of the learned Justice Kenneth Martin and Magistrate Michelides.

4.b.10. This is true to what the former solicitor of the First Defendant, Mr. Dean Elek-Roser said the Plaintiff at the initial stage of the FR417 of 2007 and the FR944 of 2007 proceedings that the courts will not do justice in accordance with the law.

4.b.11. This Honourable Court is capable of challenging the Null decision of Commissioner Herron made without jurisdiction by invoking subs. 36(4)( c) of the MCA in order to enable it to make consequential Orders for the District Court of Western Australia to remit that Commissioner Herron’s judgment in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 to the Supreme Court pursuant to subs 36(7) of the MCA and s.77 of the District Court Act, 1969 (WA) (the DCA).

4.b.12. The learned Commissioner did not do his duties in accordance with the statute law as indicated above, and it is now not too late for Justice Kenneth Martin or his alternative to do the same so as to correct that injustice occasioned to the Plaintiff, by allowing that decision to hang in the air.

4.c. It is frivolous and vexatious of the First Defendant to advance the proposition that there is strong evidence that the compromise was entered into without coercion on the following grounds in the context of para. 28 of Justice Hasluck’s judgment:

“28 At that time the applicant's son was suffering from a psychiatric illness and was under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr Giles. Steps were therefore taken to arrange for the son's signature to the deed to be witnessed by his psychiatrist, with a certification that he was not mentally impaired, he was not suffering from side effects of any drugs as would render him incapable of understanding the deed, and he appeared to sign the deed voluntarily and of his own free will.”

The veracity of the submissions of the First Defendant in this respect will need to be examined by this Court under the following circumstances:

4.c.1. The Plaintiff was at all material times protesting aloud to the treating psychiatrist the situation that the Second Defendant was “signing freely and voluntarily” because he was forced to sign that compromise document under threats of coercion due to the ever-escalating costs of the First Defendant if a compromise was not reached on time. Written communications did pass between the Plaintiff and the Health Department and the First Defendant to this effect.

4.c(i).1. The treating psychiatrist is not a lawyer and when threatened by a lawyer in the person of the First Defendant, she, Dr. Giles was under coercion to certify that the Second defendant was voluntary in coming to that duress-vitiated compromise.

4.c(i).2. The Second Defendant’s illness was precipitated by the stress and trauma of the duress situation and it is in the treating psychiatrist interests to certify that Second Defendant was well at the time he signed the compromise agreement. However, the question remains: How does the psychiatrist assess the voluntariness of the Second Defendant or the voluntariness of the Plaintiff as he and his wife Irene YM Lem was physically present and they voluntarily accompanied the Second Defendant to see Dr. Giles whilst they did apprise Dr Giles of the situation of duress?

4.c(i).3. Were the Plaintiff and his wife Irene voluntary as well? Of course, they were there as they appeared to have gone there voluntarily in order to achieve their objective. Hence the reason why Justice Hasluck said: “….he appeared to sign the deed voluntarily….”

4.c(i).4. The First Defendant must testify to the truth of his assertion that the psychiatrist is capable of attesting that the Second Defendant “signed freely and voluntarily” the compromise agreement, though it is admitted that the psychiatrist is capable of testifying that the Second Defendant was well at that time because of his lull moments.

4.c(i).5. There is no denying the fact that only the devil knows what is in a the Second Defendant’s mind when he signed the compromised agreement in the presence of his treating psychiatrist; because that is the only way for the Second Defendant to get out of the trouble of the ever-present escalating costs of the First Defendant that was hovering over his head at all material times.

4.c(ii).1. The learned Registrar Wilde has at all material times been apprised of the duress situation exerted by the First Defendant and there was “a hurry” for the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant to get out of that untenable situation.

4.c.(ii).2. Who would want to delay paying the coerced settlement money – not the Plaintiff nor the Second Defendant but the First Defendant himself? He of course, wanted more monies and the longer the delay the more money he gets out of a frivolous and vexatious ZERO SUM DEBT FALSE CLAIM.

4.c.(ii).3. This situation is evidenced by the ensuing circumstances. There was a strange and uncanny thing happening to the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant and the costs escalating factor is an unknown factor that is too “frightening” for them to delay the payment of because the justice system is perceived to be working in strange and uncanny ways. Why let it to chance and end up paying more? This is the very action of any individual confronted with a similar situation.

4.c.(ii).4. The Plaintiff had to activate the learned Registrar Wilde who dared not act against her conscience. However, there was a pressing need for the duress vitiated judgment to be acted upon by Registrar Wilde; thereby her Consent Judgment was entered into involuntarily by her as she knew that the Plaintiff and Second Defendant were involuntary but had to pretend and to be seen to be acting voluntarily. Hence, the reasons for the delay of Magistrate Wilde to enter into that judgment from 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007.

4.c(iii).1. The amount of the settlement payment was not a compromise on false claim of a ZERO SUM DEBT. At least it is not a compromise to the First Defendant as he was reasonably found to be using his wit to make more than the $11,500.00 windfall he had fraudulently induced the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant to pay him for nothing. He was not satisfied and was aiming at fishing for more and more….with due respect to the First Defendant… his greed knew no bounds … he would never release his stranglehold on the caveat on the caveat property of the Second Defendant for which he never had any caveatable interests … until he gets the whole property… that was his aim.

5.1. The Plaintiff got a null costs order from Commissioner Herron decision which was taxed by Registrar Hewitt. The learned Registrar refused to upset the order of Commissioner Herron although the law provides that he may do so. There was no way the First Defendant was able to enforce that Null Costs Order of Commissioner Herron.

5.2. Registrar Hewitt perhaps had become acutely aware of the atrocity of that inequitable Cost Order of Commissioner Herron and I have evidence to indicate that Registrar Hewitt when met with a similar situation in DC Appeal No.36 of 2008 delivered a ZERO COST ORDER to counter the original costs order of His Honour Judge Sullivan. Apparently Registrar Hewitt was bewildered by my legal argument as to why Commissioner Herron’s out of jurisdiction costs order cannot be executed.


5.3. There is no risk that the Plaintiff will run away without paying any costs to the First Defendant as he guarantees that he will be paid his costs if he wins the case as a Minor Case. This is because the dictates of the law allows the Plaintiff not to comply with the jurisdictional excesses costs order of Commissioner Herron in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008.

5.4. An undertaking to pay costs under the Minor Case Provisions is not to be taken lightly by this Court as it is a professional misconduct for the Plaintiff not to comply with his undertaking given honourably to this Honourable Court.

6.1. Irrespective of whether the Plaintiff is impecunious or not, the Plaintiff do have equitable interests in the caveat property of the Second Defendant because he had taken a $7,500.00 loan to pay the First Defendant the $6,000.00 in FR944 of 2007.

6.2. If he does not get his money back from the First Defendant to repay his loan, he will have to get it back from the Second Defendant. Therefore he has equitable interests in the property of the Second Defendant.

7.1. The Plaintiff is a victim of Australian racism. This is properly documented in his article entitled “Right to Work” found at the website of the Unity Party WA accessible at: http://www.unitywa.org/information-right-to-work.html.

7.2. The Plaintiff is impecunious but he has three sons and relatives who are monied. This does not mean that the First Defendant should be outwitting him in getting monies from his sons or his other family members to feed, with due respect, his unconscionable means of exploiting client’s vulnerabilities.

8.1. The Plaintiff’s right to access justice is blocked by the jurisdictional excesses of their Honours Magistrate Musk, Magistrate Michelides and Commissioner Herron. There is no denying of these facts.

8.2. They do stultify his rights to redress. Justice for the First Defendant is easy but justice for the Plaintiff is hard to get, given the circumstances.

9. The Plaintiff feels the grievance because he had been subjected to a false claim of a ZERO SUM DEBT that was caused by the First Defendant confusing the minds of the courts by misleading the court. The First Defendant being an officer of the court is placed in high regard by the courts below and he abused his powers to the following effects:

9.(a).1. It is not the case of the Plaintiff issuing multiplicity of proceedings in contesting the issue the validity of the compromise agreement. It is a fact that the compromise agreement is duress-vitiated right from its inception and the courts below were not able to see it as it is too unconventional.

9.(a).2. It is unbelievable that an officer (with due respect to Mr. Thies) of the court had resorted to ensnare and exploit vulnerable clients.

9.(b). The First Defendant misconceived that the Plaintiff had had made
unfounded Applications, in the following terms:

9.(b).i. The application for recusal of Justice Kenneth Martin is valid upon the following instances of apprehended bias as already explained in the foregoing sub-paragraphs 4.a.2, 4.b.2 and 4.b.9 and also when His Honour refused to accept the following:

9.(b).i.(1): the written submission of the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007 or the Plaintiff as a litigant in person ;
9(b).i.(2) the Summons in Chambers of the Second Defendant or the Plaintiff together with the Supporting Affidavit in CIV1112 of 2007 as a litigant in person;

9(b).i.(3) the fact that the Plaintiff is merely the free agent or the amicus curiae or the McKenzie friend of the Second Defendant.

9(b).i.(4) the fact that the Second Defendant can have someone else to act as his scribe or writer of his legal documents, even though it might be the Plaintiff himself?

9(b).i.(5) the fact that the Plaintiff can never be reasonably found to be acting in conflict of his own personal interests against the interests of the Second Defendant , because he was at all material times acting pro-bono for his son the Second Defendant, in accordance with subs.12(3)(d) and 12(4) of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 (WA) .
9(b).i.(6) and to understand that an uncertificated legal practitioner is still able to use his name as a barrister and solicitor provided he informs the public that he is currently uncertificated, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s name has never been removed from the roll of barristers & solicitors (and that he could be so removed only for grave and consistent professional misconduct, for which there has never been a finding of a simple professional misconduct against him, despite LPCC trying to re-persecute him for a FURTHER REMEDY debarred by the common law based on the grounds of res judicata );

9(b).i.(7) that the First Defendant is indeed and reasonably found to be acting in conflict of interests against the interests of his own clients, the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant by advancing his own personal interests before the interests of those clients.

9(b).i.(8) that the Plaintiff owe a responsibility not to neglect his own son in the Second Defendant and has a moral and legal obligation to protect his own son as the natural father from harm i.e. from the marauding activities of the First Defendant.

9(b).i.(9) that the Plaintiff should be construed as a party to the action in CIV1112 of 2007 under the circumstances as contained within paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of the Affidavit of the Plaintiff sworn and filed on 26.5.2010 and served on the First Defendant on 3.6.2010.

9(b).i.(10) that he has the right to rebut the contents of the Plaintiff’s 2-page facsimile letter, addressed to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court, marked for the attention of the Associate to His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin, copied to the LPCC and dated 28.5.2010 containing 12 grounds called for the learned Justice’s recusal.

9(b).i.(11) that the First Defendant never had a caveatable interests in the Second Defendant home property at No.29, O’Dell Street, Thornlie as he never contributed to its improvement in value to qualify for a proprietary interests, it was never part of the impugned varied solicitor’s costs agreement as it was never consensual anyway, and even if it were, that charged or mortgaged was never specifically described so as to be distinguishable in it.

9(b).i.(12) by his error in his misconception of the legal meaning of caveatable interests through quoting Bashford & Bashford at para.10 of the prejudgement by equating it with “an arguable interest in land ” divested of an equitable interests in the caveat land .

9.(b).(i).(13): that he had not taken into account relevant matters and had taken into account irrelevant matters in his pre-judgment, to the extent that he denied the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant natural justice by providing deficient statement of reasons for relevant issues of law of facts which remains undecided though they were contained in the written submissions and affidavits that was before him.

9.(b).ii. The Plaintiff’s objection to the taxation of the First Defendant’s bill of costs emanating from the Commissioner Herron’s jurisdictional-excess cost order is premised on the rationale that a cost order made without jurisdiction is prima facei unenforceable and is of null effect.

9.(b).iii. The Application for consolidation of these proceedings is based on Order 83 of the RSC 1971 (WA) which has the legal effects of a principle of the common law as applicable in Western Australia and is reasonable and just as its purpose is to quiet all claims pertaining to one transaction or event and is aimed at the conservation of resources of all parties concerned .

9.(c). The Plaintiff does not make false allegations of impropriety against Mr.
Thies and judicial officers without providing proper particulars and adequate
supporting materials and will endeavour to do so in the following:

9.(c).(1). Every statement made by the Plaintiff in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit sworn filed and dated 23.7.2008 is fully substantiated with spontaneous and simultaneous evidentiary materials that are contained within the court records of those proceedings for which the parties involved have also simultaneously been fully apprised of. They pertain to Her Honour Magistrate Musk denial of natural justice to the Plaintiff and her jurisdictional excesses.
9.(c).(2). Paragraph 28 and sub-paragraph 85.7 of the Plaintiff’s Affidavit sworn 12.5.2010 bears the truth that Registrar Wilde was involved in an involuntary decision to make that Consent Judgment Order in order to avert further calamities to the Plaintiff, the Second Defendant and his other family members.
9.(c).(3). That was the best Registrar Wilde could do in the interest of justice and she did it at the importunateness of the Plaintiff to fulfil a need at that time.
9.(c).(4). Under the circumstances, she is to be construed as a conscientious, honest and a just judicial officer.
9.(c).(5). Registrar Wilde’s will in the meantime had been suborned by the duress of the First Defendant and therefore her decision is a nullity and she knew it to be so and that explains the reasons why she had delayed in delivering that Consent Judgment, albeit she even refused to endorse the subsequent Costs Order of the learned Magistrate Michelides, implying the universal truth that any derivative of a fraudulent compromise is of itself of null effect and unenforceable by a court of law.

9.(c).(6): His Honour Justice Ken Martin should reach his own conclusions about whether he should recuse himself from further hearing this case without the interference of the First Defendant as any consent request by him would be:
"fraught with potential coercive elements which make this practice undesirable ."

9.(d). All materials provided by the Plaintiff are to the point and serve
to emphasise the case for the Plaintiff in that the conduct of the First
Defendant in these proceedings had been anything but oppressive, frivolous,
intimidating, exploitative and vexatious.

10. Irrespective of whether there was a delay for security of costs, this Application does not serve any fruitful purpose in the interests of justice, is misconceived and should be dismissed with costs.

11. The security for costs is a tactic to stultify the Plaintiff from accessing his just claims and is therefore an abuse of the court process.

12. As per the dictates of the circumstances, these proceedings in FR417 of 2007is reviewable under the Certiorari Orders and are to be made absolute in terms of subs. 36(4) of the MCA.

13. Registrar Wilde had rightly refused to sign the costs orders of Magistrate Michelides as they are orders made without jurisdiction as the Plaintiff was denied natural justice on the ground that the learned Magistrate did shut his mind off to the Plaintiff’s Appeal against Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment on the ground of his plainly unreasonable refusal to extend time to appeal.

14.1. The principles ordinarily applicable to the discretion of Justice Kenneth Martin under s.36(4) of the MCA pertaining to a grant of a stay of the decisions made without jurisdiction of Magistrate Michelides pending an appeal as quoted by the First Defendant in the case law quoted by the First Defendant is indeed misleading this Court.

14.2. However, the relevant case law providing the legal authority for the lawful exercise of discretion by this Court under s.36(4) of the MCA to exercise its discretion to allow the Plaintiff’s application for Certiorari Orders to be made absolute has been established in the decision of Beech J in the case of Re An Application Under The Magistrates Court Act 2004; Ex Parte Brecker [2007] WASC 151 in circumstances where there has been an exercise of public authority by Registrar Wilde (albeit involuntarily), Magistrate Musk, Commissioner Herron and Magistrate Michelides, without jurisdiction .

15. The effect of Order 5 does not deprive the First Defendant of his fruits of his judgment as those judgments of Registrar Wilde Consent Order, Magistrate Musk, Magistrate Michelides and Commissioner Herron are decisions made by a public authorities without jurisdictions, they are reviewable by way of Certiorari and should be set aside by the discretion of Justice K Martin by way of a proper exercise of discretion as accorded by s.36(4) of the MCA.


CONCLUSION:

1. The First Defendant Application for security of costs be dismissed with costs.
2. The Plaintiff be provided for security of costs by the First Defendant.
3. The Court exercise its discretion to make the Certiorari Orders originally granted by Justice Hasluck to be made absolute.
4. The two actions in CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV1112 of 2007 be consolidated.
5. The Second Defendant be compensated with special damages for the wrongful caveat of the First Defendant in accordance with s.140 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1895(WA) at the rate of $95.50 per day to be calculated as from the 13.4.2007 till judgment and until the unlawful caveat has been lawfully removed by the First Defendant.
6. The First Defendant put the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant to their original position as if the Zero Sum false Claim of the First Defendant never occurred.
7. Costs of these proceedings to be assessed by this Court.
8. Any other relief deem fit.



Signed by the Plaintiff: ………………………………… ….


LIST OF AUTHORITIES

CASE LAW:


1) Bashford V Bashford [2008] WASC 138;
2) Chin v Thies [2008] WADC 71;
3) Diagnostic Medlab Ltd V Auckland District Health Board, Waitemata District Health Board, Counties-Manukau District Health Board And Ors HC AK Civ 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) At Paragraphs: 122 And 123 Per Asher J:
4) Eastland Technology v Whisson (2003) 28 WAR 308 at 311;
5) Gudgeon v Black; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179);
6) Latoudis V Casey [1990] HCA 59;
7) Mcwilliam And Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2005] AATA 1148 (11 November 2005) At Para. 35;
8) Minister For Immigration And Multicultural Affairs V Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597;
9) Oshlack V Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72;
10) Re An Application Under The Magistrates Court Act 2004; Ex Parte Brecker [2007] WASC 151;
11) Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527, Martin CJ;
12) Re McBain; ex parte Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372 at 473 [284] per Hayne J observed in (Gummow and Gaudron JJ agreeing at [80]);
13) Re Michelides; Ex Parte Chin [2008] WASC 256: Para. 144;
14) Ruddock V Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865;
15) Surfers Paradise Coaches P/L v TSU Chan Lin [2007] NSWSC 475.
16) Thies -V- Chin [2010] WASC 111;

STATUTE LAW:

1) District Court Act, 1969 (WA): ss. 76, 77;
2) Legal Profession Act, 2008 (WA), s.12;
3) Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 (WA); s. 25 and 31;
4) Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill 2003 (WA) s. 25(5);
5) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 (WA): subs. 36(1), 36(4), 46(4)(c), 36(7);
6) Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA): ss. 137,138 B, 138C, 140.


ARTICLES AND WEBSITES:

1) http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/just;
2) http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/92-1h.html for the article: CJE Opinion No. 92-1 of The Massachusetts Judicial Branch: Judicial Ethics Opinions: Hearing De Novo Retrials of Cases Tried by Judge's Father , and ADA, and Trials Involving The District Attorney's Staf;f
3) http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v1n1/boyle11.html entitled: S Boyle: CAVEATABLE INTERESTS - THE COMMON LORE DISTINGUISHED.
4) http://www.unitywa.org/information-right-to-work.html.

EMAIL LETTER TO LPCC INFORMING IT OF HIGH COURT DECISION IN P1 OF 2010 DELIVERED 26.5.2010 AND REQUESTING IT TO STOP MALIGNING ME

LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
Post Office Box Z5293, St Georges Terrace, Perth WA 6831
2nd Floor, Colonial Building, 55 St Georges Terrace, Perth WA 6000
TEL (08) 9461 2299 / FAX (08) 9461 2265 / EMAIL lpcc@lpbwa.com
Atten: Ms. Caroline Brookes
Dear Sirs:
I refer to the above matter and wish to inform you that the High Court had arrived at its decision on 26.5.2010 in P1 of 2010 which implies that if there were no falsifications of the court records by the Mr. David Taylor with regard to the date of filing of CIV 1131 of 2006, I would have succeeded in removing the Spunter’s Caveat. So, the allegations by the LPCC that I have a proclivity to make false allegations of Mr. Taylor are now being vindicated by the decision of the High Court because the proof that I have been maligned is available before the Court of Appeal within the contents of my Yellow Appeal Book.
The High Court dismissed my Application for Special Leave to appeal the Court of Appeal decision in Chin v Hall based on the error of fact and law of Justice Owen in paras. 54 and 55 of that judgment. Please find my attached letter to the learned Registrar Eldred explaining this situation. I am now seeking for my case to be re-opened so that the Affidavit Evidence of Mr. David Taylor in CIV 1131 of 2010 filed on 29.3.2007 together with Annexure DGT14 in my Yellow Appeal Book shows that Mr. David Powell lied in his letter to me dated 11.6.2009 to cover up Mr. Taylor.
It is for the Committee now to take up this matter so that it is seen to be doing its duties to uphold the public interests and that it should no longer continue to support the contention of Mr. David Taylor maligning me.
Yours faithfully
NICHOLAS N CHIN
387, ALEXANDER DRIVE
DIANELLA WA 6059
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Nicholas N Chin [mailto:nnchin09@tpg.com.au]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 9:17 PM
To: 'enquiries@hcourt.gov.au'
Cc: 'nnchin1@gmail.com'
Subject: Special Leave Dispositions in Chin v Hall & Ors [2010] HCASL 104 (26 May 2010)
All the Justices of The High Court of Australia and
All The Registrars of the High Court of Australia.
Your Honours:
Please find my attached letter to the Registrar of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia with regard to the High Court of Australia decisions as indicated delivered on 26.5.2010.
It looks as if the High Court is telling the Court of Appeal of the Western Australia to correct its own decisions with regard to the causal connection between the recovery or preservation of the relevant property and the work of the solicitor right.
Cheers
NICHOLAS N CHIN
387, Alexander Drive
DIANELLA WA 6059
Phone: 08 92757440
Mobile: 0421642735

Chin v Hall & Ors [2010] HCASL 104 (26 May 2010)
Last Updated: 26 May 2010
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
v
AUDREY FRANCES HALL AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE KENNETH DUNCAN HALL & ORS
[2010] HCASL 104
P1/2010
The first respondent obtained judgment from the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Master Sanderson) against the applicant and the second respondent. The judgment required them to remove caveats against the title to two properties. The applicant is a solicitor who contends that he is entitled to maintain a caveat over the properties to protect a statutory charge. The Master found that the first respondent's mortgages had priority over the charge.
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed an appeal, but for a different reason. Owen JA (McClure P and Buss JA concurring) held, not that the mortgages had priority over the charge, but that the charge never arose because the factual precondition to it was not satisfied. That factual precondition was a causal connection between the recovery or preservation of the relevant property and the work of the solicitor. The Court of Appeal held that even if effecting the removal of a caveat constitutes recovery or preservation of property, the removal was caused by the first respondent's successful application for summary judgment, not the applicant's work.
The papers filed in support of the applicant's application for special leave to appeal do not focus on that crucial aspect of the Court of Appeal's reasoning and do not show error in it.
The application is dismissed.
Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.
J.D. Heydon
26 May 2010
V.M. Bell

CALLING FOR JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN TO RECUSE HIMSELF FROM HEARING CIV 1903 OF 2008 AND CIV 1112 OF 2007

Friday, 28 May 2010

The Principal Registrar
Mr. Keith Frederick Chapman
Supreme Court of WA Stirling Gardens, Barrack Street
PERTH WA 6000 Associate: Tel: 08 9421 5302 Fax: 08 92218350
Atten: The Associate to the Honourable Justice Kenneth Martin

The Legal Profession Complaints Committee
Atten: Legal Officer Ms. Caroline Brookes PO Box: Z5293,
St. Georges Terrace, PERTH WA 6831 Facsimile: 9461 2265
Atten: Ms. Caroline Brookes: I shall send you by email a copy of my Affidavit in 21 pages, devoid of all annexure to keep the LPCC informed of the latest developments in this case.

Dear Sir

JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN IN CIV 1112 OF 2010: THIES V CHIN [2010] WASC 111 DELIVERED ON 13.5.2010 AND PUBLISHED ON 25.5.2010.

I am writing this letter to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court to settle an administrative matter of the Supreme Court.

I refer to the above judgment which crossed my Affidavit in 140 pages sworn and filed on 26.5.2010 filed in CIV 1903 of 2008 in response to the Affidavit of Mr. Thies sworn and filed the 12.5.2010.

In my Affidavit I have requested for His Honour to review his ruling in accordance with the common law with regard to his Honour’s refusal to allow me to represent my son Paul Chung Kiong Chin in CIV 1112 of 2007 for which I had posed an immediate objection to it at the time when that ruling was made.

Further in my Affidavit I have made an application for the two cases to be consolidated into one case for the purpose of quieting all claims that arose out of one transaction or event. This is a very cogent reason which the Court should heed having regard to the fact that since I have agreed for Paul to be made a Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2009 and similarly, Mr. Thies should trade it for my being made the Defendant in the CIV 1112 of 2007.

I am now asking for His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin to recuse himself from further hearing of the consolidated case on the ground that His Honour had taken into account irrelevant considerations and had refused to take into account relevant considerations and is deficient in his provision of the reasons of his decisions by paying scant regard to the written submissions of both myself and of my son Paul on inter alia, the following grounds:

a) There is no conflict of interests subsisting between my son’s interests and my own personal interests under the exhaustive circumstances which I have provided for in my Affidavit.
b) At all material times, I have not acted as a solicitor for Paul and I had only acted as a settlement agent for the vendor of the Centenary Lunch Bar with the written informed consent by both parties. The fact that I am divested of my practice certificate does it not mean that I can act as a free agent for anyone without the unnecessary restraints imposed on me.
c) If I had acted as a solicitor for Paul, I agree that I owe Paul legal obligations and public obligations as a solicitor to ensure that my own personal interests do not conflict with the interests of my son Paul.
d) The Acts governing the legal profession as extant in WA do not say that I am acting as a solicitor for my son Paul unless I am being paid a legal fee by my son.
e) The fact that there are two conflicting interests existing between the interests of the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar and the interests of my son Paul does not mean that these conflicting interests cannot be stayed by both parties exercising their free own wills to provide me with a Written Informed Consent which is only limited to the settlement process and none other.
b) It is an error in law on the face of the record for the learned Justice to suggest that I or someone else cannot write on behalf of Paul those documents which he Paul had caused to be filed and served in CIV 1112 of 2007 and in which Paul represented himself as a litigant in person. This is tantamount to saying that Paul cannot obtain the services of a clerk or a scribe-writer.
c) There is no reason why I cannot use my label, Barrister and Solicitor, although I am not a certificated legal practitioner as long I made this fact known or as long as I am acting as a litigant in person in my own case or in the case where I have the sanction of the Supreme Court to represent my son as provided for in the transcript of the proceedings by Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2010 in which I had specifically posed those questions before Justice Hasluck.
d) Given that I am not allowed to act as a litigant in person for my son in CIV 1112 of 2007, Paul had taken note of that fact and had altered all those documents into his own name as a litigant in person. Why in this instance when Paul is being denied natural justice? This denial of natural justice by a judge is itself an abuse of power of the learned Justice himself who then in error sought to convert it into an abuse of process by Paul or by me, acting as litigants in person, without Paul being active, as promised by the opposing party. Paul and I are seeking the services of His Honour as an impartial judge. I cannot understand His Honour’s logic - as it is clear that His Honour is now descending into the arena of conflict and is being blinded by the dust of conflict as a result.
e) The unlawful caveat which my learned friend Mr. Thies had recalcitrantly refused to remove even after he had been paid the coerced settlement monies clearly cannot be based on an arguable interest in land in accordance with the learned Justice Ken Martin’s view.
f) How is it possible for the learned Justice Ken Martin to fall into error by attributing a zero sum debt with the qualities of caveatable interests when section 137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA) and the relevant common law clearly implies that such an interests must be concomitant with some equitable interests in the caveat land.
g) Surely, His Honour could not fall into the error that Mr. Thies can have an equitable interests in the Caveat land if he had never entered into a contractual relationship with Paul in which the nature of the caveat land is properly and exactly described in the varied Solicitor Costs Agreement which Paul entered into with him based on the pre-contractual terms of the my email dated 25.10.2004, having regard to the circumstances affecting the consensus ad idem of both parties to that contract.
h) How is it possible for His Honour to fall into this error unless His Honour is prone to make a pre-judgment of the whole issue and is therefore coming to judge the case with less than an impartial mind?

In view of the circumstances as explained above, the written judgment of His Honour in the
above case clearly indicates albeit strongly so, that it is in the interests of justice that His
Honour should now recuse himself from further hearing this case. If this does not happen, the
litigation is not going to end here, it is going further. In the interests of conserving the resources
or all parties concerned and the courts as well, an immediate abdication by the Learned Justice
is only and the best solution. This is despite my inclination to give the learned Justice the
benefit of the doubt.

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN
c.c.
Mr. Timothy Robin Thies
No.70 King Street,
EAST FREMANTLE WA 6158
(Please find this cover letter attaching to my Affidavit sworn and filed 26.5.2010 in 140 pages in response to your Affidavit sworn 12.5.2010, by way of service upon you).

LETTER TO COURT OF APPEAL REGISTRAR TO RE-OPEN THE CASE IN CACV 107 OF 2008 IN THE LIGHT OF HIGH COURT DECISION IN P1 OF 2010

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Court of Appeal Registrar Eldred
Supreme Court of Western Australia
Court of Appeal
Stirling Gardens, Barrack Street
PERTH WA 6000 Phone: 94215333 Fax: 94215471
Attention: Ms. Maria Santos

Mr. Anthony Prime
Mc Callum Donovan Sweeney
No.16, Irwin Street
PERTH WA 6000
Phone: 9221 2220
Email: mds@mdslaw.com.au

Mr. Maurice Frederick Law
PO Box 399, MIDLAND WA 6936
Or 87, William Street, HERENE HILL WA 6056.
Email: moza@bigpond.com; moza35@bigpond.com;

Dear Sir

CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216

I refer to the above case that was decided by the Court of Appeal on 12 August, by the Court of Appeal comprising of McLURE P, OWEN JA and BUSS JA. In that judgment His Honour Owen J at paragraph 54 and 54 states as follows:

54 I have reviewed the evidence which Chin seeks to adduce and it does not prove his contention. The high point of Chin's evidence is a letter written to him by a registrar of this court dated 11 June 2009 saying: (Page 17)
You state you have a copy of the writ. In that case you will note it has 2 dates on it.
The first is 10 February 2006 with a notation that the fee was $654.20.
The second is the assessment which in its original form shows a date of 10 February 2006 and an assessment no of 201702. That assessment was cancelled after close of business on 10 February 2006 when it was realised by the Court that the cheque tendered for payment was for $654.00 and was therefore 20 cents short.
I assume that fact was forwarded to the plaintiffs' solicitors because on 16 February 2006 the correct amount was paid: $654.00 by credit card and 20 cents cash. The assessment stamp was altered to 16 February 2006 and the new assessment number 202483 entered on the altered stamp.
The assessment number is given on payment.
55 The letter does not establish that the action was not commenced on 10 February 2006. It indicates that the writ was filed on 10 February 2006 and, through an oversight, the filing fee paid was 20 cents short of the proper amount. The underpayment was brought to Spunter's solicitor's attention and the correct amount was paid. This does not mean that the writ was not filed until the correct fee was paid.

However, Mr. David Taylor swore an Affidavit on 29.3.2007 in CIV 1131 of 2006 which is found at pages 46 to 48 of my Yellow Appeal Book in CACV107 of 2008 to the effect that the total sum of filing fees namely $654.00 and 20 cents were received together on the same day in two lots for which a Receipt No. 1348 dated 10.2.2006 were given to Mr. David Taylor by the Supreme Court.

Therefore the letter by Registrar Powell to me dated 11.6.2009 found at page 136 of the Yellow Appeal Book when read together with his other letters to me regarding the same matter indicate that the learned Registrar Powell was trying to falsify the court records and did falsified the court records by stating that the Writ of Summons was issued on 10.2.2006 when it was never done so by the Supreme Court.

Had the court records never been falsified in accordance with s.85 of the Criminal Code, 1903 (WA), I would not have been deprived of my right to exercise my solicitor’s lien as a charge over the estate of the late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall under s.244 of the former LP Act for my work to remove the caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd.

The High Court decision in dismissing my Special Leave Application P1 of 2010 that was delivered on 26.5.2010 refers to the causal connection between my work and the removal of the Spunter’s caveat. It denies that my work has that causal connection. Therefore this issue of the causal connection vis a vis the corrupt act of falsification of court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 has never been decided by the High Court of Australia nor in the Court of Appeal. This issue is never not bounded by the rule of res-judicata and need to be decided again. The question, where is the forum of this non-res judicata issue to be decided. I believe most appropriate forum is still the Court of Appeal.

However, my contention is that if there was no corrupt act in the falsification of the court records, my solicitor work for the late Ms Hall would have been the first one to remove the Spunter’s caveat instead of the learned Master Sanderson having to await the application by Mr. Anthony Prime of Mc Calluim Donovan and Sweeney as solicitors for their client the First Respondent i.e. Mrs. Audrey Francds Hall to remove the Spunter’s Caveat through a summary dismissal. Had there been no such falsifications of the court records as aforementioned, the causal connection would not have been intercepted by Master Sanderson’s summary dismissal which removed the Spunter’s Caveats at a later date instead of a prior removal by my solicitor work. In other words, had there been no falsification of the court records, I would have been paid for my work done for the late Ms. Hall from her estate. A travesty of justice had been done to me and I want to seek your procedural advice as to how I should access this justice.

Please find attached a copy of the High Court decision in my Special Leave Dispositions in P1 of 2010.

Yours faithfully


NICHOLAS N CHIN