WHITBY GAZETTE OF JUSTICE MURRY ORDER AGAINST NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN ORDER IS PLAINLY WRONG IN LAW

WHITBY GAZETTE IS PLAINLY WRONG IN LAW AND SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED

From: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin, 387 Alexander Drive, Dianella WA 6059
Email: nnchinatv@gmail.com
To: Principal Registrar, Supreme Court of Western Australia
CC: Chief Justice of Western Australia; Chief Magistrate of Western Australia; Principal Registrar, District Court of Western Australia

Subject: Whitby Gazette orders are misconstrued as a blanket bar and should not be followed

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I write to place on the public record, and to notify the Principal Registrar and the Heads of Jurisdiction, that the Government Gazette entry made by Registrar Whitby, purporting to record the orders of Murray J in The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7, has been treated in practice as if it were a blanket bar on all future proceedings by me in every Western Australian court and tribunal.

This is plainly wrong in law.

1. Murray J’s orders are not a blanket prohibition

Murray J was careful to confine his orders to the 23 past proceedings then under his supervision. His Honour expressly recognised that:

• (a) The right to commence or defend proceedings is a fundamental right in a free society.
• (b) The court must be “astute to ensure that it does not prevent a litigant from pursuing a claim that may have legal merit”.
• (c) Any restriction operates through the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (VPRA), which requires a case‑by‑case assessment under s 4 and s 6, not a permanent, global ban.

Despite this, the Whitby Gazette has been read and applied as if it were a permanent, universal prohibition under s 4(1)(d) VPRA, barring me from instituting any future proceedings, regardless of their merits. That construction contradicts both the text and the spirit of Murray J’s reasons.

2. Only courts can bar me; Landgate and AFCA cannot

Landgate (Commissioner of Titles) and AFCA are not courts. Their decisions:

• (a) Do not constitute orders under s 4(1) VPRA.
• (b) Do not bar me from commencing proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction.
• (c) Have themselves repeatedly deferred to “a court determination” on the merits of my claims concerning the stolen s 52 PLA implied quasi‑easement (S.52PLAISQE) and the converted fixtures.

It is therefore incorrect and misleading to treat Landgate or AFCA as if they had somehow exhausted or extinguished my rights. They have not. Only a court, acting under the VPRA and according to law, can restrict my access to proceedings.

3. Misapplication of the Whitby Gazette in later courts

In subsequent matters—including:

• (a) Chin v Nguyen (Ward SM, MC/PER/CIV/GCLM 10010/2021);
• (b) Chin v Nguyen & Anor (DCJ Tovey, CIVO 96 of 2023); and
• (c) my later application before Lemonis J in CIV 1973 of 2024,

the Whitby Gazette has been treated as if it conclusively established a standing, universal bar under s 4(1)(d), without first applying the threshold tests in s 4(1)(a)–(b) and the safeguards in s 6(1), (3), (5) VPRA to the particular proceeding in question.

This approach:

• (a) Ignores the distinction between past “vexatious” proceedings and new, unrelated proceedings raising fresh causes of action (for example, the theft and plunder of S.52PLAISQE and converted fixtures in 2016).
• (b) Treats the Gazette as if it were a self‑executing, permanent ban, rather than a record of orders that must still be applied consistently with the Act and with Murray J’s own caution against blanket orders.
• (c) Risks depriving me of my human right to seek a judicial determination of serious property and trust issues that Landgate, AFCA and others have expressly left to the courts.

4. Why the Whitby Gazette should not be followed as a blanket bar

For these reasons, I respectfully contend that:

• (a) The Whitby Gazette, to the extent it is read as a blanket prohibition on all future proceedings by me, is plainly wrong in law.
• (b) It should not be followed by any court or tribunal as a substitute for the proper VPRA analysis required by ss 4 and 6.
• (c) Each new proceeding must be assessed on its own merits, with the court first determining whether the proposed proceeding is “vexatious” in the statutory sense and whether there is a prima facie ground.

I therefore ask that the Principal Registrar bring this concern to the attention of the Chief Justice, the Chief Magistrate and the District Court, and that future references to the Whitby Gazette in my matters be confined to its proper, limited scope, consistent with Murray J’s reasons and the VPRA.

I also request that this communication be placed on the court file(s) relating to my matters, so that any future judicial officer is aware that Landgate and AFCA do not bar me, and that only the courts—applying the VPRA correctly—may restrict my access to justice.

Yours faithfully,
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin
Ex‑parte plaintiff / appellant