Nicholas N CHIN Sep 1, 2026, 5:27 PM (15 hours ago) to Associate, Associate, Associate, SC, Associate, Associate, associate.registrar.whitbread, associate.registrar.gilich, associate.registrar.allison, associate.registrar.millman, associate.registrar.eaton, Associate
To: The Principal Registrar All Registrars of the Supreme Court of Western Australia The Honourable the Chief Justice of Western Australia From: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin Perth, Western Australia
Subject: Misapprehension of Judicial Function Under VPRA s 6(1) and s 6(5) — Request for Administrative and Judicial Clarification
1. Purpose of This Letter This letter accompanies my memorandum dated 1 September 2026. Its purpose is to respectfully identify a misapprehension of judicial function that has arisen in the series of VPRA decisions delivered by Justice Gething in:
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 40
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 90
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 157
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 369
The issue is not personal. It is structural and concerns the correct application of the VPRA and the proper scope of judicial duty under s 6(1) and s 6(5).
2. The Misapprehension of Role Under VPRA s 6(1) In WASC 369, Justice Gething stated:
“The appropriate forum for determination of that issue is by way of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, not a request for me to reconsider the issue.”
This statement reveals a fundamental misapprehension of the judge’s statutory role.
Under VPRA s 6(1):
Each application for leave is a fresh and independent judicial determination.
The judge must assess prima facie grounds on the material filed in that application.
The judge is not functus officio on any legal issue previously considered.
The judge cannot decline to reconsider a legal question merely because he previously ruled on it.
The VPRA does not create a doctrine of “issue finality” within the leave jurisdiction.
3. Misapplication of VPRA s 6(5) Justice Gething repeatedly applied a merits‑based test, not the statutory prima facie test.
The judgment states:
“They do not raise any argument … which has not already been considered and rejected by me.”
This is not the test under s 6(5).
The correct test is:
Whether the proposed proceeding discloses a prima facie ground,
Not whether the judge personally agrees with the legal argument,
And not whether the argument was previously rejected in a different VPRA application.
By treating earlier decisions as binding on subsequent applications, the judge has:
Collapsed the prima facie test into a merits test,
Foreclosed reconsideration of statutory construction,
Converted VPRA leave into a de facto permanent bar, contrary to Parliament’s intention.
4. Failure to Consider Mandatory Relevant Matters In WASC 369, the judgment does not address:
Transfer of Land Act ss 201 and 205 compensation rights,
The statutory preservation of pre‑existing quasi‑easements under s 52 PLA,
The administrative consequences for the Registrar of Titles.
These matters were squarely raised in the originating motion and affidavit.
A failure to consider mandatory relevant considerations is a jurisdictional error, not a discretionary one.
ANNEXURE A — MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Re: Mandatory Judicial Re‐Determination of the Construction of s.52 Property Law Act 1969 (WA) To: The Honourable the Chief Justice of Western Australia From: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin Perth, Western Australia Subject: Request for Judicial Re‐Determination of the Proper Construction of s.52 Property Law Act 1969 (WA) — VPRA Contains No Appeal Mechanism 1. Purpose of this Memorandum This memorandum accompanies my cover letter addressed to all Registrars of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Its purpose is to bring to your attention a systemic legal issue arising from the interpretation of Section 52 Property Law Act 1969 (WA) (“s.52 PLA”) adopted in Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 90 and [2026] WASC 369. The issue cannot be corrected through an appeal to the Court of Appeal because the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (“VPRA”) provides no statutory right of appeal from a refusal of leave under s.6(1). Accordingly, the matter requires determination by another judge of the Supreme Court to prevent the entrenchment of a doctrinal error with ongoing administrative consequences. 2. No Appeal Lies to the Court of Appeal Under the VPRA The VPRA establishes a closed statutory regime governing applications for leave to commence proceedings. The Act: ● confers jurisdiction on a judge of the Supreme Court under s.6(1); ● requires the judge to determine whether a prima facie ground exists under s.6(5); ● does not provide any right of appeal from a refusal of leave; ● does not incorporate the appeal provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA); ● does not permit a challenge to the refusal through ordinary appellate channels. Therefore:
The erroneous construction of s.52 PLA adopted in WASC 90 and WASC 369 cannot be corrected by the Court of Appeal. This creates a structural problem: a legal error of general importance has been made, but the statutory framework prevents appellate correction. 3. The Error Is Systemic and Affects the Court’s Administrative Arm The construction adopted by Justice Gething — namely, that: “s 52 does not create a statutory implied easement” is contrary to the historical doctrine codified by Parliament, including: ● Pyer v Carter (1857) ● Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) ● Pwllbach Colliery (1915) ● Wong v Beaumont (1965) and contrary to the statutory purpose of s.52 PLA. This error: ● affects all future VPRA applications involving s.52 PLA; ● affects the administrative practice of the Registrar of Titles; ● affects the integrity of the land register; ● affects the rights of landowners whose pre‐existing uses were preserved by statute; ● risks perpetuating a misunderstanding of s.52 PLA across the Court’s administrative and judicial functions. Because the VPRA prevents appellate correction, the error will remain indefinitely unless addressed by another judge. 4. Necessity for Determination by Another Judge Given: ● the absence of an appeal mechanism under the VPRA; ● the systemic nature of the legal error; ● the administrative consequences for Landgate and the Registrar of Titles; ● the doctrinal importance of s.52 PLA; ● and the need for consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence; it is necessary that: Another judge of the Supreme Court be allocated to determine the proper construction of s.52 PLA, independent of the VPRA leave regime.
This is the only lawful pathway to correct the doctrinal error and prevent its entrenchment. 5. Request I respectfully request that: 1. The issue of the proper construction of s.52 PLA be referred to another judge of the Supreme Court for determination; 2. The Court provide administrative guidance to the Registrar of Titles to ensure that statutory rights arising under s.52 PLA are correctly recorded and maintained; 3. The Court take steps to prevent the perpetuation of the erroneous construction adopted in WASC 90 and WASC 369. Yours respectfully, Nicholas Ni Kok Chin Perth, Western Australia DATED 1ST SEPTEMBER, 2026.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA CITATION : NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN [2026] WASC 369 CORAM : GETHING J HEARD : 27 AUGUST 2026 DELIVERED : 1 SEPTEMBER 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1628 of 2026 BETWEEN : NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Plaintiff
Solicitors: Plaintiff : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 157 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 40 The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7
GETHING J: 1 By originating motion filed on 14 May 2026, Nicholas Ni Kok Chin (the Applicant) seeks leave to commence proceedings pursuant to Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (VPRA) s 6(1). Leave is required as in 2012 the Supreme Court prohibited Mr Chin from instituting proceedings in any Western Australian court or tribunal without the leave of the court.1 2 The proceedings which Mr Chin seeks leave to commence are against the State of Western Australia and the Registrar of Titles (Proposed Proceedings). The Proposed Proceedings relate to a commercial property in Malaga. The relief sought is set out in the originating motion in the following terms: A. Compensation under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) A.1 Compensation under ss 201(1) and 205(1) for deprivation of an estate or interest in land, including the loss of the 31 items of plant and equipment formerly located at Unit 1/383 and registered under PPSR No. 20170412006511.
B. Declarations concerning the statutory implied easement under s 52 Property Law Act 1969 (WA) B.1 A declaration that Unit 1 on Strata Plan 34659 (Unit 1/383) satisfies the legal requirements for creation of a statutory implied easement, including that: (i) Prior to subdivision, Lot 12 (383 Victoria Road) was held in common ownership by St Mark Investment Pty Ltd (unity of possession); (ii) During unity of possession, the portion now comprising Unit 1/383 was designated and operated as the Victoria Road Lunch Br. (iii) The lunch bar portion enjoyed continuous and apparent quasi-easement rights over adjoining parts of Lot 12; (iv) The quasi-easement was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of Unit 1/383 at the time of subdivision;
1 The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7.
[2026] WASC 369
GETHING J
Page 4 (v) The easement was not expressly excluded in the instrument of subdivision; and (vi) Upon subdivision, the easement attached to Unit 1/383 as an incident of the land. C. Declarations concerning extinguishment and loss C.1 Declarations identifying the existence, scope, and purported extinguishment of the statutory implied easement, including that: (i) Any purported extinguishment was effected without lawful authority or compliance with the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA); (ii) Such extinguishment was invalid and of no legal effect; and (iii) The loss of the 31 items of plant and equipment was caused by enforcement of the void order made by Magistrate Ward in MC/PER/CIV 10010/2020.
D. Damages D.1 Damages for deprivation of an estate or interest in land, including consequential loss arising from removal, sale or destruction of the 31 items of plant and equipment.
E. Further relief E.1 Such further or other orders as the Court considers appropriate.
3 So far this year, the Applicant has made three applications relating to the same matter, each of which have been decided by me: (a) an application by originating motion filed 27 January 2026, dismissed on 13 February 2026 (February Decision);2 (b) an application by originating motion filed 3 March 2026, dismissed on 27 March 2026 (March Decision);3 and
2 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 40. 3 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 90.
[2026] WASC 369
GETHING J
Page 5 (c) an application by originating motion filed 16 April 2026, dismissed on 4 May 2026 (May Decision).4
4 The Applicant filed affidavit sworn by him on 9 May 2026 as well as the following submissions: (a) 'Written Submissions of the Applicant' filed 16 May 2026; (b) 'Second Submission – Factual Matrix' filed 22 May 2026; (c) 'Third Full Submission of the Applicant' filed 23 May 2026; (d) 'Fourth Full Submissions of the Applicant to Correct Section 3 of the Third Submissions' filed 23 May 2026; (e) 'Consolidated Submissions for Hearing' filed 3 June 2026; (f) 'Sixth Submission' filed 4 June 2026; (g) 'Sixth Written Submission' filed 19 June 2026; (i) 'Eighth Written Submission' filed 19 June 2026; (j) 'Ninth Written Submission of the Plaintiff' filed 21 June 2026; (k) 'Oral & Written Submission (Hand-Up)' filed 22 June 2026; (l) 'Eleventh Written Submission of the Plaintiff' filed 26 June 2026; (m) 'Twelfth Written Submission' filed 27 June 2026; (n) 'Thirteenth Written Submission (Consolidated)' filed 4 July 2026; (o) 'Fourteenth Written Submission' filed 5 July 2026; (p) 'Fifteenth Written Submission of the Plaintiff' filed 16 August 2026; (q) 'Written Submission No. 16' filed 21 August 2026; (r) 'WS16 – Written Submissions of the exparte Applicant' filed 22 August 2026;
4 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 157.
[2026] WASC 369
GETHING J
Page 6 (s) 'MUCC Consideration Notification', handed up at the hearing on 27 August 2026; (t) 'Oral Script for Justice Gething', handed up at the hearing on 27 August 2026; (u) '17th Written Submissions', handed up at the hearing on 27 August 2026; and (v) 'Contingent WS16', handed up at the hearing on 27 August 2026.
5 I have read each set of submissions. They do not raise any argument relevant to the grant of leave to commence the Proposed Proceedings which has not already been considered and rejected by me in the February Decision, March Decision or May Decision. Nor did his oral submissions. The foundational legal premise of the Proposed Proceedings is that Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 52 creates a 'statutory implied easement'. As I set out in the May Decision ([9]), it does not. 6 At points in the documents I have set out at [4], and in oral argument, the Applicant asserts that I have made errors in one of my earlier decisions. The appropriate forum for determination of that issue is by way of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, not a request, in effect, for me to reconsider the issue. 7 I find that there is no prima facie ground for the Proposed Proceedings for the purposes of VPRA s 6(5). Therefore I must dismiss the application.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. CC Associate to the Hon Justice Gething 1 SEPTEMBER 2026
Nicholas N CHIN
ReplyDeleteSep 1, 2026, 5:27 PM (15 hours ago)
to Associate, Associate, Associate, SC, Associate, Associate, associate.registrar.whitbread, associate.registrar.gilich, associate.registrar.allison, associate.registrar.millman, associate.registrar.eaton, Associate
To: The Principal Registrar All Registrars of the Supreme Court of Western Australia The Honourable the Chief Justice of Western Australia
From: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin Perth, Western Australia
Subject: Misapprehension of Judicial Function Under VPRA s 6(1) and s 6(5) — Request for Administrative and Judicial Clarification
1. Purpose of This Letter
This letter accompanies my memorandum dated 1 September 2026. Its purpose is to respectfully identify a misapprehension of judicial function that has arisen in the series of VPRA decisions delivered by Justice Gething in:
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 40
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 90
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 157
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 369
The issue is not personal. It is structural and concerns the correct application of the VPRA and the proper scope of judicial duty under s 6(1) and s 6(5).
2. The Misapprehension of Role Under VPRA s 6(1)
In WASC 369, Justice Gething stated:
“The appropriate forum for determination of that issue is by way of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, not a request for me to reconsider the issue.”
This statement reveals a fundamental misapprehension of the judge’s statutory role.
Under VPRA s 6(1):
Each application for leave is a fresh and independent judicial determination.
The judge must assess prima facie grounds on the material filed in that application.
The judge is not functus officio on any legal issue previously considered.
The judge cannot decline to reconsider a legal question merely because he previously ruled on it.
The VPRA does not create a doctrine of “issue finality” within the leave jurisdiction.
3. Misapplication of VPRA s 6(5)
Justice Gething repeatedly applied a merits‑based test, not the statutory prima facie test.
The judgment states:
“They do not raise any argument … which has not already been considered and rejected by me.”
This is not the test under s 6(5).
The correct test is:
Whether the proposed proceeding discloses a prima facie ground,
Not whether the judge personally agrees with the legal argument,
And not whether the argument was previously rejected in a different VPRA application.
By treating earlier decisions as binding on subsequent applications, the judge has:
Collapsed the prima facie test into a merits test,
Foreclosed reconsideration of statutory construction,
Converted VPRA leave into a de facto permanent bar, contrary to Parliament’s intention.
4. Failure to Consider Mandatory Relevant Matters
In WASC 369, the judgment does not address:
Transfer of Land Act ss 201 and 205 compensation rights,
The statutory preservation of pre‑existing quasi‑easements under s 52 PLA,
The administrative consequences for the Registrar of Titles.
These matters were squarely raised in the originating motion and affidavit.
A failure to consider mandatory relevant considerations is a jurisdictional error, not a discretionary one.
ANNEXURE A — MEMORANDUM TO
ReplyDeleteTHE CHIEF JUSTICE OF WESTERN
AUSTRALIA
Re: Mandatory Judicial Re‐Determination of the Construction of s.52 Property Law Act
1969 (WA)
To: The Honourable the Chief Justice of Western Australia
From: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin Perth, Western Australia
Subject: Request for Judicial Re‐Determination of the Proper Construction of s.52 Property
Law Act 1969 (WA) — VPRA Contains No Appeal Mechanism
1. Purpose of this Memorandum
This memorandum accompanies my cover letter addressed to all Registrars of the Supreme
Court of Western Australia. Its purpose is to bring to your attention a systemic legal issue
arising from the interpretation of Section 52 Property Law Act 1969 (WA) (“s.52 PLA”)
adopted in Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 90 and [2026] WASC 369.
The issue cannot be corrected through an appeal to the Court of Appeal because the
Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (“VPRA”) provides no statutory right
of appeal from a refusal of leave under s.6(1). Accordingly, the matter requires
determination by another judge of the Supreme Court to prevent the entrenchment of a
doctrinal error with ongoing administrative consequences.
2. No Appeal Lies to the Court of Appeal Under the
VPRA
The VPRA establishes a closed statutory regime governing applications for leave to
commence proceedings. The Act:
● confers jurisdiction on a judge of the Supreme Court under s.6(1);
● requires the judge to determine whether a prima facie ground exists under s.6(5);
● does not provide any right of appeal from a refusal of leave;
● does not incorporate the appeal provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA);
● does not permit a challenge to the refusal through ordinary appellate channels.
Therefore:
The erroneous construction of s.52 PLA adopted in WASC 90 and WASC
369 cannot be corrected by the Court of Appeal.
This creates a structural problem: a legal error of general importance has been made, but
the statutory framework prevents appellate correction.
3. The Error Is Systemic and Affects the Court’s
Administrative Arm
The construction adopted by Justice Gething — namely, that:
“s 52 does not create a statutory implied easement”
is contrary to the historical doctrine codified by Parliament, including:
● Pyer v Carter (1857)
● Wheeldon v Burrows (1879)
● Pwllbach Colliery (1915)
● Wong v Beaumont (1965)
and contrary to the statutory purpose of s.52 PLA.
This error:
● affects all future VPRA applications involving s.52 PLA;
● affects the administrative practice of the Registrar of Titles;
● affects the integrity of the land register;
● affects the rights of landowners whose pre‐existing uses were preserved by statute;
● risks perpetuating a misunderstanding of s.52 PLA across the Court’s administrative
and judicial functions.
Because the VPRA prevents appellate correction, the error will remain indefinitely unless
addressed by another judge.
4. Necessity for Determination by Another Judge
Given:
● the absence of an appeal mechanism under the VPRA;
● the systemic nature of the legal error;
● the administrative consequences for Landgate and the Registrar of Titles;
● the doctrinal importance of s.52 PLA;
● and the need for consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence;
it is necessary that:
Another judge of the Supreme Court be allocated to determine the proper
construction of s.52 PLA, independent of the VPRA leave regime.
This is the only lawful pathway to correct the doctrinal error and prevent its entrenchment.
5. Request
I respectfully request that:
1. The issue of the proper construction of s.52 PLA be referred to another judge of the
Supreme Court for determination;
2. The Court provide administrative guidance to the Registrar of Titles to ensure that
statutory rights arising under s.52 PLA are correctly recorded and maintained;
3. The Court take steps to prevent the perpetuation of the erroneous construction
adopted in WASC 90 and WASC 369.
Yours respectfully,
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin Perth, Western Australia
DATED 1ST SEPTEMBER, 2026.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ReplyDeleteCITATION : NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN [2026] WASC 369
CORAM : GETHING J
HEARD : 27 AUGUST 2026
DELIVERED : 1 SEPTEMBER 2026
FILE NO/S : CIV 1628 of 2026
BETWEEN : NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
Plaintiff
Solicitors:
ReplyDeletePlaintiff : In Person
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 157
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 40
The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7
https://ecourts.justice.wa.gov.au/eCourtsPortal/Decisions/ViewDecision?returnUrl=%2feCourtsPortal%2fDecisions%2fFilter%2fSC%2fRecentDecisions&id=9882d22c-d291-4727-9a68-7193295ee51c
ReplyDeleteGETHING J
ReplyDeletePage 3
GETHING J:
1 By originating motion filed on 14 May 2026, Nicholas Ni Kok
Chin (the Applicant) seeks leave to commence proceedings pursuant to
Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (VPRA) s 6(1).
Leave is required as in 2012 the Supreme Court prohibited Mr Chin
from instituting proceedings in any Western Australian court or tribunal
without the leave of the court.1
2 The proceedings which Mr Chin seeks leave to commence are
against the State of Western Australia and the Registrar of Titles
(Proposed Proceedings). The Proposed Proceedings relate to a
commercial property in Malaga. The relief sought is set out in the
originating motion in the following terms:
A. Compensation under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)
A.1 Compensation under ss 201(1) and 205(1) for
deprivation of an estate or interest in land, including the
loss of the 31 items of plant and equipment formerly
located at Unit 1/383 and registered under PPSR No.
20170412006511.
B. Declarations concerning the statutory implied easement
under s 52 Property Law Act 1969 (WA)
B.1 A declaration that Unit 1 on Strata Plan 34659
(Unit 1/383) satisfies the legal requirements for
creation of a statutory implied easement, including that:
(i) Prior to subdivision, Lot 12 (383 Victoria
Road) was held in common ownership by St
Mark Investment Pty Ltd (unity of
possession);
(ii) During unity of possession, the portion now
comprising Unit 1/383 was designated and
operated as the Victoria Road Lunch Br.
(iii) The lunch bar portion enjoyed continuous and
apparent quasi-easement rights over adjoining
parts of Lot 12;
(iv) The quasi-easement was reasonably necessary
for the enjoyment of Unit 1/383 at the time of
subdivision;
1 The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7.
[2026] WASC 369
GETHING J
Page 4
(v) The easement was not expressly excluded in
the instrument of subdivision; and
(vi) Upon subdivision, the easement attached to
Unit 1/383 as an incident of the land.
C. Declarations concerning extinguishment and loss
C.1 Declarations identifying the existence, scope, and
purported extinguishment of the statutory implied
easement, including that:
(i) Any purported extinguishment was effected
without lawful authority or compliance with
the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA);
(ii) Such extinguishment was invalid and of no
legal effect; and
(iii) The loss of the 31 items of plant and
equipment was caused by enforcement of the
void order made by Magistrate Ward in
MC/PER/CIV 10010/2020.
D. Damages
D.1 Damages for deprivation of an estate or interest in land,
including consequential loss arising from removal, sale
or destruction of the 31 items of plant and equipment.
E. Further relief
E.1 Such further or other orders as the Court considers
appropriate.
3 So far this year, the Applicant has made three applications relating
ReplyDeleteto the same matter, each of which have been decided by me:
(a) an application by originating motion filed 27 January 2026,
dismissed on 13 February 2026 (February Decision);2
(b) an application by originating motion filed 3 March 2026,
dismissed on 27 March 2026 (March Decision);3
and
2 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 40.
3 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 90.
[2026] WASC 369
GETHING J
Page 5
(c) an application by originating motion filed 16 April 2026,
dismissed on 4 May 2026 (May Decision).4
4 The Applicant filed affidavit sworn by him on 9 May 2026 as well
as the following submissions:
(a) 'Written Submissions of the Applicant' filed 16 May 2026;
(b) 'Second Submission – Factual Matrix' filed 22 May 2026;
(c) 'Third Full Submission of the Applicant' filed 23 May 2026;
(d) 'Fourth Full Submissions of the Applicant to Correct Section 3
of the Third Submissions' filed 23 May 2026;
(e) 'Consolidated Submissions for Hearing' filed 3 June 2026;
(f) 'Sixth Submission' filed 4 June 2026;
(g) 'Sixth Written Submission' filed 19 June 2026;
(i) 'Eighth Written Submission' filed 19 June 2026;
(j) 'Ninth Written Submission of the Plaintiff' filed 21 June 2026;
(k) 'Oral & Written Submission (Hand-Up)' filed 22 June 2026;
(l) 'Eleventh Written Submission of the Plaintiff' filed 26 June
2026;
(m) 'Twelfth Written Submission' filed 27 June 2026;
(n) 'Thirteenth Written Submission (Consolidated)' filed 4 July
2026;
(o) 'Fourteenth Written Submission' filed 5 July 2026;
(p) 'Fifteenth Written Submission of the Plaintiff' filed 16 August
2026;
(q) 'Written Submission No. 16' filed 21 August 2026;
(r) 'WS16 – Written Submissions of the exparte Applicant' filed
22 August 2026;
4 Nicholas Ni Kok Chin [2026] WASC 157.
[2026] WASC 369
GETHING J
Page 6
(s) 'MUCC Consideration Notification', handed up at the hearing
on 27 August 2026;
(t) 'Oral Script for Justice Gething', handed up at the hearing on
27 August 2026;
(u) '17th Written Submissions', handed up at the hearing on
27 August 2026; and
(v) 'Contingent WS16', handed up at the hearing on 27 August
2026.
5 I have read each set of submissions. They do not raise any
argument relevant to the grant of leave to commence the Proposed
Proceedings which has not already been considered and rejected by me
in the February Decision, March Decision or May Decision. Nor did
his oral submissions. The foundational legal premise of the Proposed
Proceedings is that Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 52 creates a
'statutory implied easement'. As I set out in the May Decision ([9]), it
does not.
6 At points in the documents I have set out at [4], and in oral
argument, the Applicant asserts that I have made errors in one of my
earlier decisions. The appropriate forum for determination of that issue
is by way of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, not a request, in effect,
for me to reconsider the issue.
7 I find that there is no prima facie ground for the Proposed
Proceedings for the purposes of VPRA s 6(5). Therefore I must dismiss
the application.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of
the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
CC
Associate to the Hon Justice Gething
1 SEPTEMBER 2026